







 Corporate Policing, Yellow 
Unionism, and Strikebreaking, 
1890–1930 
This book provides a comparative and transnational examination of the complex 
and multifaceted experiences of anti-labour mobilisation, from the bitter social 
conflicts of the pre-war period, through the epochal tremors of war and revolution, 
and the violent spasms of the 1920s and 1930s. 
It retraces the formation of an extensive market for corporate policing, privately 
contracted security and yellow unionism, as well as processes of professionalisation 
in strikebreaking activities, labour espionage and surveillance. It reconstructs
the diverse spectrum of right-wing patriotic leagues and vigilante corps which, 
in support or in competition with law enforcement agencies, sought to counter 
the dual dangers of industrial militancy and revolutionary situations. Although 
considerable research has been done on the rise of socialist parties and trade unions 
the repressive policies of their opponents have been generally left unexamined. 
This book fills this gap by reconstructing the methods and strategies used by state 
authorities and employers to counter outbreaks of labour militancy on a global 
scale. It adopts a long-term chronology that sheds light on the shocks and strains 
that marked industrial societies during their turbulent transition into mass politics 
from the bitter social conflicts of the pre-war period, through the epochal tremors 
of war and revolution, and the violent spasms of the 1920s and 1930s. 
Offering a new angle of vision to examine the violent transition to mass politics 
in industrial societies, this is of great interest to scholars of policing, unionism and 
striking in the modern era. 
Matteo Millan is associate professor of modern and contemporary history at the 
University of Padova, Italy. He worked as a postdoctoral researcher in Oxford and 
Dublin. In 2015 he obtained a major grant from the European Research Council. 
He has published extensively on Italian fascism and pre-1914 armed associations. 
Alessandro Saluppo is an ERC postdoctoral researcher at the University of Padua, 
Italy. His current research is devoted to private industrial policing, strikebreaking 
and anti-labour violence in the United Kingdom before the First World War. 
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Coercion at work, violence in politics: 
what changed between 1890 and 1930? 
 Geoff Eley 
Dimensions of violence 
The years covered by the extremely rich studies presented in this volume formed a 
vital watershed in the shifting relationship of violence to the structure and conduct 
of politics. The character and meanings of violence itself are anything but trans-
parent and straightforward. Any full and persuasive treatment would require the 
kind of elaborate conceptual work that exceeds the modest scope of these obser-
vations. Definition would proceed on multiple fronts. The first would separate 
agency from structure, distinguishing “physical assault” and the “use of physical 
force”.1 On the one hand, there is violence as the visible, tangible, directly expe-
rienced or witnessed material damage to persons or property, the actual blood, 
pain and shock, and the sensory horror or thrill of wreckage and destruction that 
such damage produces; on the other hand, there is violence as the more abstracted, 
distanced, mediated application of physical force to produce damage and harm 
elsewhere, and through it the securing of social and political objectives. 
This distinction moves from the immediacy of the particular act to the more 
complicated chain of agency involved in the designing of policy, the implement-
ing of plans, the sending of an order or the pressing of a button. It is this distancing 
effect, or displacement effect, that shapes violence as we move down the twentieth 
century. Clearly there were instances earlier, but during the last century the scale, 
speed, logistical effectiveness, applied technologies and general normativities of 
politically motivated violence become ratcheted so relentlessly higher, especially 
when perpetrated by states. One version of that story travels from the trenches of 
the First World War; another version runs from the bombing of Iraqi villages in 
1920 through the Strategic Bombing Offensive, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all the 
way down to 2003’s “Shock and Awe”. 
Equally important are the concepts of structural or systemic violence and their 
cognate proposition of symbolic violence. These further elaborate the afore-
mentioned displacement effect – the production and productivity of violence 
elsewhere, its projection and transference outside and beyond the immediately 
encountered everydayness of the practical circumstances where the particular act 
happens to land. “Structural violence” has been classically studied in its colonial 













that becomes endemic to the structural circumstances and mundane dynamics of 
the effects of a public power on its society (say, British rule in India). He sees 
violence not as an exceptional event – as something that is not “temporary, occa-
sional, even abnormal”, not an “interruption”, not “merely transitional, a birth-
mark, or a departure” and definitely not “premodern”, a trace of earlier practices, 
or a cultural formation that ought to have been superseded. Instead, Pandey argues, 
violence is “a much more general and continuous aspect of modern life”.2 
Originating with Pierre Bourdieu, symbolic violence was used by Alf Lüdtke 
in re-grounding an argument about nineteenth-century Prussian militarism in the 
social practices of policing in everyday life.3 It describes the latent and unspo-
ken, habituated or unconscious modalities of domination deeply and insidiously 
inscribed in everyday social practices and relations. It considers how generally 
distributed forms of injury or damage, like class rule, gender domination, ethno-
cultural “othering” or racism, work to ensure the “misrecognition of power rela-
tions”. It describes the foisting of modalities of perception onto subordinated 
subjects who then accommodate to the given terms of the social order, naturalise 
it and come to believe in its necessity and justice. As such unreflected normativi-
ties become reproduced, given relations of domination get secured. The governed 
participate in the justice of their own naturalised subjection. Symbolic violence 
may even be more efficacious, precisely by  grounding the social order’s legiti-
macy in this imprinting of power relations on the very practices and habits of cog-
nition of individuals.4 Another version of this radically culturalist understanding 
of the political consequences of violence – of how popular acquiescence in a form 
of rule may become naturalised under the threat of physical violence as much as 
its actuality – can be found in post-Foucauldian treatments of governmentality 
and surveillance. 
To grasp the full complexities of the violence of early twentieth-century labour 
history, these wider socio-cultural meanings will certainly be needed. In recon-
structing the cultures of conformity and coercion, order and acquiescence, incen-
tives and intimidation, whose consequences structured the management of labour 
markets and the labour process in the widely varying contexts covered by this 
volume, the socio-cultural perspectives enabled by concepts like “structural” and 
“symbolic” violence will have to be explored. In grasping the prevalence and 
efficacy of strikebreaking and vigilantism, or the two-way dynamics of workplace 
discipline and shopfloor practices, we surely will need the same. 
In what follows, though, I approach issues of violence during 1890–1930 as a 
problem for democracy in the normative sense – as a wilful political challenge to 
the functioning and legitimacy of the emergent political forms and practices of 
those years. Relevant here is that classic claim to the monopoly over the legiti-
mate use of political force seen by Max Weber as a hallmark of statehood and 
vital for the European state-making of the later-nineteenth century. I complicate 
that story by a two-step argument: first, by emphasising aspects of its uneven-
ness before 1914, especially its contested and unfinished character; second, by 
showing how the turmoil after 1918–19 threw that process of the monopolising of 












anti-labour violence forms a prime feature of the pre-1914 histories, then fascism 
supplies the framing for what follows. In a nutshell: the prevalence of political 
violence in the 1920s and 1930s signifies a breakdown in the norms and ideals of 
democracy, publicness and civility whose efficacy became cumulatively estab-
lished after the 1860s. 
Expanding civility, 1860 to 1914: violence constrained 
At the largest scale of analysis, two interconnected questions defined this terrain: 
• What were the processes, under conditions of constitutional democracy, that 
enabled the large-scale use of political violence for the purposes of sustained 
collective mobilisation aiming at democracy’s destruction? 
• What was the relationship between the forms of anti-labour violence and this 
larger context of violence at the level of the polity and the state? 
In the workplace, in labour markets, in the economy more broadly, anti-labour 
violence was constitutive for the rise of political movements demanding authori-
tarian rule and dismantling of democracy. At the same time, the precise forms 
and varying prevalence of anti-labour violence, society by society, were directly 
connected to the strength or weakness of each society’s democratising capacities. 
The political violence we associate with fascism after 1918–19 overwhelmed and 
largely subsumed the more isolable forms of action already developing before 
1914. The recourse to violence after 1918 bespoke a political logic, whether 
intended or entailed, that abrogated those political rules whose purpose was to 
contain the use of physical force, while organising and enabling the pluralist
cohabiting of differences. 
I understand fascism in the early twentieth century as the recourse to organised 
collective violence in the midst of an extreme polarisation of differences heading 
for a general crisis of society. And here is a really stark contrast. The recourse 
to political violence – to repressive and coercive forms of rule, to guns rather 
than words, to beating up your opponents rather than denouncing them from the 
speaker’s platform – was ultimately what distinguished fascism in Germany, Italy 
and elsewhere from earlier forms of right-wing or conservative politics. But at 
the same time, violence was not exactly absent from the conduct of politics before 
1914, least of all in the countless settings of labour conflict across the various 
countries of capitalist industrialisation. So we need to begin by drawing some 
distinctions. 
With the exception of Britain, where labour stayed far longer inside an older 
liberal framework of politics, ensuring that specifically socialist politics remained 
far more locally contained, Europe had three distinct geographies of working-
class politics before 1914:5 
• One was what I have called the central and northern European Social Demo-


















associated trade unionism dominated labour movements from the 1890s. It 
encompassed those parties attaining more than 25 per cent of the popular vote 
in democratic elections before 1914. 
• A second pattern described the western Mediterranean, where anarcho-
syndicalism weakened the socialist parties and rendered working-class poli-
tics more volatile, devolving it onto locally based chambers of labour, where 
the functions of trade unions and parties were practically mixed. 
• The final pattern occurred in the broad eastern border zone of Russia, the 
Balkans, and much of Austria-Hungary, where weak and uneven industriali-
sation combined with repressive political systems to impede socialist parties 
or force them underground. 
At the level of states and their national polities, liberal constitutionalism
was just as crucial as the extent of industrialisation in shaping the initial rise
of socialist parties and labour movements. Where industry made little prog-
ress, so too did socialism. But industrialisation was not an infallible guide to
socialism’s strength: Bulgaria, East Galicia, Finland, Norway and Sweden all
showed socialist parties winning major rural support, as did many localities
and regions elsewhere. Legality, a functioning parliamentary constitution and
a more democratic franchise could be as enabling for socialist emergence as
growth of industry. Conversely, a repressive polity (e.g. Russian autocracy)
held back the political expression of popular militancy, just as a discriminatory
franchise in heavily industrialised Belgium successfully depressed the Belgian
socialists’ electoral performance. If the polity’s early liberalisation could com-
pensate for the absence of capitalist industry, then in the more industrial econo-
mies an absence of liberalisation might still hamper a labour movement’s rise.
The “constitutional factor” could either anticipate or impede the consequences
of industrial class formation.
Any robust liberal constitutionalism required a liberal system of the rule of 
law. Under the European constitutional settlements of 1867–71, a functioning 
parliamentary constitution usually secured the classic civil freedoms, including 
rights of association and assembly, plus the legalising of trade unions. Unsurpris-
ingly, the western Mediterranean pattern of weaker socialist parties was accompa-
nied not only by a thinness of parliamentary culture but also by far greater police 
repression and anti-labour violence. Indeed, with its preference for direct action 
and community-based militancy, syndicalism directly responded to the vicious-
ness of policing, deployment of troops and the failure of a parliamentary socialist 
party to bring government under constraint of law. This was precisely the Italian 
dialectic during 1901–03: while Giolitti walked his tightrope of legislative nego-
tiations with parliamentary socialists, the police were killing strikers in a series of 
“proletarian massacres” that claimed 40 deaths between June 1901 and Septem-
ber 1904. Beneath this comparison of states and whole societies were examples 
galore of police repression, vigilantism and employer-initiated violence in central 
and northern Europe too – inside particular strikes, particular plants and particular 







1911–13. Drawing out such locally bounded or situated dynamics is precisely the 
great virtue of the papers collected in this volume. 
The difference between the violence of the fascists and these pre-1914 forms 
must be sharply marked. Violence and use of force were nothing new. The state’s 
coercive resources were always deployed against certain kinds of opposition, 
whether by routine application of the law for protection of persons and property 
or for maintaining law and order, or by curtailment of civil liberties under pres-
sure of national emergency, as in wartime or a general strike. Under constitu-
tional governance between the 1860s and 1914, a wide spectrum of restrictive 
and authoritarian systems of public policing were embraced, whether through 
army, gendarmerie, citizens’ militia or uniformed police as such. Coercion in that 
sense was an entirely typical dimension of legally constituted governing author-
ity, whatever the political complexion. Use of force supplied predictable sanction 
against actions transgressing allowable boundaries of social and political dissent. 
Privately organised coercion was likewise commonly found in societies under-
going capitalist economic development in the later nineteenth century: strike-
breaking, vigilantism, economic paternalism and servile labour, especially in 
the countryside, were all entirely plentiful. The balance of public jurisdiction 
and such privately organised coercion, society by society, varied in extremely 
complex and subtle ways, including of course the forms and extent of practical 
collusion and fully articulated integration, whether clandestine, tacitly accepted 
or openly acknowledged. How this distribution of coercive tasks and practices 
worked to shape the boundaries of public order could be very complex: the large-
scale autonomies of neo-seigneurial jurisdiction on big landed estates and the 
capitalist prerogatives of spatially isolated extractive industry, single-industry 
settlements, and company towns are only the most obvious instances of how that 
worked. As a number of the essays show, ships were another instance of the same 
kind. Nor did the incidence of privately deployed coercion necessarily correlate 
with strength of constitutional government or liberal systems of the rule of law. 
Such violence was far more prevalent, even endemic, in the United States before 
1914 than in Germany, for example. To take a single notorious case: in the Lud-
low Massacre of April 1914, a combined assault by National Guard and company 
enforcers massacred some two dozen people, including women and children, with 
aggregate death toll of nearly 200 lives during the strike. Nothing remotely like 
this happened during the German industrialisation before 1914.6 In July 1917, the 
Phelps Dodge Corporation used cattle cars to deport 1,300 striking copper miners 
and supporters from the company town of Bisbee, Arizona, to the New Mexico 
desert 200 miles away, aided by 2,000 deputised vigilantes commanded by the 
county sheriff. It was preceded by a smaller deportation from the company town 
of Jerome. 
In Germany pre-1914, such privately organised coercion was becoming ever-
more visibly reined in. Armed force was gathered steadily inside the state’s 
jurisdictional realm. Beginning in the 1860s, state-managed repression became 
itself ever-more strictly subject to constitutional limitations, which by the 1900s 






   
 
xx Foreword 
precedents, fascist violence after 1918–19 was something shockingly new. Bis-
marck’s Anti-Socialist Law of 1878–90; the harassment, deporting and imprison-
ment of left-wing activists; and the unleashing of police or troops against strikers 
and demonstrators – all these were one thing. But terror, first by means of a mili-
tarist and violently confrontational style of politics (1919–23, 1928–33), then as a 
principle of state organisation (post-1933), was quite another. 
Violence returns, 1914–23: fascism as breach 
The years 1914–23 were a crucial watershed. The disaster befalling the German 
right in 1918 – the doubled trauma of military defeat and popular-democratic 
revolution – viciously radicalised its emotional and ideological temper. During 
the civil-war-like disorders prevailing for most of the years 1918–23, there was 
ample scope for the resentful militancy of the returning “front soldiers” and their 
civilian compatriots, simultaneously elevated and brutalised by the wartime, 
morally enraged by the dissolution of familiar values they saw accompanying 
the revolutionary circumstances of the new Republic’s foundation. The para-
military formations coalescing across Germany from the end of 1918 became the 
practical medium for mobilising and deploying this counter-revolutionary anger, 
together with the völkisch and anti-Semitic associations mushrooming during the 
same time. 
Much of that momentum persisted into the Weimar Republic’s years of so-called 
relative stability between 1923–24 and 1928–29. Its instituted forms then contrib-
uted vitally to the full-scale national-political arrival of the Nazi Party between 
the elections of 1928 and 1930. This passage from the counter-revolutionary con-
fusion of 1918–23 to the growing concentration of right-wing energies around the 
Nazis during the Republic’s demise needs far more detailed explication. But the 
new willingness to use political violence against one’s opponents was impossible 
to ignore. Moreover, hatred of the left, meaning not only communists and Social 
Democrats but also pacifists, feminists, left liberals and any other defenders of 
democracy, supplied vital impetus behind this right-wing political violence. 
To be blunt:  killing socialists rather than just arguing with them, or at most
legally and practically restricting their rights, was the most radical of depar-
tures. The brutality of this break cannot be overstated. Anti-socialism as such
certainly defined the German right pre-1914. That earlier history embraced not 
only recourse to “exceptional legislation” on the model of the 1878 Anti-Socialist 
Law and other forms of legal harassment, but also far wider strategies aimed at 
suppressing socialism and other popular radicalisms, while neutralising the labour 
movement and generally resisting the spread of democracy, or at least regulating 
its encroachments and containing its effects. Those strategies encompassed many 
“normal” phenomena endemic to the Wilhelmine polity after the 1890s, includ-
ing policing and use of the judiciary; routine discrimination via the state appara-
tuses; strategically conceived welfare legislation and other social reforms aimed 
at dividing some categories of workers from others; private systems of company-
based welfare; ambitious schemes of social discipline targeting young people; and 

















systematic propaganda offensives among the working class. This German record 
was entirely consistent with responses to socialism elsewhere. 
But this anti-socialist politics occurred within normative legal and political
frameworks bringing it gradually under constraint: the liberal-constitutionalist
polities generalised across Europe after the 1860s, which rendered arbitrary
authority increasingly accountable to elected government, parliamentary over-
sight, and liberal protocols of law. As the European socialist parties gained in
electoral strength and parliamentary influence from the 1890s they brought
repressive policing under further review and restraint. Although during the
1900s fresh polarisation could be seen gathering pace, this incremental bolster-
ing of constitutional politics enabled political life in much of Europe to settle
on the given parliamentary terrain. So, it was this political culture of relative
civility that the massive disruption of the First World War so badly disordered.
This was the practical ground of functioning pluralism that fascists wanted to
tear apart.
In Germany by the early 1900s, precisely such a parliamentary stabilisation had 
been setting in. In the 1890s, some parts of the German right continued hankering 
after the chimera of a coup d’état against the 1871 Constitution, a so-called Sta-
atsstreich, involving confrontation with the Reichstag, abolishing the democratic 
franchise, returning to monarchical authority and if necessary, the imposing of 
martial law. In fact, the government did attempt a number of times to replicate the 
former Anti-Socialist Law by severely restricting civil liberties, as in the Revolu-
tion Bill (Umsturzvorlage) in 1895 and a proposal to revise the Prussian Law of 
Association (so-called Little Anti-Socialist Law) in 1896–97. But each of those 
initiatives failed, defeated by parliamentary majorities. While  Staatsstreich talk 
persisted, climaxing during spring-summer 1897, government became decisively 
stabilised and plans were shelved. It was only amid the right’s parliamentary iso-
lation after the disastrous 1912 elections that some circles returned to the idea of 
revising the Constitution, this time by killing the democratic franchise with ver-
sions of anti-democratic “corporative representation”. 
But from the later-1890s until this resurgence of right-wing designs against 
the Constitution in 1912–14, public life settled on constitutionalist ground. Poli-
tics was now conducted by rules and procedures, by argument and persuasion, 
by observing the practical norms of pluralist competition and orderly exchange. 
Socialists now fought on their own terms – namely, by leaflets and speeches, agi-
tation and propaganda and patriotic mobilisation of one’s own supporters, rather 
than straightforward repression. In this emergent repertoire of anti-socialist prac-
tice, in other words, the coming political violence of post-1918 had no place. 
Wilhelmine anti-socialism always stopped short of the violence so commonplace 
in the years 1918–23 and 1928–34. Reeling from shocks of defeat and revolution, 
sneering at the 1919 republican Constitution, enraged by apparent disrespect for 
property and privilege, the left’s opponents in this later context turned to a new 
kind of extreme. But before 1914 the constitutionalist norms stayed solidly intact. 
So to repeat: it was this practical ground of political civility that the post-1918 










Amid the polarised climate of collapsing authority and working-class insur-
gency, the abrupt loss of an earlier consensual framework in autumn 1918 called 
the fascist option to the stage. When that happened, the left’s  strength was initially 
the driver. The right’s parliamentary weakness and unaccustomed severance from 
access to government opened a space for more violent alternatives. For a while – 
before 1914 in the imperfect but democratically elected parliamentary arena of the 
Empire, after 1918 in the full-scale parliamentary democracy of the new Republic – 
the polarising of options still worked potentially to the left’s benefit, so long as 
politics stayed ordered along electoral and constitutionalist lines. Even as the 
original republican consensus eroded and an emergent centre-right seemed possi-
bly on the cards in 1924–28, the Weimar Constitution’s pluralist logic held steady, 
inside practical scenarios of compromise and negotiation. Albeit equivocally and 
at the cost of internal splits, the DNVP (German National People’s Party) was 
drawn briefly into that process, joining governments first in 1924–25 and again in 
1927–28, much to the rage of its intransigent anti-republican wing. 
In a severe crisis, this syndrome – breadth of right-wing hostility against a
polity tilted structurally to the left – could become a source of acute danger.
That dynamic was indeed repeatedly the trigger for right-wing political violence. 
That occurred initially in 1918–23, when working-class insurgency threatened 
to exceed the parliamentary confines of the given revolutionary changes. It hap-
pened still more dangerously in 1930–33, when the welfare state, the defensive 
recalcitrance of trade unions, and the mobilised popular resources of SPD (Social 
Democratic Party of Germany) and (KPD) Communist Party of Germany seemed 
to be impeding Germany’s economic and political recovery as the right had con-
ceived it. The right proved increasingly willing to turn its back on democracy 
and embrace extra-parliamentary solutions once politics had reached an impasse: 
liberal-constitutionalist governance seemed to have exhausted any remaining capac-
ity for stabilising a protracted societal crisis deteriorating apparently towards end-
less stalemate. As the most extreme version of an authoritarianism demanding to 
cut through the entanglements and immobilities of democracy,  fascism could then 
offer a credible and appealing alternative. 
Conclusion 
The micro-dynamics of anti-labour violence, across multivarious workplace,
plant-level and community-based settings, are always linked to larger political 
histories shaped by polity and state, whether we approach that connectedness 
via constitutional questions and forms of law or via the socio-cultural effects of 
structural and symbolic violence. And here, the post-1918 rupture was crucial: 
combined with the rise of fascism, the popular insurgencies of 1919–23 produced 
back-and-forth excesses of political violence, under circumstances tantamount to 
civil war, that overwhelmed any more isolable local forms of anti-labour violence 
of the kind prevalent before 1914. This occurred unevenly across Europe, but 
increasingly with effects that were pervasive and transcendent rather than spa-







and counter-revolutionary tumults in Germany make it equally hard to isolate 
vigilantism, workplace intimidation and other forms of anti-labour violence in the 
manner of the pre-1914 years. After a lull in the mid-1920s, this German cycle 
resumed with a vengeance after 1928–29. 
Pre-1914, things were much different. If, after 1918, anti-labour violence was 
subsumed into the fascist-inspired political violence in society at large, then 
before 1914 the widening political civility made anti-labour violence more isol-
able and subject to constraint. Here Germany is especially interesting. From the 
late-1890s the German right vacated its ideal program of constitutional revision 
and anti-socialist laws, in a pragmatics of adjustment that became strengthened 
after 1903–04, when an SPD electoral landslide joined major strikes in throwing 
big employers onto the defensive. That close repressive nexus following the Paris 
Commune between government and a broad propertied front of bourgeois society, 
at its peak in the 1880s and early-1890s, became severed. In severe crises (e.g. 
the 1905 Ruhr coal strike), the state backed big employers with its policing, but 
explicitly ruled out any new Anti-Socialist Law or equivalent exceptional legis-
lation. When the SPD and the Catholic Centre Party raised the cry of the “The 
Constitution in Danger” in the 1898 elections, both government and right-wing 
parties hastily withdrew. 
Under ensuing conditions of the right’s political weakness in the early 1900s 
Social Democrats had to be fought on their own terms – not with police measures 
and martial law, but at the ballot box, on the hustings, with the propaganda leaflet 
and via agitational campaigns, i.e. with words and paper, rather than truncheons, 
bullets and swords. Biggest impetus came from the SPD’s post-1890 electoral 
advance, the post-1895 explosion of mass unionism, and the 1896 completion of 
the Code of Civil Law. There followed endless guerrilla skirmishing through the 
courts of law, whose signs historians invariably misread. Thus, in his close analy-
sis of trade unions and the law, in an exhaustive empirical study of court records, 
Klaus Saul delivered an imposing indictment of class justice, state partisanship 
and judicial repression during the early 1900s. But on his own evidence, judicial 
rulings constantly pushed government into having to devise fresh expedients of 
legal chicanery in order to continue harassing the unions, and these years were 
certainly a time when the rule of law steadily constrained the latitude for arbitrary 
intervention against labour and civil rights.7 
Under all of this pressure, the biggest employers fell back onto self-help,
developing an impressive repertoire of tactics, including new shop-floor disci-
pline; black lists of militants, agitators, union-joiners and other “trouble-makers”; 
labour exchanges; compulsory welfare schemes; company housing; nationally 
centralised employers’ associations; company unions. Several things stand out in 
this new system of company-based authority: 
• It was different from the older  Herr-im-Hause system associated with the 
Saar heavy industrialist Carl Ferdinand von Stumm in the Bismarckian era, 
or the aristocratic mining estates of the Pless family in Upper Silesia, where 















• The new company paternalism was only feasible under benefit of the most 
advanced capitalist industry, including the highest levels of monopoly con-
centration, supplying the necessary resources of coordination and scale. 
• The new system was common across the highly concentrated sectors, regard-
less of political affiliations. Indeed, it was Siemens, a self-consciously liberal 
employer in the more dynamic electro-technical sector with strong links to 
left liberalism, that pioneered the aggressively confrontational techniques of 
company or “yellow” unionism in a bitterly fought battle with the SPD Free 
Union in 1905. 
• Finally, the political complement to the self-help strategy of company unions 
was the drive for an anti-democratic realignment of the so-called “bourgeois 
parties”, a goal borne most clearly by the Imperial League Against Social 
Democracy launched in 1904. There was little consensus over how this might 
unfold, however, and it was only after 1910 that a strategy cohered. 
These specific modalities of isolable and contained anti-labour violence were 
structured by those processes of political stabilisation inside parliamentary and 
electoral norms, which from the late-1890s steadily ordered violence in the polity 
at large. One vital dimension was a new practical ground of political civility. This 
was never entirely settled, sufficient or finished. And 1913–14 brought renewed 
signs that it might be breaking down – in renewed confrontational violence in 
strikes and other labour disputes, in growth of street protests and disorders, in 
extensions of policing and armed intervention, and in the radicalising of right-
wing politics towards a possible coup. But the true rupture – the violent breach 
from those developing norms of civility – came in 1918–19. 
In Die Geächteten (The Outlaws), published at the outset of this crisis in 1930 
as a fictionalised memoir of his anti-Bolshevik exploits as a teenager in a Frei-
korps unit in the Baltic in 1919, Ernst von Salomon captured this new fascist 
sensibility: 
We ran over fields of snow and stormed into the forests. We fired into sur-
prised crowds and we raged, we shot and hunted. We chased the Latvians like 
rabbits over the fields, we burnt every house and destroyed every bridge and 
every telegraph mast. We flung the bodies into fountains and threw hand gre-
nades on top. We slaughtered whoever fell into our hands; we burned what-
ever would catch fire. . . . There were no human feelings left in our hearts. . . . 
A giant smoke trail marked our path. We had set fire to the stake where we 
burnt. . . . the bourgeois tablets, the laws and values of the civilized world.8
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 1  Introduction 
Strikebreaking and industrial 
vigilantism as a historical problem*
 Matteo Millan and  Alessandro Saluppo 
American historian Warren B. Catlin wrote in 1926, 
If it be true that the history of nations has been too largely taken up with war-
fare and the remembrance of these struggles has served to perpetuate animos-
ity from generation to generation, doubtless the same might be said to have 
been the effect of the prominence given to strikes, lockouts, and boycotts in 
the popular discussion of labor activities.1 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Europe, the United States and 
large areas of the globe experienced labour unrest and multiple strike waves at an 
unprecedented pace and intensity, some of which developed a quasi-revolutionary 
momentum. From the bitter conflicts of the pre-war period, through the epochal 
tremors of war and revolution, to the violent spasms of the 1920s and 1930s, a 
sense of impending cataclysm, symbiotically associated with fears of revolution-
ary upheaval and forebodings of social anarchy, ceaselessly haunted those who 
had assumed the role of guardians of the established order. While much work has 
been devoted to socialist parties and revolutionary organisations, the multifaceted 
experiences of anti-labour mobilisation and privately organised coercion have not 
received the same degree of scholarly attention. 
As Martin Conway explains in his contribution to this volume, several reasons 
concur to explain this neglect. There is, first of all, a material problem due to the 
lack or scarcity of sources. Actors, ranging from employer associations to corpo-
rate security and commercial strikebreaking services, have tended to be very pro-
tective of their archives or have left few papers behind. This paucity of records, 
however, is in significant contrast to the important role these actors played in 
social conflicts. Many years ago, Charles Tilly invited historians to consider the 
plurality of actors involved in strikes: not only workers and employers, but also 
local and regional authorities, bystanders and civil and military powers, includ-
ing “private police”, since it is “the relationship of workers to other groups [that] 
determines the frequency and character of collective conflict”.2 Tilly’s invita-
tion has not always been taken up in the field of labour history. As it turns out, 
historians have generally explained the repressive strategies of both employers 
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organisations. This also implies a sort of automatic identification of those workers 
organised by left-wing trade unions, parties and associations with the  whole of the 
working class. As a consequence, independent and company unions, non-socialist 
associations as well as strikebreakers and “scabs” were usually out of the general 
picture or, at best, received little attention. 
Studies on the topic have also been limited by the fact that “the boundaries of 
the nation-state” often turned into “an analytical cage”.3 In spite of global inter-
dependencies and the transferability of social-political experiences that increas-
ingly bound the fate of industrialised and industrialising countries, research on 
the methods by which the business and propertied classes attempted to solve the 
“labour problem” has relied on accounts that have rarely broken through the per-
meability of national boundaries.4 The result has often been that national sin-
gularities were taken for granted and even exalted, as in the exemplary case of 
the supposed authoritarian paternalism characteristic of the equally suppositious 
backward, feudal-like attitudes of German employers.5 In contrast, we hope that 
the comparative angle adopted here may contribute to defusing such apparent 
national particularities and to outlining how and to what extent coordinated anti-
union and anti-strike strategies constituted a common repertoire of action across 
different countries. 
Analyses of industrial conflict have, furthermore, tended to focus on the cores 
of capitalist development, deemed to be comprehensive and paradigmatic exam-
ples, with the consequent marginalisation and downplaying of the structural ten-
sions between work, technology and authority in other parts of the world besides 
North America and Europe. At the same time, the narrative field has too often 
been restricted to specific industrial sectors or individual companies. This means 
that, with few exceptions, little attention has been paid to the complex realities 
of labour disciplining in imperial and trans-imperial settings as well as in sec-
ondary markets and industries. At its worst, research has depicted the develop-
ment of industrial vigilantism, commercial strikebreaking and labour espionage 
as a uniquely American experience. To be sure, some of the anti-labour strategies 
and weapons used by employers and managers in the industrial heartlands of the 
United States still display “archetypical features”.6 Yet, this does not presuppose 
that company police systems and cases of para-policing explicitly geared towards 
counteracting strike action did not exist in Europe and the rest of the world. It 
would be sufficient to consider the extent of cross-national commonalities in the 
lexicon applied by trade unionists to anti-labour methods and weapons to refute 
the postulate of American exceptionalism. 7 
In particular, one of the characterising features usually attributed to the Ameri-
can way of dealing with strikes, namely citizen vigilance and vigilantism, has 
rarely been investigated outside the United States. Apart from “yellow union-
ism”, historiography has regularly overlooked exploration of “the labour prob-
lem” from the point of view of the public. Notably, the more or less spontaneous 
mobilisation of citizens with the aim of protecting the general welfare of the 
people from the disruptive effects of protracted labour stoppages has not received 







the slippery relationship between visions of “patriotic or responsible citizenship” 
and the rhetoric of belonging and exclusion. At the same time, this interaction has 
lured historians into the teleological categorisation of pre-war anti-socialist and 
anti-union movements as precursors of fascism.8 All these factors have converged 
into a broad underestimation of strikebreaking and yellow unionism. More impor-
tantly, these issues have rarely been considered as topics in their own right and, 
consequently, subject to very little comparison, contrast and cross-examination. 
Previous investigations into strikebreaking activities on the part of both gov-
ernments and employers in the period in question have generally been contained 
within the traditional boundaries of labour history and the history of industrial 
relations.9 In mapping out the changing relationships between labour, capital and 
the state, researchers have seldom touched upon the issue of “yellow unionism” 
or, broadly speaking, those organisations of workers – normally established and 
subsidised by employers or groups of employers – who acted against trade union 
interests and endeavours. The lack of scholarly scrutiny into these formations has 
hampered detailed sociological and sociographic research on strikebreakers and, 
in turn, deflected questions over the place of gender, race and religion into the rifts 
of class solidarity and the morose landscapes of class antagonism. 
The first goal of the following pages is to highlight the forgotten dynamics 
of “the other side of the revolutionary coin”. By bringing together scholars with 
expertise across a broad geographical and chronological range, this book consti-
tutes the first systematic attempt to understand the political, economic, social, cul-
tural and legal dimensions of strikebreaking and repressive anti-union practices 
in the decades from the 1890s to the 1930s. Adopting a comparative and transna-
tional perspective, the chapters in this volume reconstruct the diverse spectrum 
of right-wing patriotic leagues, paramilitaries, vigilantes and para-police corps, 
and the vast array of private security services that, in support of or in competition 
with law enforcement agencies, sought to counter the dual dangers of industrial 
militancy and revolutionary situations. They retrace the formation of an extensive 
market in corporate policing, privately contracted security services and yellow 
unionism, as well as processes of professionalisation in strikebreaking activities, 
labour espionage and surveillance. They also detail the emergence of transna-
tional networks and international cartels of employers that aimed to fight trade 
unionism by creating their own security apparatuses or by delegating protection 
services to third parties. The book focuses on the organisation and evolution of 
these private bodies, which attempted to make inroads into the state monopoly of 
force. In this way, the volume adds a new dimension to our understanding of the 
processes of alteration, deformation or fragmentation of public order and labour 
relations in periods of severe political and social tensions. It also offers an impor-
tant new perspective on the shocks and strains that marked industrial societies 
during their turbulent transition to mass politics. 
**** 
The rise of working-class parties, trade unions and organisations after the 
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levels. Qualitative leaps in the organisation of labour movements and the increas-
ing influence of Marxism were regularly accompanied by major outbreaks of 
social conflict, large numbers of strikes and industrial restructuring. 10 These 
largely novel challenges prompted a wide array of organised responses, from both 
state authorities and employers: the first part of this volume, therefore, is devoted 
to the various anti-union and strikebreaking strategies adopted by the preservers 
of order and property to deal with the social question. 
Most autocratic regimes of Europe were not unscathed by the mobilisation 
and organisation of workers. In the semi-absolutist tsarist empire, as Volodymyr 
Kulikov and Irina Shilnikova argue in their “Policies and practices against labour 
movement in the late Russian empire”, the state’s attitudes and policies on labour 
were persistently shaped by intense worries over social control. Unlike their coun-
terparts in Wilhelmine Germany and Habsburg Austria, the Russian governing 
classes prevented working-class organisations from gaining a foothold in political 
life and industry. Under these conditions, the development of collective work-
ers’ organisations, especially in the Stolypin years (1906–11), was systematically 
thwarted by the combined repressive action of the state and industrialists. Radi-
calised by the war, workers’ despair found an explosive outlet in the proletarian-
socialist revolution of 1917. 
At the opposite end of the continent, Spain and Portugal were also experiencing 
deep political and economic transformations, which greatly affected the estab-
lished balances. Assumpta Castillo Cañiz’s chapter, “Violence against strikers in 
the rural peripheries of the Iberian Peninsula, 1890s–1915”, explores the nature 
of anti-strike violence in three labour disputes that took place in rural areas of 
Spain and Portugal between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These 
conflicts shed light on how deep socio-economic and political transformations 
sparked violent new forms of conflict in the “double periphery” of the rural Ibe-
rian Peninsula. The consolidation of capitalism in rural areas brought with it a 
process of agricultural specialisation, the decentralisation of production and inter-
regional interlinking of transport and energy infrastructures, as well as an increase 
in the mobility of the working population. At the same time, the countryside, in 
dynamic interaction with economic mutations, began to penetrate into the political 
space, in particular through the extension of suffrage and union rights. This dual 
process showed how the rural situation was not alien to the violent contradictions 
that had already manifested themselves in industrial urban areas. In all the cases 
examined, violence against striking workers was carried out by a mixture of pub-
lic and private forces, which ranged from military and police forces to antiquated 
local private forces. The analysis raises questions about the strength of the state 
in both countries and the effectiveness of their coercive mechanisms to overcome 
new internal challenges. 
In countries where labour parties and voters had grown sufficiently to exert 
influence on government policy and legislation, state authorities acted or, at 
least professed to act, as an impartial third-party arbitrator between employers 
and employees. On the one hand, recourse to repressive and malignant measures 








services or affected strategic economic sectors. On the other hand, the extension 
of the franchise, the development of mass party politics, the huge increase in 
union membership and, more generally, mass society meant that the use of repres-
sive methods would have costly political consequences. The ability to strike a 
balance between defending order and production and protecting individual and 
collective rights became the means by which the wider population could measure 
the legitimacy and credibility of many liberal regimes. In France, in the years 
1902–06, troops were mobilised “on a very large scale” to maintain public order 
during major labour stoppages, although this was always carefully planned to 
avoid bloodshed and disparage the “honour” of the Army. 11 In Britain, progress 
in the demilitarisation of public order suffered a dramatic setback when the gov-
ernment brought in over 58,000 troops to cope with the national railway strike of 
1911. 12 In Sweden, as Erik Bengtsson demonstrates in his chapter, “The Swed-
ish labour market c. 1870–1914: a labour market regime without repression?”, 
the state was less forbearing towards the labour movement than historians have 
assumed so far. While it is highly disputable whether the liberal policy of gradual 
concessions to the working class lowered the potential for violent protest, legisla-
tive restrictions on trade unionism action continued. The 1899 Åkarp Law, for 
instance, penalised any attempt by strikers to coerce non-strikers into joining the 
strike or to prevent them from going to work and back. During the general strike 
of 1909, the government’s premeditated passiveness played an important role in 
the disastrous defeat of the labour movement, as a consequence of which mem-
bership of the Landsorganisation i Sverige plunged to 80,000 by 1912. In several 
instances, troops were ordered out to protect strikebreakers and property. Little or 
no blood, however, was spilled until the Ådalen shootings in 1931. This appar-
ently less violent nature of industrial confrontations distinguished Sweden from 
other continental countries. 
In the recently founded German Kaiserreich, the 1878 Sozialistengesetz (anti-
Socialist law) anaesthetised the labour movement for 12 years. When it lapsed, 
the growth of social-democratic organisation, fuelled by industrialisation and 
urbanisation, appeared to be unstoppable. The socialist union movement contin-
ued to be subject to political and administrative ostracism in several state legisla-
tures, judicial discrimination and police harassment until 1914.13 Nevertheless, on 
the eve of the Great War, the vigorous growth of the social democrats was such 
as to fuel projects for extra-parliamentary actions aimed at reforming the constitu-
tion.14 In Austria-Hungary, too, the state’s response to the rise of labour organisa-
tion was shaped by tensions between mere repression and the integration of the 
working classes into the political nation. In her chapter, “State authorities, munic-
ipal forces, and military intervention in the policing of strikes in Austria-Hungary, 
1890s–1914”, Claire Morelon examines the different types of state intervention 
during strikes in the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire. The increased num-
bers of social conflicts from the 1880s onwards often pushed the overstretched 
local security forces to the limits. Police forces in most towns (except the larger 
cities) were still paid by the municipality and were answerable to the mayor. Local 
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local forces were not sufficient to maintain order. Based on her examination of 
the different strategies adopted to quell strikes and the deployment of military 
unions to replace striking workers, Morelon argues that the Austrian economy 
and politics became increasingly militarised in the years immediately before the 
outbreak of the war. 
Extending from the 1870s through to the post-war years, qualitative transfor-
mations in working-class organisation, ideological orientations and policies had 
regularly summoned proportionate (and frequently disproportionate) responses 
from owners and managerial elites around the industrial world.15 As the secre-
tary of the Italian Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Trade wrote in 1912, 
“the employers’ organisations come from those of the workers. . . . These are 
two forces tied to a single life from two opposite poles, around a single fact: the 
class struggle”.16 The French economist Charles Gide invited French employ-
ers to organise themselves into strong associations in order to establish “armed 
peace” in accordance with the slogan “si vis pacem para bellum”.17 In his 1922 
essay on organised capital in the United States, American historian F.W. Hilbert 
noted that “Employers’ associations formed solely for the purpose of dealing 
collectively with labor, come into existence only after organizations of employ-
ees have become strong enough”.18 Associations, such as the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, the National Metal Trades Association, the National 
Founders Association, the National Erectors’ Association and the International 
Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers, were all formed at the end 
of the nineteenth century to protect the “open shop” from the assault of indus-
trial unionism.19 In Britain, the rise of New Unionism had similarly precipitated 
the formation of militant employer organisations and federations. The Ship-
ping Federation, established in September 1890, was specifically envisioned 
by the large shipping companies as a “permanent battle-axe” in the fight against 
the rapid growth and militancy of maritime labour. 20 In Wilhelmine Germany, the
development of employers’ organisations accelerated only at the beginning of
the twentieth century, when the rapid expansion of the trade union organisation 
prompted manufacturers to coalesce into the Hauptstelle der Deutschen Arbe-
itgeberverbände (Central Confederation of German Employers’ Associations) 
and the Verein Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände (Federation of German Employ-
ers’ Associations). The initial aims of these counter-organisations, which later 
merged to become the  Vereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (Union 
of German Employers’ Associations) were to fight trade union policies and 
oppose any outside interference in proprietorial prerogatives.21 
In France, despite some early initiatives, such as the Comité des Forges , estab-
lished as early as 1864, the small average size of enterprises probably slowed 
down the reaction of employers to the wave of labour protests that affected almost 
all regions and industries between 1900 and 1913. Certainly, initiatives such as 
the Union des industries métallurgiques et minières (1901), which involved big 
industrialists (most notably Eugène Schneider II), the Comité Central des Arma-
teurs de France (1907) and the establishment of shop keepers’ and small mer-



























1908, however, the methods of collective self-defence put in place to counteract 
strike action were mostly imitations of foreign models.23 
Also in Italy where, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 59.8 per cent of 
the population was still employed in agriculture, industrialists had to take steps 
to centralise their response to trade unionism and Giovanni Giolitti’s new-fangled 
policy of state neutrality in labour disputes. In 1910, this process culminated in 
the creation of the Confederazione Italiana dell’Industria. In rural areas, particu-
larly the Po Valley, pre-war landowners’ associations, like the  Interprovinciale
and the Confederazione Nazionale Agraria, ferociously opposed the Federation 
of agricultural labourers (Federterra) and proved especially successful in defeat-
ing strikes.24 
In Catalonia, traditional cultural and technical clubs for the promotion of eco-
nomic development, such as the Fomento Nacional de Trabajo and the Instituto 
Agrícola Catalán de San Isidro, paved the way for more antagonistic and reso-
lutely centralised employers’ associations, most notably the  Confederación Patro-
nal Española (1914), which coordinated the actions of several local employers’
organisations and made arrangements with political and military authorities to 
repress strikes and the actions of the working class. Among the more resolute 
members of the Patronal were those Catalan employers, like Eusebi Güell and 
Claudio Lopez Bru, 2nd Marquess of Comillas, who also controlled the powerful 
and long-established Catalan militia, Somatén, which took to the streets several 
times both before and after WWI in support of the police and the army against 
strikers and rioters.25 
In tsarist Russia, inspired by the national centralisation of employers’ organ-
isations in Germany, the  St. Petersburg and Moscow Societies of Factory Own-
ers were established in conjunction with the intensive unionisation following 
on from the 1905 revolution. The purpose of the organisation, according to its 
organisers, was to oppose the “unreasonable aspirations” of the workers. 26 Even 
in the Nordic countries, the growth of trade unionism convinced employers to join 
forces. In Sweden, the Landsorganisation i Sverige (Federation of Trade Unions), 
which had forged a close alliance with the  Socialdemokratiska Arbetare-Partiet
(Social Democratic Labour Party) on its inception in 1890, was confronted by 
powerful employer organisations like the  Sveriges verkstadsföreningen (Swedish 
Manufacturers’ Association), the Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (The Swedish 
Employers’ Association) and the  Centrala arbetsgivareförbundet (The Central 
Federation of Employers). In Denmark, the Danish Employers’ Confederation, 
in an impressive display of capitalist solidarity, proclaimed the 1899 lockout as a 
veritable “declaration of war”.27 During the First World War, in neutral Scandina-
vian countries the main employers’ federations of Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
drew up an agreement that established an anti-strike mutual insurance plan that 
allowed employers involved in strikes or lockouts to claim benefits of up to 80,000 
crowns per week for a maximum of five weeks.28 The counter-mobilisation of 
capital was a truly global phenomenon. In Australia, employers’ federations were 
established or reactivated in response to the arbitration legislation of 1901.29 In 
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least until 1905, the first national federation of employers was founded in 1902.30 
In Argentina, too, at the end of the nineteenth century bodies of employers began 
to federate to resist unionism and force the state authorities into enforcing more 
repressive policies.31 
An interesting aspect of the mushrooming of employers’ associations through-
out the world was their transnational nature. Remarkably, this period of history 
marked a distinctive phase of international cooperation among anti-labour organ-
isations. This is not so obvious, as it implied that employers were ready to set 
aside patriotic interests and to refrain from taking competitive advantage over 
their global competitors. In other words, the social enemy became an acceptable 
common foe to the extent that the threat of it could override conflicting national 
interests and foster forms of capitalist solidarity. In his chapter, “Employers of 
the world, unite!: the transnational mobilisation of industrialists around World 
War I”, Pierre Eichenberger traces the origins of the International Organisation of 
Industrial Employers (IOIE). Faced with the formation of international coalitions 
of labour and socialist parties, employers’ organisations had, since the early years 
of the twentieth century, supported consultations, partnerships and the coordina-
tion of resources to deal with the “labour problem” at home and abroad. In the 
convulsive post-war years these desires for international solidarity among pro-
ducers gave rise to the IOIE. The scope of this body, founded in 1920, shortly after 
the Washington Treaty, was to represent and defend the interests of employers’
organisations in the governing body and at the general conferences of the Interna-
tional Labour Office. The IOIE, whose early membership included the diplomati-
cally isolated Germany and Austria, was the only organisation of its kind in the 
interwar period. 
As a result of unique economic and logistical characteristics, transnational
cooperation among employers and the coordination of strikebreaking strategies 
were conspicuous in the maritime sector. 32 Shipowners had long recognised the 
high degree of global interdependence in the maritime industry, which meant 
that the disruption of labour in one seaport inexorably reverberated in others. 
These conditions of vulnerability had been spectacularly proven by the cluster of 
maritime strikes that had cyclically swept through the Atlantic ports from 1889 
onwards. Predictably enough, the shipowners were among the prime proponents 
and movers of the international employers’ associations. In 1909, an international 
cartel of shipowners’ federations, which included the  Shipping Federation, the 
Federation Maritime d’Anvers, the Sveriges Redareforening, the Dampfskibsree-
derei Foreningen, the Zentralverein Deutscher Rheder and the Nederlandsche 
Reedersvereentging, established the International Shipping Federation (ISF). The 
principal scope of this body was to fight the trade union organisation and to break 
strikes, but its development was halted by the outbreak of war. 33 In the shipping 
industry, however, high levels of conflict were ingrained. By 1929, the great ports 
on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States still displayed “the same cha-
otic and tragic spectacle” as in the past.34 
Institutional responses from governments, firms and business organisations 










The employers’ need to maintain production, protect company property and deny 
the right of collective bargaining created a profitable market for commercial anti-
union activities. In light of this, the second section of the volume is devoted to a 
multifaceted analysis of various strikebreaking tactics and practices, ranging from 
the recruitment of blacklegs along maritime routes to innovative forms of coop-
eration between state and private actors. 
The huge disparity between the supply and demand of labour had given ship-
owners across the world considerable power in resisting union pressure to run 
a closed shop and enact protective legislation for seafarers. In those days of 
expanding global interconnectedness and transnational alliances in both capital 
and labour, class struggle transcended the confines of the nation state, power-
fully intersecting with ethnic and religious identities. Drawing on research into 
the Messageries Maritimes, Charles Bégué Fawell demonstrated how France’s 
shipping lines outmanoeuvred workers by taking advantage of the interstices 
between imperial governance and the exchange of global labour. The success of 
the shipowners and the preservation of harmonious labour relations at sea relied 
on a variety of anti-labour weapons and tactics, including the systemic turnover 
of the workforce and the manipulation of racial cleavages. As Prerna Agarwal 
shows in her chapter, “In the name of constitutionalism and Islam: the murky 
world of labour politics in Calcutta’s docklands”, such  divide et impera strategies 
were common practices in imperial spaces for a long time. Agarwal’s contribution 
describes how a powerful coalition of political, business and criminal interests 
was behind the formation of the “black-flag” Calcutta Dockers’ Union (CDU). 
The organisation was expressly designated to countermand red propaganda in the 
port of Calcutta. When the  Calcutta Port and Dock Workers’ Union (CPDWU), 
affiliated to the Communist Party of India, was made illegal after the strike of 
1934, shipping companies instantly recognised the CDU as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative. 
The maritime sector is a paradigmatic example of how strikebreaking dynam-
ics worked. Nevertheless, as many chapters in this volume show, a basic law of 
strikebreaking applying to a wide array of sectors is identifiable: work replace-
ment was more successful wherever workers could be easily replaced, namely 
in those sectors that required little or no skill from the workforce. Wherever 
unskilled workers predominated, a strike could only be won by mobilising the 
entire workforce and preventing the arrival of replacement workers. This posed 
huge challenges and required tremendous organisational efforts by union leaders. 
In very few situations was this possible, and it was often at a cost of rocketing 
tensions and extremely bitter confrontations, as clearly shown by events in the 
ports of Europe. Another paradigmatic case is that of the day labourers in Italy’s 
Po Valley. There, socialist labour leaders were able to organise several thousands 
of unskilled workers in a vast network of unions, co-operatives and associations, 
as well as by exerting social pressure and employing coercive methods.35 
It is no surprise, then, that in many trades that had originally relied on a skilled 
workforce, employers made significant efforts to increase productivity and 
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and other performance-based compensation schemes. The introduction of new 
organisational and technological systems magnified fears of displacement and 
unemployment, in particular among craftsmen. The establishment of temporary 
devices to stabilise employment by limiting the maximum output of the machines 
or regulating the way they were used proved unworkable in the long run. The 
reconfiguration of production and manufacturing processes gave employers 
an additional advantage against unions, as it significantly facilitated use of the 
“most formidable” anti-strike weapon: the recruitment of blacklegs.36 Thanasis 
Betas, in his “Cairo, Athens, Salonica: strikebreaking and anti-labour practices of 
employers and the state in the early twentieth-century cigarette industry”, shows 
that processes of labour casualisation and subcontracting also encompassed the 
peripheries of capitalist development. In the tobacco industries, the decision of 
Greek manufacturers to replace manual with machine production led to violent 
struggles not only between employers and employees, but also between skilled 
and unskilled female and juvenile labour. The sabotaging, breaking or disabling 
of casing machines or revolving steam boxes by workers was regularly met with 
severe police repression. 
Anti-labour practices certainly benefitted from increased cross-border labour 
mobility and large emigration flows. Employers refusing to meet unions’ 
demands for better wages, improved employment conditions or simply recogni-
tion could secure labour from other regions or countries. While the traditional 
stereotyping of foreign or immigrant workers as wage depressors or strikebreak-
ers is misleading – labour migrants in fact played a prominent role in the world-
wide surge in socialist organisation – there were numerous reported instances 
of employers importing large numbers of foreign strikebreakers during strikes. 
Portuguese workers were brought into Spanish Galicia to break a strike in the 
building sector in 1895,37 while British shipowners were able to import labour 
from Sweden and the Netherlands in the 1893 Hull Dock Strike.38 Thousands of 
Belgian workers were brought into the coal mines in the Pas-de-Calais region 
in the general strike of 1892.39 Similarly, German employers regularly exploited 
cheap labour reservoirs in neighbouring Polish, Czech and Austrian territories. 40 
In the United States, employers routinely recruited “scabs” from large reserves 
of cheap immigrant labour. It comes as no surprise, then, that the terminology 
used to define strikebreakers had obvious racist overtones. In common Italian 
parlance, labour replacements were referred to as “krumiri”, with reference to a 
north African nomadic tribe. In France, they were sometimes called “bédouine”, 
while “blacklegs” (or simply “blacks”) was the term that British workers gave to 
those workers who had taken anti-trade union action or helped break a strike.41 
In America, deplorable ethnic slurs, such as “Wop”, “Dago” or “Greaser”, desig-
nated foreign-born American workers. 42 
Of course, besides transnational cooperation and cross-national labour strate-
gies, employers devised a variety of comprehensive strikebreaking techniques. 
Importing strikebreakers from distant regions or even from abroad would have 
been insufficient. Apart from in the maritime sector, this option was subject 


















employers had first of all to find their own scabs locally. Nearly everywhere, 
employers played a direct role in hiring labour replacements in anticipation of 
or during strikes. In several cases, large companies decided to establish artificial 
unions in order to have a permanent (or insulated) reserve of labour in case of 
dispute and to undermine the solidarity and strength of the labour organisation. 
These bodies were variously known as “company unions”, “household unions”, 
“peaceful unions”, “tame unions” or “yellows”. However, while in the United 
States, the term “yellow” was largely used to describe bogus unions, in Europe it 
broadly included those unions that opposed socialist or class struggle principles 
and opportunistically promoted harmonious relations between employers and 
wage earners.43 These unions of non-unionists gave employers the possibility 
to outsource the cumbersome tasks of recruiting, supplying and even protecting 
labour replacements to third parties and thus relieve themselves of costly legal 
liabilities. Not surprisingly, they found fertile soil in industries overfed by casual 
labour and chronic underemployment. In Britain, the National Free Labour Asso-
ciation (NFLA) first served the interests of shipowners and then, from the early 
twentieth century onwards, those of the railway companies. Founded in 1893 by 
former omnibus driver and one-time union organiser William Collison, the NFLA
maintained a network of free labour exchanges, which funnelled thousands of 
unskilled or semi-skilled non-union workmen into British industry until the First 
World War. Although this strikebreaking organisation was normally involved in 
small-scale disputes, it wound up playing a decisive role in the events which led 
to the Law Lords’ momentous decision in the Taff Vale case. 44 
In France, the Jaunes, as George Mosse emphatically wrote years ago, “may 
well provide the most important example of a working class movement of the 
Right before the first word war”.45 Under the leadership of Pierre Biétry, the 
Jaunes professed anti-Marxist and anti-socialist views, asserting the organic 
notion of class collaboration (rather than class conflict) as an essential condition 
for the realisation of a rich and robust national future.46 Local branches of the 
Jaunes were subsidised financially and supported materially by industrialists and 
employer associations, who provided Biétry’s men not only with money, but also 
with guns and other weapons. In exchange, the Jaunes took on the role of action 
squads to intimidate local union leaders and provoked violent incidents. This was 
the case in 1905 when Alexander Dreux, director of the  Comptoir métallurgique 
of Longwy, subsidised Biétry and other Jaunes to intimidate the leader of the local 
socialist unions; Dreux also tried to supply the Jaunes with two cases of weapons, 
including war rifles and guns.47 
In spite of the strong nationalist character of the Jaunes, their leadership – 
and their supporters – tried to establish international alliances based on common 
anti-socialist and anti-democratic cooperation around Europe. Relationships were 
established with employers and politicians in Switzerland and Germany, and 
from there French-inspired yellow unionism spread to Austria-Hungary. 48 In the 
aftermath of the revolutionary events of 1905–06, Biétry had already attempted, 
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The tsarist empire provided a particularly favourable environment for such 
coercive endeavours. In what was the most backward of the major European pow-
ers, anti-strike forces amongst Russian nationalists had mobilised in response to 
the appearance of mass-based labour organisations and popular protest, which 
spread first in the industrial cities and then in the vast countryside at the turn 
of the century. George Gilbert’s chapter, “In Reaction to Revolution: anti-strike 
mentalities and practices in the Russian radical right, 1905–14”, investigates the 
ideas, worldviews and types of action engaged in by the Union of the Russian 
People (URP) and the other right-wing bodies that emerged across the Empire to 
“actively oppose” labour protest. Far from being compliant forces created at the 
behest of Russian governance, they were driven mostly by their own desires to 
restore Russia to what they perceived as a time of order in contrast to the contem-
porary realities of unrest and conflict. 
Besides creating complacent yellow unions, another option was to turn to pro-
fessional union busters. The hostile attitude of American employers to trade union-
ism generated a vast market for investigative, private security and commercialised 
strikebreaking services. In September 1914, over 270 detective agencies were still 
assisting employers involved in strikes and lockouts.50 This impetus towards del-
egating policing functions to private bodies and developing strikebreaking into a 
distinct occupation did not only concern America. In Europe, attempts at emulat-
ing the strikebreaking businesses of Pinkerton, Farley and Baldwin-Felts became 
a quasi-instinctive response of employers to the sudden strengthening of labour 
organisation. Amerigo Caruso, in his “We can kill striking workers without being 
prosecuted’: armed bands of strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany”, traces 
the forgotten stories of professional anti-strike organisations in Wilhelmine Ger-
many. In response to the intensification of labour militancy, the most intransigent 
sectors of German capital resolved to arm strikebreakers and recruit “anti-strike 
gunfighters”. Resort to strikebreaking provided an unanticipated pathway for 
professional criminals and men with violent reputations into legitimate indus-
trial conflicts. By taking a micro-historical approach, his chapter explores the 
activities of Friedrich Hintze’s band and the ill-famed strikebreaker agent Karl 
Katzmarek. Not infrequently, these gangs of armed strikebreakers benefitted from 
the support of conservative and right-wing nationalist politicians and the overt 
connivance of police forces. 
Sometimes, however, employers and conservative parts of the “consuming
public” did not simply rely on subcontracting to suppliers of strikebreakers
and specialised agencies. They felt they needed to intervene directly in the
repression of social unrest in order to defend private property and a social
order they perceived as being in peril. This gave rise to a variety of forms of
self-mobilisation by entrepreneurs and patriotic middle classes, which usually
acquired violent overtones. These corps usually had controversial relationships
with the legitimate holders of the monopoly of force. The third and last sec-
tion of the volume, therefore, is devoted to examination of a few case studies













In their chapter, “The wild west of employer anti-unionism: the glorification
of vigilantism and individualism in the early twentieth-century United States”, 
Vilja Hulden and Chad Pearson describe how employers’ organisations drew on 
the practices and imaginaries of frontier vigilantism to praise those employers 
and workers who took the law into their own hands for the purpose of protecting 
individual freedom, private property and freedom of contract from trade union 
policies and methods. The chapter pays special attention to the organisation and 
media strategies, which included the publicity work of the writer of Western nov-
els, Owen Winster, that were carried out by the Citizens’ Industrial Association 
of America (CIAA) in its efforts to forestall any infringement of the “open shop”. 
In southern Italy, landowners benefitted from the services of rural guards and 
other hybrid groups to enforce order, discipline and respect for their authority in 
their estates.51 According to socialist accounts, semi-criminals and young thugs 
were recruited by capitalist leaseholders of the Po Valley to provoke members 
of socialist unions and to intimidate strikers.52 French mining conglomerates 
also had recourse to illegal methods of control over workers by raising vigilante 
squads for labour espionage. For example, the Bande à Patin, a sort of private 
police, allowed the manager of the Blanzy mines, Léonce Chagot, to keep strict 
surveillance over employees, avert infiltration from left-wing unions and prevent 
strikes and conflicts within the premises of his company. The Bande collected 
information on the moral attitudes, political inclinations and religious beliefs of 
every individual employee, filling thousands of secret personal files. They also 
intimidated and threatened workers during local and national elections to ensure 
the results went in favour of the candidates supported by the company. 53 
In the midst of the processes of democratisation and its ruthless opposition, the 
issue of strikebreaking easily overstepped the boundaries of economic interest to 
erupt right at the very heart of the idea of citizenship. In 1913, the British-born 
American socialist writer, John Spargo, wrote in his critique on revolutionary 
syndicalism that “[s]o long as there exists sufficient armed force to preserve the 
essentials of public order, the middle class in every country has sufficient skill 
and power to prevent the complete paralysis of society”. Spargo cited the example 
of upper and middle class Swedish citizens who volunteered for the Frivilliga 
Skyddskåren – the Public Security Brigade – to provide water, light, transport 
and sanitation services during the Great Strike of 1909.54 The “Swedish experi-
ment” attracted considerable attention in the United Kingdom, where even the 
prestigious Times of London advocated emulating it. After the transport strikes 
of 1911, “civic strikebreaking” turned into reality when a myriad of volunteer 
organisations rose up with the intent of assisting the authorities and securing the 
maintenance of indispensable services and supplies. Preeminent among these anti-
labour bodies was the London-based Volunteer Police Force (VPF). In his chapter, 
“Vigilant citizens: the case of the Volunteer Police Force, 1911–14”, Alessan-
dro Saluppo reconstructs the origins, organisation and operations of this quasi-
military organisation, whose purpose was to protect life, liberty and property from 
strike violence. The opposition of the Liberal government to increasing vigilante 
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experience of the VPF serves to reveal the overt propensity of upper and middle 
classes to take defensive action in the years of the “Great Unrest”. 
In the post-war years, the spectre of a general strike and the fear of Soviet 
contagion spread across Europe and the wider world55 and contributed to the rise 
of new, sophisticated forms of strikebreaking. The revival of private participation 
in policing strikes and the taking to the streets against supposed revolutionary 
threats was common to both defeated and victorious countries. Already during 
the war, the US government had invited private citizens to be vigilant, which 
resulted in the mushrooming of vigilante and surveillance groups. On mining 
company properties or in isolated estates, in particular, ultra-diligent citizens, who 
believed they were defending the Constitution and enforcing law and order, took 
up arms and contributed to the repression of social disturbance.56 In Germany, in 
response to the quasi-revolutionary events of 1919, a largely spontaneous multi-
tude of “defence organisations” and auxiliary militias emerged to repress strikes 
and social upheavals and to keep public services running. Groups like the Ein-
wohnerwehren attracted hundreds of thousands of volunteers and soon acquired 
the semblance of a real paramilitary corps. Their aim was not simply to police 
industrial unrest but also to oppose Bolshevism, repress criminality and foster 
national cohesion. The main purpose of the  Technische Nothilfe (Technical Emer-
gency Corps), which was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, was to 
keep operating essential public services during major strikes, ensure a modicum 
of productive continuity and to assist authorities in case of emergency, fire, storms 
and other natural disasters.57 In Spain, the fear provoked by some huge strikes, 
especially in Catalonia, prompted brutal repression, in which criminal gangs and 
civilian militias, such as the Somatén, cooperated with military authorities and 
police forces. This sparked a vortex of violence and terrorism which became 
known as the age of pistolerismo.58 In Britain, the renewal of industrial militancy 
and the bugbear that was the Triple Alliance of dockers, railwaymen and min-
ers prompted the government to form an extensive strikebreaking apparatus. “An 
embarrass de richesse of volunteers” flooded the specialist committees of the 
Supply and Transport Organisation (STO) to lend their services and skills at each 
labour crisis. Notably, this body helped to break the General Strike of 1926. 59 In 
France, “good citizens” responded enthusiastically to government invitations to 
cooperate in the repression of social disturbances and strikes. The purpose of the 
Unions Civiques was to gather together civilian volunteers and, under the strict 
supervision and control of government authorities and prefects, keep the railways 
and public services running.60 While the mobilisation of French urban middle 
and lower middle classes largely resulted in a patriotic, anti-revolutionary effort 
which strengthened the government’s legitimacy, in Italy the situation took quite 
the opposite turn. There, the government’s reliance on “loyal citizens” to defeat 
industrial action had never been so unambiguous as it was in the immediate post-
war years. In his “From ‘State Protection’ to ‘Private Defence’: strikebreaking, 
civilian armed mobilisation and the rise of Italian fascism”, Matteo Millan analy-
ses how a combination of the government’s efforts to foster civilian cooperation 







against the “red fear” contributed to irreparably jeopardising public order in the 
country. The limited legitimacy and contradictory attitudes of the Italian ruling 
elites opened a Pandora’s box of clear anti-government attitudes and fuelled the 
emergence of a plethora of civilian militias and strikebreaking groups which ulti-
mately became a favourable breeding ground for fascist mobilisation. At the same 
time, Millan’s chapter shows how such post-war groups took inspiration and even 
legitimacy from much older forms of civilian mobilisation and points to signifi-
cant continuities across the watershed of the Great War. 
**** 
We started this introduction with historian W.B. Catlin, who, in 1926, urged his 
contemporaries to consider how not only wars and conflicts, but also “strikes, 
lockouts, and boycotts” contributed to perpetuating “animosity from generation 
to generation”. In the end, we think that Catlin was right, and for various reasons. 
What emerges from the cases presented here is that many of the social chal-
lenges which affected Europe and the wider world in the aftermath of the Great 
War had some similarities to or even found their precursors in the crucial decades 
between the 1880s and 1914. The relatively lengthy temporal focus of this book 
also allows us to map the strategies of states and employers as they sought to halt, 
or at least forestall, the advance of socialist movements. At times, overreaction to 
the “red threat” helped to escalate political and social crises and paved the way for 
the rise of fascist movements, which promised a “Third Way” between capital and 
labour. In most cases, coercive anti-labour practices gave way to strategies of cor-
porate negotiation that minimised the risks of violence and usurpation of public 
authority. Certainly, this is not to underestimate the disruptive impact of war and 
revolution or to overstretch the search for historical continuities. However, draw-
ing attention to the emergence and development of anti-labour militancy helps us 
trace the anxieties that occupied the minds of the governing classes, conservatives 
and business interests in a period marked by social turbulence, global wars and 
crises of capitalism. It is equally possible to retrace the ways in which these strat-
egies were able to pass through the epochal watershed and were driven by long-
term models based on previous experiences and shaped by enduring scripts. Many 
years ago, Charles Maier defined the corporatist agenda which characterised the 
“recasting of bourgeois Europe” after the Great War as being marked by “the 
growth of private power and the twilight of sovereignty”.61 From this volume’s 
perspective, it appears that this transfer of power was a dream which already
inhabited the minds of many employers during the Belle Époque. In this regard, 
additional research should be carried out to further investigate how industrial dis-
putes, social conflicts and processes of social democratisation were intertwined 
with state collapse, revolutionary contagion and military defeat if we are to fully 
understand the unprecedented levels of paramilitary, political and ethnic violence 
which were a feature of Europe and global empires on the eve of the Great War. 62 
These are just a few examples of why we think strikebreaking is important, and 
not just as a minor erudite detail in traditional accounts of social and labour his-
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we hope that the chapters presented here may persuade readers of the potential 
of strikebreaking as a powerful tool with which to investigate broader questions. 
In fact, we think that study of the methods deployed by employers, state authori-
ties and professional and amateur strikebreaking bodies to fight socialist political 
forces and trade unionism in the crucial decades from the 1890s to the 1930s 
has tremendous historiographical potential. We are happy that Martin Conway is 
able to illustrate some of them (along with many other things) in his conclusive 
remarks. 
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  2 Policies and practices against 
labour movement in the late 
Russian Empire 
 Volodymyr Kulikov and Irina Shilnikova 
 Introduction 
On 3 October 1913 the chief of Saint Petersburg secret police submitted a report 
to the Department of Police about the political “spirit” in the city in which he sin-
cerely acknowledged that any preventive measures against the labour movement, 
such as repression of trade unions, are useless. “The current labour movement is 
a kind of psychosis”, he explained. “In some cases, the repressions may even turn 
to be harmful, because liquidation [of the workers’ organisations] can only accel-
erate the explosion of the strike movement”.1 This note epitomises the ultimate 
result of tsarist’s labour policy: it could not seize the labour movement despite 
increasing the power of its repressive apparatus. This chapter investigates why 
practices of the government and employers against the labour movement in the 
late Russian Empire turned to be inefficient. 
The industrial boom in the Russian Empire, starting from the 1880s, brought 
economic growth and modernisation. At the same time, like other rapidly indus-
trialised countries, it was accompanied by fierce labour conflicts. Employees 
demanded higher wages, fewer working hours, better living conditions and more 
respect. Employers were upset by the instability caused by labour migration, 
as well as by the low level of productivity and lack of discipline on behalf of 
their workers. Labour conflicts often burst into violence on both sides, which 
embroiled the third side – the government. Other actors, such as the church, radi-
cal socialists, journalists and scholars, were also involved, but it was mostly the 
industrialists and the government that determined the balance of power and the 
outcome of the labour conflicts. 
Although the history of the labour movement in the Russian Empire has been 
researched in detail by historians, they paid less attention to the repressive policies 
and practices of the employers and state authorities; so, no comprehensive study 
has been written on the topic. Contemporaries studied the repressions against the 
labour movement in the context of elaborating factory legislations and tried to 
find the best solution for the so-called labour problem.2 
Soviet historians approached the topic from the perspective of the class con-
flict.3 They contributed to our knowledge about the repressive policy of the gov-
ernment, mostly presenting it in the context of the general repressive policy of 
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1960s, papers by several American and British scholars explained how the tsarist 
administration and the employers managed labour protests in Russia.5 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, interest in labour history significantly 
declined in Eastern Europe. However, a group of Russian scholars organised an 
extensive research project to study labour conflicts in the Russian Empire at the 
end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century. They collected materials 
about thousands of conflicts from 112 archives of the former Soviet Union and 
published it as a multivolume series entitled Labour Movement in Russia. 1895 – 
February of 1917. Chronicle.6 
Using the materials of these publications, a group of historians created a relation 
database of all known cases of labour conflicts in the Russian Empire from 1895 
until 1904 (7,769 records; about 4,757 strikes).7 The results of the analysis of this 
database were presented in several publications.8 This study also relies on the 
database, focusing on the empirical evidence on practices against the strikes. It is 
a combination of a quantitative analysis of practices against the labour movement 
with a qualitative analysis of anti-strike and anti-union policy. 
This chapter describes the evolution of labour policy and practices against 
strikers adopted by the industrialists and the government in the late Russian 
Empire. The first part on policy presents an overview of the legislation about 
strikes, explores how the attitude of governments and industrialists towards the 
labour movement transformed in time. The second part describes the emergence 
and development of the repressive forces. The third part about practices is based 
on the results of a quantitative analysis of punitive actions against strikes. Overall, 
the chapter explains the strategy developed by industrialists and state authorities 
to prevent the labour movement and traces the evolvement of this strategy in the 
period from the 1870s until 1917. 
To understand approaches against labour movement, national and regional
chronicles of the labour conflicts, legislative materials and reflections regarding 
labour conflicts published by the contemporaries – industrialists, politicians and 
scholars in social sciences – were analysed. These sources were supplemented by 
some archival documents providing relevant case materials to illustrate the prac-
tices and to present the situation from the perspective of the strikers. 
Striking movement in the Russian Empire: a brief overview 
Strikes in the 1870s, such as that at the Nevsky Thread Manufacturing Co. in 
1870, at Krenholm Manufacturing Co. in 1872, and at the Iuzovka Ironworks in 
1875, marked the beginning of a new era in the economic and social development 
of Russia. From that time on strikes became the “new normality” in Russia. 
Figure 2.1 presents the dynamics of strikes in the Russian Empire in the period 
between 1870 and 1894. During these decades, the labour movement was rela-
tively moderate, with a few resonant conflicts and a low level of involvement of 
revolutionary organisations. The two peaks in 1878–79 and 1887 were because of 
a series of massive protests at the textile factories in Saint Petersburg, Moscow, 
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 Figure 2.1 Number of strikes in the Russian Empire from 1870 to 1894 
Sources: Anna M. Pankratova, Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v XIX veke: Sbornik dokumentov i
materialov. T. 2: 1861–1884. Ch. 1. 1861–1874 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1950), 607–18.; Ibid. Vol. 2. 
Part 2: 1875–1884, 644–676; Moscow, 1950; Ibid. Vol. 3. Part. 1: 1885–1889, 771–802; Ibid. Vol. 3. 
Part. 2: 1885–1894, 620–645. Moscow, 1952. 
From the mid-1890s, the labour movement transformed: strikes were no longer 
spontaneous but organised. The labour movement became a mass phenomenon 
and quickly politicalised. This was partly because of objective reasons, such as 
the emergence of large modern enterprises and the increasing number of profes-
sional workers, but also because of some questionable political decisions, such 
as the total ban of trade unions (in force until 1905). The revolutionary organisa-
tions saw the situation as an opportunity to establish themselves as the acting 
side in labour conflicts. They helped workers to grasp and defend their interests. 
On the other hand, they often encouraged workers to strike and exacerbate the 
conflict even if it would have been possible to avoid it through negotiations with 
the employers. 
Daniel Brower has described a typical scenario of strike violence at the turn 
of the nineteenth century.9 A series of grievances triggered the conflict. That was 
followed by a work stoppage and the gathering of a crowd, “unorganised but 
with individuals formulating complaints”. The administration of the enterprise 
refused to negotiate until the workers got back to their working places. If there 
were any representatives of the authorities (a factory inspector, police force), they 
demanded that the strikers stopped “rioting”. They explained that strikers first had 
to surrender unconditionally and return to their jobs, and their grievances would 
have been examined only afterward. They would often arrest the delegates. Work-
ers began to attack administrative buildings and company stores. If they had got 
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a day or two. Then military troops arrived, dispersed the crowd, beat the strikers 
and arrested as many of them as possible. The next phase was an investigation run 
by the state authorities. Many of the most active strikers – the “instigators” – were 
imprisoned, and a few dozen of them were deported to their own villages. 
The most likely consequences for strikers are vividly presented in a propaganda 
poster distributed by the authorities ( Figure 2.2 ). This poster published in Moscow 
in 1906 displays six images demonstrating “numerous disasters caused by unjusti-
fied strikes which are harmful to all people, but primarily to the strikers, who do 
not wish to work honestly”. The text emphasised that strikes are “no godly activ-
ity” instead, it “brings terrible distress and utter destruction”. The first image show-
ing the battle with the military troops is followed by the image of wounded workers 
in the hospital. The next one depicts the arrest of the strikers. In the following pic-
ture, the worker is selling his boots because he does not receive a salary anymore 
and run out of money. Then he is fired and finally finds himself on Khitrovka, a 
square in the centre of Moscow which used to be a job market for unskilled labour. 
This place was infamous for its unsanitary conditions, crime and overall misery.
The number of strikes in the period between 1895 and 1917, as presented in 
Figure 2.3 , hundreds, sometimes thousands per year, indicates that the govern-
mental propaganda must have been inefficient. In the early twentieth century, 
the peaks were designated by the General Strike of 1903 in Southern Russia, the 
Russian Revolution of 1905, and the years following the Lena massacre of 1912. 
 Figure 2.2 What happens to workers after the strike 
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 Figure 2.3 Number of strikes in the Russian Empire from 1895 to early 191711 
The number of strikes remained high during the First World War. There was only 
a short period at the beginning of the war when patriotism was skyrocketing and 
workers refrained from protesting.10 Workers were ready to strike again by the 
autumn of 1915 because of the poor performance of the Russian army on the front 
and a significant decrease in their living conditions.
The rationale of tsarist labour policy 
The development of the labour movement induced the government and the 
industrialists to develop a policy towards this phenomenon. According to the 
government’s perception, the “patriarchal” attitude of the employers and a strict 
hierarchy determined the relationship between industrialists and workers. As the 
Minister of Finances, Sergei Witte described it in a secret circular issued on the 5 
December 1895, 
The patriarchy [between master and worker] expresses itself in many cases in 
the concern of the factory owner for the needs of the worker and employees 
in his factory, in his solicitude for the preservation of harmony and agree-
ment, in the simplicity and justice of their mutual relations.12 
In the eyes of the government, the employer was a benevolent master who took 
care of the moral and material well-being of his workers. The state saw its own 
role as an independent agency standing above the interplay of conflicting and 
private interests and above partisanship. 
Strike had no place in such a hierarchical model of labour relations. It was not 
perceived as an argument between the competing sides but as the “misbehav-
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Theoretically, workers were offered some mechanisms to seek justice against a 
misbehaving employer. They were supposed to appeal to a representative of the 
state (who was above the employer in the hierarchy) and who could punish the 
violator. In practice, the enormous power of industrialists and the limited rights of 
workers led to many cases of power abuse.13 
Moreover, the system proved to be inefficient in those cases when the viola-
tions of workers’ rights were reported with the expectation to restore justice. This 
convinced workers that the only way to attract the attention of officials was to 
strike. In theory, both employers and employees had equal rights to receive state 
protection. In practice, the government always took the side of the employers 
and cooperated with them in repressing the strikers. Courts examined all violent 
conflicts, but relatively few were those cases when the administrators were pun-
ished for provoking a strike. For the government, the social order always received 
priority over justice.14 
The government interpreted strikes not as a private affair but as a matter of pub-
lic concern; this is the reason why the public authorities were to be informed and 
involved immediately in any (even potential) mass labour conflict. As Minister 
Sergei Witte explained, “the government cannot accept the situation that workers 
achieve what they wanted even if employers expressed a desire to satisfy such 
demands”.15 The government’s approach to managing strikes was based on what 
economists call “collective action problem”. The willingness of a company to put 
an end to the strike as soon as possible empowered the workers; consequently, it 
could harm collective entrepreneurial interests. The government presented itself 
as a body whose role was to balance private and collective interests for the com-
mon good and intended to regulate these through labour legislation. 
In 1882, the government established a factory inspection as an institution to 
facilitate the implementation of factory legislation, to collect statistical informa-
tion about workers and to act as a mediator between employees and employers. 
Factory inspectors were kept busy, preventing strikes until the end of the Russian 
Empire. However, many of their representatives admitted that, though this insti-
tution was very efficient in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, after 
1905 their peace-making effect and ability to negotiate significantly faded. 16 
Strikes and unions were unlawful in the Russian Empire up to 1905. Those who 
dared to strike risked facing “the knout, jail, or exile”.17 The first law about strikes 
appeared in 1845 as an amendment to the Penal Code. It was elaborated with more 
details and slightly changed in 1874 and 1886. According to the law, strikers were 
to be imprisoned for a period of two to four months, while “instigators” risked 
spending four to eight months in prison. In the case of aggravating circumstances, 
such as damaging factory property or forcing other workers to cease work, the 
punishment was doubled.18 The government cancelled the criminal penalty for 
strikes only in 1905, and even then, with some special conditions. 
The state interpreted any labour conflict as a threat to public order, even if the
conflict evolved for economic reasons; this is why strikes fell inside the scope of
criminal law and not of civil law. Since strikes meant a challenge to the autocratic
regime, they were seen as a matter of public concern.19 No wonder that in many offi-
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In practice, however, it was difficult to follow the law strictly. Sometimes, 
strikes involved hundreds and thousands of participants, so the police could not 
criminalise each of them. The solution was to criminalise the group of the most 
active strikers, and the rest received some forms of administrative punishment. 
The most popular among the latter was to expel strikers to remote provinces or 
to the villages where they were registered.20 Such actions were regulated by a 
number of secret circulars issued by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry 
of Finance. The most infamous one was the circular signed on the 12 August 
1897, in which the Minister of Interior Ivan Goremykin strongly recommended 
that the governors united the efforts of all officials and the regional police forces 
to stop the “disturbances among the workers”. The minister demanded that the 
local police monitor carefully the factories and workers’ houses. As a preemptive 
measure, he encouraged the police to arrest those individuals who were suspected 
to be political agitators. The circular reminded the officials that any unauthorised 
gathering of workers was strictly forbidden, and the organisers of such meet-
ings were to be arrested immediately. The minister ordered his subordinates to do 
their best to put an end to any strike quickly and peacefully. Those workers who 
refused to cooperate were to be arrested and exiled. 
Still, the minister acknowledged that “it is not always possible to conduct pros-
ecution due to the lack of evidence of any crime”, so his recommendation was to 
apply “administrative punishment on a mass scale”.21 The recommendation to pun-
ish workers who were not formally recognised guilty was unlawful; this is why 
the circular was disseminated secretly. Instructions like this encouraged repres-
sion rather than reconciliation and easily led to the abuse of power. 
By 1905 the labour movement became so intense that it was impossible to 
tackle it with only repressive actions, which demonstrated the failure of the previ-
ous tsarist labour policy. The government had to liberalise the legislation. In April 
1905, it cancelled the circular from the 12 August 1897. In October 1905, in the 
context of the revolution, the emperor issued a manifesto which granted the free-
dom of conscience, speech, assembly and association. The “Temporary regula-
tions on unions and societies” issued on 4 March 1906 legalised the formation of 
trade unions and educational societies and, at the same time, clarified the “rules” 
for the workers’ assemblies. 
Trade unions functioned actively in 1905 and 1906, even despite the significant 
limitations.22 Efforts by the unions were mostly channelled into the struggle for 
improving the workers’ material conditions. Nevertheless even these limited activ-
ities irritated the government, which intensified the efforts to repress the unions 
from 1907. The slightest reason was enough to close down the existing trade unions 
and to obstruct the registration of new ones. The government permitted a limited 
restoration of the workers’ assembly after the Lena massacre in April 1912, but 
trade unions were considered suspicious until the time when tsarism collapsed.23 
Though those aspects of factory law which fall outside the repressive elements 
in labour legislation are beyond the scope of this paper, the fact itself that Rus-
sia developed its factory legislation in the period between 1882 and 1912 has a 
significance for the topic. More than ten acts were issued in this period regulat-
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introducing social securities. These acts improved the working conditions con-
siderably but did not lead to a decrease in the intensity of the labour movement. 
The labour policy of the industrialists 
Most industrialists agreed with the government in this respect and also saw any 
conflict between the employer and employee as a deviation from normality, which 
should be hushed up by all means. Both the traditional theory of paternalism and 
social Darwinism, that time the two most popular social ideologies among indus-
trialists, considered disputes and strikes as an anomaly. In terms of the paternalis-
tic approach, strikes were a sign of a supreme ingratitude, a fight against corporate 
benevolence. For social Darwinism, a strike was a break in the social order: the 
presence of wealth and poverty was seen as a part of the “normal” order reflecting 
the differences among people in their abilities and efforts. 
The picture of Russian workers created by industrialist was very persistent, 
presenting them as being backward and lazy, but amendable to the influence of 
socialist propaganda. Because of this image, the employers generally preferred 
repression to negotiation. Nikolai Avdakov, an influential member (and later 
chairman) of the Association of Southern Coal and Steel Producers, concluded 
his report in 1893 on how to secure workforce supply for coal-mining enterprises 
with the following words: “A rioting spirit has appeared among the miners due 
to the high wages and their drunkenness. Therefore, we need more police forces 
to maintain decorum and order among the workers”.24 Industrialists like Avdakov 
looked at the strikes as a zero-sum game, so power was the key to determine 
which side gains and which loses. 
The tactic of increasing repressive forces worked on the local level but proved 
to be ineffective in preventing the labour movement in general. Thus, industri-
alists relied on the combination of stick and carrot policy. Welfare work was a 
recurrent topic during the discussions at the meetings of the regional associations 
of industrialists starting from the 1880s. From that time on, enterprises invested 
heavily in social infrastructure and improved the working and living conditions 
of their employees.25 However, the expanding enterprises and the rapidly increas-
ing number of workers often negated the efforts of the enterprises to improve 
the quality of life of its staff. Although the working and living conditions were 
steadily improving during the period between 1870 and 1914, many contem-
poraries described them even in the 1910s as inhuman and intolerable. Modern 
technologies and luxurious offices of the new technocracy often coexisted with 
primitive forms of economic coercion, debilitating physical labour and extreme 
poverty. 26 
The changing economic situation, the broadening and strengthening of the 
working class and the intensifying labour movement pushed the industrialists 
towards making their labour policy more flexible. Their position concerning the 
legalisation of worker’s organisations gradually changed. Even the most con-
servative industrialists had to accept that the total ban of such institutions was 
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owner of the largest metallurgy plant in the Russian Empire, said in April 1905: 
“The current labour law and the law about strikes do not correspond anymore to 
the reality. If the law is permanently violated and the state has no power to pre-
vent this, the law should be adjusted [to the reality]”.27 Therefore, the emperor’s 
decision to legalise the workers’ organisation in 1905 did not meet any significant 
opposition from the side of the industrialists. 
The intensification of the labour movement also inspirited the industrialists 
to unite and coordinate their efforts in the face of a new threat. They started to 
establish their own organisations aimed to give mutual support in the struggle 
against strikes. These organisations were usually operating at a regional scale. 
The Association of Southern Coal and Steel Producers, founded in 1874, coordi-
nated the policy and practices against the labour movement in the Dnepr-Donbas 
region. In Saint Petersburg, the industrialists established the St. Petersburg Society 
for Assistance to the Improvement and Development of Factory Industry in 1897. 
The society collected and analysed information about all strikes that happened in 
the region to adjust its labour policy. The members established a special fund for 
their mutual assistance in cases of lengthy strikes, and they also coordinated their 
actions against strikers. The Moscow entrepreneurs created the Society of Factory 
Owners of Moscow Industrial Region in 1907. The funding chart of this society 
contained articles about mutual support, including financial, consulting and legis-
lative means. By 1908 there were 18 such societies in the Russian Empire, mostly 
in large cities such as Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov. 28 
Many Soviet historians presented the relationship between the entrepreneurs 
and the state as having been cooperative, aimed to repress workers: when violent 
conflicts arose, the industrialists and the government combined their efforts to put 
it down29. However, behind the scenes, there were many conflicting interests not 
only between the business and the state but also within these two groups. 
The business community was characterised by local differences. Industrialists 
of the Moscow region retained their more traditional, patriarchal practices, firmly 
opposing any worker organisation. They often stated that workers are a “dark 
poorly-literate crowd”, which can easily be manipulated by revolutionists.30 In 
contrast, their peers in Saint Petersburg and the Dnepr-Donbas regions gradu-
ally shifted from oppressive towards rationalising labour policy. 31 However, there 
were disagreements from time to time, even within the regional groups. For exam-
ple, the members of the eighteenth congress of the Association of Southern Coal 
and Steel Producers in December 1893 had a very heated discussion about how 
to tackle the labour movement. A participant of the congress, Vladimir Vagner, 
suggested that every ten to 15 workers elected a so-called desiatskikh who would 
represent the interests of their group and communicate it to the authorities. How-
ever, most of the industrialists present at the congress rejected the idea arguing 
that the workers were “backward” and not ready for such practices. Instead, they 
insisted on asking the government to strengthen the police forces in the region.32 
From the perspective of the industrialists, the strengthening of the police con-
trol had several disadvantages, the most disturbing one being the police meddling 
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on the principle of conflict prevention. To promote industrial development, the 
Ministry of Finance backed the interests of the industrialists. The position of the 
Ministry of the Interior was shaped by other influencers, such as the landown-
ing nobility. 33 This ministry prioritised public order and the prevention of violent 
labour conflicts and conducted several investigations which demonstrated that 
many conflicts were caused by the poor working conditions and by industrial-
ists violating the law. Thus, the ministry developed the following strategy: 1 to 
urge employers to improve the working conditions; 2 to prevent violent conflict 
through their undercover network and preventive arrests; and 3 to suppress work-
ers’ “disorders” promptly and firmly in case the preventive measures failed. 34 
Despite the previously mentioned tensions, all stakeholders agreed regarding 
the necessity of powerful police forces at their disposal. Police could be used 
either to repress the labour movement or to strengthen the employers’ position 
during the negotiations in time of labour conflicts. 
 Repressive forces 
The first strikes in the 1870s broke out spontaneously, and the reaction of the 
police was rather slow. Therefore, the industrialists had to rely on their own 
solutions to suppress the “rioters”. The enterprises often applied the principle 
of divide et impera: they used a group of loyal workers to repress the rioting 
ones.35 Factory workers could be turned against miners, skilled workers against 
non-skilled ones and foreign employees (who were always better paid) against the 
locals. Sources present some cases when companies or the local authorities armed 
peasants from the surrounding villages to repress the striking miners.36 
The government found it suspicious when unofficial military groups were used, 
especially if it was done by foreign-managed enterprises, so it decided to enforce 
police presence in the factories. The government granted free access to the police 
into the factories, and police could inspect and arrest workers who fell under sus-
picion any time in the presence of a factory manager. 37 Because of the immediate 
interventions of the police and military forces on behalf of management, many 
wage conflicts tended to be characterised by the government as political. 
However, the government could not provide sufficient police forces to super-
vise every enterprise. The presence of police was especially weak in small 
company towns scattered in a large geographical area. To strengthen the con-
trolling forces, the enterprises supported the police service on their premises by 
establishing factory police or paying the local police department for increasing 
their presence at the factory. By the end of the 1890s, there were officially 572 
factory policemen in Russia, mostly in the Central Industrial and South Indus-
trial regions. Their service was costly. For example, the Aleksandrovsk South-
Russian Plant of Briansk Society spent 15,900 roubles annually to support 60 
policemen at the turn of the century while, in 1902, they spent 37,284 roubles on 
medical service and 17,282 on schools.38 Still, the officials acknowledged that 
these forces were inadequate as well as distributed unequally, mostly concen-
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This solution entailed an ethical problem as well: policemen receiving their pay 
checks from industrialists saw labour conflict through the eyes of their employer. 
The leadership of the police forces even acknowledged that in such cases, the 
police did not serve justice but acted as a servant of the entrepreneurs.39 On the 
1 February 1898, the government issued a new law enforcing police presence in 
the factories. The costs were divided between the taxpayers and the industrialists: 
the government paid the salaries while the enterprises covered the expenses of the 
accommodation and the utilities of the newly enforced police body. 
From the 1880s, the priority tasks of the secret police in Imperial Russia, the 
so-called Okhranka (Otdeleniye po Okhraneniyu Obshchestvennoy Bezopasnosti 
i Poryadka), were broadened with tackling the labour movement. This included 
investigating and preventing unauthorised meetings or demonstrations such as 
worker strikes. While the ordinary policeman, the gendarmes, were focused on 
formal investigations, the Okhranka operated through informers, spies and under-
cover agents.40 From 1898 on, the Okhranka monitored and accumulated infor-
mation about the strikes and workers’ organisations all over the country. They 
established a system of surveillance targeting both illegal and legal worker organ-
isations, with special focus on trade unions. A circular issued by the  Okhranka
explained that some unions “drew themselves towards extremely harmful anti-
government activities and thus forced us to repress them by all possible means”.41 
Sources offer evidence that police used mercenary agents and involved street 
hooligans to provoke violence. A worker called Zakharkin recalled that during the 
1905 revolution, the police “instigated hooligans” in looting pubs and to have a 
hand in Jewish pogroms. He referred to the example of Iuzovka, where there “was 
[the gang of] Alyoshka Sibiryak and two hundred men with him. Of course, they 
were connected to the police”.42 
Perhaps the most well-known enterprise of the Okhranka was establishing a 
spoiler work organisation under the control of the police at the turn of the cen-
tury. Following the old principle, “if you cannot beat them, join them”, the chief 
of the Moscow Secret Police, colonel Sergey Zubatov offered to create a legal 
workers’ organisation under police supervision to defend their economic inter-
ests. He argued that it would allow the workers to seize the initiative from the 
socialist organisations and thus to have primacy in seeking for governmental sup-
port. However, his primary motivation was to have a certain degree of control 
over the workers’ activities. 43 The police chief of Moscow, Dmitri Trepov, and the 
governor-general of Moscow, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, both supported 
the proposal of Zubatov. The minister of interior hesitated first but finally gave 
the green light to the project. Between 1901 and 1903, Zubatov established work-
ers’ organisations in several large cities in the European part of Russia. Zubatov’s 
initiative faced severe opposition on behalf of the employers and in some govern-
ment circles. The minister of finances, Sergei Witte, believed that the project initi-
ated by Zubatov and Trepov “catalyzes disturbance among the workers”, de facto 
“replaced revolutionary propaganda” and aimed “to overthrow capitalism”.44 The 
minister of the interior also had concerns about the project: he assumed that these 
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oppositional organisations. He was afraid that workers were gaining experience 
in organising themselves, which they could later utilise in demonstrations, strikes 
and revolution.45 The general strike of 1903 in Southern Russia was the last straw, 
and after that, the minister stopped the project. 
In those cases, when the police forces could not stop mass violence, the govern-
ment sent army troops. However, it was not infrequent that the conflict had already 
been over for some days by the time the army arrived. Thus, industrialists asked 
the government to station troops near the large enterprises in those regions where 
enterprises clustered. The minister of war was not very enthusiastic to comply 
with this request since, as he explained, stationing troops in the industrial regions 
to “pacify riots” obstructed proper military training.46 Furthermore, sending mili-
tary troops to repress labour violence often resulted in massacres, which attracted 
unwanted public attention and criticism, and ultimately contributed to the radi-
calisation of workers. The minister of the interior, Vyacheslav Pleve, believed that 
extreme mass violence threw workers to the arms of the revolutionists. Following 
the massacre in Zlatoust, Ufa Province, in March 1903, when local military troops 
killed 45 workers, he told the minister of war in private that he wished the troops 
would not use “such deadly bullets”.47 
Therefore, both the government and industrialists preferred to rely on the inter-
vention of the Cossacks, the light cavalry force of a historically privileged social 
group famous for its pro-monarchist views. Cossacks acted violently and were 
very efficient in dispersing crowds, but without mass killings since they used 
non-lethal weapons such as nagaika – a thick, tightly twisted whip. However, they 
were inefficient against the passive resistance of workers. 
Practices against strikers 
Based on their rich experience in suppressing “unrests” on the factories and mines, 
the authorities and industrialists developed a toolbox of practices against strik-
ers. The most popular solutions included dismissals, calling for police or military 
units, followed by arrests and exile, lockouts, strikebreaking and blacklisting. The 
following section discusses which of these were preferred by the employers and 
the government, and how often they were applied. 
The relational database entitled “Chronicle of the labour movement” contains 
data about 4,757 strikes, which took place in all regions of the Russian Empire 
between 1895 and 1904.48 The database allows tracing the popularity of specific 
repressive methods and their dynamics in this period. It also provides evidence 
on the efficiency of these methods to put an end to the conflict. Built on the basis 
of that database, Table 2.1 demonstrates that police or military troops interfered 
with 14 per cent of the strikes. The number of cases of police/military intrusion 
fluctuated from year to year, with 70 occasions on average in the period of 1895 
to 1899 and 72 from 1900 through 1904. However, because of the increasing 
absolute number of strikes, this still means a slight relative decrease in the share 
of conflicts with police/military involvement, from 18 per cent to 13 per cent. The 
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 Table 2.1 Repressive practices against strikers in Russian industry in the period from 1895 
to 1904 
 Year  Number of The reaction of the authorities
strikes 
 Police or  Trials  Arrests Banishment  Lockout or 
military 
intervention 
dismissal of a 
group of workers
1895 265 16% 5% 9% 2%  11% 
1896 280 20% 3% 18% 6%  11% 
1897 445 18% 4% 15% 6% 14% 
1898 441 18% 3% 13% 4% 12% 
1899 552 17% 2% 15% 5% 10% 
1900 382 15% 3% 12% 3% 12% 
1901 510  11% 1%  11% 4% 10% 
1902 443 16% 1% 10% 1% 13% 















There were various factors behind this phenomenon. First, though the labour 
moment intensified, the authorities could not develop the police forces at the same 
pace. Therefore, they had to be more selective about where to interfere. In the late 
nineteenth century, military forces were often used just to intimidate the potential 
rioters, as a preventive measure against labour violence. From the early twentieth 
century, however, the government could not afford this anymore; they sent troops 
only in cases of actual mass violence. 
At the same time, the effect of the violent oppression of strikers has also 
changed. Instead of pacifying the situation, it often aroused the indignation of 
workers also in the neighbouring enterprises and resulted in a powerful strike 
movement for the sake of solidarity. The Lena massacre of 1912, which trig-
gered an immense wave of strikes and protests in the entire empire, is a textbook 
example for such a process. As Michael Melancon pointed out, the Lena massacre 
and other similar violent episodes “delivered successive blows that cracked and 
then shattered the last fragile remnants of Russia’s post-1905 consensus” and as a 
result “workers, peasants and much of the educated society turned their backs on 
tsarism and capitalism”.49 
In the period of the First World War, the share of “political” among all strikes 
were around 24 per cent in the first two years, slightly declined in 1916, then 
sharply increased in early 1917 to 51 per cent. The difficult situation at the front 
and loosening discipline on the factories and mines made the authorities put more 
pressure on workers. However, violence against the strikers also led to public 
outcry and solidarity strikes, such as the series of strikes in the Central Industrial 
Region of Russia in August 1915. In early June 1915, workers of the Big Linen 
Manufactory in Kostroma demanded an increase in housing expense reimburse-
ment. The administration did not give them a clear answer, so the workers decided 
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factory to join them and then turned their attention to the workers of one more 
linen factory owned by the Zotov brothers. However, this latter company worked 
for the Ministry of War and was carefully controlled by the authorities. So, instead 
of solidary peers, the strikers were met by a police squad. The clash with the 
police resulted in the violent death of several strikers and the imprisonment of the 
organisers. 50 
A similar tragedy happened in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, another centre of the 
textile industry in Russia, some 100 kilometres south from Kostroma. A bloody 
clash between strikers and police forces left several killed and many wounded.51 
These brutal repressions caused enormous public outrage. Seven days after the 
Kostroma conflict, many Russian cities, including Saint Petersburg and Moscow, 
hosted mass strikes of solidarity. Thus, by applying brutal repression against strik-
ers, the authorities often ended up with the opposite result: these repressions cata-
lysed a new wave of protests. 
Workers’ solidarity was a serious constraining factor against the temptation to 
resolve all conflicts by force. The calculation presented in Table 2.1 shows that 
the percentage of strikes with the intervention of the police or military troops 
(14 per cent) is higher than the proportion of those strikes, which resulted in 
arrests (12 per cent), lockouts (11 per cent), or banishments (3 per cent). These 
numbers indicate that the appearance of the police and military troops did not 
necessarily lead to further repressive actions; sometimes it was enough in itself to 
convince the strikers to terminate their activity and to get back to work. 
Table 2.1 demonstrates that lockouts or the dismissal of some workers were an 
instrument applied by industrialists at least since the mid-1890s. Employers relied 
on lockouts not only during the strikes but also as preventive measures, to get rid 
of pro-socialist workers.52 During the periods of wars (the Russo-Japanese War 
in 1904 and 1905 and the First World War) industrialists were less keen to lock 
down their enterprises in case of labour conflicts. For example, in the second half 
of 1914, 8.5 per cent of conflicts ended up with lockouts and partial dismissal, but 
this number decreased to 5.1 in 1915 and 4.9 per cent in 1916.53 During wartime, 
the industrialists could not afford to apply lockout because it meant that the facto-
ries ceased to operate, which could disrupt the supplies expected by the Ministry 
of War or the Ministry of the Navy. 
Table 2.1 presents the statistics of those repressive practices that are quantifi-
able. However, there were practices, such as blacklisting and the cartelisation 
of the labour market, about which we have only anecdotal evidence. Numerous 
sources indicate that industrialists had practised blacklisting since, at least, from 
the early 1890s. Workers, whose names were in the blacklists, had difficulties 
in finding a job. Kliment Voroshilov, a worker in the early 1900s and later, dur-
ing the Stalin era, a prominent Soviet politician, recalls in his memoirs how he 
struggled to find a job after being blacklisted. He was fired from a metallurgy 
plant in Alchevsk, a company town in the Donbas region (now Eastern Ukraine), 
and moved some 350 kilometres west. He hoped to find another job in one of 
the numerous metallurgical or metalworking enterprises of Ekaterinoslav, a large 
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job there either because his name was blacklisted. An informed colleague told 
Voroshilov that he was probably added to a list by a policeman from Alchevsk, 
who suspected that Voroshilov had been one of the organisers of a strike there 
some time ago. Voroshilov’s only hope was to find temporary work at a workshop 
which was not covered by the blacklisting network.54 
In the case of Voroshilov, the list was probably maintained by the police net-
work. However, evidence indicates that the enterprises also created and distrib-
uted blacklists among themselves.55 The practice remained popular until the 
collapse of the Russian Empire, especially in the industrial areas and among large 
employers.56 
Industrialists cooperated to protect their interests in the labour market also by 
signing cartel agreements about the maximum wage limits.57 Nikita Khrushchev, 
a Soviet political leader in the 1950s to the 1960s, recalled in his memoirs the 
practices of cartels in the labour market of the Donbas around 1908. Some groups 
of miners approached the owner of a mine demanding to increase their wages and 
threatening to strike in case their request was rejected. The answer of the owner 
was the following: 
I would gladly give you an increase in pay, but the mine owners have an 
agreement. It says that we should not have differences in wage rates. So, if all 
the owners of mines where there are strikes going on increase their wages, I 
will do the same for you. If they do not, then I am sorry, but I will not increase 
your wages either. 
Khrushchev pointed out that when other strikers got their raises, the owner of 
their mine “made good on his word and increased wages, but only for men with 
families; the single men did not get raises”.58 
The outcome of the strikes 
How did the repressive practices affect the outcome of the strikes? Table 2.2 pres-
ents the rate of successful strikes and how this relates to specific repressive prac-
tices. These data indicate that the application of repressive forces did not always 
mean that the workers’ requirements were not satisfied. Moreover, the share of 
fully or partially satisfied demands is even higher in those cases when the police 
were involved, and various repressive means were applied compared to the over-
all number of the strikes.
A possible explanation might be that police and military forces were usually 
sent to handle those cases, which were especially difficult, threatening to outburst 
in mass violence (or already doing so). Such cases came under the close control 
of the authorities who often detected that the workers’ rights had been violated. 
Second, the government sent more often the police and military forces to large 
enterprises than to the small ones. The demands of the strikers on large facto-
ries were usually more diverse compared to those in small enterprises. Thus, the 
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 Table 2.2 Share of the strikes resulting in total or partial satisfaction of the strikers’ demands,
including those which were accompanied by some repressive practices 
 Year All  Police or  Trials  Arrests Banishment  Lockout or 
military 
intervention 
















1897 31% 46% 56% 37% 36% 33% 
1898 29% 42% 29% 31% 33% 38% 
1899 19% 29% 27% 22% 27% 40% 
1900 18% 28% 50% 13% 10% 33% 
1901 16% 39% 40% 21% 33% 100% 
1902 12% 26% 33% 16% 33% 20% 















satisfy at least a part of the demands. The main reason to strike was the workers’
dissatisfaction with their wages. Around half (in some years, more than 65 per 
cent)59 of all strikes in Russia happened because of wage-related conflicts. How-
ever, the diversity of demands corresponded to the size of the enterprises. Large 
enterprises usually attracted many qualified workers who expected a certain level 
of working and living conditions. The larger an enterprise was, the more resources 
it had to invest in social infrastructure and to satisfy such needs. Consequently, 
though strikes at large enterprises were the most probable to attract repressive 
police intervention, still, these were the employers who were also the most open 
for negotiations to satisfy the workers’ requests. 
Industrialists were relatively open towards the workers’ demands in the pres-
ence of police and military forces also because they were afraid of provoking a 
violent collision between strikers and the police. The arrests of strike organis-
ers following the appearance of police often led to mass labour violence, which 
resulted in damaging factory property, stopping production and ultimately in 
financial loss. 
Local state representatives also had an impact on the outcome of the strikes. In 
15 per cent of conflicts, the factory inspection or another representative of the local 
authorities (a governor or a persecutor) interfered with the conflict and tried to 
resolve it. Statistics indicate that these actions tended to produce positive results: 
the chance to come to a compromise between the conflicting sides was higher in 
the presence of a state representative. However, if the state representative was 
inactive or aggressive with the strikers, his behaviour could provoke the explosion 
of violence. The strike of miners in the Central mine of Iuzovka in October 1898 
was such a case. The labour conflict was peaceful until a mining engineer called 
Sutulov decided to intrude. The crowd of striking miners was standing around the 
pit head when Sutulov appeared in a state of inebriation and asked why the work-
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of the crate. A voice from the crowd shouted that they wanted a raise in pay. Then 
one of the strikers stepped forward and tried to formulate the workers’ grievances. 
However, Sutulov interrupted the worker and ordered the foreman to take the 
man’s name and have him fired. At that point, the entire crowd began to demand 
that they all be fired and hissed at Sutulov. After that, some 150 miners headed to 
the nearby ironworks, forced metallurgists to cease their work and knocked out 
all the windows in the workshop.60 
Overall, several factors affected the outcome of a strike, including the actions of 
police, factory inspectors and local authorities, the behaviour of the strikers, the 
flexibility of the management, the efficiency of communication channels between 
the management and the strikers and the level of the activities of revolutionary 
organisations. 
Conclusions 
Strikes and unions were unlawful in the Russian Empire until 1905, and those 
who dared to participate in strikes were punished. Criminal punishment was com-
bined with administrative measures. However, often it was the only way to attract 
attention to the workers’ problems. 
The government and the industrialists looked at strikes as a deviation from the 
norm and disturbance of the public order. They considered any compromise with 
strikers as weakness and inspiration for other workers to fight for their demands. 
Therefore, they gave preference to repression over negotiations. Moreover, the 
hierarchical relationship between the main stakeholders made the idea of strikes 
unacceptable. Some representatives of the state and some entrepreneurs started to 
change their attitude gradually to strikes and workers’ organisations only from the 
early twentieth century. They advocated for relaxing labour law and, at the same 
time, for an increase in spending on welfare work. 
To repress the labour movement, the government and the industrialists spent a 
significant amount of resources on repressive forces, including factory police and 
the employment of Cossacks. As preventive measurements, the police established 
a system of surveillance and spying. The secret political police were continuously 
searching for agitators among workers. 
Employers did not have enough power to repress the labour movement and, 
at the same time, did not bother to establish efficient communication channels 
with their workers. The total ban of worker organisations which would be able 
to formulate and communicate the employees’ demands, radicalised the labour 
movement and pushed the workers into the arms of revolutionaries. Any extreme 
violence to repress labour movement often had the opposite effect: it motivated 
the workers to increase solidarity and led to the outburst of mass-scale public 
protests. 
The gradual improvement of working and living conditions from the late 1880s 
did not eliminate the labour movement: workers went to strikes relatively often, 
especially in the period from 1905 to 1907. In the period from 1895 to 1905, the 
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1905. Still, the labour movement during the Russian Revolution of 1905 became 
so overpowering that it was obviously no longer possible to repress it with police 
and military forces; the government had to relax the labour legislation. 
When the labour movement started to decline from 1906, the authorities again 
returned to the old repressive methods persecuting both legal and informal worker 
organisations. They were able to handle local conflicts; however, they failed to 
confront the labour movement on a large scale. Although the labour movement 
was relatively weak in the period from 1907 to 1911, it sharply intensified from 
1912 and in five years. The labour movement emerging as a mass phenomenon 
in the Russian Empire in the late nineteenth century and strengthening due to the 
confrontation with the authorities played an imperative role in the Revolution of 
1917 and the collapse of the tsarism. 
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 3 Violence against strikers in the 
rural peripheries of the Iberian 
Peninsula, 1890–1915*
 Assumpta Castillo Cañiz 
New repertoires of protest in a changing rural space 
In October 1903, the Spanish conservative newspaper La Época noted the alarm 
created by the “large number of workers” in the mining area of Bizkaia who were 
participating in the so-called Bilbao strike. According to the newspaper, this type 
of protest made a greater impression in Spain than in other countries where the 
higher level of industrial development meant that strikes were more widespread 
and frequent, and that therefore the authorities and society there were somehow 
more used to them.1 In fact, La Época was right to be concerned, as strikes were 
on the rise in Spain, especially in contexts and sectors other than the traditional 
industrial ones. The same went for Portugal. Even though neither Spain nor Por-
tugal were paradigmatic cases of social conflict during this period (the number 
of strikes remained comparatively low in both countries), we can see a relative 
upward trend in the use of strike action as an effective tactic in the collective 
struggle, a pattern that becomes very evident from 1909 onwards.2 Furthermore, 
the levels of intensity of these strikes, measured by the number of participants and 
the degree of confrontation with public forces, were, on the whole, significantly 
high.3 In both countries, the numerical weight of the strikes was concentrated in 
the main cities and their surroundings: Barcelona and Madrid, in Spain; Lisbon 
and Porto, in Portugal.4 Nonetheless, in both cases the data show a gradual ter-
ritorial extension of strikes. In Spain at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
number of strikers began to rise even higher in other provinces where there was 
significant industrial activity, particularly in the mining and public works sectors. 5 
In Portugal, we see Lisbon and Porto beginning to be overtaken in terms of the 
number of strikes by other centres where economic activities were closely linked 
to the primary sector, whose workers were particularly active in the years around 
the turn of the century. 6 In Spain, according to the fragmentary available data, the 
sector where strikes grew most exponentially throughout the period was agricul-
ture (particularly from 1912 onwards). Agricultural strikes would have particular 
importance in Portugal from the beginning of the republican regime among the 
workers of the Alentejo. During these years, furthermore, areas traditionally asso-
ciated with agricultural work saw this activity give way to the growth of other 
economic activities and new strategies of struggle, as had already occurred in the 
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This chapter examines the nature of violence against strikers in three different 
episodes that took place in the rural peripheries of Spain and Portugal over the last 
decade of the nineteenth century and the years preceding WWI. First, it examines 
the strike movements during the last decade of the nineteenth century and, in 
particular, the first two decades of the twentieth in the east of the Spanish prov-
ince of Huesca (Aragon), an area particularly affected by the acute agricultural 
crisis.8 The protests here were led by rural workers who were seasonally engaged 
in the construction of public works, namely railways, roads and water supplies, 
and in the energy industry. Second, it examines the strikes by rural workers that 
took place in 1901–2 in the Spanish province of Badajoz (Extremadura). In this 
area of large landowners, the turn-of-the-century crisis led to a process of cereal 
specialisation and expansion of the traditional model of extensive agriculture. The 
short-term benefit of this specialisation triggered the concentration of the prole-
tarian population in medium-sized cities. Third, it reviews the cycle of strikes that 
took place at the beginning of the Portuguese Republic in the region of the Alen-
tejo (1911–15), where cereal specialisation went hand in hand with technical and 
social advances. Here, economic activity was gradually diversified, the capitalist 
agricultural model became a pole of attraction for the working population and 
some industrial nuclei were created.9 
Regional differences in the socio-economic transformation were accompanied 
by differences in the degree and pace of politicisation. In both Spain and Portu-
gal, the countryside gradually entered the political space, especially through the 
extension of suffrage and union rights. However, Spanish laws on association 
(1887), male suffrage (1890), agricultural unionisation (1906) and strikes (1909), 
and Portuguese laws on agricultural unionisation (1894), association without pre-
vious authorisation (1907) and strikes (December 1910) had limited impact on 
the countryside and did not change the authorities’ attitude to a fully implemented 
democratisation. In fact, these measures went hand in hand with the reinforce-
ment of repressive mechanisms. As in other European countries, exceptional laws 
were enacted in the last decade of the nineteenth century (in Spain the repressive 
laws on terrorism, 1894, 1896; in Portugal the law on the repression of anarchism, 
1896). However, what was most instrumental in unleashing the repressive poten-
tial of both states, particularly in the case of Spain and increasingly in the case of 
Portugal (especially from the beginning of the Republican regime in 1910), was 
their view that socio-labour conflicts, and even the rise of workers’ associations, 
were challenges to public order that had to be occasionally repressed.10 In all three 
cases, the repression of strikers was delegated to four different forces: the army, 
as the ultimate guarantor of so-called “public order”; the gendarmeries of each 
country, the Spanish Civil Guard ( Guardia Civil) and the recently created Portu-
guese Republican National Guard (Guarda Nacional Republicana); local secu-
rity forces, clearly insufficient in view of the scale and nature of these conflicts; 
and private forces or civilian volunteer corps, which in both countries played an 
important role in defending the interests of property. 
The strengthening of private mechanisms for the preservation of order went 
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coincided with a radicalisation of positions, it was based on habitual practices of 
private control in areas where the political costs of repression had traditionally 
been lower. The exercising of the right to strike aroused new fears, even more 
so when, as was often the case, it was related to the penetration of new political 
tendencies. 
Although historiography has delved into the nature of repression and police 
deployment in both Spain and Portugal,11 work remains to be done, especially with 
regard to the interplay between the centre and the rural periphery, and between 
the public and private spheres in the policing of protests. The same goes for the 
specific practice of strikebreaking, which provides a lens through which we can 
shed new light on the use of violence during this period and how the elites and the 
state managed the challenges posed by the new mass politics.12 In the three cases 
discussed in this chapter, the emergence and the nature of these strikes and how 
and by whom they were repressed are issues that must be assessed under the prism 
of belonging to a “double periphery”: with respect to the most dynamic spaces 
of capitalism at the global level, and with respect to the decision-making centres 
within their respective territories.13 These are also defining issues for many other 
regions and areas worldwide, hence the significance of the present contribution in 
this collective volume. 
Tension in public order mechanisms 
In 1890, the Spanish Prime Minister, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, stated that 
the army was a “robust support for social order and an invincible dam against the 
illegal attempts of the proletariat”.14 Definitive consolidation of the process of 
militarisation of the public order system in Spain can be found a little more than 
a decade earlier with the enactment of the law constituting the army (1878). It 
stated that the task of the body was to act against the enemies of the fatherland, 
both external and “internal”. In Portugal, too, the army was the main police force 
throughout the period, a role anticipated in the mid-nineteenth century. Although 
the control of public order was militarised to a far lesser degree than in Spain, 
this began to change with the inception of the Republican regime.15 In 1911, the 
National Republican Guard was created in Portugal, which until then had been 
the only continental country without a gendarmerie.16 The Spanish Civil Guard 
and the Portuguese National Republican Guard together with the army were the 
cornerstone of the repression of strikes in both countries. However, behind the 
territorial deployment of both bodies was not only the need to preserve or restore 
public order, but also the latent idea of a social upheaval following any kind of 
collective demonstration and certainly a work stoppage.17 Although these epi-
sodes were usually of brief duration or the conflict was resolved through media-
tion between workers, authorities and employers or construction managers, the 
threat of force as a deterrent was on the table from the beginning. 
In both Spain and Portugal, the public order model had been strengthened and 
adapted to meet new needs, but there were some elements that occasionally, and 
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nature of conflicts, their actual or potential territorial extension, and their increas-
ing simultaneity. Although these were not entirely new elements, their interaction 
with a more politicised context significantly changed how they were perceived 
and experienced. 
The misgivings of the Portuguese and Spanish elites and authorities multiplied 
in the face of an increasingly recurrent scenario: the concentration of workers 
in particular areas of both countries, especially where public works were being 
constructed and where public or private economic activity generated a significant 
need for labour. In some areas, workers were gathered in their hundreds, often out-
side the cities, as was the case at the turn of the century during construction of the 
Canal of Aragon and Catalonia in the east of the province of Huesca and in the 
Catalan province of Lleida. In 1897, shortly after the state took over construction 
of the infrastructure, there were increasing concentrations of labourers demand-
ing work on sites that were progressing only intermittently and not absorbing the 
anticipated workforce. Up to 3,000 workers were making such demands in towns 
of not even a thousand inhabitants. This was the case in San Esteban de Litera, 
where in mid-March a partial strike was declared. April saw a concentration of 
workers not only from the town itself, but also from the region’s capital, Tama-
rite, and other neighbouring towns.18 The supra-local nature of the protest was 
revealed as being of paramount importance. This is made explicit, for example, in 
the increasingly frequent communications between the Guardia Civil commands 
of the Canal construction zone in Huesca and the Ministry of War in dealing 
with the strikes of 1901 and 1903 in the towns of the Canal area, conflicts which 
would worsen in the following two years.19 In Extremadura, the general strike 
of agricultural workers and stockbreeders, as well as domestic servants called 
by the workers’ association of the city of Badajoz in May 1901 was taken up by 
neighbouring towns, a situation that would be repeated in 1902 with a new general 
strike of agricultural workers throughout the province.20 In the Portuguese region 
of the Alentejo, the number of municipalities in which rural workers went on 
strike during the summer of 1911, mainly in the district of Évora and some areas 
of Portalegre and Beja, rose to 27 in just one and a half months.21 The provincial 
city was the driving force and at the same time the recipient of a large number of 
these demands for work, sometimes with a dynamic that some called “invasion 
of the city”. In March 1912, the Portuguese government took steps to investigate 
the events that had taken place during the two waves of strikes by the Alentejo’s 
rural workers, in the summer of 1911 and in January 1912, whose epicentre was 
the city of Évora. As some owners told the government’s delegated commission, 
in January “herds of people [magotes de povo] from the countryside” had begun 
to enter the city. Some newspapers would also describe this episode as an “assault 
on the city”, an expression not far removed from the one the governor himself 
would use, pointing out that, despite the efforts made, the workers “gradually 
invaded the city”.22 Some local newspapers spoke of more than 15,000 strikers, 
of whom more than 10,000 would have come along the Reguengos de Monsaraz 
road, which became the most heavily guarded thoroughfare during this second 
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Along with this, a second key element was gaining importance: the extension 
of the protest to new territories and involving workers from various company 
branches or other production areas. This was the case with the numerous works 
that were being carried out in the Pyrenees and Pre-Pyrenees in Catalonia and 
Aragon at the beginning of the century for the construction of hydroelectric power 
stations. It was not unusual for groups of workers to travel seasonally from one 
centre to another in search of work, despite belonging to different companies, as 
they were not very far from each other. In June 1913, more than 2,000 workers 
left their jobs at the Energía Eléctrica de Cataluña’s construction site in Capdella 
in the Catalan region of Pallars on the border with Aragon. 24 In December of the 
same year, the construction workers of another hydroelectric company,  Barcelona 
Traction Light and Power, better known as “La Canadenca”, had done the same 
in Aitona, another border town, when the company refused to approve the work-
ers’ demands. 25 In May 1914, 350 workers at the Compañía Catalana de Gas 
y Electricidad’s construction sites of the Seira and El Run hydroelectric power 
plants in the Ribagorza region of Huesca also determined to demand a pay raise.26 
In the context of a broader articulation of the labour movement, this extension 
of the protest was manifested in another way: a call for solidarity strikes. After 
the repression of the Évora rural workers’ strike in January 1912, which resulted 
in one death and several serious injuries, a general strike was declared and was 
widely supported in several parts of Portugal, including the capital. The strikes in 
the mining area of Baixo Alentejo were also part of this dynamic of general protest. 
In Lisbon, a state of siege was declared and the city was handed over to the mili-
tary authorities, an unprecedented event.27 Previously practically isolated nuclei 
being drawn into cycles of conflict that affected the whole country was a new 
threat, something that the Spanish authorities could not fail to notice in cases such 
as Badajoz in 1902. Underlying this extension of the protest was another element 
that particularly concerned the authorities: political and union propaganda. In the 
province of Badajoz, territorial articulation of the labour movement became very 
evident when, after the initial strike episodes in 1901, the first regional workers’
meetings began taking place. At the end of April 1902, the first workers’ congress 
was held in the town of Torre de Miguel Sesmero, some 30 kilometres from Bada-
joz, and was attended by delegates from 21 towns representing more than 14,000 
workers. Two months later, the convening power of provincial trade unionism 
became very clear in a new general strike.28 In Aragon, the main concern of the 
central and military authorities was the proximity to Catalonia and the fear of 
possible “contagion”. The correspondence between the military captain general’s 
office and the Ministry of War during the celebrations of 1 May 1891 had already 
contained references to the “agents of Catalonia”. In 1905, this concern for cross-
border transfer embraced the “revolutionary work” of almost a thousand Republi-
can elements, in the face of which the general of the 5th Army Corps informed the 
Minister of War that he would try to stifle movement with “the few elements” at 
his disposal. A year later, the authorities again became suspicious that behind the 
canal workers’ riots and strikes were “political issues and reckless propaganda”. 29 
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had arisen out of the strikes themselves, the National Federation of Rural Work-
ers was created in August 1912, coinciding with a propaganda “tournée”. 30 One 
of the questions several workers were asked as part of the enquiries of the previ-
ously mentioned delegate commission regarded the exact nature of the relation-
ship between the rural associations of the Évora district and the Lisbon workers. 
A third important element was the co-occurrence of several conflicts. It is 
worth mentioning that, aside from the simultaneous strike episodes that took 
place over a short period of time in areas such as Spain’s Badajoz province and 
Portugal’s Alentejo region, there were other waves of protest occurring at the 
same time but making claims of a different nature. At the beginning of 1905, 
nearly a thousand workers from France and Catalonia went to the mayor of 
Tamarite de Litera and demanded to be allowed to work on the Canal of Aragon 
and Catalonia. At the same time, in neighbouring towns such as Benabarre or 
Albelda there were tax riots and workers rioting against the wealthy of the town 
assuming they were responsible for them, the workers, not being admitted to the 
canal works. In Ballobar, the Civil Guards of five adjacent posts were brought 
together to counter a collective attack on private property, a protest believed to 
be “aggravated by recent speeches”. In April, approximately 500 workers on the 
Tamarite section threatened to go on strike. In Zaidín, several hundred people 
demonstrated in front of the town hall demanding work on the site. In August, 
the Tamarite workers rioted and members of the Civil Guard were once again 
concentrated in the vicinity. 31 
Faced with this state of things, both states redoubled their coercive capacities. 
In Spain, the number of Civil Guard staff and posts was increased, particularly 
after 1899 and between 1909 and 1910. In Portugal, the Republican Guard, for-
merly the Municipal Guard with jurisdiction in Lisbon and Porto, extended its 
range to the rest of the country, becoming the National Republican Guard. It was 
deployed for the first time in the Alentejo region. 32 There are, however, several 
elements that show that there were important gaps in the apparent territorial cov-
erage of the gendarmeries and armies of both countries, especially as the episodes 
of conflict multiplied. The correspondence between the Spanish Ministry of War 
and the regional commands of the Civil Guard and the general captains of the 
different military regions contains references to the excessive travelling times 
incurred by forces that were supposed to suppress or prevent the outbreak of con-
flicts. This was a major problem in areas where the railway infrastructure was 
scarce, such as in Extremadura, or where the railway service was highly unreli-
able, a frequent grievance in the east of the province of Huesca. During the 1902 
strikes in the province of Badajoz, the correspondence between the forces and the 
central authorities pointed to the “remoteness” of some places (including some 
regional capitals, such as Olivenza), which brought with it some risk. As a result 
of simultaneous strikes and conflicts in various parts of the province, several Civil 
Guard commands warned that as the forces were concentrated in the capital there 
were none available for other areas, so requests were made to the Ministry of War 
to move several army units.33 In Portugal, the Alentejo was the scene of this early 
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the first wave of strikes in the summer of 1911 that the force was installed in the 
district of Évora, which saw the headquarters of the third battalion established 
there only in early November. It was not until September that there were posts in 
all the municipalities of the Alentejo. 34 Army intervention continued to be neces-
sary, but it was also fully mobilised alongside the National Republican Guard in 
the industrial zone south of Lisbon, including units based in districts of the Alen-
tejo, such as the 5th cavalry, mobilised in August in the Setúbal area. 35 To this must 
be added the frequent threats of alleged monarchical conspiracies and incursions 
into the north, which saw a very large number of troops mobilised between July 
and October 1911 and during the summer of 1912. It is certainly revealing that in 
the official inquiry into the strike episodes of May-July 1911 and January 1912 
that opened in March 1912, the owners declared that “thanks to the deployment of 
the NRG” the character and especially the duration of the January strike had been 
markedly different. In November 1911, the civil government received repeated 
requests for a needed increase in the number of National Republican Guard posts. 
In February 1912, as several Alentejo deputies were expressing their joy at hav-
ing “finally” had their properties guaranteed and defended, the civil governor
of Évora warned the owners in the district of the need to reach agreements with 
the rural workers in the face of a probable new strike and the possibility that the 
resources they had at their disposal would not be sufficient to repress it. 36 
These insufficiencies could have two possible consequences: either the state’s 
capacity to repress certain episodes of conflict would be reduced, or the lack of 
personnel would be particularly lethal where the conflict could not be properly 
managed. In 1902, a confidential note on public order from the Spanish Ministry 
of the Interior warned that in most cases of public disorder, a shortage of person-
nel meant that civilian governors were forced to entrust the military authorities 
with restoring calm, often resulting in “bloody scenes”.37 This is indeed what hap-
pened in the city of Badajoz on 1 June 1902, when guards seriously injured dozens 
of strikers, killed a day labourer and arrested 130 people. That same afternoon, a 
state of war was declared in the city. 38 At the beginning of March 1906 five day 
labourers were killed by the police in Fraga, in the Spanish province of Huesca. 
The stoppage at the Canal works close to the town led to protests and the calling 
of a general strike in the town. It was not until seven o’clock the next morning 
that a company from the infantry regiment arrived in the town. Three days after 
the event the force concentrated in the city numbered 150 men, while a company 
of 70 stayed for two months.39 In Évora, the military and the National Republican 
Guard violently evicted demonstrators who had gathered on 23 January for the 
new strike that had begun on 13 January. The result was dozens of arrests, one 
dead and several seriously injured. However, in this case it is more difficult to talk 
about a shortage of forces, since they arrived from all over the country in what 
seemed to be a real military occupation of the city. The strike had by then spread
throughout the district of Évora and to some towns in the Beja, Santarém and 
Setúbal areas. In fact, it seemed to be an open choice to suppress the conflict  manu 
militari: in the words of the governor, when the strike had been underway for 11 
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New repressive mechanisms parallel to the state: private action 
The need for repressive action in the more remote areas, something that needed 
not only to be done quickly but also to be maintained, spurred the involvement 
of the private sphere. The shortage of forces, the distance from the major cities, 
the empowerment of workers ensuing from their organisation and militancy, and 
the proliferation of simultaneous protest episodes meant that state repression was 
often not enough. Private citizens were therefore pushed into taking an active part 
in repressive tasks. The organisational boom in the workforce had its counter-
part in the acceleration of the processes by which owners and employers formed 
associations. These platforms, however, sought not only to become economic lob-
bies, but also to increase their management capacities on various fronts, including 
policing.41 This section outlines five strategies of private sphere intervention in 
the management of public order in parallel with – and often with the acquiescence 
of – state institutions. 
The first strategy for dealing with the workers’ increasing mobilisation in the 
context of a weak state presence was negotiation. The records of the  Instituto de 
Reformas Sociales contain accounts of many episodes of strikes in Spain that 
were settled by “direct management between employers and workers”. Some-
times this negotiation took the form of opening subscriptions and distributing 
coupons, as was done on many occasions in 1906 in the villages in the Canal of 
Aragon and Catalonia construction area in response to concerns about the increase 
in episodes of protest. However, this failed to meet the workers’ aspirations. On 
other occasions, the productive calendar or mediation by the authorities were the 
main reasons for committing to a negotiated solution. This is what occurred at the 
beginning of June 1911 in Évora, where a meeting was held between employers 
and workers at which the latter greatly outnumbered the former. The agreements 
reached at this meeting represented a partial victory for the rural workers, but 
they were later ignored by the employers, which led to a second wave of strikes. 
Appearing before the commission delegated to clarify the facts, several owners 
declared that they had signed the agreement out of fear of reprisals and that at the 
time they would have signed anything the strikers wanted. Several of them also 
added that the forces of law and order had not been present at the meeting.42 
The second strategy was the systematic use of law enforcement for private 
purposes. The difficulties that both gendarmeries had in establishing a presence 
throughout the entire territory were solved in innumerable cases with the active 
participation of owners, patrons and private companies. Companies such as the 
Energía Eléctrica de Cataluña in Capdella or the Empresa Catalana de Gas y 
Electricidad in Seira rented buildings to convert them into barracks for the Civil 
Guard in view of the arrival of substantial numbers of workers once work began on 
the plants in 1912.43 In both countries, the central institutions warned of the abuse 
this practice constituted. In 1901 the Spanish Ministry of the Interior drew atten-
tion to the frequency with which the Civil Guard were concentrated in provincial 
capitals and other major towns “without a really justified reason”. A year later, a 
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individuals were making “excessive” requests. The Portuguese Ministry of War 
had already noted in 1887 the “repeated and excessive requests for armed force”.44 
However, it is revealing that over time these requests did not diminish, but the cen-
tral authorities’ discouragements did, and ultimately they chose instead to approve 
of this private subsidy. In a circular to the district administrators in November 
1911, the civil governor of Évora made it clear that it would be impossible to 
increase local allocations of the National Republican Guard. Aware that many 
employers had already tried to remedy the situation through their own means, he 
legally established that they would be responsible for the costs of the additional 
places. The employers’ union of each locality was to make a request to the Ministry 
of the Interior to this effect. The need was “urgent”, according to the governor. 45 
This was not, however, a radically new practice: as early as 1908, in the last years 
of the monarchy and coinciding with a period of marked social agitation due to the 
concentration of numerous groups of workers protesting against unemployment, 
some “citizens’ commissions” offered to pay the salaries of civil police, who were 
then used as private night watchmen in different towns. 46 
Closely related to this last strategy is the third: delegation of law enforce-
ment powers by the government to groups of individuals. In Spain, the “Rural 
Police Law” allowed landowners’ organisations to become Farmers’Associations 
(Comunidades de Labradores) or Rural Police Unions. Under this law, passed in 
July 1898, the public order powers previously granted to the municipality were 
transferred to local landowners. The vast province of Badajoz would have the 
largest number of these associations and police unions. 47 In 1902, after the sec-
ond strike of rural workers in several areas of the province of Badajoz and at a 
time when there were signs of a stable workers’ association, a confidential letter 
from the Ministry of the Interior to the civil governor of the province stressed 
the need for more preventive work, which was to be complemented by the active 
participation of the owners: “Even more important will be to bring to the minds 
of individuals the essential need to combine their efforts and proceed to protect 
their interests by forming associations in the localities”, measures considered 
“extremely necessary” in the broad terms of the province’s municipalities. 48 
Although the Rural Police Law was intended to be applied particularly in areas 
where the latifundia system was prevalent, other localities operating under differ-
ent systems would form their own “farmer’s associations”. This was the case in 
some of the towns involved in the Canal of Aragon and Catalonia protests, such 
as Barbastro, where one of these associations had already been created in 1904, 
very early compared with the others that would be established throughout the 
country, including several in the province of Badajoz. Thereafter, questions of 
public order disappeared completely from the municipal records.49 Although the 
construction of the Canal of Aragon and Catalonia had passed into state hands 
in 1896, the local elites maintained a high degree of involvement in the works, 
mainly because they were the ones who ended up building the secondary sections 
of the canal. From 1894, a corps of labourer-watchmen ( peones-vigilantes) were 
engaged on the work, but in the years of greatest strike agitation, an organisa-
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sections of the Canal beginning to form Associations of Irrigators ( Comunidades 
de Regantes) of the canal area. Each association had a steering board composed 
of owners, who had police jurisdiction over their area, and a first instance jury (as 
did the Farmer’s Associations). 50 In Portugal, however, alongside the aforemen-
tioned establishment of commissions for the private use of the police force, there 
appears to have been greater recourse to individual legitimate defence. Since the 
beginning of the republic, there had been a very noticeable increase in the number 
of arms licences granted to owners and traders. This was because of, among other 
things, the greater territorial deployment of the state and greater control over the 
circulation of previously unlicensed weapons. However, it also confirms an ear-
lier trend, already noticeable from 1908 in the district of Évora. Even then, the 
large number of weapons, both shotguns and revolvers, declared as weapons “for 
self-defence” (which included defence of person and property) was noteworthy. 51 
Along with the delegation, a fourth one was the permissiveness in the constitu-
tion of private police. Significantly, this was the strategy adopted by some of the 
companies established mainly through foreign initiative and with foreign capital, 
particularly those involved in mining. Subordination to foreign capital, together 
with the desire to maintain good relations with these companies, ended up gen-
erating strong relationships of dependence and the ceding of important spaces of 
sovereignty to them.52 This was also evident in the area of policing. Private police 
forces paid by company directors had become widespread since the beginning of 
the twentieth century in the large mines of the southern Alentejo region of Por-
tugal owned by firms such as the British Mason & Barry or the Belgian Société 
Anonyme Belge des Mines de Aljustrel. The miners of the Baixo Alentejo staged 
several strikes in 1879, 1905, 1907 and 1912. The 1912 strike came after the con-
stitution of the mining union and was part of the cycle of protests that took place
throughout the country following the events in Évora. The companies’ private 
police were actively involved in the repression of these strikes.53 The same was 
true on the other side of the border, in the mining areas around the basins of the 
southern Alentejo. The Rio Tinto Company Limited, the British firm that had won 
the contract for the deposits in the Riotinto mining basin in the Spanish province 
of Huelva, Andalusia, also had its own police force, the so-called  guardiña. The 
members of these corps were tasked with surveillance of both the facilities and 
the workers and exercised the functions of a kind of political police. Surveillance 
was reinforced during the strike preparations, when the numbers of guardiña were 
increased or new positions were created within the body, as happened in 1913 in 
Riotinto with the creation of the position of “house guard”.54 However, the large 
number of workers concentrated in these districts meant that these forces were 
insufficient to maintain public order in the event of open conflict, so the assistance 
of the state’s repressive forces continued to be necessary. Fearing a strike, requests 
continued to made for units of infantry and cavalry. In Riotinto, the massacre that 
had taken place during a first strike in 1888 was at the hands of the private police 
forces, the Civil Guard and the army and was one of the bloodiest episodes of the 
period of Spanish Restoration. There was, furthermore, close cooperation between 
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The final strategy is of “civic defence of order”. That the emergence and prolif-
eration of patriotic leagues, civilian shooting groups and militias and the increases 
in their membership coincided with the main episodes of strike and social conflict 
is indicative. This was the case in the province of Badajoz, where the National 
Shooting Federation (Tiro Nacional), the delegation of the civil shooting federa-
tion, was especially active from 1902.56 In 1911, the members of some municipal 
governing bodies of towns in the Portuguese Alentejo region, such as Reguengos 
de Monsaraz and Estremoz, were keen to build shootings ranges and join the so-
called National Shooting Crusade (Cruzada Tiro Nacional).57 The so-called bat-
talions of Republican volunteers were involved in the strike called by the railway 
workers of the Companhia dos Caminhos de Ferro do Sul e Sueste that took place 
in January 1911 with demonstrations in several municipalities of the Alentejo. 
The Republican volunteers had emerged in the heat of the civic mobilisation that
accompanied the revolution and were, according to the governor of Lisbon, the
“best assistant for maintaining order” given a police force that was “not sufficiently
republicanised”.58 The members of these battalions replaced striking workers and
were involved in strike repression, which included arresting workers from several
Alentejo towns, conduct that was later imitated in the industrial zone south of Lis-
bon and in the capital itself. That same month, the battalions were also instrumental
in extinguishing a rural workers’ strike in Estremoz. 59 In mid-August 1911, the gov-
ernor of Évora in a letter to the commander of the fourth military division referred
to the existence of “non-official” battalions. The word “legal” in the draft version
was changed to “official” in the final version. 60 Later on, in a formal declaration to
the government commission, a volunteer proudly pointed out that even before the
establishment of the Republic, he had been a member of the Carbonária secret soci-
ety. During the summer strikes he was in charge of surveillance of the rural work-
ers and anyone else who was in the movement. He added that this type of “careful
vigilance” was exercised “continuously and rigorously” by militant Republicans.
A little later, in 1913, in the era of the government of Republican Democratic Party
leader, Afonso Costa, the group  Formiga Branca (the termite) was created and was
supported and promoted by the institutions themselves, particularly the civil gov-
ernment of Lisbon. Its members were granted special police status and were autho-
rised to carry weapons; the police could not interfere with their activities. In January
1914, alongside the National Republican Guard, they were involved in breaking
the railwaymen’s strike in the capital. Their role seems to have been to restrain
the advance and extension of the protest, since they seem to have been involved in
repressive activities in other parts of the country, signs of which could be seen in
the south of Alentejo during the mining protests of 1915 and in Évora, where they
allegedly supported the Republican National Guard in suppressing a demonstration
and imprisoning more than 30 trade unionists in January 1916.61
 Conclusions 
The evidence presented here show a convergence of interests and a confluence of 
strategies on the part of the state, the employers and the wealthy classes of both 
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countries regarding the maintenance of public order in the context of a gradual 
consolidation of modern capitalism. In both Spain and Portugal, we see a signifi-
cant change in the methods for dealing with the rise of strikes, often caused by 
difficulties in implementing this capitalist modernisation. All the same, institu-
tional permissiveness with regard to the creation of parallel forces, or even the 
delegation of these powers to private entities, cannot be attributed solely to a 
certain inability on the part of the state to cover the territory effectively in situa-
tions of conflict. In both cases, it was within the very framework of the process 
of strengthening the state and increasing its repressive capacity that these efforts 
were redoubled. On the other hand, there is no doubt that these methods reached 
a greater degree of complexity in regard to activities where the weight of the pri-
vate sector was stronger. However, at no time did the public institutions, owners 
and those companies with national or foreign capital abandon the use of public 
force as the main element of both repression and deterrence. One of the reasons 
for this was undoubtedly the clearly military nature of repression exercised by the 
gendarmeries in the two countries, the Spanish Civil Guard and the Portuguese 
National Republican Guard, and by the army, which was particularly aggressive. 
Nonetheless, in the case of both Spain and Portugal, the state’s repressive 
actions were often reinforced by the active participation of the private sector. 
It is useful to consider this coalition as a convenient solution to the problem of 
covering a rural periphery in a gradual process of change. This did not exclude 
a certain fear that control over the maintenance of public order would be dis-
persed. However, this suspicion was mitigated in both countries by a confidence 
in the convergence of the interests of central institutions, elites and the bourgeoi-
sie. How this process evolved depended not only on the economic situation and 
cycles of protest, but also on the differing political actions of both governments. 
Although it is difficult to establish a clear line of development or to talk about 
real planning in this combination of forces, we can draw up an approximate 
chronology covering these two and a half decades. In this, we can distinguish 
three periods delineated by distinct political crises and regime changes, and clear 
changes in the patterns of social protest or even significant transformations in 
repressive attitudes and strategies. 
The first period covers the last decade of the nineteenth century and was marked 
by a notable increase in social conflicts and strikes, exceptional measures in terms 
of public order and the beginning of the mobilisation of the private sector. Along 
with this was the end-of-the-century crisis and a timid modernisation, a process 
that proved to have high social costs. In addition, the political crises follow-
ing colonial losses by both countries resulted in a toughening of political-social 
measures and a certain abandonment of the maintenance of public order outside 
the major regional capitals. Militarisation was very evident in Spain, especially 
in the wake of the colonial crisis, while in Portugal exceptional measures were 
eased after 1897, although the army remained the main police force. The rise of 
property-owners’ associations led to requests from individuals for greater powers 
in upholding public order, a dynamic that was accompanied by an increase in the 








56 Assumpta Castillo Cañiz 
increase in patriotic leagues and a strengthening of the discourse on civic defence 
of the fatherland and order. 
The second period covers the first decade of the twentieth century and was 
characterised by a growing fear of social overflow, the entrenchment of tough 
policies and the state sanction of private activities. The turn-of-the century years 
were particularly marked by the threat of a general strike in Spain and by a strike 
boom in Portugal. The aforementioned dynamics of protest were reinforced, and 
this coincided with a greater structuring of the labour movement and the republi-
can alternatives. The attempted state intervention in social matters and the timid 
democratic opening were combined with an iron-fisted policy when it came to 
managing the rise of protest. While in Portugal this softened after the 1908 regi-
cide, in Spain the process was particularly marked by the military’s desire for 
autonomy and became more starkly evident from 1909. Moreover, with this policy 
repression had a lower political cost because of the radicalisation of sectors of 
the elite and the bourgeoisie. Aside from this, the trend towards private control 
of public order mechanisms continued, particularly in the rural peripheries, and 
was now backed by state legislation that sanctioned this private violence on a 
delegated basis. In addition, the use of private police increased in some industrial 
sectors, particularly by foreign-owned companies. 
The third period covers the second decade of the twentieth century up to the 
beginning of the First World War and was marked by limitations to the process of 
democratic opening, the definitive consolidation of militarisation and the emer-
gence of a new vigilantism. At the same time the rise of workers’ associations led 
to a further increase in the number of strikes. However, the implementation of arbi-
tration measures was combined with a harsh repressive policy in both countries, 
resulting in definitive consolidation of the militarisation of public order. In the 
case of Portugal, the new republican regime’s quest for stability together with the 
conversion of the elites into new political clients was a setback for the very open-
ness these measures announced. In contrast, there was a gradual strengthening of 
the model of citizen surveillance in the form of volunteer battalions and citizens’
militias, which, in the midst of a formal democratisation process, was occasion-
ally encouraged or even outrightly permitted by the institutions, and therefore cir-
cumvented certain legal constraints. At that time, in Spain, citizen militias would 
occasionally take to the streets in the role of anti-worker militias, as the Somatén
did in Catalonia; this was a model that would spread to the latifundia , especially 
in the interwar years (and very particularly during the so-called Bolshevik Trien-
nium, 1918–20). Some scattered youth militias also began to settle in provincial 
capitals, such as Badajoz and Huesca, leading to some incidents in the latter city. 62 
The deployment of such a plurality of practices was part of a dynamic in which 
the centre-periphery dialogue was a major component. This partial convergence 
of interests between the state, the upper-middle classes and other institutions, such 
as the army and the church, in relation to socio-labour conflicts would lead to new 
political cultures becoming more clearly defined and the pre-configuration of ele-
ments that in both Spain and Portugal would contribute to the future consolidation 
of authoritarian regimes. 
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 4 The Swedish labour market 
c. 1870–1914 
A labour market regime without repression? 
Erik Bengtsson♣ 
Introduction: a peaceful labour market? 
From discussion on anti-labour violence and the general repression of trade 
unionism and strikes pre-World War I, Sweden would appear – at least from the 
domestic literature – to be an exceptional case. We know that peaceful industrial 
relations developed in the 1930s, symbolised by the famous Saltsjöbaden Agree-
ment between unions and employers in 1938. But several scholars assert that even 
in the final third of the nineteenth century, there was very little repression of 
unionism and strikes in this country. 1 Against the view that a cooperative Swedish 
model emerged under Social Democratic auspices in the 1930s, the revisionists 
see the “bourgeois roots of the Swedish model”. 2 
This essay interrogates this narrative of Swedish exceptionalism in the context 
of the labour market. I have indicated elsewhere that analyses of Swedish excep-
tionalism in terms of early democratisation and social egalitarianism tend to be 
overestimated.3 This chapter starts with two research questions: was the Swedish 
labour market regime c. 1870–1914 uniquely liberal and labour-friendly and, if 
so, which social forces were behind this exceptionalism – the strength of farm-
ers, the liberalism of the bourgeoisie or something else? The chapter does not 
in the main build on original archival research, but rather on a synthesis of the 
existing literature, combined with analysis of parliamentary materials. As par-
liament, the Riksdag, was the decision maker on labour market regulation, the 
essay focuses mainly on parliamentary politics. To trace social inputs on policy, 
extra-parliamentary forces and movements will also be discussed. The relations 
between workers, unions and employers, and important phenomena such as
strikebreaking will also be discussed. 
The conventional view and its contradictions 
The conventional view of a peaceful Swedish labour market goes back to the 
political scientist Jörgen Westerståhl’s classic 1945 study of the development 
of the Swedish trade union movement.4 His analysis begins with the 1846 and 
1864 liberal reforms of enterprises. Previously, the state had regulated access to 
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journeymen and workers, doubling the fine if the demand for higher wages had 
been made collectively. Collective action was seen as a form of rebellion and 
punished under criminal law. 5 The 1864 law abolished the requirement of guild 
membership and stated allegiance to “free work” (arbetets frihet), but still stipu-
lated, in patriarchal spirit, that employers were the masters (husbonde) and should 
inculcate the fear of god, orderliness and sobriety in their employees. The Master 
and Servant Law (Tjänstehjonsstadgan) prevailed, together with the law of oblig-
atory service, which allowed any landless person without lawful employment to 
be sentenced to forced labour. 
Westerståhl argued that the 1864 reform ushered in a liberal labour market 
regime; apart from the “unclear” law of obligatory service, workers had “achieved 
a judicially completely independent standing”.6 This, he argues, was remarkable: 
“most other” countries implemented laws against unions and collective action. 
The Swedish union movement that emerged in the 1880s, Westerståhl maintained, 
had no specific legal barriers to surmount, and interventions by authorities were 
“comparatively rare”.7 Without explaining Sweden’s uniquely liberal regime, he 
dated its advent to 1864, generally among Swedish political historians considered 
a liberal watershed.8 
The journalist and political scientist Svante Nycander follows Westerståhl
in arguing, in a 2008 general history of the Swedish labour market, that, after
the 1864 reform, Swedish labour was organised in a climate of relative free-
dom, while in other countries, unions and strikes suffered direct oppression. 9 
The Master and Servant Law, Nycander says, persisted in Britain, without
mentioning that Sweden retained it until 1926. Generally, Sweden’s treatment
of unions was relatively lenient; Nycander dismisses accounts of oppressed
labour activists in Sweden10 as narratives of “martyrs”, replacing them with
a description of “collective laissez faire” from the government’s side, which
allowed and encouraged organisation of workers and employers. This, argues
Nycander, provides the historical roots of the famous Saltsjöbaden Agreement
of 1938.11 
For Nycander, himself a politically organised liberal and longtime leader writer 
for the liberal daily Dagens Nyheter, Sweden owed its non-interventionist model 
fundamentally to the strength of social liberalism. “The main political conflict 
line wasn’t between bourgeoisie and the labour movement, but between the left 
and the right”, the left at this time being the Social Democrats as well as the 
Liberals, who won roughly 30 per cent in elections until around 1930. “Liberals 
prevented anti-union laws and made the decisive difference in moulding opinion 
for the right to organize”. 12 
Another theory attributes Swedish labour market exceptionalism not to liberal 
reforms of the 1840s or 1860s, or to left-wing liberals, but to the farmers. Some 
contend that farmers had exceptional influence in Swedish politics, standing 
for a proto-Social Democratic line. In this vein Mary Hilson argues that it was 
the farmer-dominated second chamber that led Sweden to be relatively benign 
towards labour. 13 This version of the peaceful labour market thesis has not been 
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where farmers are assumed to carry a democratic and egalitarian tradition from 
the early modern period and into industrial society. 14 
Why question the conventional view? 
Advocates of Swedish (or Scandinavian) exceptionalism educe several, presum-
ably related societal traits: economic equality, equal political influences and 
peaceful relations between the classes. As one recent contribution to the genre 
comments: “Scandinavia is unique in Western Europe in that there has been no 
real class war”.15 However, both in terms of economic inequality and political 
democracy, the exceptionalism narratives exaggerate. In the 1890s, Sweden was 
one of the least democratic countries in Western Europe, in terms of suffrage laws, 
and one of the most unequal in terms of the distribution of incomes and wealth.16 
From this point of view, it is interesting to revisit the idea that Sweden had 
unusually peaceful relations between the classes and less oppression of the labour 
movement. While a more conflict-oriented, and often Marxist-inflected history 
writing dominated in the 1970s and 1980s when the field of labour history experi-
enced an upswing, today the history writing of the early industrial Swedish labour 
market is dominated by the consensus perspective. This is indicated by the fact 
that both textbooks on Swedish labour market history, Nycander’s  Makten över 
arbetsmarknaden and Lundh’s  Spelets regler, propose this perspective.17 
The state, workers and the labour movement, c. 1870–1910 
In studying the Swedish labour market in this period, we should first consider 
agricultural workers and servants, the major groups left out of the conventional 
accounts of developing industrial relations. In 1870, 72 per cent of workers were 
in agriculture; in 1910, 51 per cent.18 The importance of the Master and Servant 
Law has been dismissed by saying that it was used mostly in sectors – agriculture –
where unions did not operate,19 but this is of course the wrong way around: the 
presence of the law in itself contributed to the lack of unions. From 1896 on, Social 
Democrats and Liberals in parliament fought for a repeal but succeeded only in 
1926, which indicates the persistence of patriarchalism in Swedish society. 
A recent economic study argues that this enduring law increased the exploita-
tion of agricultural workers and reduced their chance to escape to other work.20 
Like servant-girls, who proliferated between the wars, farm workers also long 
continued non-unionised. Attempts to organise were stifled by the employers in 
the early 1890s, then in 1904–05, with a liberal use of strikebreakers, and again 
in 1909; they did not become a part of the union movement mainstream until the 
1930s.21
 Violence 
Sweden can claim a relative lack of bloodshed in industrial relations in the period.
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the army protecting strikebreakers, are legendary in Swedish labour history, but 
largely for their uniqueness. Compared to for example the United States, there 
was less bloodshed in Swedish labour market relations.22 
The official political élite registered the arrival of a labour movement challenge 
in the 1870s. The use of the military to suppress a strike at a major iron mine (Pers-
berg) in 1870 was taken in parliament to show the usefulness of a standing army, 
as opposed to a conscript force of soldiers who might be susceptible to radical 
agitation.23 General Lars Tingsten, Minister of Defence in the early 1900s, recalls 
in his memoirs how as a young officer in 1879 his regiment was sent to Sundsvall 
to control the massive strike in its sawmills. In his account however, the army 
did nothing more militant than guarding strikebreakers and shepherding striking 
workers to speeches by the anti-union county governor, Curry Treffenberg. 24 
Letters in 1892 between Christian Lundeberg, industry leader and later leader 
of the Conservative party, and Patric Reuterswärd, an iron-works owner, court 
marshal and leading Conservative in the first chamber, tell much about the com-
fort of the élite. At the 1892 parliament ( Riksdag), Liberals as they always did, 
proposed a wider suffrage, which was once again opposed by a rock-solid right-
wing majority in the first chamber and the second (more fluctuating) chamber. 
Lundeberg argued in his letter that the first chamber should make no fuss over the 
growing extra-parliamentary suffrage movement, and Reuterswärd agreed: they 
must “make a strong union, to sternly stick to the status quo. If the first chamber 
should tremble, then the country is lost, and if a rebellion comes, then the sooner 
the better, while our military is still untainted”. 25 The conservatives trusted the 
army to contain any outbreaks of labour militancy – as in Persberg in 1870 or the 
Sundsvall sawmills in 1879 – but there was never any immediate socialist threat. 
This moderation cannot be explained by a relatively democratic state, because 
Sweden was not relatively democratic, nor by narrower class differences in 
incomes and wealth, because Sweden’s inequality could by 1900 rival that of any 
capitalist country. 26 Rather, I believe that the explanation must be sought in the 
field of political culture and repertoires of action in politics – Sweden’s élite was 
not more democratic or equal, but it was less violent. I return to this in the con-
cluding section, after discussing the forms of repression that were used. 
The lack of violence does not signify that the Swedish state apparatus was 
politically neutral versus the left and the right. In March 1920, two police detec-
tives were in the audience for a lecture by the Social Democratic leader Hjalmar 
Branting, enthusiastically taking notes and waiting to hear something illegal.27 
Nothing unusual, perhaps, about such surveillance of a socialist event – except 
that Branting was the current prime minister! This indicates how far the socialists 
were from being legitimate bearers of power until the prolonged parliamentary 
struggles of the 1920s. Suspicion still lingered that this was an insurrectionary 
movement. But while the police watched everything the labour movement did, 
they relatively seldom intervened or stopped meetings. Eventually, the policemen 
became familiar to the activists, with whom reciprocal acceptance developed.28 
Thus relations between the state and the labour movement may not have been 
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Restrictions of free speech, from the 1880s to the 1900s 
The Swedish Social Democratic Party was constituted in April 1889. King Oscar II
immediately called Örbom, the minister of Justice – the government was then 
King’s advisers – to the castle and recommended that the 1887 law against agita-
tion should be sharpened. This law, called the “little socialist law” with reference 
to the stronger anti-socialist laws in place in Germany, outlawed incitement to 
crimes (rebellion, treason etc.) and was directed against socialist and radical agita-
tion. Explicitly, this law made it illegal to incite violence (very broadly understood) 
against a person or property. During the 1888 “prosecution frenzy” ( åtalsraser-
iet) several Social Democratic agitators had been imprisoned under these rules. 
By 1889, all Social Democratic newspaper editors, including the informal party 
leader Branting, were in prison on account of anti-religious or otherwise inflam-
matory statements.29 
But in 1889 Örbom agreed with the king that the rules must be strengthened 
to prevent “violence and excess”, to protect workers against “ruthless agitators” 
and to protect society from the “spiritual disease” of socialism. The law seeks to 
prevent verbal incitement to actions “which amount to threats against the social 
order or danger for its duration”.30 The Riksdag accepted Örbom’s proposed revi-
sion with some amendments. The law came to be used, among other things, in 
several instances against leaders of mobs who had fought the police: a riot in 
Stockholm during the 1902 general strike in favour of universal suffrage; strike-
breakers in the west coast stone industry in 1904; and rioters against a prison in 
1906. More simply political cases all concerned Social Democrats: when leading 
party agitator and journalist Axel Danielsson on 1 May 1891 apparently encour-
aged the use of violence against the police, when party leader Branting on 1 May 
1895 discussed the secession of Norway from the Norwegian-Swedish union and 
how drafted militaries should use their weapons (not against the Norwegians), and 
when two anarchist-leaning agitators in 1906 got 10 and three months in prison 
respectively for encouraging resistance to conscription.31 The 1889 law quickly 
became known as the “muzzle law”. 
What were the social forces behind the 1887 and 1889 laws? The king was 
clearly one of the actors behind the 1889 law, acting from his conviction that 
socialism was a threat to the existing social order. Minister of Justice Axel Örbom 
was a lawyer and a bureaucrat of conservative bent, serving in a government, led 
by Baron Gillis Bildt, considered at the time to be moderately conservative. Of 
the ten ministers, four were noble, and Baron Bildt, a court marshal and personal 
friend of the king, was an estate owner. When the farmer leader Liss Olof Larsson 
was discussed as potential government minister, to appoint a farmer as minister 
was considered too brave. Bildt was court marshal and friends with the king. In 
sum, the government was as ancien regime as it gets.32 
The 1889 “muzzle law” was voted through by a 83–25 majority in the first 
chamber, and 109–102 in the second. 33 Albert Lilienberg, a lawyer and member 
of the free-trading Centre Party, thought that the proposal was too vague, giving 
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the first chamber, the criticism levelled at the reform was also that it was inef-
ficient and/or unnecessary. There were a few more principled criticisms as well. 
Hans Andersson, a farmer on the liberal wing of the Country Party, fought against 
the law on principled grounds, arguing that it would limit the right to assembly 
and could lead to political trials where people would be sentenced just for arguing 
for reforms. One of the most prominent Liberals of the Riksdag, S.A. Hedlund, 
spoke of the reform as a “politics of oppression”. The prominent Free Church 
leader Waldenström warned that this anti-socialist law might in the future be used 
against dissenting churches. 
In the case of the 1887 law, the initiative came from the Minister of Justice
von Steyern. Three farmers and one schoolteacher spoke out against the deci-
sion. Around 60 second chamber MPs voted against the law; in the first cham-
ber, only one.
On the whole then, we might say that with a weaker first chamber and weaker 
royal power, repressive laws such as the “little socialist law” and the “muzzle 
law” would have been harder difficult to pass. The evidence here does not sup-
port the idea of liberal influence guaranteeing civil rights from the farmers. In 
both 1887 and 1889 farmers were quite evenly split, with more liberal free traders 
rejecting the repressive measures, and more conservative protectionists approv-
ing. The Liberal intelligentsia played a role through representatives including 
S.A. Hedin who was the most fierce and feared opponent of the conservative gov-
ernments of the late 1880s and early 1890s. The king and the government were 
afraid of Hedin’s oratory and mobilising powers, and this may to some extent 
have restrained their conservatism: to tack too far to the right could have sparked 
a revolt led by agitators such as Hedin.34 
The restrictions of free speech continued into the twentieth century. In 1906, 
the liberal government of Karl Staaff outlawed anti-military propaganda. That the 
reformist liberal Staaff put through this reform has caused consternation among 
historians; it may have been a (failed) attempt to endear himself to the conser-
vatives and make them more amenable to suffrage reform. 35 However, Staaff 
himself in the intemperate second chamber debate claimed that the socialists had 
worsened since 1889 by spawning the monster of militant anarchism. The Staaff 
Laws were especially directed against anti-militarist propaganda but were also 
used in labour market conflicts, which makes them interesting here. For example, 
in 1908 Carl Lind was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment for encouraging 
a general strike, direct action and economic destruction. Hjalmar Gustafsson was 
sentenced to two months’ penal labour for having encouraged railroad workers to 
join the strike at a strike meeting of 15,000 people in Stockholm in August 1909; 
this was illegal since they were state employees. The chairman of the miners’
union in Norberg served 11 months’ penal labour for a strike meeting in August 
1909 where he referred to strikebreakers as traitors and encouraged a riot to free 
striking workers from the local jail. To sum up the Staaff Laws were indeed used 
to hamper strikes.36 
What then were the social forces behind the law? As referred to earlier, they 
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was presented to the Riksdag’s Law Committee, three members spoke against it 
altogether or in parts. The liberal Theodor Zetterstrand wanted to remove “praise 
of criminal acts” as a punishable action, while two Social Democrats opposed 
the entire law. The first chamber accepted it without debate, whereas the second 
chamber debate was intense, ending with approval by 164 votes to 51 for its main 
proposals.37 There were only 13 Social Democratic MPs at the time, so quite a few 
liberals must have defected from Staaff’s line and voted against. 
 Defending strikebreaking 
After the union movement’s breakthrough in the 1880s, it became more and
more obvious to the ruling élite that unions and strikes were a significant fac-
tor in the Swedish labour market. In 1894 the new labour conflict statistics
included 44 strikes and in the three years that followed the numbers grew to 65,
109 and 144.38 At the 1892 Riksdag, J. Eliasson, a farmer, proposed a law to
prevent obstacles to strikebreaking. Eliasson urged the measure by describing
several “threatening phenomena, which threaten the social calm”. He wanted
a new law against anyone who with “cunning, temptations, threats or force”
hindered anyone from working, and he argued that prosecutors must be able
to prosecute such crimes without any initiative from the victims themselves.
The strikebreakers, Eliasson argued, were too afraid of vengeance and there-
fore would not themselves attempt counter-prosecution. “It cannot be denied
that several work cancellations look like and degenerate into rebellion. One
has often seen that military or increased police presence has been necessary to
conserve social peace”.39 
The legal technicalities of Eliasson’s proposal complicated the Riksdag debate 
and it was once re-referred to the parliamentary Law Committee, but thereaf-
ter the motion was passed by 99 votes to 65 in the second chamber, and with 
little debate in the first. The only people who vigorously opposed it on principle 
were the urban radical liberals. S.A. Hedin, in a long tirade cited horror stories 
of employers’ maltreatment of their workers and accused Eliasson of a biased 
view of justice in the labour market: no punishment for employers who dismissed 
workers for joining a union, yet punishment for workers who organised. Interest-
ingly, Hedin in a way defended the farmer hypothesis of Swedish liberalism, argu-
ing that Eliasson belonged to “a class, a stratum of society, which for centuries has 
been oppressed by the nobility and royal bureaucracy”, and that Eliasson should 
see its similarity to the working class of the 1890s. Julius Mankell40 reinforced 
Hedin’s rejection by referring to the story of a worker who was imprisoned for 
eight months for having touched a strikebreaker’s arm. A farmer Jonsson argued 
that the proposal was one-sided, limiting the union’s actions but not the employ-
er’s, and that it could awaken a sleeping bear, i.e. provoke the labour movement 
to greater activity. But most MPs supported the proposal, and it was passed in its 
revised version. 
Defending strikebreakers was a recurrent aim in Swedish parliamentary poli-
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the (protectionist, conservative) New Country Party proposed that strikers should 
be sentenced to forced labour. 41 He warned of the “strike disease” and of “modern 
tyrants called trade union leaders”. Thirty MPs from the same party joined in, 
showing again the farmers’ conservative voice. Against the proposal, the liberal 
farmer Daniel Persson believed that the road to harmony between employers and 
workers would not go through the prison. Liberals and conservative farmers split 
over this issue, while city representatives were much more negative.42 After the 
Law Committee’s revisions, the first chamber passed the proposal, but the second 
rejected it. 
In 1899, Jakobson’s proposal was taken up by a Country party colleague, and 
this time the second chamber passed it by 118 votes to 93. This U-turn since the 
1898 parliament related to growing intensity of the labour market issue. In 1898, 
the first Swedish trade union confederation LO (Landsorganisationen) constituted 
itself with the aim to organise workers in all sectors. And during the year, there 
was a wave of strikes, including some major ones, in the southernmost Malmöhus 
County, which was well represented in the second chamber. Relations between 
(political) farmers and workers were deteriorating.
In 1899, the farmer Pehr Persson from Åkarp, a village in southern Sweden, pro-
posed criminalising not only successful but also failed attempts to incite strikes. 
The first chamber passed it without debate, but the second chamber gave it a nar-
row majority – 108 to 93. Conservative and moderately conservative farmers were 
the keenest to back it43 and only one city dweller, a moderately liberal lieutenant 
expressed support. Some urban right-wing notables opposed it: the Free Church 
leader Waldenström and von Krusenstjerna – and the radicals naturally dismissed 
it as expressing “egoistic class interest” on Persson’s part. All its opponents in the 
second chamber, bar the jurist Husberg, whose opposition was technical-legal, 
were liberals or radicals.44 
This pattern further undermines the farmer hypothesis of Swedish exceptional-
ism and supports the bourgeois intelligentsia hypothesis. The élites of the first 
chamber – estate owners, capitalists and the like – favoured labour repression, 
farmers were rather evenly split (but increasingly Conservative over the 1890s) 
and urban liberals fought it.45 
The evolution of employer attitudes and the use 
of strikebreakers 
This chapter mainly concerns the stance of the state vis-à-vis the unions, but to 
understand the state’s action, it is worth looking at the employers, who also car-
ried much political weight. In the final third of the nineteenth century, employer 
attitudes were marked by patriarchalism. John Bernström, CEO of the impor-
tant engineering company Separator in Stockholm, is typical. He was a Chris-
tian patriarch whose lifelong worldview was coloured by the Lutheran Haustafel. 
Even in 1904 he advocated that the employers should aim to defend the “rights 
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Swedish labour history on the late 1800s is replete with depictions of anti-union 
activity. The iron processing companies of rural central Sweden, so dominant in 
their localities, shut organisers out by evicting them from company land (which 
was most land around the works where the workers were), or, when the organisers 
and agitators had found public ground to use, by measures such as commending 
the employees’ brass band to play loudly to drench out the agitation, or com-
mending agricultural workers on the company land to beat their milk jugs with 
clappers for the same purpose. As one dissertation found, most of the ironworks 
investigated fired the workers who joined the first union.47 
The Separator company responded to the 1902 three-day strike in favour of 
universal suffrage with a lockout and by firing all the striking workers, whom 
they refused to reinstate unless they left the trade union.48 The CEO Bernström 
would refuse to hire any organised worker and would dismiss anyone who joined 
a union. In practice the freedom to organise was rather limited. Bernström gradu-
ally started to accept unions after 1903, after a protracted war of attrition between 
unions and employers in the engineering industry, but always believed that social-
ist influence in the union movement should be crushed. 
At the first labour conflict of the Cementaktiebolaget of southern Sweden, in 
1886, the company dismissed about 40 strikers. R.F. Berg, its CEO at the end 
of the 1890s still spoke of Social Democracy as “hating christianity and often 
threatening with illegal actions and violence”.49 From 1902 on, Berg was in con-
tact with the bourgeois reformists of the CSA – the Swedish equivalent of the 
Fabians or the Kathedersozialisten – and his anti-union attitudes mellowed; by 
1906 he had embraced collective agreements. In 1908, advising on the ongoing 
conflict in the harbour of Norrköping, he said: “the use of strike-breakers is a 
very dangerous method, which we here in Scania no longer dare to use”. Liberal 
ideas, acquired in discussions with prominent reformist intellectuals, and his Free 
Church experience of consorting with lower-class people were surely important 
to Berg’s reformism after 1906, but the impression remains that it was also sim-
ply his adjustment to the attrition battle of strikes and lockouts in the 1899–1906 
period. 
The right of workers to organise was indeed issue of a protracted struggle 
between workers and employers. In the 1906 “December Compromise” between 
SAF, the employers’ confederation, and LO, the union confederation, union organ-
ising was accepted in principle. In exchange, SAF got a guarantee from LO for the 
exclusive say in hiring and firing. The issue of strikebreaking was left unresolved. 
However, with this compromise, the employers turned away from rejecting col-
lective agreements and used them in their own favour, to control competition over 
labour, 50 thus helping to usher in a new era of Swedish industrial relations. But the 
road to 1906 had been rocky, and conflicts continued. 
The use of strikebreaking paralleled more generally the evolving employer 
attitudes. Before the 1890s it was easy for employers to punish strikers and win 
conflicts by combined strikebreaking and dismissal. Afterwards, with develop-
ing organisation in Social Democratic unions, it was harder to find spontane-
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England, in the case of harbours – but after a violent conflict in 1908, they ceased. 
Next they either recruited for this purpose strikebreakers from organisations, 
or from other social classes, notably, military officers. 51 Some tried to form a 
Yellow union movement, in the shape of the Swedish Workers’ Union ( Svenska 
Arbetareförbundet); however, this never became very important, though it fur-
nished strikebreakers in 1905–07.52 In the first decade of the twentieth century, 
strikebreakers were still used in 20–30 per cent of all strikes, and the use flared up 
again in the militant interwar era during the years 1925–36, but declined after that. 
The study of German employers by Paster offers a comparative perspective 
on employer attitudes.53 In Paster’s account, German employers after the 1890s 
sporadically moved from a conservative, completely anti-union “master in my 
house” position to a reluctant acceptance of unionism under the revolutionary 
threat of the First World War. The “master in my house” metaphor is of course 
precisely what Bernström and other Swedish employers used (Sw.  husbonde). 
After 1900 some employers – fewer in heavy industry, more in industries with 
stronger unions – chose to negotiate rather than trying to crush the unions, Pas-
ter says. The timing is then not completely different from Sweden’s. While pro-
ponents of Swedish exceptionalism imply that no employers in other countries 
accepted unions, this seems to overstate the degree of opposition elsewhere and 
the uniqueness of the Swedish experience.54 
Why strikebreaking didn’t take a stronger hold in Sweden is an interesting in a 
comparative European context,55 but is difficult to answer based on the research 
which currently exists. That it became difficult for employers to recruit strike-
breakers from the ranks of the workers themselves can be explained by the rather 
exceptional spread of Social Democratic class consciousness from the 1910s on – 
Swedish workers were to an internationally exceptional degree organised in trade 
unions, the Social Democratic party, and various other social and political organ-
isations of a Social Democratic bent, such as workers’ libraries, study groups 
and social organisations. 56 But the decline of imported and middle-class strike-
breakers is less well explained, and indeed an important topic for further research. 
The general strike of 1909 should be brought up here. The employers’ success-
ful use of strikebreakers in 1909 became well-known all across Europe, as is high-
lighted by Pierre Eichenberger’s chapter in this book. But it must be said that the 
strike itself, while massive in its extension and very important in the short run as it 
depleted the unions’ strike funds and caused a massive exodus of members, in the 
long run was less important than we would perhaps expect of a general strike. The 
fundamental factors leading to the conflict were, as Schiller showed in his bril-
liant dissertation,57 trivial and very mundane for the time – unions’ opposition to 
employers’ demands for wage-cutting in a recession. The binding together, during 
the years 1907–09, of such conflicts from various sectors, led to a breaking point. 
Schiller shows that after the three-day general strike for universal suffrage in 
1902, the issue of a general strike had been debated several times within the LO. 
The reason why a general strike was decided in 1909 was rather an issue of the 
transformation of quantity into quality – the long-standing, simmering conflicts 
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and interesting occurring in 1909. The LO leadership were tired of the recurrent 
demands for lowering wages and worried about how the internal left opposition 
could exploit rank and file dissent if the LO stood for a conciliatory policy vis-à-
vis the employers too many times. The resulting win for the employers was not 
surprising, but not very long-lasting either: after a very drastic drop in trade union 
affiliation as workers could not afford the union dues or became disgruntled, the 
unions started growing very rapidly again, and actually grew stronger than ever 
before, as their political allies in the Social Democratic party grew into a party of 
government and as the revolutionary threat during World War I strengthened the 
workers’ hand at the bargaining table. 58 
The growth of liberal reformism within the state apparatus 
We may wonder how the liberal reformist intelligentsia responded to increasing 
labour unrest. Research has shown that placing social liberals in the state appara-
tus could indeed decisively ameliorate class conflict.59 
In Sweden, Ernst Beckman, a leading left liberal, proposed in 1892 and 1893 
in the second chamber that the state must collect official statistics on labour con-
flicts. Science was needed to solve the “worker question”, Beckman maintained.60 
After Beckman’s proposals fell, the liberal suffrage movement leader David Berg-
ström proposed the same in 1895.61 Interestingly, Beckman’s proposal fell in the 
second chamber owing to fierce opposition from the leader of the New Country 
Party, A.P. Danielsson. Danielsson, who was the wealthiest farmer in the sec-
ond chamber and involved in various companies outside of the farm sector, was 
staunchly conservative. This divide between urban bourgeois liberals of the social 
liberal type and wealthy, conservative farmers is telling. 
Liberals did reach influence at the Swedish National Board of Trade ( Kom-
merskollegium) where around 1903, a group of liberal-minded social reformists 
gathered in the labour market section, led by Henning Elmquist.62 In this regard, 
as well as in employer organisations, Swedish labour market relations took a con-
ciliatory turn around 1905. 
At this time, despite the Staaff Laws, some evidence shows increased support 
for a more conciliatory industrial relations model among the liberal policy intel-
ligentsia and large employers. In 1906 this tendency became policy when the 
Liberal government led by Karl Staaff proposed the creation of a state mediation 
institute to get to grips with labour market conflicts. The very serious strikes and 
lockouts in the previous years, especially in the engineering industry, make a sub-
stantial background to this proposal. A recent study finds that mediation, which 
started in 1907, had a significant effect on the outcomes of conflict, increasing the 
share of compromises,63 but the important underlying question is how the media-
tors came to exist in the first place. 
Here we can trace the influence of the liberal urban intelligentsia. During the 
formative period 1904–06, proposals were also going in a very different direc-
tion. Conservative MPs in 1904 and 1905, inspired by the Taff Vale case in 
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responsible for any costs to employers from strikes.64 However, in 1905, when 
suffrage had been extended by wage growth and inflation that pushed workers and 
lower-middle-class people over the income limit for the right to vote, the Liberals 
and the Social Democrats won a majority in the second chamber. The Liberals in 
1906 could secure what Beckman and Bergström had proposed in 1892–95. The 
conservatives and representatives of industry in parliament though opposing state 
mediation, could not prevent it. 
Conclusion 
This paper started from two research questions. One, was the Swedish labour mar-
ket regime c. 1870–1914 uniquely liberal and labour-friendly? Two, if so, which 
were the social forces behind this exceptionalism – the strength of farmers, the 
liberalism of the bourgeoisie, or something else? 
The first has no easy answer. Swedish labour relations were certainly less vio-
lent in this period than in the US, France or Spain. However, it is not obvious that 
British labour relations were as oppressive as proponents of Swedish exceptional-
ism have argued. The reforms in the 1870s which ended complete repression of 
unions under criminal law accords rather well with the 1864 reform in Sweden.65 
While British unions were not completely immune from civil prosecution until 
1906, Acts of 1871 and 1875 limited the practical impact on unions, and “fear of 
the courts had little effect on union organisation or industrial conflict during the 
1890s”.66 The difference between Britain and Sweden is possibly not as great as 
might be supposed. Indeed, the phrase “collective laissez-faire” which proponents 
of Swedish exceptionalism use to describe the Swedish system, was invented by 
Otto Kahn-Freund to describe the British industrial relations system. 
While bloodshed was not the rule, however, the Swedish regime was not par-
ticularly labour-friendly or union friendly. Restrictions on agricultural labourers 
and servants, together with the pauperism regulations, served to discipline much 
of the labour force. That unions were not outlawed is true, but the freedom of 
speech restrictions represented by the 1887 “little socialist law”, 1889 “muzzle 
law” and 1906 Staaff Laws did restrain unions’ freedom of action, as did the anti-
strike measures of 1892 and 1899. It seems that employers in the tumultuous years 
around 1902–09 gradually thawed towards the existence of trade unions, even 
socialist ones. The 1907 mediation law seems to have been successful; labour 
market conflict declined somewhat in frequency and also shifted qualitatively, 
as fundamental issues of the right to organise became less common as ground 
for conflict, and a larger share of conflicts were about more pragmatic issues of 
wages and working conditions. Thus, while labour market conflict intensified in 
the 1920s, the conflicts were by then more within the existing system, than about 
(re-)shaping the industrial relations system wholesale. 
On question two, it seems clear that the political representation of farmers was 
no guarantee of workers’ civil rights. By the late nineteenth century, under the 
very restrictive income and wealth qualifications for the right to vote, farmer MPs 







74 Erik Bengtsson 
had material interests in anti-union policies.67 This erodes the old idea of farmers 
as liberal-democratic guarantors in Swedish politics or the driving force behind 
early social reforms.68 I have found that urban liberals such as Hedin and Man-
kell were the most consistent proponents of workers’ rights, but this in a sense is 
pleonastic, for I define this group not only by their urban residence and bourgeois 
class, but also by from their ideology. Other bourgeois MPs had much less interest 
in workers’ rights, and the capital-owners in the first chamber were on the other 
side of the debate; the élites of the first chamber at least until the mid-1890s acted 
as modernisers in economic policy, but without any interest in democratisation. 69 
However, the influence of social liberal policy élites in Swedish labour market 
relations in this period is interesting for further research. 
What seems to me unique, however, about the Swedish regulation of class rela-
tions c. 1870–1914 is not that there was any consensus around liberal rights – 
indeed, the class divide seems to have been much the same as in any other 
industrialising country. Class differences in wealth and incomes around 1900 were 
as wide in Sweden as in other industrial countries. However, the country’s means 
for handling class conflict were different. The exclusion of the working class from 
politics was as absolute as in any other country and the ruling élite contained few 
or no modern liberals. But workers were repressed less violently than in many 
countries. The thesis of Swedish exceptionalism seems overblown and reached by 
overestimating the degree of labour repression in other European countries, ignor-
ing agriculture and downplaying restrictions on free speech and union action. 
But there may still be something special about the relative bloodlessness of the 
Swedish case. Tentatively, I would like to hypothesise that this has very little to do 
with evidence of egalitarianism or democracy – Sweden offers little of either – but 
comes rather from its political culture, and more specifically from its repertoire 
of collective action from its own history. Tilly’s concept of “repertoires of con-
tention”, modes of collective action which persist over time through some kind 
of path dependency, is typically used to analyse popular politics, but I believe 
that the concept may be useful for élite politics too. 70 As Tilly argues, “contention 
accumulated its own history of shared beliefs, memories, models, precedents, and 
social ties”. This could be true also for Swedish élite political action: even though 
the economy was severely unequal, it could have involved a relatively light rep-
ertoire of repression. Repression, at least until the suffrage reforms of 1909 and 
1919, was especially carried out through the exclusiveness of the political system. 
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 5 State authorities, municipal forces 
and military intervention in the 
policing of strikes in Austria-
Hungary, 1890–1914 *
 Claire  Morelon 
In an interpellation in the Austrian Parliament in 1908, a Social Democratic dep-
uty denounced the actions of the police and gendarmerie in Troppau/Opava dur-
ing a masons’ strike: 
The attitude of district officer Klinger and the municipality of Troppau and 
its police towards the strikers is absolutely improper and unlawful. Instead of 
acting impartially, they place themselves at the service of the master builders. 
This of course damages the trust of the workers and, in general, their percep-
tion of justice, and undermines the authority of the officials. 1 
In early twentieth-century Austria-Hungary, in an age of growing democratisa-
tion, the expectation that authorities would be impartial in labour disputes had 
far-reaching consequences. The need to maintain public order, a cornerstone of 
state duties, increasingly faced competing challenges. From the 1890s to 1914, the 
number of strikes (and of strikers involved) significantly rose in Austria-Hungary 
in a context of growing industrialisation.2 Consequently, employers were putting 
more pressure on state authorities to intervene in the management of the strikes. At 
the same time, the push for democratisation (culminating in 1907 with the intro-
duction of universal and equal suffrage in parliamentary elections) and increased 
calls for constitutional rights to be respected meant that workers’ representatives 
demanded greater accountability from the Austrian government. 
This chapter examines how the Austrian state managed these competing
demands in the two decades before the First World War. It analyses the regulation 
of public order in the Habsburg monarchy by examining the interaction between 
the different authorities at the local level and the centres of power. The interplay 
between the various levels highlights the discrepancy between central decisions 
and local practices, as well as the regional differences across the vast Empire. We 
limit our focus here to the Austrian half of the Empire as the organisation of the 
police and gendarmerie forces in the Hungarian half was wholly separate and, 
hence, dissimilar. 3 The much narrower franchise and the systematic persecution 
of the workers’ movement also created a very different context where trade unions 
were barely tolerated and harsh repression of strikes was consistent with the law. 4 
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made severe measures more fraught. Through the topic of strikes, this chapter 
explores the strength of the rule of law on the ground.5 One of the important com-
ponents of this discussion was the role of the army in the repression of strikes, 
both in quelling unrest and in replacing strikers as a workforce. The increased 
militarisation of the monarchy in the lead-up to the war also had a strong influ-
ence on the debate.6 Detailed examination of administrative correspondence and 
public arguments reveals the contradictions faced by the Austrian state between 
demands of impartiality, lack of resources and more repressive attitudes. The 
examples from the various corners of Cisleithania discussed here are drawn from 
the archives of the Interior Ministry and Defence Ministry in Vienna as well as 
local archives to provide a more vivid picture of strike policing across the Empire. 
Strikes and public order
As the number of strikes grew towards the end of the nineteenth century, they 
increasingly became a matter of public order for local authorities in the Habsburg 
monarchy. The police apparatus in the Austrian half of the Empire had developed 
progressively since the 1850s. The security forces directly answerable to regional 
and district authorities were the gendarmerie and the state police. District officers 
in rural areas and smaller towns relied on gendarmerie units, while in larger cit-
ies (such as Vienna, Graz, Prague, Brünn/Brno, Lemberg/Lwów/L’viv, Cracow 
and Trieste/Trst), police headquarters ( Polizeidirektionen) supervised public 
safety. 7 The number of state police centres in Cisleithania rapidly increased in 
the last decades before 1914: new police commissariats (Polizeikommisariate) 
were established in Przemyśl (1892), Mährisch-Ostrau/Moravská Ostrava (1894), 
Pola/Pula (1903), Rovigno/Rovinj (1910) and Borysław/Boryslav (1913), and 
two new police headquarters were established in Czernowitz/Cernăuți/Chernitsvi 
(1905) and Laibach/Ljubljana (1913). Municipalities all over Cisleithania also 
employed and funded their own police forces. These municipal forces were fre-
quently involved in the policing of strikes. In contrast to the state police, local 
police forces were under the authority of the mayor and only assisted the state 
authorities.8 
State intervention in the policing of strikes was viewed through the prism of 
the state’s duty to maintain public peace. Local state authorities (district officers 
and police chiefs) therefore tended to monitor the development of strikes and call 
for reinforcements when necessary, but only intervened if the strike threatened to 
turn violent. The mobilisation of forces was gradual: if locally stationed forces 
were deemed insufficient, district officers called for gendarmerie reinforcements, 
even if they were not immediately deployed. Some regions, however, suffered 
from a greater shortage of gendarmerie troops. The district officer in Pisino/Pazin 
(Istria), for example, explained in 1909 that there were no gendarmes available 
in the district to be sent to the coal mines in Carpano/Krapan for an upcoming 
strike, as they were all mobilised elsewhere to prevent sheep thefts.9 The frequent 
“concentration” of gendarmes, moving from one district to another or even from 
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as the gendarmes needed to be transported and housed. For example, during the 
second half of 1911 alone, 1,700 gendarmes intervened in strikes in 64 locations 
in Bohemia. The Defence Ministry (which controlled the gendarmerie) charged 
the expenses incurred during such operations to the Interior Ministry. 10 Costs and 
available manpower were thus part of the considerations taken by local authorities 
when making decisions on intervention. Finally, in cases of larger demonstrations 
or fear of violence, authorities called for the support of army units. Use of the mil-
itary was officially intended to be the “utmost and last resource to maintain and 
restore public peace”.11 But in practice district officers sometimes asked for army 
support if there were insufficient numbers of gendarmes available in the area. 12 
During strikes, one of the main causes of violence – or disturbance to pub-
lic order in the official jargon – was the interaction between striking workers 
and “strikebreakers”, either workers from the factory who continued to work or 
imported workers brought in by the employers to replace the strikers. An example 
of these confrontations can be seen during a strike in 1906 at the large wagon 
factory in Nesselsdorf/Kopřivnice (Moravia), which employed several thousand 
workers. When 30 workers decided to resume work, the strikers attempted to dis-
suade them from going back with insults and shaming. The district officer imme-
diately took preventive measures and commented: “The entire location in its full 
extent had to be occupied by gendarmes to protect the few willing workers”.13 
During the following weeks, gendarmes accompanied the strikebreakers to and 
from the factory. As the strike continued and the number of strikebreakers grew, 
several small incidents occurred. On one day, the strikers blocked the road to a 
nearby town to stop 12 new workers on their way home. When these workers took 
the train instead, a crowd of 500 people came to meet them at the station, swing-
ing sticks and shouting insults and threats. Other incidents included rotten eggs or 
excrement being thrown at individuals in the street or outside the factory. Some 
windows of private homes were broken.14 The shaming rituals aimed at coerc-
ing non-striking workers into compliance with the strike and the frequent verbal 
threats and insults sometimes turned physical.15 The tactics against strikebreak-
ers recalled traditional forms of popular justice, such as charivaris, and can be 
traced back to the rural background of most of the workers at the time.16 From the 
employers’ point of view, police protection of “willing workers” at all times was 
essential to maintain their activity: the intention was to reassure the workers and 
encourage them to come back. In some cases, employers even armed the “willing” 
workers with revolvers to ensure they could protect themselves. During a lockout 
in Vienna in 1911, the  Arbeiter-Zeitung mocked the “little performance” of the 
factory owner leading his new, armed workers outside the factory. 17 
Employers regularly complained of the insufficient protection offered by the 
police forces to willing workers. In a letter to his district officer, a silk factory owner 
in Mährisch Trübau/Moravská Třebová (Moravia) outlined his expectations: 
[we ask for] the authorities’ protection against the threatening attacks of strik-
ing workers, which is due to us as citizens and taxpaying industrialists. . . . We
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activity with work-willing elements. [This support should consist in] preven-
tive measures to avoid trouble, especially attacks against the work-willing. . . . 
Without the provision of armed police forces the work-willing could never 
bring themselves to enter the workplace during the strike.18 
Furthermore, many employers wanted the state to outright eliminate any attempt 
by the workers to persuade others to join the strike. They thought that the legal 
restrictions on picketing did not go far enough. The 1870 law regulating the right 
of coalition did not ban individuals from standing near the establishment on strike 
or from giving out information; it merely specified that “intimidation” or violence 
could not be used for this purpose. In the early 1900s, as employers became more 
organised through professional associations, a movement emerged to push for 
reform of the current legislation. A memorandum sent to the Interior Ministry by 
the Union of Employers in Austria in 1906 asked for picket lines to be forbidden 
and for better protection of employers from the “terrorism” of striking workers. 
Numerous letters from employers all over Austria recounting their own experi-
ences of strikes were sent to the Interior Ministry in support of the initiative. 
A company in Littai/Litija (Carnolia) described a strike in their factory in the 
previous year where an “ever smaller group of workers terrorised the workers”, 
and demanded that the ministry “remove this unlawful terrorism”.19 A few years 
later, the employers’ mouthpiece still actively campaigned for tougher legislation 
on picketing in line with English and American laws and blamed the “backward 
mores and revolutionary excesses” during strikes on “the weakness and timidity 
of successive governments”.20 
The debate on picketing firmly revolved around the appropriate level of inter-
vention by state authorities. Social Democrat leaders complained of overzealous 
policing, which prevented workers from simply gathering or protesting outside 
factories. For example, seven people were arrested by the Trieste/Trst police for 
“bothering work-willing workers” during a strike of warehousemen in 1907. The 
Social Democratic newspaper Il Lavoratore criticised the behaviour of the police: 
when the strikers spotted a strikebreaker, they would whistle loudly at him, 
sneer at him and throw his betrayal in his face, then the [police] guards would 
move nervously, start performing ridiculous and useless “manoeuvres” and 
the mounted guards would press forward almost at a trot against the groups 
of warehousemen. . . . And whistling – there are judgments from the court of 
appeal – is not criminal!21 
Faced with recriminations from both sides, the government often stepped in to 
defend policing decisions made at the local level. The government’s official posi-
tion, as articulated in a speech by the interior minister in 1908, was to give some 
leeway to local officials in determining the extent and degree of the “intimida-
tion”. While acknowledging the strikers’ right to walk about and give out infor-
mation near the factory, the guidelines nevertheless underlined that pickets were 
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police forces. Authorities were entitled to intervene accordingly to maintain pub-
lic order. Replying to complaints about police action against pickets in Vienna, the 
minister insisted that they had not substantially deviated from these principles and 
that only in a few isolated cases had the chief of police needed to remind his men 
of the general instructions.22 
By the early twentieth century, police intervention during strikes was a highly 
political subject and authorities were called to account by both sides. Social Dem-
ocrats defended the workers’ right to strike and to demonstrate based on con-
stitutional freedoms, while employers lobbied for protection of “those workers 
willing to work” (Arbeitswillige). Contesting the very concept of strikebreaking, 
employers claimed they supported the freedom to choose to work, which should 
be guaranteed by the state.23 Discussions and efforts to change the law at the cen-
tral level constituted only one of the means used to influence policing practices. 
Another was to exert influence on local officials, whose responses varied greatly 
throughout the Empire. 
The state as umpire? Central principles and local practices 
As legislative change was slow and difficult to achieve, employers also attempted 
to put direct pressure on police forces. Complaints about the partiality of the 
local police surfaced in many towns throughout Cisleithania, the motives varying 
according to the political leanings of the municipal council. In Troppau/Opava 
(Silesia), Czech-speakers deplored the passive attitude of the municipal police 
against German youth violence.24 In Pola/Pula (Istria) policemen affiliated with 
the Italian liberals were accused of mistreating Croatian-speakers and political 
adversaries. After one such episode, the loyalist newspaper  Omnibus ran the title: 
“Down with the municipal guards! Send them all away!”25 In the case of labour 
disputes, Social Democrats frequently denounced the collusion between employ-
ers and municipal policemen, who, being directly answerable to the mayor, were con-
sidered to be more biased than gendarmes or soldiers. During a masons’ strike in 
Neutitschein/Nový Jičín (Moravia), a leaflet published by the strike committee 
accused the employers of “relying on the help of strikebreakers protected by the 
local police, whose leader is said to be a relative of the master-builder Blum”. 26 
Similarly, during the strike at the Witkowitz/Vítkovice steelworks in the Ostrava 
mining region in 1906, the workers saw the local police as acting on the orders of 
the management and referred to them as the “cossacks of the Vítkovice Czar”. 27 
Local policemen were also suspected of taking bribes or being pressured to act 
as guards for the employers.28 The Arbeiter-Zeitung commented on the case of a 
policeman who arrested striking laundresses for no reason in the suburbs of Vienna 
following the threat of an official complaint by the employer: “the police think 
they are the handmaidens of the employers and execute their orders blindly”.29 
The local police’s independence vis-à-vis district authorities also meant that offi-
cial recourse against them was not so effective. After a few incidents during a 
strike at a bike factory in Eger/Cheb (Bohemia) in 1912, the municipal chief of 
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willing workers to stop their activity. When Social Democrats complained to the 
district officer, the latter retorted that he had no influence over decisions taken by 
the autonomous police forces.30 
The fact that the limited municipal forces could more readily defend employ-
ers’ interests did not mean that employers did not resort to the state authorities or 
try to influence how they managed public order. The bloody repression of a large 
Social Democratic demonstration after the elections of 1907 in Przemyśl when 
the police charged into a peaceful crowd showed that a state police force was by 
no means a sufficient guarantee of impartiality. 31 In smaller localities, employers 
often directly requested the local district officer to provide gendarmerie protection 
or send reinforcements to areas where few men were permanently posted. In 1905, 
the previously quoted silk factory owner in Mährisch-Trübau/Moravská Třebová 
went so far as to ask the Interior Ministry to demote the district officer because he 
had refused to provide additional gendarmes and then call for the army to protect 
the willing workers. In his letter to the Moravian governor, the owner asked that 
a man “with more understanding of the situation and interests of the industry be 
nominated”. The district officer had made several attempts at negotiation, which 
had failed, and claimed that the protection offered was sufficient. 32 As strikes could 
last several weeks, the costs of maintaining troops from elsewhere weighed on offi-
cials’ decisions. A letter from the Union of Industrialists to the regional authorities 
defended the owner of an agricultural machinery factory in the Moravian country-
side and requested continued gendarmerie protection during a strike: 
It seems to us out of question that the granting of protection for the work-
willing should be somehow tied up with the issue of the costs of further gen-
darmerie protection. The question of the protection of the work-willing is a 
public law issue, which cannot be made dependent on the civil law factor of 
its costs.33 
The Union of Austrian industrialists created in 1897 often acted as an interme-
diary to relay complaints of poor public management of strikes. Another local 
branch of the union sent a telegram to the Moravian governor to request the ban-
ning of a worker’s demonstration in Sternberg/Šternberk (Moravia). 34 The union 
also backed a request to the Interior Ministry from a furniture factory in Buczko-
wice to have gendarmes posted there in order to deter socialist agitators (before 
a strike broke out). The company offered to house them for free. 35 To solve the 
difficult question of costs, companies in sparsely populated areas were sometimes 
prepared to make arrangements themselves to enable the gendarmes to stay. In 
anticipation of an upcoming strike, a mine owner in Carpano/Krapan (Istria) had 
built housing for the strikebreakers as well as a separate house for the gendar-
merie reinforcements.36 
For local state authorities, therefore, the relatively swift resolution of strikes had 
an impact on the mobilisation and use of public forces. The authorities in many 
cases tried to mediate between employers and workers in order to bring an end 
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who sent the minister of Justice to lead the negotiations during the 1900 coal 
miners’ strike, was a combination of pragmatism and respect for constitutional 
rights.37 State officials had often noticed that army or even gendarmerie interven-
tion exacerbated tensions and saw compromise as a more efficient method of con-
flict resolution. This ideal of mediation was very present in instructions from the 
Interior Ministry, but in practice it was often flouted in favour of force. Moreover, 
conceptions in Vienna ministries could clash with interests at the regional or local 
levels. During the 1904 strike among Borysław oil workers, the Galician gover-
nor Potocki, himself an owner of oil fields, defended the oil producers’ inflex-
ible stance despite pressure from the Vienna government to find a compromise. 
Potocki committed to the protection of willing workers with as many military 
troops as necessary. 38 Even so, employers found the number of soldiers mobilised 
insufficient and asked for more, promising to cover the transportation costs. 39 One 
of the oil companies sent a telegram to Koerber requesting additional troops and 
asked the English consul to also push for stronger army intervention, claiming 
that they feared for their own safety if soldiers did not intervene.40 
Furthermore, the necessity for impartiality in labour disputes was perceived 
differently across the various regions of Cisleithania. District officers in industrial 
regions such as Bohemia, Moravia, Upper and Lower Austria sometimes pub-
lished notices limiting picketing or sent out the police or the gendarmerie early 
on during strikes.41 But, conversely, there were also complaints of officials who 
favoured the strikers and examples of serious attempts at mediation. For example, 
in Marienbad/Mariánské Lázně (Bohemia) during a masons’ strike in 1903, the 
district officer “summoned” to negotiations the masters, who refused to comply 
and complained about the “improper form” of these summons in parliament.42 
During the aforementioned strike in the Nesselsdorf/Kopřivnice wagon factory 
in 1906 as the owners refused to recognise the workers’ organisation, the district 
officer negotiated separately over several days with the workers’ leaders and the 
head of the factory to come to an agreement.43 In contrast, the local district offi-
cers’ management of the massive field workers’ strike in Galicia in 1902 betrays 
a more immediate willingness to defend the employers’ position. The strike was 
one of the largest labour movements in the Late Habsburg Empire. It started in 
the early summer and lasted until September, spreading through 18 districts and 
in 386 towns in the Eastern part of the province.44 The day labourers, who would 
usually lend their services to the nearby large estate during harvest time collec-
tively refused to take up the work. The number of “strikers” is hard to estimate 
since entire villages participated in the boycott movement. To be able to proceed 
with the harvest, landowners recruited workers from other regions, mostly from 
the South or West of the province, but also from as far afield as Croatia. Vio-
lent incidents against the work-willing broke out in 121 towns. In Czernichowce/ 
Chernikhivtsi when a crowd of around a hundred people threw stones at gen-
darmes bringing workers back from an estate on a cart, the two gendarmes fired 
their weapons and wounded one man.45 
Local authorities often reacted to the strike by requesting army intervention. 
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commandeer the military to enable the foreign workers to bring in the harvest”.46 
Yet, the Viennese government had invited the local authorities early on to find 
an acceptable compromise for both parties by examining the peasants’ demands 
“strictly impartially” and, in managing public order, to avoid any “measure which 
could be misinterpreted as a one-sided exertion of influence by the government 
in favour of one party”.47 Ruthenian politicians, however, complained of the dis-
trict officials’ partiality and asked for employees from the Interior Ministry to be 
sent instead.48 In their complaints, they described several district officers in Gali-
cia who put out public notices to dissuade the peasants from joining the strikes 
and claimed that pressing for better conditions was against the law. The army 
was supposedly sent to one village before the strike had started.49 According to 
Deputy Andrii Kos, an army officer even reported that he had been instructed by 
an official from the governor’s office to “not spare” the population, “to harm them 
materially”, and he had the impression the official wanted to inflict revenge upon 
the striking peasants.50 Several episodes of violent repression were also criticised. 
In a small town in the district of Czortków/Chortkiv a crowd came to drive out 
the foreign workers who had been hired on the estate. To defend them, the army 
charged into the crowd and the gendarmes carried out a mass arrest of 137 people, 
who were locked in a barn for several days before being taken to the district 
capital for interrogation.51 In Jaktorów/Yaktoriv, near Lemberg/Lwów/L’viv, the 
cavalry attacked peasants who tried to prevent a reaping machine from being 
started up: five suffered light injuries, three more serious injuries, one of whom 
subsequently died.52 
Overall, 444 people were arrested during the summer. 53 Local authorities in 
Galicia did not acknowledge the workers’ right to strike and construed the strike 
as a national insurrection (many of the peasants in the region being Ruthenian-
speaking). Some of the measures taken against strikers, such as the forced bil-
leting of soldiers in private houses, were experienced as a punishment against 
politically active workers. The Galician governor’s detailed report to the Interior 
Ministry, which attempted to deflect criticism voiced in parliament and in the 
press, plays down the accounts of violence but tends to confirm the officials’ sym-
pathy for the landowners.54 In the eyes of the district officers and the governor, the 
peasants’ claims for constitutional rights of assembly or the right to strike were 
perceived as fundamentally illegitimate. The governor explained that the move-
ment could not be put on a par with the wage disputes in the Western provinces 
and that the field labourers had been manipulated by agitators, comments which 
reflected the Polish landowners’ prejudices against the peasantry. He also insisted 
on the “moral effect” on the population of the appearance of the military. His view 
was that the goal of army deployment was to show the peasants “the truth” of the 
situation and contradict the rumours that the strike was sanctioned by the state.55 
He deemed “fairy tales” the brochures that were circulating explaining the work-
ers’ right to strike. The automatic repressive measures (unlawful mass arrests, 
ordering the army to attack before violence had broken out) are confirmed by 
the reports and contrast with the management of strikes elsewhere. It also clearly 
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but saw their duty as lying in harsh repression of the movement. The notion of 
labour conflicts as legitimate forms of action and of workers as equal citizens was 
emerging slowly in Late Habsburg Austria and was not uniformly respected. The 
variations reflected local arrangements or interests but also more fundamentally, 
sometimes, as in the case of Galicia, the local officials’ lack of recognition of 
constitutional rights. 
 Military assistance 
The systematic deployment of military units during the agricultural strike of
1902 led to complaints of violence and raised questions about the use of aux-
iliary brute force (Brachialgewalt) in dealing with labour unrest. In spite of its
length and territorial extent, the strike resulted in few serious casualties: many
peasants were injured, but only one died. However, that same summer in the
province’s capital, Lemberg/Lwów/L’viv, five men were killed by the army in
repressing a construction workers’ strike. 56 In the last decades before the First
World War, the army was still frequently deployed to quell unrest (strikes or
demonstrations) and many citizens still died from the weapons of their own
military. Army assistance was supposed to be a means of last resort. Official
regulations stipulated that it should only be used when all other possibilities
for reinforcement, whether gendarmerie or police forces, had been exhausted.
Indeed authorities often resisted calls for army dispatches. For example despite
pressure from the population for army intervention following fears of peasant
unrest in Bukovina in 1907, the governor insisted on respecting the regulations
and not calling the army too quickly. 57 In contrast, local officials in Hungary
called on soldiers more readily and army officers themselves deplored what
they saw as a misuse of military forces for political aims in the Eastern half of
the Empire.58 Austrian parliamentary deputies also complained about the use
of the Common Army to influence elections in Hungary, questioning the burden
of such “assistance” on the common budget.59 In Croatia-Slavonia, too, military
reinforcements were a common means of quelling unrest, for example during
the 1897 rural protests.60 
The growing illegitimacy of sending in troops against the home population 
and the complaints from the Social Democrats meant that army intervention, 
especially when it resulted in casualties, increasingly had to be justified. In this 
respect, national unrest sometimes furnished a useful explanation. In the case of 
the stokers’ strike in Trieste, where 14 people were killed by the army, the spec-
tre of irredentist agitators justified the army’s prompt and firm response, even 
in the eyes of the liberal Neue Freie Presse.61 In fact, the strike was led by the 
local Social Democrats and had no connection to irredentism. Similarly, in Galicia 
the local administration presented the 1902 field workers’ strike as the work of 
Ruthenian anti-Polish agitators and hence a threat to the state in order to justify 
harsh repression and the intervention of the army. 62 In reality, even the Ruthenian 
National Deputy Andrii Kos acknowledged that the strike had purely economic 
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gather wood) clearly point to classic peasant/landowner issues.63 The threat of 
an insurrection or nationalist tendencies allowed justifying ex post the heavy-
handedness of the repression.64 
These two examples should not mislead us into thinking that army violence 
only took place on the periphery or that it was only there that it was lethal. Accusa-
tions of subversion or treason as a means to suppress labour unrest had its roots in 
earlier measures against strikes in the 1870s and 1880s.65 Moreover, army troops 
sent to deal with demonstrators led to deaths in Graz during the Badeni riots of 
1897, in the Bohemian Lands in 1905 and even in Vienna itself, where four work-
ers were killed during cost-of-living riots in 1911. 66 As Social Democrat deputy 
Karl Leuthner claimed in 1912, “in Austria and Hungary there is more shooting 
than anywhere in Europe: for every election, every larger strike, every turbulent 
demonstration”.67 By 1914, most large cities in the Empire had witnessed a bloody 
episode of army repression in the preceding 20 years. 
The army, for its part, perceived the recourse to military assistance by civilian 
authorities as potentially damaging to its prestige. In a 1911 note, the Military 
Chancellery commented on the recent use of military assistance that it had lost 
its “imposing effect on the people” in the last few years. Instead of dampening 
agitation, military intervention often exacerbated it and turned the crowd against 
the military. When weapons were used, there were discussions in parliament as to 
whether it was justified or not, which were then publicised in the press. Without 
weapons, the soldiers might have to endure the scorn of jeering crowds for days, 
which “shattered the troops’ standing ( Ansehen)”. The Military Chancellor criti-
cised the use of assistance troops for “scare effect” ( zum Bangemachen ) rather 
than for the “restoration of public order”. Frequent use of army troops inured 
people to the “scare effect” and they became used to the “harmlessness” of the 
assistance troops. The note concluded that 
if the civil servant had to be answerable for “fetching the military” to the 
same extent as the officer is for the use of force, . . . the mob would already 
scatter at the approach of the military and the number of “victims” would sink 
significantly. 68 
In the eyes of military leaders, the civilian authorities’ overreliance on the army in 
case of unrest undermined both the standing of the army as an institution and the 
effectiveness of the assistance itself. 69 The consequences of these interventions 
could be unpleasant and could aggravate the relationship between the civilian 
population and the local garrison. In a context of general conscription, it was 
important to maintain the army’s good standing in society. Local commanders 
might be tempted to mend their relationship with the town’s inhabitants after the 
use of violence. The military command in Brüx/Most (Bohemia) was thus strictly 
forbidden from giving the press or the municipality “excuses or explanations” 
as this could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. The decree sent to all military 
commands acknowledged the difficult position of local officers but asked them in 
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assistance meant that the soldiers would be attacking not a foreign enemy, but 
workers, sometimes women and children, in defence of private property. 71 The 
soldiers perceived the task as highly unrewarding and army officers considered it 
an “unpleasant duty”.72 
The debate on the role of military intervention in strikes concerned not just the 
casualties induced by the repressive measures. Despite strong Social Democratic 
opposition to the practice, soldiers still sometimes took the place of strikers to 
ensure continuity of production. For example, during the highly publicised brick-
layers’ strike of 1895 in Vienna, which prompted a wider discussion in the press 
and parliament on army and gendarmerie intervention during strikes (in this case 
leading to one death) and on the harsh conditions of workers, complaints also 
targeted the use of soldiers as strikebreakers. The interior minister insisted that 
only a few men had been hired “in their free time” (even the Arbeiter-Zeitung
considered it “insignificant”), but it was seen as compromising the government’s 
position. The troops themselves were quickly withdrawn after the parliamentary 
debate.73 Officially, posting soldiers for work purposes was condemned and could 
only take place by express authorisation from the emperor. Whereas in the 1870s 
it was still accepted in exceptional cases, especially if the food supply was threat-
ened, as it was, for example, during bakers’ strikes, a War Ministry decree of 1889 
severely limited the provision of soldiers for economic assistance. The decree 
forbade a military command from taking such a measure without authorisation 
from the War Ministry and made it contingent upon approval from the imperial 
military chancellery, which was mostly refused. 74 In practice, however, ad-hoc 
arrangements and the lending of soldiers still happened, even though they were 
not part of a systematic policy. In Trieste in 1902, the Austro-Hungarian navy 
provided the private company Lloyd with stokers to replace the strikers. The 
Minister of Commerce justified the navy’s action by the need to maintain postal
traffic in the public interest, claiming that the military stokers only worked
on ships also carrying mail.75 During a citywide strike of textile workers in
Reichenberg/Liberec in 1904, a tailor whose workforce was on strike received
the help of a few military tailors to complete orders of army uniforms. The
governor similarly insisted that the military tailors had not worked on the pro-
duction of civilian clothes.76 
Asking for soldiers to perform the work of strikers was increasingly not sim-
ply a temporary improvised expedient, but part of a double strategy to defend 
the national economy in the lead-up to the war, first by ensuring uninterrupted 
services in key sectors, and second by undermining the Social Democratic move-
ment. The strike wave of 1905 spawned demand for the systematic deployment of 
soldiers in strategic industries, such as bakeries, butchers, printers, transportation 
facilities, communication services and gas and water works. The risk of a general 
strike in the wake of the Russian revolution and the movement for universal suf-
frage was considered enough of an emergency to call for the use of soldiers to 
guarantee the continuation of food and energy supplies, as well as official printing 
presses. The governors in Lemberg/Lwów/L’viv and Linz had turned directly to 
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help in the food industries in case a general strike broke out. The Bohemian gov-
ernor explained the double goal of using the military against a general strike: 
it is on the one hand an important state interest to weaken the effect of this 
Social Democratic weapon, but also to counter the damage caused to the 
public by a disrupted food supply and forced stoppage of lighting and water 
works. It would be a great asset, in this respect, if the most important services 
could be maintained through the provision of a military workforce.77 
The War Ministry, however, reminded regional military commanders that soldiers 
were prohibited from working for private businesses. This position sought to pre-
serve military discipline and military standing and spare the men from possible 
insults from strikers and also avoid fragmenting forces when they might be needed 
to restore order. If the situation were to become serious, the ministry was prepared 
to furnish goods from its own bakeries and stocks rather than a workforce.78 
The notion that several key activities were too indispensable to be disrupted 
and that the army should then step in to maintain them came to be further rein-
forced in the following years. Army troops were indeed used to guarantee conti-
nuity of service, especially in larger cities. In 1908, during a strike at the Budapest 
gas works, 300 soldiers from the Common Army were mobilised to work for the 
private company while additional troops were sent to maintain order. This mas-
sive recourse to common soldiers generated outrage among Social Democrats, 
who saw the official justification, that the lights could not go out in the second 
largest city in the Empire, as a mere excuse. 79 Similarly, in Cracow in 1913, 40 
soldiers replaced striking gas workers.80 
The demonstrations and strikes in 1905 had not led to a paralysis of the econ-
omy, but the “passive resistance” of railway workers in November of that year had 
demonstrated the potential damage a general stoppage would cause.81 In nearby 
Hungary, the weeklong strike among railway workers in 1904 had been crushed by 
the Tisza government through mobilisation of the workers into the  Honvéd (Hun-
garian army).82 Faced with the possibility of another movement among railway 
workers in Cisleithania, the emperor gave preventive authorisation for the partial 
mobilisation of reservist railway workers in 1907, 1908 and again in 1911. 83 In 
1907, the general inspector of railways considered that military personnel should 
be available as temporary helpers for the good “order of a service so essential 
for the defence power”.84 A project law was even drafted in 1908. 85 The Rail-
way Ministry pushed for military intervention in the case of passive resistance, 
as it endangered not only the economy but also the “the fighting capacity of the 
Empire”.86 By 1912, the War Ministry had somewhat changed its position regard-
ing economic assistance and considered it perfectly valid to maintain train traffic, 
especially since disruption could create problems for the smooth mobilisation of 
troops in the event of war. As its preferred solution, however, the ministry recom-
mended passing a law to make “passive resistance” a punishable offence, as was 
the case in Hungary. 87 In Hungarian law, the concerted refusal to work was a crime 
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1904 railway strike.88 Social Democrats denounced the “militarisation of railway 
workers” entailed in the project to mobilise railway employees.89 Following a 
strike among state employees (especially postal workers) in Trieste in 1911, Social 
Democrat deputy Pittoni questioned the legality of replacing strikers with soldiers 
to combat passive resistance, calling it an “anti-constitutional measure”.90 
The debate in parliament and Pittoni’s interpellation led to an inter-ministerial 
conference in early 1914 to determine the extent to which the military could be 
drawn upon to replace state employees. According to the final report, the commis-
sion considered that recourse to the military in state services was not a negation 
of constitutional rights. If “passive resistance” in economic public establishments 
endangered “public safety, peace and order,” then replacement with soldiers was 
justified. The railway sector fell in this category: it provoked as much disruption as 
a riot, since it threatened the common well-being through its effect on supply routes, 
the national economy and social life. The other sectors considered indispensable to 
the smooth continuation of economic life were coal production in certain cases and 
the postal and telegraph services. Moreover, “protection of the endangered public 
interest” required military forces to be drawn on not only to replace state railway 
employees but also employees of private railway companies in order to maintain 
operations.91 These provisions, which made the increased recourse to soldiers to 
replace strikers acceptable, corresponded to similar measures in France and Italy at 
the time. They also did not stand out in the context of the increased militarisation of 
the Habsburg monarchy immediately before the war. The War Production Law of 
1912, which laid out plans for potential military mobilisation of the economy, had 
already given the military substantial control over labour relations in case of war. 
Measures to use the military to counter strikes of state employees were a logical 
extension of the militarisation effort driven by preparations for war. 92 
The intervention of authorities to maintain public order during strikes offers a 
case study in the articulation of the different layers of power in Habsburg Aus-
tria. The concrete mechanisms of containing violence during strikes reveal the 
links between the state as guarantor of public safety, the municipalities and the 
army. The gradual deployment of police, gendarmerie and army forces left local 
officials with a wide margin of appreciation within the limits of the general reg-
ulations. Many complaints about biases were lodged from both the side of the 
employers and the side of the workers’ organisations. Employers took for granted 
that the Austrian state would intervene to further industrial interests. An ideal of 
impartiality on the part of the Austrian state in labour disputes definitely existed 
and was promoted by the Interior Ministry, at least from the Koerber era onwards. 
However, state intervention could take a different form at the local level, high-
lighting the chasm between theory and practice. Sometimes, local officials, as in 
Galicia, dismissed workers’ actions as automatically illegitimate and fell back on 
earlier methods of discrediting strikes by treating them as state subversion. The 
Austrian state was not blind to the effects of harsh repression on public opinion 
and was concerned by its potential for undermining state legitimacy. The public’s 
attitude towards the use of soldiers as strikebreakers provides, in this sense, a 
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benchmark for the transformations in the last decades before 1914. While the 
practice was increasingly disdained around the turn of the century, it gained new 
legitimacy from the militarisation of the economy that wartime necessitated as it 
was felt that a patriotic emergency trumped considerations of the rule of law. This 
course would only be further reinforced through the increased military control of 
society during the First World War. 
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 6 Employers of the world, unite! 
The transnational mobilisation of 
industrialists around World War I 
 Pierre  Eichenberger 
“The social explosiveness of capitalism increased”, writes Jürgen Kocka, when 
“It began to expand from the sphere of circulation to the sphere of production 
and to reshape the world of work directly”.1 The Industrial Revolution, the rise 
of the factory and the dynamics of capitalist investment were global phenomena. 
They changed the world of work as men and women left their rural and semi-rural 
lives to become like cogs, semi-automatons in the production of vast amounts of 
manufactured goods, which in turn generated streams of cash for the factory own-
ers. Workers, however, soon embraced internationalist agendas to advance their 
political rights in society and prevent wages and working conditions racing to the 
bottom; “Workers of the world, unite!” famously urged Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels in 1848.2 The successive international gatherings of political parties of the 
left are important benchmarks in working class cooperation, from the Communist 
League (established in 1847), to the First (1864), Second (1889), Third (1919) 
and Fourth (1938) Internationales. Trade unions also enthusiastically welcomed 
internationalist agendas. Bricklayers, miners, stonemasons, transport workers and 
woodworkers established international federations before the end of the nine-
teenth century. An International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centres was 
created in 1901 and was transformed into the International Federation of Trade 
Unions (IFTU) in 1913.3 
As a consequence, workers’ uprisings and the desire to protest and strike spread 
across the world. Eric Hobsbawm described the “Springtime of the Peoples”, in 
1848, as “the first potentially global revolution”; while the 1871 Paris Commune 
and its bloody repression sent out a global shockwave. Even before the rulers 
of Austria, Germany and Russia created the Three Emperors’ League in 1873 
to combat the threat from workers collaborating internationally – a “capitalists’
counter-International” 4 – French lawyer Léon Chotteau (1838–95) criticised 
the “apathy and inertia of capital” and suggested that employers’ best option to 
prevent such social uprisings was to create an “Association Internationale des 
Patrons”, composed of an international council made up of national and local 
divisions, which would spearhead ambitious plans of social reform. “So, industri-
alists and traders, rise!” he wrote in his brochure.5 Chotteau’s initiative failed to 
take wing and fly, though; only two industrialists showed up at the general gather-
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unsuccessful was the initiative of the Paris British Chamber of Commerce in 
1874–75 to create a “Chambre de Commerce Internationale” in order to provide 
a private international forum to debate commercial issues.6 The idea of an Inter-
nationale in the employers’ camp was floated again during the wave of strikes 
around 1900, but only in 1920 would the International Organisation of Industrial 
Employers (IOIE) be finally founded, with a light secretariat in Brussels, as a 
rallying point for employers’ representation in the new (tripartite) International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). During one of the first meetings of the new organ-
isation, Allan Smith (1871–1941), chairman of the British National Confedera-
tion of Employers’ Organisations, told his fellow employers’ delegates, who were 
from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland, why the 
foundation of the IOIE was necessary. The minutes quote: 
He laid stress on the importance of employers realising the great responsibil-
ity which rested on them in these days, when from so many quarters, even 
from certain Government officials, strong attacks were being made on capital 
and private ownership, and how they must recognise the significance of these 
attacks and get together and discuss all aspects of industry. He thought this 
could not be done satisfactorily in these days of the International Labour 
Organisation without the employers of labour meeting internationally and 
discussing their difficulties and striving to bring about uniformity of action as 
far as such was practicable, and thus vindicate beliefs in the duties and neces-
sities, in the interests of the world’s trade, of private employers of labour. 7 
From Paris to Brussels, via Zurich, Turin, Stockholm and Washington, this
chapter tells the story of employers’ transnational collaborations to unite and 
mobilise against labour’s political, economic and social challenges. At the centre 
of this story are employers’ associations, which specialised in addressing issues 
related to labour, most importantly about strikes. Created around 1900, these asso-
ciations were vastly different from the older trade associations and chambers of 
commerce. The literature is rich with many case studies of capitalists’ individual 
and collective actions, and investigations have been made of both trade asso-
ciations and chambers of commerce (in which capitalists act as businessmen) 
and employers’ associations (in which capitalists are represented as employ-
ers of labour). While these different bodies – and their actions – should not be 
regarded as separate entities, as they constitute “an integrated area of research 
in which market trends, technological innovations, entrepreneurial strategies, 
industrial relations and political concerns are all interrelated”, the history of trade 
and employers’ associations is one of separate dynamics in response to specific 
challenges. Numerous studies have shown that while most national trade associa-
tions were created in the last third of the nineteenth century in response to the 
increasing intervention of the state in the economy and the imposition of tariffs – 
“organized capitalism” – most employers’ associations were created after 1900 
specifically to combat increasing labour militancy, in workplaces and in societies, 
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fight trade unionism were, however, created as early as 1890, like Britain’s Ship-
ping Federation, founded in reaction to the London dock strike of 1889, and the 
Arbeitgeberverband Hamburg-Altona, which mobilised employers in this strong-
hold of German trade unionism.8 
Strikes “had launched a cycle of worker-employer strife whose ultimate destina-
tion no one could predict”, Daniel Rodgers writes, and industrialists had the most
to lose from workers’ mobilisation and the new world order that internationally
minded socialists wanted to create. Nations on both sides of the Atlantic around
1900 were hence haunted by the “social question”, which opened up a battlefield
between “a world of competing solutions”. The mobilisation of employers in pro-
fessional, well-founded and disciplined associations, I seek to demonstrate in this
chapter, was part of this battle. The foundation of employers’ associations took a
good share of wind from unions’ sails, reinforced the most reactionary elements
among employers and conservative governments, and gave the upper hand to the
employers that chose not to compromise with workers, but to confront them. In most
countries, employers’ self-organised defence pre-dated the first significant interven-
tions by the state in the labour market and in social policies, which massively pre-
empted the range of possibilities that could be implemented afterwards because it
solidified a “constituted field of interests” that would prove difficult to overcome. 9 
In other words, the employers got the first shots in, in many countries. This chapter
argues that employers’ associations were pivotal in the conservative response of
industrialists to progressive ideas promoted by the labour movement; “Reactionary
Avant-Gardes”, wrote Hans Ulrich Jost. They were against (industrial) democracy,
welfare policies and economic redistribution, and they fashioned conservatism dur-
ing the Belle Époque in ways that are only now beginning to be fully understood.10 
While most studies of employers’ mobilisation have concentrated on regional 
or national analyses, this chapter will consider the foundation of employers’ asso-
ciations as a distinct transnational event, because the reasons why they were 
created, their respective constitutions and their actions all followed clear trans-
national patterns. The men – and very few women – and organisations involved 
in that process that would meet in the IOIE in 1920 had established powerful 
local, sectoral and national employers’ associations around 1900 that convened 
internationally, learnt from one another, and built social, political and economic 
influence, from their local town hall to Geneva’s Palais des Nations, in complex 
jeux d’échelles.11 Because global history is “both an object of study and a particu-
lar way of looking at history”, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that “what we 
call the ‘local’ is replete with elements of ‘global’ origins and vice versa”, hence 
illustrating that internationalism was as important a factor in employers’ collec-
tive action as it was for the representatives of labour. 12 As regards employers, 
however, as Philippa Hetherington and Glenda Sluga show, there was an illiberal 
internationalism that was locked into a continuous interaction with liberal inter-
nationalism.13 The chapter begins by discussing the transnational contacts that 
framed the creation of European employers’ associations before World War I, then 
progresses to the genesis of the IOIE, in which all of these contacts crystallised 
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The “social question” and the creation of employers’
associations 
In 1909, Swiss socialist leader and trade unionist Robert Grimm (1881–1958) 
advanced his view that the creation of employers’ associations had dramatically 
changed the labour movement. He wrote: 
The times when trade unions could mow down one firm after the other are 
gone forever. Every raid on a firm is henceforth considered as a declaration of 
war on all employers. Immediately, the employers’ federation enters the game 
and puts all its force to crack down on any strike and to make it ineffective. 
Worried by what he called “employers’ terrorism”, but ready to take on this new 
challenge he rhetorically asked whether coalesced employers, “would succeed in 
preventing strikes forever and in demolishing trade unions?”14 Just a year later, 
Eduard Sulzer-Ziegler (1854–1913), a major Swiss industrialist from the Sulzer 
company in Winterthur, warned his fellow employers about the dangers of the 
labour movement, as it “had declared a war on the entire social order, capital-
ism in general and the firm in particular”. “Si vis pacem, para bellum” explained 
Sulzer-Ziegler: “If the employers want peace, they must unite; otherwise, if they 
fail to unite, if they do not get prepared for the war, then they will have the war as 
a matter of certainty”.15 
In Switzerland, strikes had reached their peak in around 1905–06, but this pat-
tern of behaviour was replicated all over the industrialised world. At the turn of 
the century, trade unions and employers’ associations both grew increasingly well 
organised, with each side claiming that they needed to be ready and able to face 
a better coordinated opposite side. “In every instance, the organization of labor 
is more extensive than that of the capital employing the labor”, wrote the Illi-
nois Coal Operators Association in 1901. 16 In addition, in some places, the state, 
although not remotely as interventionist as it would become directly after the war, 
and then to a greater extent in the 1930s, did not stay totally inactive. In 1902, a 
massive coal strike in Pennsylvania caused a coal shortage in the US that led to 
Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919) intervening and imposing a mediated agree-
ment. Laws on arbitration and extension of collective labour agreements were 
still in their early stages, but it was becoming clear that the fight to alter public 
intervention would become a much higher priority for employers. Another source 
of concern for employers was the fact that from 1899 – when for the first time, a 
socialist became part of the French government – employers started to doubt the 
state’s resolve to take their side in the face of threats from the labour movement, 
a threat they perceived as existential. In fact, social policy and/or labour market 
regulations gained global traction around 1900, as Daniel Rodgers highlighted,17 
and all employers had to face them in one way or another. 
Industrialists all over the world watched strikes erupting and the labour move-
ment becoming better organised. Industrialists viewed this as socially, eco-
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qualitative changes also took place: for instance the general strike became another 
weapon in the unions’ armoury. Swedish trade unions organised a two-day general 
strike to gain political rights, just like Austrian and Belgian unions did. The Ger-
man Social Democrats of the SPD passed a resolution in 1905 in support of the use 
of general strikes to advance political rights.18 In response, numerous publications 
urged industrialists to meet this challenge by the foundation of associations of 
defence: “Gründet Arbeitgeberverbände!” (“Create Employers’ Associations!”) 
wrote Wilhelm Georg Heinrich von Reiswitz (1859–1926), the secretary of the 
Arbeitgeberverband Hamburg-Altona in 1904. 19 Such calls to action put forward 
the argument that: 
The individual employer confronted with organised workers is at a disadvan-
tage. Often, he must choose between binding to the demands that workers 
and their leaders dictate, or to stop his business altogether. This evil can be 
solved thanks to the organization of employers, so that unjustified workers’
claims can be denied. But, for business activities to be safeguarded from 
economic damages, one should not wait that workers’ said unjustified claims 
be formulated; the collective action must have been prepared for a long time 
already, and an organization must be created which is not only valid for one 
single case, but for all cases.20 
Those publications reviewed foreign experiences in Britain and in Germany, in 
Sweden or in the USA, and adapted such models to their local context. 
Large extended strikes motivated business owners to create employers’ associa-
tions in a region, sector or nation. Transnational waves of activity sprang up, from 
Pittsburgh to the Ruhr region, from Petersburg to Turin. All over Europe, employers
were confronted with similar events. Their response often varied, though, between 
the stick and the carrot, and syncretic plans combining strikes insurances, lockouts 
and the provision of strikebreakers were regularly promoted alongside plans of 
social reform and negotiations with trade unions.21 Large industrial companies were 
the spearhead of this movement. Copenhagen’s heavy industry firms had already 
created the Foreningen af Fabrikanter i Jernindustrien i København in 1885, fol-
lowed by the national Arbejdsgivere inden for Jernindustrien i Danmark in 1902. 
British employers founded the Engineering Employers’ Federation in 1896, French 
employers created the Union des Industries Métallurgiques et Minières in 1901, 
and Swedish industrial companies founded the Svenska Arbetsgifvareföreningen 
SAF in 1902 in response to the general strike. In response to the 1903–04 Crim-
mitschauer strike in Germany (in the textile industry), employers established the 
Hauptstelle der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände in 1904;22 the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, which had been founded in 1895 in Cincinnati, refocused 
its action against trade unions in 1903; and the Swiss machine industrialists created 
the Arbeitgeberverband der Maschinenindustrieller in 1905, which in turn joined 
with similar associations from the textile and construction industries to create a 
centralised association, the Zentralverband Schweizerischer Arbeitgeber Organ-
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As Grimm noted in 1909, the literature has highlighted the way that the cre-
ation of employers’ associations turned the tide in industrial conflicts during the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Nicolas Delalande underlines the importance 
of the new strikes’ insurances created by employers’ associations, 23 and Leopold 
Haimson writes that these new associations offered an “increasingly ferocious 
resistance” to threats to managerial power, strikes in particular. With Germany in 
mind, Haimson highlights 
the ability and will that employers, especially those of large metal and
mechanical firms, displayed individually and in concert in resorting to the 
use of blacklists, lockouts, as well as “yellow” unions, to stifle labor protest 
and to destroy the effectiveness of existing trade unions organizations. 24 
The deployment of strikebreakers became a very useful weapon of the employ-
ers with which to confront strikes, while lockouts became an effective tool for 
well-funded employers’ associations, as they would dry up trade unions’ strike 
insurance funds.25 Violence was not rare, in particular in the USA, where the 
Pinkerton detective agency became an option for employers, but also in Britain, 
where the Shipping Federation used private guards to protect strikebreakers and 
oppose industrial democracy in ways that “explicitly called into question the 
state’s monopoly of violence”. 26 There were often “bloodless victories” won by 
the employers, though, whereby management exercised its power by alternative 
means.27 On both sides of the Atlantic, employers’ associations initiated anti-union 
policies, political measures aimed at the authorities and political parties and mea-
sures aimed at the discipline of their own members. Their attitude to blacklists 
or lockouts was that they must be rigorously implemented, with no room for ill-
discipline. To achieve this those associations gathered more expensive contribu-
tions from their members to finance the strike insurances and propaganda and 
imposed strong discipline on their members.28 
These associations’ creation marked the changing balance of power between 
labour and capital. In 1905, Swedish employers started using lockouts on a large 
scale, with Siemens managing to destroy labour unions in its plants and usurping 
them with a scientific mixture of repression and targeted social policies. 29 Employ-
ers would often resort to appealing to nationalist sentiments, using unions’ interna-
tionalist agenda strategically against them. Strikes, indeed, instigated diverse sorts 
of migrations, with international solidarity fundraising for strikers and the inter-
national exchange of strikebreakers between employers. Christian Koller argues 
that “strikes and strike-related transnational migration [of locked-out workers and 
strikebreakers] were the main causes of international cooperation between national 
trade unions and employer organizations”. 30 In addition, strikes tended to evolve in 
waves that would swipe entire regions and reverberate from places to places, hence 
becoming increasingly European in scope and sometimes even transatlantic; this 
made strikes and strikers particularly vulnerable to xenophobic bashing.31 
Men who would prove instrumental in the creation of employers’ associations, 
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associations, chambers of commerce and international conferences on social pol-
icy. From 1905 onwards, thousands of business delegates from all over the world 
discussed issues related to ever-increasing economic global exchanges in the 
International Congresses of Chambers of Commerce and Commercial and Indus-
trial Associations, which took place every second year in a European or American 
town. In the preparation for the Milan gathering of 1906, a brochure described 
the organisation of chambers of commerce in 31 separate countries, the explicit 
aim being to promote the exchange of practices and mutual understanding among 
businesspeople from whatever part of the world they came from.32 
For the unions and social reformists, after the first international conference for 
the protection of labour took place in Berlin in 1890, social policy debates gained 
an increasingly explicit international dimension too. Up to World War I, many 
international conferences – initiated by social reformists and trade unionists – 
promoted the idea of developing an international set of labour standards and social 
protection measures. A significant result of this was the creation of the Interna-
tional Association for Labor Legislation (IALL), which was founded in 1900 with 
headquarters in Basel and was considered as a frontrunner for the ILO in 1919. 
Not all employers frontally opposed international labour regulations, as level-
ling the playing field might appeal to some of them. Sulzer-Ziegler, for instance, 
was a delegate in the IALL. In this domain, he followed a tradition pioneered by 
Welsh progressive industrialist Robert Owen (1771–1858) and Frenchman Daniel 
Legrand (1783–1859).33 
Strikes and the international organisation of the labour movement provided 
another reason for employers to build international collaborations. Following 
strikes running across borders (like in 1904–05 throughout Germany and Swit-
zerland), employers took international trips to see how their foreign counterparts 
dealt with such actions, and how they fought back. Key actors of employers’
movements in different countries thus had sustained exchanges; Sulzer-Ziegler 
and Alexander Tille (1866–1912), an important organiser of German employers, 
deputy secretary of the Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller and social Dar-
winist philosopher, knew each other well. 34 Another Swiss machine industrialist, 
Gustave Naville (1848–1929), who was a key figure in the 1905 foundation of 
the Arbeitgeberverband schweiz. Maschinenindustrieller, went to Munich, Berlin 
and Nuremberg to study how his German colleagues operated before laying down 
the plans of the future Swiss organisation. In this last city, Naville met with the 
director of the Maschinenfabriken Augsburg-Nürnberg AG (MAN) , Anton Johann 
von Rieppel (1852–1926). In 1905, Rieppel was president of the Verband Bayer 
Metallindustrieller and had just dealt with an important strike, which concerned 
the labour unions’ demand to sign a collective agreement, a demand that German 
and Swiss employers rejected. In those days, German employers were among the 
most advanced in their ability to counter labour unions, and Naville came back 
with a clear idea of what needed to be done in Switzerland. Back from his trip, he 
remarked that “Everywhere, the necessity to create stronger organizations, with 
a permanent secretariat and sufficient means at their disposable, is shared”. 35 It 
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some of the key Swiss machinery industry firms, like Escher Wyss, the firm in 
which Naville had made his career. Normal business competition between firms 
was therefore no barrier to preventing key industrialists from helping one another 
to deal with major waves of strike action. In the same way, the 1908 establishment 
of the Swiss Zentralverband Schweizerischer Arbeitgeber Organisationen was 
majorly influenced by Germany. 36 
Indices of employers’ new organisational efficiency can be found in the full-
blown victory for Swedish employers in the 1909 general strike; this incited 
major interest in Europe, and not only because European trade unions massively 
helped with funds to strike in solidarity with their Swedish comrades.37 The Sven-
ska Arbetsgifvareföreningen actually initiated the hostilities through lockouts. Its 
director, Hjalmar von Sydow (1862–1932), who was in charge on the employ-
ers’ side, received visits of Europeans eager to learn from his experiences – for 
instance the secretary of the German employers’ federation, Fritz Tänzler (1869– 
1944), and von Sydow toured Europe to explain his techniques afterwards. Inter-
estingly he himself had visited Germany in 1904 to learn how German employers 
had taken control over labour exchanges (Arbeitsnachweis).38 After his success 
in Sweden, he went to at least Austria, Germany and Switzerland – but most 
certainly to other countries as well – and paid a visit to the Krupp plant in Essen. 
Tänzler, as well as his Swiss colleague Otto Steinmann (1876–1961), the sec-
retary of the Zentralverband, held conferences and wrote brochures describing 
the events and victories in Sweden; they expounded at length on the lessons that 
German and Swiss employers could draw from these events. There was a great 
deal of interest in Steinmann’s analyses and his publications shaped employers’
responses to the 1918 general strike in Switzerland.39 Further information was 
circulated to employers in 1910, with the publication of a brochure by Stein-
mann; the prime conclusions were republished when the threat of a general 
strike loomed in the fall of 1918. Steinmann wrote that a general strike “did not 
represent such a great risk for society and for employers as one might think”. 
Based on the Swedish experience, he argued that “If harsh measures are taken 
to maintain public order and security, if citizens, courageous and fearless, fulfil 
essential tasks, and, finally, if employers hold together and maintain solidarity 
among themselves, the failure of the general strike is unavoidable”.40 When mili-
tary provocations forced trade unions to declare a general strike in November 
1918 (a few weeks after Steinmann published his article), employers were ready, 
remained in close contact with the army and had already advanced plans to cre-
ate private militias: all lessons learnt from Sweden. In three days, trade unions 
had to surrender. 
Such informal encounters among employers reinforced already existing con-
tacts in sectoral international associations. The International Federation of Master 
Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Associations, founded in 1904, had goals 
such as the regulation of prices or the provision of commercial arbitration ser-
vices.41 Others were created to battle trade unions, like the International Ship-
ping Federation, founded in 1909. Under British leadership and despite fierce 
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through transnational exchanges of strikebreakers.42 Through these international 
bonds, employers sought to echo the workers’ international collaborations with 
organisations of their own that were of equal strength. Some trade unions signed 
agreements facilitating the mobility of their respective members: for instance, 
enabling migrant workers not to have to pay union fees in every country, but just 
in one. The mutual support that those agreements provided varied significantly. 
Most mentioned, for instance, that members would refuse to work as strikebreak-
ers. Others used international congresses and conferences to meet with each 
other, enabling practices and information to be shared across countries. The most 
advanced form of international cooperation between trade unions was the founda-
tion of international secretariats or international trade unions. As a case in point, 
an International Metallurgists’ Bureau of Information was established as early 
as 1893 by trade unions of six European countries, which paved the way for the 
foundation of the International Metalworkers’ Federation in 1904. By 1900, there 
were as many as 17 of these international trade union secretariats; by 1914, the 
number had risen to 28.43 An International Secretariat of National Trade Union 
Centres was created in 1901 and was transformed into the International Federa-
tion of Trade Unions (IFTU) in 1913. However, only four international unions (in 
the textile, lithography, fur and bricklaying sectors) had an international strike 
fund at the time of World War I. Others gave their financial support to unions in 
other countries when they could, on a case-by-case basis. Overall German unions 
played a leading role, if not the prime role, in most of these international unions, 
until World War I at least. 44 National employers’ associations in different coun-
tries combatted this by also signing agreements. The Swiss  Zentralverband, for 
instance had such an agreement with Austrian and German employers, the main 
objectives of which consisted of preventing the migration of striking and locked-
out workers. As early as 1907, employers’ associations from Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden met regularly and introduced some level of coordination, even on the 
rates of wages.45 Those formal and informal transnational contacts would become 
the roots of the IOIE, the employers’ Internationale. 
The genesis of the International Organisation 
of Industrial Employers 
In 1911, the Italian lawyer Gino Olivetti (1880–1942), the founder of the  Lega 
Torinese degli Industriali in 1906 and of the Federazione Industriale Piemontese
in 1908, and by then the secretary of the 1910-founded Confederazione Generale 
dell’Industria Italiana, the central Italian employers’ association, invited Euro-
pean employers in Turin to the first “ Congrès International des Organisations 
Patronales de l’Industrie et de l’Agriculture” (28–30 September and 1 October). 
Olivetti contended in his invitation letter that 
In all countries, the employers’ class finds itself confronted by the same prob-
lems, born from the same causes: the universal effects of economic laws, the 
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centres of a labour movement which offers everywhere the same fundamental 
characteristics and uses of the same methods. 
“As a consequence”, Olivetti continued, an obligation has risen “for employers to 
organize the defence of their interests against the charges of new regulations by 
the state on the one hand, and against the actions of the labour movement on the 
other hand”. Olivetti suggested three themes for the conferences: comparing
the organisation and strategies of employers in different countries, their stance on 
the labour movement and also over social policies, while he also suggested that “a 
great good” might come from employers debating “the results of their experiences 
and the teachings of their actions”.46 
In addition to numerous Italian employers, the congress’s honorary committee 
comprised presidents of sectoral and national employers’ associations and cham-
bers of commerce: one British, one Austrian, one Swedish (von Sydow), one Bel-
gian and 12 Frenchmen. Although little is known about the Congress itself its 
final resolution is well documented. It called for the strengthening of employers’
associations in every way, testifying of the common will that employers expressed 
in Turin. The congress gave a special mission to two Belgian congressmen – Jules 
Lecocq (1878–1961), a lawyer, and Jules Carlier (1851–1930), a former Belgian 
MP, commissioner of the Belgian delegation to the Universal Exhibitions of 1889 
and 1903. Lecocq and Carlier were respectively secretary and president of the 
Comité central industriel de Belgique. The congress commissioned them to plan 
an organisation that would become a permanent international employers’ associa-
tion; hence this represents a decisive moment in the history of employers’ inter-
national cooperation. Lecocq and Carlier became “pilgrims”, touring Europe to 
spread this idea to employers’ associations on the continent. 47 In 1912, they went 
to Paris to meet with the Comité des Forges. They went to London and Manches-
ter the same year and to Berlin and Vienna in 1913, with Lecocq then drafting 
statutes for an international organisation of employers. A meeting was organised 
in May 1914 in Paris between Austrian, Belgian, British, French, German and 
Italian employers. If one is to trust the account Lecocq gave of the event, the birth 
of the International Association of Employers was greeted by a toast from each 
delegation. Had World War I not brought these internationalist projects to a brutal 
stop, an employers’ Internationale would have been founded during that summer 
of 1914. The idea of such an  Internationale in the employers’ camp, which had 
failed after the Paris Commune in 1871, was now ready to be implemented. While 
chambers of commerce had only started to meet internationally in 1905, several 
years after their establishment, employers’ associations convened very soon after 
they were founded. Launched in Turin in 1911, celebrated in Paris in 1914, the 
employers’ Internationale came back in force after World War I. 48 
The aftermath of World War I was marked by the creation of the League of 
Nations and the ILO, two paramount examples of the new politics of the time; 
these types of initiatives were now happening on a global scale.49 Employers found 
themselves on the defensive while massive strike waves ran all over the Atlantic 
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crumbled and social revolution proliferated all over Europe. From employers’
points of view, “recasting bourgeois Europe” turned out to be a tricky task after 
the earthquake of the Grande Guerre.50 International trade unions had long been 
advocating for an international regulation of labour and had a clear upper hand 
when work to establish the ILO started. Among other things, the tripartite struc-
ture of the ILO – where states, trade unions and employers met at all levels of 
the organisation – was a victory for labour. 51 The IFTU resumed its activities
in the summer of 1919 52 and it was Emile Vandervelde (1866–1938), the leader of 
the Second Internationale since 1900, who gave the main speech at the Versailles 
Conference in April 1919 about the creation of the future ILO. As a member of 
the Commission on International Labor Legislation, whose task was to prepare 
the foundation of the future international organisation, he was a key figure in the 
shaping of its structure. In Versailles, he spoke of the ILO as “a work of transition 
between the absolutism of the employers that was the regime of yesterday, and 
the sovereignty of labor, that . . . would be the regime of tomorrow”. 53 Such ideas 
directly challenged employers’ power and were interpreted as such, as the ILO 
offered international unions the opportunity to implement their long proposed 
agenda for an international regulation of labour. Employers had been less influ-
ential in the preparation of the First International Labor Conference in Washing-
ton, D.C., held in October and November 1919, and their delegates had no clear 
strategy during the conference. Labour representatives, in contrast, had organised 
an office in Washington before the conference and were very well prepared. As 
a result, they managed to get most of their delegates elected.54 Furthermore, the 
Labor Conference adopted the first internal labour convention that limited work-
ing time to eight hours a day, the single most important international claim made 
by the labour movement since the middle of the nineteenth century. Even if some 
employers supported it, that decision substantiated for most of them the danger of 
the ILO’s new global labour politics. 55 
This was all it took for employers’ representatives in Washington to create the 
IOIE. After several preparatory meetings on 22 March 1920, in London, and on 
7 June 1920, in Genoa, statutes were adopted on 1 and 2 October 1920, in Brus-
sels. The IOIE’s Brussels office opened in 1920 with a staff of only three people: 
Jules Lecocq, who had toured Europe between 1911 and 1914, was chosen as 
the secretary for the IOIE, and he could count a few years later on the help of an 
assistant and a stenographer. The first president of the IOIE was Jules Carlier, the 
other “pilgrim” of the pre-World War I times. Other members of the first elected 
executive committee were either major industrialists, typically the president of 
the central national employers’ federations or the professional director of these 
federations. Some of them, like Frenchman Robert Pinot (1862–1926), the secre-
tary of Comité des Forges, a key figure of the Musée social and close to Frédéric 
Le Play (1806–82),56 the Briton Allan Smith mentioned earlier or the Swedish 
mechanical engineering industrialist Sigfrid Edström (1870–1964), were major 
figures of industrial circles in their country and internationally. 
IOIE’s statutes made it clear that the association’s aim revolved around the ILO, 
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all subjects relevant to employers, plus they would collect data and distribute 
information.57 The ILO, however, would remain at the very centre of IOIE’s pre-
occupations, and the histories of both organisations are inseparable, for instance 
in their joint rejection of communism, as Marieke Louis shows. From the start, 
the IOIE had a fairly broad membership. By June 1920, the association already 
counted 15 countries, mainly in Europe but also Japan and the Transvaal. A dozen 
others joined during the 1920s, so that almost all European countries were mem-
bers of the IOIE, making the IOIE a crucial node of private internationalism in the 
interwar period, not least because it included delegates from countries that were 
not (yet) members of the League of Nations, like Germany and Austria at the 
beginning of the 1920s. In addition the IOIE had regular contacts with employ-
ers’ associations not (yet) formally affiliated in Argentina, Australia, Canada and 
India. Despite the long absence of the USA from the ILO, the IOIE also kept in 
touch with the National Association of Manufacturers all through the interwar 
period.58 
The IOIE was not the only international business organisation created in the 
aftermath of World War I. In 1920, delegates from the victorious countries in 
the war (Belgium, Britain, France, Italy and the USA) created the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC). A clear division of labour was established: while 
the IOIE dealt with ILO-related matters, strikes, labour relations and social pol-
icy, the ICC functioned as a trade association, representing business interests in 
matters of international trade, transportation and finance. The same individuals 
were often active in both the IOIE and the ICC, simultaneously or at different 
times. This was the case for the organiser of the 1911 employers’ conference, 
Gino Olivetti, but also for many others, like the Italian rubber industrialist Alberto 
Pirelli (1882–1971) and Sigfrid Edström, both among the founders of the IOIE 
and later ICC presidents.59 
Conclusion: employers and illiberal internationalism 
“There can be no revolution without counter-revolution”, wrote Arno Mayer. 60 
This chapter has described the action of employers in the face of labour’s mobili-
sation. While scholars have focused on the trade unions, a careful examination of 
employers’ social and political mobilisation is indispensable to fully grasp the 
conflicts created by industrial capitalism, which involved “organised armies of 
Capital and Labor”, as The Economist called them in 1928.61 
This chapter has shown that the creation of employers’ associations was a trans-
national phenomenon, and that once they were created, they reached out to one 
another. The events narrated in this chapter also suggest that transnational encoun-
ters shaped employers’ strategies, stances on industrial policies and on social 
policy, at the very least from the first decades of the twentieth century onwards. 
Hence, this research provides a double contribution to the existing literature: first 
in studying the lesser known dimension of collective action from employers (bat-
tling trade unions and not as businessmen), and, while most studies are regional 
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events took place. Despite its importance in shaping the attitudes and action of 
employers’ delegates in the ILO – the IOIE was “the backbone” 62 of the employ-
ers’ group – the literature on the history of the ILO has until now failed to fully 
identify the role of the IOIE.63 The relative neglect of the IOIE in the literature on 
the ILO is just one example of the general lack of attention to the historical role 
of employers. While new research has shown that employers’ influence on social 
policy was highly debated and conflictual among employers,64 there is much to 
discover on the transnational dynamics surrounding employers’ associations: for 
instance the way they shaped social, political and economic conservatism. Fur-
ther studies might investigate the extent to which such employers’ transnational 
encounters contributed to a specific form of illiberal business internationalism, 
nurtured in opposition to workers’ internationalism. 65 
Inspiration might be taken from German experts writing during World War I, 
who mentioned five possible motivations for employers to meet internationally: 
to regulate competition for workers in order to avoid wage increases; to produce 
in collaboration in case of strikes; to prevent locked-out workers finding employ-
ment in neighbouring countries; to prevent workers’ shortages; and to organise 
financial support among employers facing strikes. Those forces were, however, 
compromised by competition between firms, while foreign competitors posed the 
threat of taking advantage of a strike to capture new customers instead of helping 
their foreign competitors to oppose strikers.66 There were indeed clear caveats to 
the international collaboration of employers, which provide promising research 
avenues. In 1926, in the context of the British General Strike, the IOIE explicitly 
rejected the idea of international financial support to employers affected by big 
strikes. The risk, the IOIE decided, was that such a solidarity action would back-
fire against employers if it were to become public and would lead to more inter-
national collaboration between labour unions.67 Hence, there was a tactical limit to 
international collaboration among employers. 
Scholars have underestimated the transnational contacts among employers,
assuming that classes were “not well organized internationally” and that “one can 
hardly speak of any institutionalized and permanent transnational characteristic 
of any class in modern society”.68 The IOIE and the ICC, among other struc-
tures, display durable international class-based collective action by enterprises’
owners and managers, which are still active today, all of it awaiting proper his-
torical investigation. Researchers might take many paths from there. What was at 
stake during the barely known World Congresses of Employers, held in different 
European capitals during the 1920s? What was the shape and reach of private 
diplomatic networks created by the IOIE or the ICC? How did nationally organ-
ised business communities negotiate the balance of competition and cooperation 
within international associations such as the IOIE? 
Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin recently invited historians “to begin the pro-
cess of recovering and re-imagining the plurality of internationalisms that fed 
political faith and disillusionment and the processes of historical change shaping 
the modern world”.69 The transnational mobilisation of employers constitutes one 
form of internationalism; this is a form that has barely been studied, though. This 
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chapter has shown that the importance of transnational encounters should not be 
minimised in the explanation of the mobilisation of industrialists against strikes at 
the turn of the century, but the extent of business internationalism remains to be 
fully investigated in diverse contexts and periods, as employers have not finished 
reacting to Chotteau’s urge: “So, industrialists and traders, rise!” 
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 7 Anti-labour repression in the 
in-between spaces of empire 
The Compagnie des Messageries 
Maritimes and the steamship workers 
of the “China Line” (1900–20) 
Charles Bégué Fawell 
In the lore of labour history, strikes in ports were won or lost depending on whether 
the ships departed. If the ships stayed in port, the workers had succeeded; if the 
ships set out, the bosses had prevailed. But this narrative of labour contests lacks 
in nuance what it possesses in drama. After all, even when the most massive 
strikes broke out, many ships were already at sea. On ships at sea, moreover, 
outbursts of labour militancy could occur without instructions from home. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, then, while the historiography of late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century labour movements in France includes comprehensive accounts 
of battles over the docks of major port cities like Marseille or Le Havre, far less is
known about how Belle Époque struggles over labour unfolded outside the dock-
yards of metropolitan ports; that is, at sea, in motion and beyond the oversight of 
metropolitan port authorities.1 
Syndicalism in France’s maritime industries began in the 1870s, but mass 
actions culminated in the opening decades of the twentieth century. In Marseille, 
France’s “gateway to the Orient”, the new century ushered in a wave of massive 
strikes; first in 1900, then again in 1902, 1907 and 1912, after which tensions 
were contained during the First World War, only to explode with renewed inten-
sity as the war concluded.2 None of these labour conflicts was put on hold when 
the worksite was mobile and far from home. How, then, did shipping compa-
nies combat labour militancy in transit, far from European ports, along maritime 
highways? 
The scarcity of responses to that question reflects, in part, scholarly assump-
tions regarding transit and the spaces in which it occurs. Though repeated “global 
turns” and “mobilities” paradigms have emphasised the importance of connect-
edness and the mobile subject, most scholarship continues to address the trans-
oceanic routes connecting imperial metropoles to far-off colonies in functionalist 
terms, with the infrastructure of maritime routes appearing as a conveyor belt 
that neutrally connects port to port, as if node to node.3 By implication, mar-
itime highways come across as depoliticised and un-peopled – quintessential 
spaces, as opposed to places.4 And yet, as this chapter suggests, maritime routes 
were far more crowded and contested than residual assumptions suggest. Criti-
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Époque, shipping corridors were neither neutral infrastructure nor homogenous 
expanses. Rather, these in-between spaces of empires were shaped by competing 
legal regimes, shifting borders and the complex interplay of people, ship, sea 
and port.5 
Foraying into the question of how shipping companies combatted labour mili-
tancy in motion, this chapter focuses on France’s largest shipping company on 
Europe-to-Asia routes, the Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes, and specifi-
cally its “China Line”, an intercontinental route that began in Marseille, crossed 
the Suez Canal and extended (despite its name) to the Japanese port of Yoko-
hama.6 In the early twentieth century, the  Messageries Maritimes experimented 
with a range of tactics to prevent labour militancy from spreading across this 
bustling and geopolitically vital highway, and to quash strikes when they arose en 
route. The company systematically labelled strikes as “mutinies”, manned ships 
with scab crews and mobilised consuls and police forces in foreign layover ports. 
Simultaneously, the  Messageries tacked between the French agencies historically 
tasked with regulating the merchant marine, and the Navy, which offered ship 
captains and company agents the tantalising possibility of meeting labour unrest 
with martial justice. 
The efficacy of those tactics, however, depended on whether  Messageries
bosses in Marseille, ship captains at sea and company agents stationed along 
the route could outmanoeuvre workers in the interstices of imperial sovereignty 
and the politics of transoceanic, trans-imperial transit. In such contests, I argue, 
workers proved surprisingly capable of foiling company plans. The  Messageries’ 
ensemble of tactics thus amounted to little more than a strategy of opportunism –
with one important exception. In developing a global system to recruit and circu-
late African and Asian workers, the  Messageries found a structural, as opposed 
to opportunistic, approach to thwarting labour militancy within its mobile work-
force; outsourcing avant la lettre.7 
To begin, it is worth reflecting on the  Messageries Maritimes’ origins and its 
orientation at the turn of the twentieth century. 8 Among French companies, the 
Messageries was rivalled only by the famed Compagnie Générale Transatlan-
tique, which, as the name suggests, dominated France’s trans-Atlantic traffic, 
while leaving what lay “East of Suez” in the hands of the Messageries. Inter-
nationally, the  Messageries spent the latter nineteenth-century trying to keep up 
with its perennial rival for Europe-to-Asia traffic, the British Empire’s  Peninsu-
lar & Oriental Company (P&O). However, competition was stiff enough that the 
lines reached an early “Gentleman’s Agreement”, alternating their schedules and 
sharing the lucrative market for trans-Suez cargo and passengers. 9 Secure in its 
market, the Messageries expanded, and by 1891 the company was transporting 
over 120,000 passengers annually on a fleet of 62 ships (most of them built in the 
shipyards of La Ciotat, near Marseille).10 After the First World War devastated its 
fleet, the Messageries struggled to withstand challenges from the subsidised ship-
ping lines of Germany, Japan and others. Nonetheless, France’s commercial proxy 
“beyond Suez” remained a giant of the Age of Steam, with one of the world’s 
largest fleets and a global network of agencies and facilities. 11 
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Like the British P&O, the Messageries was privately owned but intertwined with 
the operations of the imperial state. From 1881 on, the French state subsidised ship 
construction and some of the operational costs of voyages, while the company, 
in turn, carried mail to the far corners of the French Empire, along with soldiers, 
administrators and bureaucrats, diplomats and statesmen – essentially anyone and 
anything the state told it to transport. Those soldiers, administrators and diplomats 
travelled alongside tourists, migrants, convicts, entertainers, merchants, mission-
aries and of course, ship workers, who, on the largest of these ships, lived by 
the hundreds. Certain Messageries ships were specialised for cargo, and others 
for passengers, but the boundaries between freight and voyagers – and between 
private commerce and imperial affairs – were anything but clear. As Jules Verne 
famously observed in a best-selling book of the 1870s, the nineteenth-century 
steamship was evolving into nothing less than a “floating city”.12 What, then, 
could a company like the Messageries do when “floating cities” became labour 
battlegrounds? 
Makeshift solutions: the mutiny accusation and 
“makeshift crews” 
Nomenclature was the first arena in which navigation companies responded to 
surging labour militancy at sea. To label the intensifying contestation of mari-
time workers, ship captains and company officials returned to an ancient concept: 
mutiny. Unlike the legendary “Mutiny on the Bounty” and other precedents from 
the Age of Sail, though, mutiny in the era of labour militancy did not entail com-
mandeering a ship or capturing a captain. Nor were these mutinies equivalent 
to the naval uprisings of the First World War and its aftermath, when state-paid 
sailors contested their governments en masse. Rather, aboard the large steamships 
of the turn-of-the-century, militancy became mutinous when it stopped traffic, 
throwing a wrench into the giant assembly line of global trade that had developed 
in the wake of steam navigation and the Suez Canal. In the eyes of pro-business 
diplomats and jurists, a mutiny was merely a strike in motion, and to take the ship 
captains of the Age of Steam at their word, the period abounded with mutinies. 
Indeed, the legal threshold for such a qualification was remarkably low, for as 
soon as multiple crewmembers refused a direct order from their captain, they 
were engaging in mutinous activity. 13 In choosing not to differentiate between 
violent and non-violent acts of resistance, captains and their sympathisers used 
the mutiny accusation (“revolt” was also a common label) to suggest that insub-
ordination was violence. As will be seen, however, the myriad actors who were 
pulled into labour negotiations en route – consuls, port police and foreign jurists – 
were not always as quick to conflate protest and mutiny. 
Beyond rhetorical framing, the Messageries developed a range of concrete 
practices of intervention. Perhaps the most obvious tool for preventing the spread 
of militancy to the route was to recruit a “makeshift” (i.e. scab) crew. 14 Normally, 
crews had to be drawn mostly from the Inscription maritime, or Maritime registry, 
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During strikes, the Messageries was sometimes allowed to forgo the registry, 
instead manning its ships with unscreened applicants from Marseille’s streets, or 
even navy men (when available). This tactic offered shippers an efficient means 
of sidestepping strikes, but it had glaring defects, for while the Messageries could 
slip a makeshift crew across the picket line and onto a ship, once that ship was en 
route, all bets were off. 
A 1909 voyage of the  Messageries ship, Calédonien, running the China Line 
from Marseille to Yokohama, illustrates the potential volatility of makeshift 
crews. In voyage reports, the captain of the Calédonien noted that his makeshift 
crew had performed well until laying over at Port-Saïd, the chokepoint of mari-
time traffic at the head of the Suez Canal, where they encountered another  Mes-
sageries ship, this one carrying a full crew of inscrits maritimes, or registered (i.e. 
professional) sailors. In front of a crowd of foreign ships, the Calédonien endured 
an extended barrage of insults and menaces from its sister ship.15 In a vacuum, 
the bloodless clash might have been of little consequence, but the route and its 
ports were not vacuums, so much as they were international stages.16 For the Mes-
sageries, which was locked in intense and increasingly mediatised competition 
with other nationally subsidised lines (not to mention a near-constant public rela-
tions campaign within France to maintain government subsidies), public humili-
ation had real consequences. Calling the incident “a demonstration of savages 
attended by foreign ships”, the captain and his directors declared it a significant 
setback in their struggle with labour; not, of course, because of the injured pride 
of their makeshift crew, but rather because the militant sailors encountered by the 
Calédonien had used the most crowded section of the China Line to castigate the 
company, exposing both its internal divisions and its reliance on underqualified 
sailors. The public spectacle rendered the company vulnerable to reports of insta-
bility within their ranks – reports that could rattle around the press, compromise 
the line’s appeal to wealthy passengers and shake the resolve of critical allies 
within the French government.17 
In 1912, against the backdrop of Marseille’s most intense strike to date, a sub-
sequent captain of the Calédonien discovered that hiring makeshift crews could 
backfire even without an external shock. Once again exempted from the maritime 
registry, the  Messageries had manned its ship with a makeshift crew, sending it 
out for the roughly 80-day journey to Yokohama and back. Midway, however, 
labour relations broke down, thefts became rampant and the Calédonien ’s officers 
discovered to their horror that the crew was sabotaging their ship. To his directors, 
the captain complained that his makeshift crew were “veritable apaches”, using
a term that evoked the infamous street gangs of Belle Époque Paris.18 To make 
matters worse, faced with what he termed a “revolt” and a “mutiny” from the very 
men who were supposed to be quashing revolts and mutinies, he found himself 
powerless to react. When conflict spiked en route to their layover in Singapore, 
for instance, he noted: 
I waited by as long as I could, and I even ceded in Singapore when they 
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doubt that we were dealing with a crew of apaches, and because we were in 
foreign land, and it would have had a very poor effect to show that we were 
working with an undisciplined crew, recognizing no authority at all, and, on 
the contrary, in a state of revolt. 19 
As the incidents suggested, the company could wrangle its way into recruiting a 
makeshift crew to keep the China Line moving, but once in motion, there was no 
guarantee that the crew would obey orders. 
The reproachful gaze of passengers and foreign commentators, meanwhile, 
constrained the company’s ability to punish rebellious workers. 
Cops, consuls and the interstices of imperial jurisdictions 
Makeshift crews may have been, to the Messageries, an infuriatingly unreliable
means of clearing labour militancy from the route, but other resources were available
to captains and company agents. Every layover port on the China Line had a French
consul, for instance, whose pro-company sympathies and direct lines to port police
made them compelling allies in anti-labour operations. Again, though, voyage reports
of the Messageries reveal the limits of calling in consuls and cops to crack down on
mutinous workers.20 Often enough, campaigns to mobilise consular networks and
port police became mired in uncertainty over the jurisdictional boundaries between
localities and foreign ships. Likewise, determining when a strike, or mutiny, had
become disruptive enough to threaten security proved surprisingly thorny. For one of
many examples in which anti-labour crackdowns idled in the interstices of imperial
sovereignty, let us return to the  Calédonien, which set out for East Asia in 1913 with
a new crew and captain, only to endure another unpunished mutiny, despite the total
sympathy of a French consul and the proximity of port police.
As reams of reports relate, the mutiny broke out in the Indian Ocean, shortly 
before the Calédonien reached its scheduled layover in British Colombo, Ceylon 
(today’s Sri Lanka). 21 Tensions crystallised dramatically when, just after the deci-
sion had been made to halt work, a crewmember succumbed to typhoid fever. 
Instead of carrying out the burial at sea, as rules prescribed, the workers stood 
still, turning the rotting corpse into a sanitary time bomb and forcing the ship’s 
officers to carry out the morbid labour themselves. After the showdown, the ship 
limped into Colombo’s port, where officers promptly called on the French con-
sul to avenge the insult and injury. Consular support was beyond doubt, since it 
turned out that France’s official representative held two roles at once: consul, and 
general agent of the Messageries in Ceylon. Disgusted by the collapse of disci-
pline aboard the ship, this consul and company man summoned the port police, 
only to find that they refused to board the ship out of fear of legal complications. 
The police, he learnt, would limit themselves to returning “deserting” sailors to 
the ship. Ironically, by ensuring that no one abandoned the action, this measure 
reinforced the strikers’ cohesion. 
As authorities searched for a silver bullet, Colombo’s press began to criticise 
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and ships of foreign competitors, and lacking means of repression, one officer 
summarised the situation simply: “We were completely disarmed”. In what the 
consul would describe as a total “abdication of the principle of authority”, the 
officers conceded to crew demands, crippling the case they could subsequently 
bring against the sailors. The ship carried on until it reached the next layover, in 
the French colonial port of Saigon, where an inquiry was conducted. Having tight-
ened ranks during the week’s journey between Colombo and Saigon, however, the 
crew refused to identify ringleaders.22 Mobility and immobility alike had played 
to the workers’ favour as they successfully navigated maritime borderlands. 
While the Messageries and its sympathisers may have been disheartened by 
the lack of support from British authorities in Colombo, it should have come 
as no surprise. Trans-Suez routes were full of layovers at British ports, and this 
geopolitical predicament placed the Messageries at the mercy of a government 
which, again and again, refused to clarify its policy regarding intervention on-
board foreign vessels. Seven years before the Calédonien’s officers were forced 
into their humiliating “abdication of the principle of authority” in Colombo, for 
instance, a Russian ship laying over in the South Asian port met a similar fate, 
sparking a legal debate among British authorities that exposed the ambiguities of 
mutiny in the age of labour militancy, and sovereignty in the in-between spaces 
of empires. 
In spring of 1906, the Grigory Moerch pulled into Colombo’s harbour with a 
cargo of petroleum for what appeared to be a routine layover on the ship’s long 
voyage to Vladivostok. A desperate cable to the Russian consul shattered the illu-
sion of mundanity. The crew, it warned, “was mutinous and the Captain’s life was 
in danger”.23 As it turned out, the Russian consul was not Russian at all, for the 
position had been recently delegated to the French Consul. A French consul nego-
tiating with British colonial officials over the fate of a Russian crew may sound 
exceptionally complicated, but it was not even the only international knot tying up 
the China Line at that moment; at the exact same moment in Naples, for instance, 
a few layovers westward, British, Italian and Chinese state officials were nego-
tiating the fate of a British ship and its mutinous Chinese crew. 24 In Colombo, 
the French-turned-Russian consul promptly requested that police board the ship, 
“strictly”, he insisted, “to protect the Captain from violence”. The crew, however, 
wisely refrained from provoking the police guard, and when the consul and cap-
tain sought a mass arrest of the crew, they were denied by Ceylon’s attorney gen-
eral. Faced with a peaceful mutiny, the police guard withdrew. As he explained to 
superiors in London, the attorney general would not authorise a crackdown unless 
the harbour’s security was threatened or violence occurred on board, and while he 
suspected there had been threats of violence, he had to admit, “But here we have 
no threat, only a strike, and with that we cannot interfere on a Foreign ship”.25 
His colleague was less circumspect: “The Consul is anxious to force the crew . . . 
ashore, but this is no business of ours”.26 
Floating in Colombo’s harbour, the  Grigory Moerch’s engine remained silent 
and the sailors refused to budge. Inside Colombo, meanwhile the ship’s officers 
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replace his rebellious countrymen with a “native crew”. Eventually, they procured 
a warrant to arrest the entire crew, only to watch the attorney general revoke it at 
the last moment. With internal divisions growing and the local press speculating 
on the standoff, port authorities hatched a plan to tow the petroleum ship outside 
of Colombo’s harbour and abandon its crew to their fate. At last, just before the 
operation launched, an offer of back pay and safe passage to Russia reached the 
crew, who accepted, coming ashore and ending the strike. 
If the facts of the episode were straightforward enough, its legal implications 
were practically indecipherable. Embarrassed by the confusion that had reigned 
throughout the standoff, British authorities in Ceylon wrote to London requesting 
legal precedents to answer two seemingly simple questions: did a colonial govern-
ment have “legal power to interfere by coercive action in the event of a difficulty, 
not involving a breach of the peace, arising between the Master and crew of a for-
eign ship lying in harbour”, and if so, how far would they be “authorized in arrest-
ing mutineers on board a foreign ship when requested to do so by a Captain of the 
ship and the Consul of the State to which the ship belongs?”27 Unfortunately for 
them, historical precedent merely multiplied the questions. The last Russian ship to 
run into labour disputes in British waters, for instance, was thought to have been 
boarded forcibly by the police, yet there existed no administrative record of the 
invasion whatsoever, raising the troubling spectre of extra-legal operations. 28 As 
the legal debate climbed to the Foreign Office, moreover, it became tangled in a 
web of complicating factors. Binational treaties seemed to clash with municipal 
codes, while scholars of international law disagreed over whether local law and 
ship law were concurrent or mutually exclusive. Commentators contradicted each 
other over whether crimes committed by crewmembers at sea became null once in 
harbour, while others cautioned that cases against crewmembers would crumble 
if crimes were tried on land after being tried at sea. Different rules applied to a 
merchant vessel and a “man-of-war”, yet few could say with clarity what to do 
when a merchant vessel was carrying military materiel or had been contracted by 
a foreign state. Having “searched in vain for a decided case”, Ceylon’s attorney 
general threw up his hands.29 
Their questions answered with a cacophony of interpretations and precedents, 
British authorities settled on a policy of ambiguity. Physical crackdowns would 
be authorised only when the British port in question was threatened, or violence 
was occurring on-board a foreign ship. Shrewdly, though, no one supplied a basic 
definition of what constituted a threat to port security, or when violence “breached 
the peace”. China Line shippers, then, faced a dilemma: the worker “mutinies” 
occurring along the route were sufficiently severe to force a state-backed com-
pany to the table, yet insufficiently bloody to trigger intervention by foreign port 
police. On the China Line, “foreign” almost invariably meant British, and the 
British government was far from confident that intervening in labour disputes 
aboard foreign ships was lawful, or in its interest. Asked to choose between their 
right to monopolise violence on British territory and their responsibility to act as 
the unpaid muscle for any foreign ship that steamed into port with a mutinous crew, 
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Sovereigns of the route 
Faced with the reality that even the most sympathetic French consul could not 
guarantee a police response to labour militancy along the route, Messageries
bosses might simply have steered ship captains to French ports, where police were 
unburdened by fears of sovereign violations. While the British were hegemons 
“East of Suez”, French captains belonged to an empire with a host of territories 
around the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, many possessing ports that could 
serve as bases for coordinating anti-labour reprisals: Djibouti, on the Red Sea; 
Madagascar, Réunion and a constellation of smaller Indian Ocean islands; coastal 
enclaves in India and China; and most importantly, Indochina, whose ports were 
becoming critical nodes of the empire’s Indian and Pacific Ocean traffic. Yet, 
from the company’s perspective, even French territory provided a shaky founda-
tion for exerting authority over militant labour. After all, while company agents 
could call French police, their workers could appeal to the aged and complex 
institution of the Inscription maritime (Maritime registry). 
Founded in the late seventeenth century, the  Inscription maritime emerged to 
replace press gangs with a registered maritime workforce that could sustain trade 
routes and fill the ranks of the royal navy in times of crisis. Despite its royal 
pedigree, the institution survived the revolution, but its reaffirmation in revolu-
tionary law came with a crucial caveat transferring the power to punish sailors 
from captains and admiralty courts to common law tribunes. This principle of 
equality under the law was undermined by reforms of the Second Empire (1852– 
70), which reasserted a special legal regime for sailors of the Inscription and 
re-empowered captains to act as judge and jury. In 1896, however, captains were 
again stripped of some of these coercive powers, and the disciplinary code for 
sailors was again open to debate and interpretation.30 Among the 100,000-plus 
workers who populated France’s  Inscription in 1900, few could say with certainty 
where the institution would place its weight in the coming struggles over labour 
rights. On the one hand, the Inscription tied sailors to a special penal code in which 
they might be hurled in prison for work infractions or accused of desertion if they 
abandoned their worksite at the wrong moment. On the other hand, the Inscription
existed to ensure that France would always have a body of professional sailors 
available in times of crisis, meaning that it was less concerned with the profits and 
pride of shipping magnates than with preventing sailors from fleeing their line of 
work. Whether merchant mariners could count on an institutional champion in the 
state, at the very least they would have an arbiter. 31 
By 1900, as Marseille’s era of massive strikes began, this spectre of state arbi-
tration horrified ship captains, who believed that their authority was under siege 
and that only new allies in the French state could save them. As one captain put it 
in 1900, “The situation has become all too clear. 1) They have made sure to dis-
arm the Captains totally. 2) Punishment by disembarkment is illusory today. 3) By 
order, the Consuls are disarmed”. 32 His despair was understandable. Having faced 
a rebellious crew for weeks, he had failed to punish them in the Japanese port of 
Yokohama, the terminus of the China Line, where an attempt to dissuade striking 
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missed the mark (like their British counterparts, it seems Japanese authorities pre-
ferred sending labour disputes down the line over clogging their courts with the 
problems of foreigners). Then, during a homebound layover in French Saigon, the 
captain appealed to the Inscription, only to watch its magistrate grant the accused 
sailors the right to a trial on metropolitan soil in their homeport of Marseille, a 
month’s journey away. As a result, the sailors who had contested this captain’s 
sovereignty were able to, as he put it, “rejoice in the most perfect impunity for six 
weeks” – ample time to craft a legal defence, jump ship or foment anger among 
fellow workers.33 To company directors, the captain named the last weapon in his 
arsenal, writing, “What remains are the warships – in the future, when punish-
ments are called for, and there will be no shortage of that, I am going to address 
myself solely to the warships and that will do it”.34 
Writing nine years later, after multiple strikes had rocked the maritime sector, 
another captain from the China Line drew a similar picture. This time, however, 
he called not only for the Messageries to rely on Navy justice, but to deploy the 
Navy in an institutional attack against the Inscription. Thanks to the pervasive 
influence of “strike-spreaders [gréviculteurs], saboteurs and others”, who had 
entered the ranks, he explained in correspondence with company headquarters: 
we are henceforth dealing with personnel who, while they don’t have very 
well-formulated ideas about their duties, are on the other hand extremely up 
to date on their rights. On voyages where the layovers are numerous, we can 
hardly shift a straw. . . . To remediate this disaster, it will be necessary for 
anyone having anything to do with the Navy to ceaselessly battle the long-
outdated regime of the Inscription maritime.35 
And indeed, faced with militancy in motion, many Messageries captains adopted 
this strategy. Taking advantage of the statutory liminality of sailors and the gap-
ing loophole available to any captain who could claim a threat to the security 
of navigation, they simply avoided ports altogether, pouncing instead on French 
warships along the route, and preventing the Inscription from fanning the fire of 
labour militancy. 36 
As China Line captains reacted to labour unrest by blocking the Inscription
from acting in its capacity as an arbiter, they simultaneously leaned more heavily 
than ever on that very same Inscription to handle a host of other cases occurring 
outside French ports. Indeed, the company may have been attacking the institu-
tion on two fronts: starving it of influence over labour conflicts, while flooding it 
with petty administrative burdens. This, at least, was the fear of A. Jaquemart, the 
man who headed the Inscription in Saigon for much of the early twentieth cen-
tury. In correspondence with Indochina’s governor general, Jaquemart accused 
the consular network “East of Suez” of being squarely in the pocket of the Mes-
sageries. As he explained to the governor general, the unholy alliance between 
company agents and French consuls along the China Line may not have been 
enough to guarantee mass arrests of mutinous crews, but consuls were compen-















   
 
 
126 Charles Bégué Fawell 
Saigon. Conveniently for the company, the  Inscription footed the bill of legal 
proceedings, imprisonment and repatriation. What they could not solve in for-
eign ports and navy courts, in other words, Messageries captains brought to the 
French government in Saigon. As a result, Saigon’s  Inscription was ballooning 
into what Jaquemart described as the unmanageable “headquarters of a maritime 
arrondissement stretching from Suez to Yokohama”. 37 Offloading dissident indi-
viduals and petty offenders onto the  Inscription when large-scale crackdowns 
were made impossible by foreign law codes, Messageries captains and agents 
continued exploiting the benefits of access to navy ships – and navy justice – 
whenever they could claim a “threat to security of navigation”. Here was an anti-
labour recipe composed of opportunism, expert navigation of state agencies and a 
cynical appraisal of the vagaries of maritime law. 
But was this approach to combatting labour militancy systematic, merely oppor-
tunistic or, in a sense, a strategy built around maximising opportunism? After 
all, navy vessels were not always available, since their locations were contingent 
upon international relations and shrouded in secrecy. As for using the Inscription
as a dumping ground for lesser offenders (or sailors who had wisely offended 
outside of French ports), eventually an angry administrator like Jaquemart could 
push back against the company. And indeed, for two decades, Jaquemart did just 
that, tirelessly working to expose the company’s abuse of state resources and legal 
loopholes.38 
Colonial subjects and maritime labour
For companies like the Messageries, perhaps the one truly systemic approach to 
combatting labour militancy arose from a system of hiring and rotating Asian and 
African workers, most of them subjects of the French and British Empires. The 
practice of manning Europe-to-Asia ships with Asian and African crews dated to 
the earliest trade routes; indeed, the very incident that inspired Grotius to theorise 
the “Free Sea” in the seventeenth century involved two European ships manned 
largely by inhabitants of the Indian Ocean littoral. 39 In France, however, the prac-
tice had been disputed since the 1790s, when revolutionary law mandated that 
any flag-bearing ship have a crew of which 75 per cent were French nationals; for 
officers, the requirement rose to 100 per cent. Over the next century, steamship 
companies formed powerful political lobbies and chipped away at the require-
ments. By 1900, French citizens on flag-bearing ships operating in the Red Sea 
and Indian Ocean could legally constitute as little as 50 per cent of a crew. Unsur-
prisingly, the French-citizen workforce in Marseille detested the hiring of colonial 
subjects, and demands to abolish the practice, often framed in viscerally racist 
terms, were central planks of syndicalism from its origins.40 
Like its British counterpart, the P&O, the Messageries handled these criti-
cisms adeptly. On  its lines, directors made clear, the flow of traffic beyond Suez 
could be guaranteed only with contingents of African and Asian workers. Spe-
cifically,  Messageries negotiators insisted that if Europeans worked in scorching-
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maritime unions and their allies argued that employing “indigenous” sailors was 
unpatriotic and unsafe (their imputed cowardice and inability to communicate 
being posited as hazards during shipwrecks), even unionists accepted the prem-
ise that certain occupational hazards of maritime labour could only be resolved 
by hiring non-European workers.41 In a series of legal contortions, the most ser-
vile jobs aboard steamships were gradually bundled into this logic over the latter 
nineteenth century, so that Asians and Africans were overrepresented not only in 
brutally hot engine rooms, but also among deckhands and service “boys”. Simul-
taneously, the  Messageries and P&O endorsed laws restricting non-European 
sailors from working above certain latitudes. The stance was less counterintui-
tive than it appears, since by selectively ratifying the critique of non-European 
workers as untrustworthy safety hazards, these shipping giants of the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans effectively cut off competitors in the Atlantic and Mediterranean 
from the gold mine of low-wage workers recruited in colonial territories.42 
The commercial advantages of hiring subject-workers cannot be overestimated. 
Compared to Europeans, they were paid less, lodged in smaller spaces and ate 
in kitchens with less equipment. Perhaps most importantly, they had no unions 
and little recourse to consuls and colonial branches of the Inscription. Thanks 
to the ease with which subject-workers could be recruited at layover ports along 
the route, moreover, captains frequently menaced mutinous sailors with replace-
ment. Citizen sailors, who, in the case of the Messageries, came largely from 
Corsica and Provence, might enter the Inscription’s database as early as 15 years 
old, and would contribute to a pension fund when they began work a few years 
later. By contrast, “indigenous” sailors were recruited in a far more informal man-
ner, through “Serangs”: brokers, translators and team leaders who coordinated 
relations between “indigenous” workers and the ship’s officers. Subject-workers 
could be recruited at essentially any port of layover on the China Line, but for the 
Messageries, Aden and Hong Kong were particularly prominent hubs for recruit-
ing Somali engine-room teams and Cantonese service workers (“boys” in colonial 
colloquialism).43 As captains occasionally admitted, recruiting workers with dubi-
ous papers and only the fuzziest of official identities gave the  Messageries wide 
latitude in disembarking subject-workers, as well as how and, critically,  where
to handle their complaints. Captains could, for example, choose to disembark or 
punish a Somali sailor of the Red Sea in French Djibouti or British Aden, depend-
ing on what suited them best, by turning a blind eye to shoddy papers or casting 
doubt on legitimate ones.44 When the captain of the Messageries ship Cordillère
became frustrated with his Indian engine-room team, meanwhile, he needed only 
a quick missive to contacts in the British government, and with a signature and a 
stamp, Indian subjects of the British Empire were transformed into subjects – for 
legal and punitive purposes at least – of a floating parcel of French land.45 
Through the China Line ships of companies like the Messageries and P&O, 
a pan-imperial procession of subject-workers flowed, leaving behind a shadowy 
presence in company records. Usually recorded with catchall categories (Arab, 
Malay, Chinese, Indian/Lascar, black, etc.), individuals’ names generally went 
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deserted or been implicated in a controversy – a sharp contrast with European 
colleagues, whose names, basic biographies and employment history figured 
regularly in the voyage reports and administrative reviews that captains and port 
agents submitted to company headquarters in Europe. The superiors reading those 
reviews never scolded their subalterns for careless bookkeeping. Indeed, relegat-
ing subject-workers to the administrative shadows was unspoken company pol-
icy. 46 The sketchiness of subject-workers’ administrative status was reflected in 
the racial tropes with which they were evaluated. Racial tropes played important 
roles in justifying decisions over whom to hire, fire or transfer, but these tropes, 
steeped in “colonial common sense”, were, of course, utterly manipulable.47 Often 
enough, groups of workers who had been lauded for their race’s ostensible docil-
ity and adaptability were fired for their race’s impudence and stubbornness, only 
to be replaced by a new group of racialised workers, now deemed more docile 
and adaptable. 
As the Messageries rode the wave of French imperial expansion, what began as 
a legal allowance to hire a few “indigenous” Red Sea workers for blistering engine 
rooms transformed into a sprawling network of labour recruitment, defined by a 
multiplicity of contracts, terms and paperwork regimes. To maintain their right 
to recruit imperial subjects, lines like the Messageries needed to argue that only 
subject-workers were sturdy and reliable enough for the gruelling labour of the 
steamship. To expand outsourced recruitment to a scale beyond any government’s 
regulatory powers, however, subject-workers had to be portrayed as incompat-
ible with stable, centralized recruitment systems; one group of subject-workers, 
in other words, would always have to be replaced and replenished by another. 48 
European workers, then, were not alone in fearing replacement by “natives”. 
Those indispensable “natives” were utterly replaceable, too. Writing in 1919, 
after years of service, including on Messageries ships that spent the war dodging 
U-boats, the leader of an Arab engine-room team testified to the shock of that 
realisation. Pleading with Messageries bosses after learning that he and his team 
would be replaced by a Chinese crew, he wrote to his captain in phonetic French: 
in recompense and gratitude for our services, the company finds nothing bet-
ter than to transform its crew and my command, to replace us, the Arabs, with
Chinese. We are, it’s true, children of the sun, but we have nonetheless a heart
to love, a conscience to judge, and a spirit to appreciate, and I refuse to believe,
my Captain, that your noble sentiments of humanity and equitable justice
would be able to act in concert with the company for such procedures. . . .49 
Whatever the captain’s feelings regarding the heartfelt plea, bosses in Marseille 
remained unmoved. “Let the serang [team-leader] of the Arabs know”, a superior 
wrote in response, “that we don’t have to explain our reasons for embarking in 
his place a team of Chinese coalers”. Indeed, not having to explain was one of the 
greatest luxuries afforded to the  Messageries by its globalized labour network. 
Their system of racialising the workforce and setting it into near-constant rota-
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in hiring and firing. The practice also prevented meaningful relationships from 
developing between “European” and “Indigenous” crewmembers – relationships 
with the potential to transmit labour militancy between citizens and subjects. Offi-
cially, the unions castigated the employment of imperial subject-workers and den-
igrated those workers themselves (it took decades before the unions experimented 
with advocating equal pay and benefits), but there were exceptions on the ground, 
or rather, on the deck. At times, workers reached beyond the colour lines. In 1910, 
one China Line captain watched this unfold, when the leader of his Arab engine-
room team issued a protest that included the line, “I lead a team of men and I 
don’t even have the wages of a low-down European coaler who doesn’t know 
how to do anything other than pour oil into a bucket”.50 As the captain investi-
gated further, he found troubling implications in the reclamation, which struck him 
as anything but isolated. “We must never lose sight”, he wrote to superiors, “of 
the fact that these men are in contact with the workers of the Workshops and the 
European coalers who, according to intelligence given to me by the mechanics, 
seek to catechize them and push them into militancy”.51 The company had good 
reason to fear sociality across racial boundaries, since their profitability relied 
upon racially stratified wages and working conditions. Contact between “Euro-
pean” and “indigenous” personnel could lead to pan-racial agitation for work-
place improvements. For the Messageries, then, ensuring the failure of labour’s 
“catechism” meant shuffling subject-workers as often as possible in a system of 
racialised substitution. The workforce was thus endowed with a permanent racial 
Other whose race was ever-changing. 
During the First World War, as hundreds of thousands of French merchant 
mariners were drawn into the war effort, the  Messageries accelerated efforts to 
hire Africans and Asians. For the first time, though, these subject-workers pos-
sessed the leverage to win substantial increases in wages and benefits, thanks to 
the scarcity of labour and the exceptional risks incurred by their wartime service. 
Messageries bosses may have feared that their fabled goose was running out of 
golden eggs, but with few options available to them, they stuck to their playbook 
of segregating and rotating the workforce by race. By the end of 1915, for instance, 
company directors in Marseille and Paris launched plans to replace more of the 
“European element” with an “Indigenous element”. As the top technical advi-
sor in the Messageries’ Central Administration explained in a widely circulated 
memo, “given the difficulties created by the Unions [and] the less-and-less easy 
recruitment of European personnel, it would be good to take advantage of the con-
ditions opened up by the war”. To this end, European personnel would be phased 
out of new ships as much as possible; “Tonkinese” would be sought for the restau-
rants and cabin service; “Japanese, preferably”, would replace the Chinese work-
ers; and increasingly troublesome “Arab coalers” would be replaced by Indians, 
deemed “more intelligent than the Arabs”. 52 When those Indian coalers outstayed 
their welcome in the Messageries roster, they were labelled weak and irritable, and 
Marseille sent its port agents instructions to replace them with Arabs, Chinese or 
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When the war ended, mass-mobilisation of organised labour led France to
become the world’s only country to extend eight-hour workday legislation to its 
maritime sector. With striking ships piling up in French ports along the China 
Line, a chorus of captains and company agents vented unprecedented disdain 
for their European personnel and called for increasing recruitment of Asians and 
Africans.55 Before the rise of the maritime unions, such calls had been based on 
the unbearable conditions of steamship engine rooms; by the interwar, they were 
based on the unbearable character of the unionised sailor. 
Conclusion 
Maritime labour militancy extended well beyond the dockyards of major Euro-
pean port cities. A mobile proletariat, merchant mariners brought militancy with 
them to sea. To quell labour activism along its trans-Suez routes, the  Messageries
mobilised a vast network of port agents, consuls, captains, lobbyists, bureaucrats 
and police. In the struggles that ensued, maritime workers proved remarkably 
capable of outlasting their bosses and outmanoeuvring them in the interstices 
of imperial sovereignty. The mutinous mariners of the early 20th century took 
advantage of the fact that their worksite was a bundle of often-contradictory roles. 
After all, every steamship was a mobile coal plant for some and a floating luxury 
hotel for others; a profit-generating machine for private capital and an instrument 
of state power; a world unto itself and an emissary hopping from port to port with 
little regard for imperial boundaries. In such a setting, the conditions of possibility 
for workers were set by the politics of mobility and the peculiar nature of gover-
nance in the in-between spaces of empires. Ultimately, the ingenuity of steamship 
workers met its match in the company’s racialisation and rotation of an informal 
workforce. By the mid-twentieth century, when maritime unions attempted inter-
racial solidarity in earnest, new threats to organised labour were already appear-
ing, not least among them automation.56
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 8 In the name of constitutionalism 
and Islam 
The murky world of labour politics 
in Calcutta’s docklands 
 Prerna Agarwal 
In December 1934, thousands of dockers disrupted imperial trading that passed 
through the Port of Calcutta.1 They went on a strike, part of a series, for shorter 
working hours across the various ports in British India. Even though the demands 
of workers were in consonance with the recommendations of an imperial inquiry, 
the Royal Commission of Labour, the legitimacy of the strike as a “genuine” 
labour dispute dominated the official and public discourse. It being admitted only 
as an official afterthought (in confidential documents) that the strike was, in fact, 
a success from the point of view of workers. 
The strike was led by a newly formed red-flag union known as Calcutta Port 
and Dock Workers’ Union (CPDWU) with several nationalist-revolutionaries, 
communists and socialists in its leading body. 2 The colonial state perceived the 
strike as announcing the resumption of radical activity in Calcutta, in the aftermath 
of the Meerut Conspiracy Trial. 3 The radical leaders of CPDWU were arrested 
for sedition, strike pickets were violently repressed and CPDWU was declared 
an unlawful organisation along with several other labour and communist organ-
isations. Such reactions reflected the deep anxieties of the colonial state faced 
with a militant labour movement, which was charged with revolutionary symbols 
and was associated with a range of self-identified revolutionaries in communist, 
socialist and nationalist traditions.4 This article assesses the responses of the colo-
nial state and how these shaped the labour movement in Calcutta’s docklands. 
The responses of the colonial state must be placed into the context of its dilem-
mas regarding the labour question as it emerged in early twentieth century India. 
Since the aftermath of the First World War, non-existence of labour organisa-
tions and any kind of official machinery for the resolution of labour disputes was 
considered to be a problem. The vacuum in the trade union field was being filled 
by red-flag activists in several major industries, and this was to remain the main 
official concern throughout the interwar period. The dock strike of 1934 was one 
of the first successful strikes marking the revival of militant labour politics in 
Calcutta’s industrial neighbourhoods and proving the inadequacy of the Meerut 
Trial in stamping out communist activity. As the imperial authorities stepped up 
the repression, even the existing Trade Union Act of 1926 appeared to be too lib-
eral as it allowed the formation of radical trade unions. The peculiar problem 
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Bengal Labour and Commerce Department thus: “I expect one day to receive an 
application from a union one of whose objects is to establish ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’, must I as a registrar, register the union?” 5 
Yet the imperial authorities were concerned that the repressive policies did 
not go against the “genuine” labour unions.6 But these were hardly to be found 
on the ground. In the largest industry of Bengal, jute mills, the influential trade 
unions were of two types: red-flag unions or white unions, the latter emerging as 
a real threat to the existence of militant unions in a number of industries.7 The 
white unions were characterised by their espousal of communal politics, which 
resulted in Hindu-Muslim riots multiple times.8 In fact, the mastermind behind 
the formation of these unions was the rising star of Muslim communal politics in 
Bengal, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. 9 He would also come to hold the portfolio 
of Labour in the first provincial government of colonial Bengal (formed in 1937). 
The imperial authorities, it would seem, were cultivating conservative and com-
munal trade unions, behind the scenes, even as they talked about the necessity of 
“genuine” trade unions. 
The local allies of colonial rulers had different motivations for meddling in 
labour affairs. The emergence of labour militancy in the interwar period across 
industrial Calcutta threatened to unsettle the traditional authority of local clerics 
and politicians as well, at a time when Muslim communalist politics was gaining 
ground. The docklands were constituted by the poorest neighbourhoods of the 
city – Kidderpore, Mominpore and Watgang – also forming the largest concentra-
tion of working-class Muslims.10 The docklands thus had fallen in the purview 
of Muslim politicians since the beginning of the twentieth century. 11 However, 
influential labour leaders among them were not always advocates of communalist 
politics or primarily used religion as a mobilisational tool.12 From the mid-1930s 
onward, the Bengal Muslim League rose as a cohesive and formidable political 
party on the basis of religious nationalism. This was part of the communalisation 
trends in anti-colonial politics, which culminated in a frenzy of Hindu-Muslim 
riots in 1946–47.13 It was in such a context that the dock neighbourhoods emerged 
central to popular mobilisation for communal politics, so much so that one histo-
rian even called Kidderpore as part of the “riot-zone of Calcutta”.14 The dockers, 
predominantly of Muslim origin15 and migrants from UP, Bihar, particularly from 
the Darbhanga region,16 and Orissa, along with the boatmen had participated in 
major riots as early as 1926.17 The dockers as well as the seamen and the boatmen 
were thus to form an important constituency for a range of Muslim politicians 
looking to establish muscle power in the streets of Calcutta. 
Taking a microhistory approach, this chapter focuses on the dock strike of
1934 and the modus operandi of dockers’ unions. It largely relies on the intelli-
gence documentation produced by the Special Branch of Calcutta Police, which 
recorded the everyday activities of radical political groups in the city’s industrial 
districts in minute details. The records produced for the purposes of “keeping 
an eye” are highly abbreviated for the most part, but combined with occasional 
investigations which provide crucial detailing, enable us to place the accent on 
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They allow a reflection on how labouring aspirations, anxieties and militancy 
were finding an outlet into a bewildering mix of political causes, including varied 
visions of anti-colonialism. It is thus that the vantage point of the docklands discloses
the antinomies of the responses of colonial authorities towards the radicalisation 
of politics of labour. It draws attention to the acceleration of communalisation of
politics in working-class districts in the decade preceding the Partition of India, as 
the colonial government formed alliances with Muslim Nationalists, in an attempt 
to resurrect a dangerous and consequential counterweight. The research shifts the 
attention away from Muslim politics as played out in the legislative assemblies, 
municipal corporation, party offices and drawing rooms, 18 towards the streets 
of Calcutta’s docklands, to highlight the embedding and congealing of political 
trends that would burst out into the open as the city was caught in between the 
Partition riots and waves of strikes in the post-war period. 
 The strike 
The dock strike of 1934 had been planned for over six months and it initiated the 
establishment of a red-flag trade union at the Port: Calcutta Port and Dock Work-
ers’ Union (CPDWU). The dockers were employed as casual labour by stevedores 
through various contractors and not directly by the Calcutta Port Trust. In total, 
they numbered around 15,000–18,000 and were spread out in various parts of the 
port; a large number of them being unemployed at any given point. 19 
The strike must first be placed in a wider context. The Royal Commission of
Labour had recommended limiting working hours at the docks to nine hours,
with an allowance of three hours of paid overtime.20 However, these recom-
mendations were to be partially implemented after the strikes at all major ports.
Between October 1929 and November 1937, there were several strikes of dock-
workers at all the Indian Ports – Karachi, Rangoon, Madras, Bombay, Calcutta
and Bombay (in that order).21 In Calcutta, workers’ demands included higher
wages, shorter working hours, compensation for accidents and two days of
leave in addition to government holidays. Separate demands for wages were
formulated by the winchmen, the salt department and the chipping and painting
department.22 
In the winter of 1933, a few dockers of British India Steam Navigation, includ-
ing the “pioneer” Mohammad Salim (a dockworker of Bombay),23 who had
known Charles Mascerenhas, an early communist and an associate of M.N. Roy;24 
a few members of the Labour Party, including one of its founders, Niharendu 
Dutt Mazumdar; and labour activists of M.N. Roy’s newest organisation, the 
Indian Republican Party, decided to form a union of dockworkers and called it 
the Calcutta Port and Dock Workers’ Union. 25 The secretary of the union was 
Shishir Roy, of the famous Sarishabari Bomb case, who was now a member of 
a “communist – cum – terrorist” group. The president of the union was another 
dockworker, Sher Khan, a winchman (a skilled docker) from Bombay originally 
from Jalandhar, who is described as a “follower” of Rajani Mukherji, leader of the 
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along with Md. Yusuf, also a winchman and the president of the Bengal Labour 
Party. Santi Ram Mondal, an ex-railway clerk, who had been prominent in organ-
ising the Lilooah Railway workshop strike of 1928 was also amongst the leader-
ship of this union.26 The profile of the union leadership indicates that the early 
communist groups attracted workers into their ranks. What’s more, such work-
ers were openly taking the risk of being associated with known communists and 
infamous revolutionary-terrorists. A few were even willing to travel across the 
country to organise other workers as was the case with Md. Salim; he was “a vol-
unteer” of the Dock Workers’ Union in Bombay and after his stint at the Calcutta 
docks, went to United Provinces to organise the peasants “under the instructions” 
of Mazumdar. 
In the first meeting of the union, held in January 1934, radical speeches were 
made and red flags were hoisted.27 A series of regular meetings and demonstrations 
followed till the end of the year. Ideas attacking the state as the ‘ mā-bāp’ (mother-
father) of the employers and not that of workers were discussed by the activists. 
The police were identified as the “fauj” (army) of the employers. It was said that 
the workers must organise their own  fauj and even a government of their own. 
Mazumdar even argued that workers “could not allow the government to exist if 
it failed to stop molestation of the workers”. Union leaders constantly asserted 
that the workers were capable of fighting without the aid of the government or 
the police, which were in fact considered the enemy. In one of these meetings, 
Mazumdar in his characteristic grandiose manner extolled the collective power 
of workers, proclaiming “when the 7 ½ lakhs [750,000] workers in and around 
Calcutta were organised the police and the government would ‘ salām’ (salute) 
them”. Continuing the reference to the army world, he argued that as the British 
government fortified its borders in Rangoon and Peshawar, so should the work-
ers defend the entry points to the Port in Metiaburuz and Kidderpore during their 
strike. The various slogans of these meetings were “ Lāl Jhanḍā kī jai” (Long live 
the red-flag), “Communist International kī Jai”, “Mazdūr Kisān Hukumat kī Jai” 
(Long live the workers’ and peasants’ government) and “Long Live Revolution”. 
In other words, radical ideas in the communist repertoire were discussed repeat-
edly, openly and rather consistently. Such ideas would have sounded very unusual 
to labourers who had witnessed politicians’ speeches before, but rarely did any 
of them talk about the strength of working class, let alone about a government of 
workers and peasants. 
This recently formed union held its annual conference in April 1934. Sher 
Khan “hoisted the communist flag with ceremony”. A.M.A. Zaman led a “squad 
of volunteers wearing red sashes with inscriptions of CPDWU and the hammer 
and sickle emblem” and marched in front of the flag.28 The resolutions that were 
passed were not only about the day-to-day problems of dockworkers. First of 
all, the changes in the Trade Disputes Act were criticised and the attitude of the 
government of India was “condemned” for renewing an act that helped continue 
“oppression of workers”. The meeting popularised the May Day. Resolutions also 
warned the workers against the Municipal Corporation dominated by the Con-
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police to shoot at workers during the scavengers’ strike in 1928. Release of politi-
cal prisoners and “labour workers” (which included the names of known commu-
nists) was also demanded. The annual conference of the union was an explicitly 
political affair, aiming to inform members of the important matters relating to the 
labour movement as well as the anti-colonial movement. 
Meanwhile, as no concessions came for any of the workers’ demands, the
union took charge of the preparations for the strike, which included formation
of a strike committee composed mainly of workers. 29 The strike, in contrast to
the union, involved a large majority of workers – between 8,000 and 15,000
out of the total 18,000, according to different estimates presented in the Ben-
gal Legislative Council, and it lasted for 20 days. Throughout the duration of
the strikes, pickets were organised at the docks and at the offices of principal
stevedores in charge of recruiting labour, and these often led to breakouts of
violence since the police was heavily deployed in the defence of the stevedores
and shipping interests.30 Contemporary newspapers described the scenes of
strikebreakers, mainly recruited among outsiders: Anglo-Indian youth, Chi-
nese labourers and Coconada workers.31 On the day the strike was to be dis-
cussed in the Bengal Legislative Council, around 7,000 strikers marched to
the council house to present their petition.32 Some even attended the session,
leading The Statesman to report about the “unaccustomed visitors [the dock-
ers]”.33 Because of the demonstrations and heavy picketing, the strike was seen
as highly disruptive by contemporary observers, and as one of them observed,
“the strike was a standing menace to the peace and tranquility of Calcutta not
to mention the loss of trade”,34 or to put it in another perspective, it was a very
visible labour dispute.
The entry of Suhrawardy and the making of a “white-union” 
The strike ended in very curious circumstances still, which were reported in The 
Statesman as “Maidan Meeting Scenes”. According to the newspaper, it was 
declared over in a meeting of at least 5,000 workers. Rajani Mukherjee announced 
that the union had received an assurance from the shipping agents that there will 
be no victimisation if workers resumed work and so, they should resume work.35 
After the strike was declared over by the activists of CPDWU, Huseyn Shaheed 
Suhrawardy, a member of the Bengal Legislative Council, arrived and told the 
workers that the shipping agents had refused to deal with the CPDWU because 
“it was influenced by extraneous considerations as distinct from the interests of 
the men” and the workers must form a new union under his leadership.36 This 
was unusual; it was one thing for a member of the Legislative Council to discuss 
labour issues but another to actually come and give speeches to thousands of 
workers. In any case, a new union called the Calcutta Dockers’ Union (CDU) 
was formed with Suhrawardy as the president and it was duly recognised by the 
Master Stevedores’ Association (MSA) “as a  legitimate trade union [empha-
sis added] formed in the interests of the workers”. 37 The MSA refused to rec-
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influence”.38 Subsequently, the CPDWU was even declared unlawful along with
a number of “communist” organisations in the city, 39 although, the stevedores 
remained sceptical of asking the workers to sign a document stating that they 
were no longer members of or had never been members of CPDWU as demanded 
by the shipping companies.40 The dockers won a reduction in working hours by 
an hour, 41 and they were to be on board quarter of an hour before starting time (a 
reduction of 15 minutes from the previous starting time).42 In addition, a strike 
agreement was drawn between the shipping companies, the MSA and Suhrawar-
dy’s CDU covering the major terms of employment. 43 
Suhrawardy was a deeply conservative man but with a good grasp of street 
politics and intimate connections with the criminal world of Kidderpore. Belong-
ing to an elite ashrāf family, he was one of the rare Muslim politicians of the time 
to build links with the urban masses, which were to transform Muslim politics 
in Bengal in the decade leading to independence. As deputy mayor of Calcutta 
Corporation, he had been operating in the milieus of poor urban Muslims since 
the early 1920s. In one incident he enlisted the support of the Muslim butch-
ers of Calcutta’s Municipal Market through allowing the burial of their beloved 
pīr (saint) under the main drains of the meat section of the market, causing a 
lot of controversy amidst which the “butchers allegedly threatened bloodshed”.44 
During the 1926 Hindu-Muslim riots, Suhrawardy was found with other Muslim 
public figures like the Ariff brothers, inciting violence from the mosques. He was 
also said to have connections with the city’s underworld, so much so that the Brit-
ish government had thought of externing him from the province.45 According to 
a biography penned by a family relative, he was so deeply affected by the riots of 
1926 that he became one of the first to advocate the cause of Muslim communal 
interests46 and championed them right through to the Partition of India. He was 
the organising secretary of Muslim League, held the Labour portfolio in the first 
provincial government, was the minister of supplies during the Second World War 
and the premier of Bengal in the post-war government. The man straddled the 
world of the streets and that of high politics. 
With the opening of the possibilities of representation of Muslim maritime trade 
unions in the new provincial legislative assembly, a range of Muslim politicians, 
including Suhrawardy, had started taking systematic interest in the trade unions 
of the dockers and the seamen in the early 1930s.47 By 1934, Suhrawardy had 
successfully engineered a split in the most influential of seamen’s trade unions, 
Indian Seamen’s Union and Indian Quarter-Masters’ Union, to form the rival 
Indian Quarter-Masters’ Union. 48 Through the establishment of CPDWU and the 
popular strike of 1934, dockers were developing a working-class identity; they 
were exploited but were capable of challenging exploitation, without the help of 
politicians like him. Not only did they participate in well-orchestrated strikes but 
(some) also in regular meetings and demonstrations, where symbols of revolu-
tionary upturning of society such as the red flag and the hammer and sickle were 
openly displayed, songs of protest were sung and slogans such as “Mazdūr rāj” 
echoed. A politician like Suhrawardy was quick to realise the dangers of such self-









140 Prerna Agarwal 
opposed radical ideologies like communism and fashioned himself as the great 
champion of anti-communism. The colonial government in Calcutta, on the other 
hand, had found an experienced politician as interested as them in dampening the 
rising radicalism of labour movements. 
Suhrawardy presented a note to Sir Harry Haig of the Bengal Legislative Coun-
cil on the “labour question” in January 1934. Here, he argues that “constitutional 
labour agitation” under the then government was “futile” and therefore, labour is 
being “captured by the attractiveness of Communist slogans”. According to him, 
“Government should further broadcast anti-communist literature through news-
papers and pamphlets, both vernacular and English. Today the propaganda is all 
one-sided and in favour of ‘mazdur raj’”. He added, “Persons must be trained 
with facts and figures, to speak and deliver lectures against Communism”. He 
went as far as to say that since the reds have their organisers in the constitutional 
trade unions, the “constitutionalists” should have their men in the “red organ-
isations” and the government can be of “great help”.49 He was helping give a 
practical shape to the government’s drive against the communists in the labour 
field, placing the emphasis on conducting anti-communist propaganda, presum-
ably to give the workers another worldview for interpreting their experiences and 
struggles, and providing for loyalist men to function in workers’ milieu. Such 
functions were, in fact, better envisaged and performed under the leadership of a 
native politician like Suhrawardy. 
The case of dockers’ strike shows that the colonial state was receptive to 
Suhrawardy’s offers, so much so that, the president of the newly formed CDU, 
which was recognised by the employers as soon as it was formed, was Suhrawardy 
himself. The shipping employers didn’t need to look far, they found a “trade union 
leader” from within the Bengal Legislative Council, who was even to climb the 
ladder of colonial governmental apparatus to serve as a labour minister from 
1937. The collusion between the employers, the colonial government and a sec-
tion of the nationalist politicians could not have been starker. Moreover, it was 
commented in the official correspondence that: 
The strike was finally settled by the intervention of Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, 
through whose good offices a new union working on  lawful and constitutional
[emphasis added] lines was formed. I refer to this for it shows that our action 
is in no ways directed against bona-fide labour [emphasis added] unions: we 
are fully satisfied that no such unions are affected by our action. 50 
In other words, a trade union which had been formed to break a popular strike was 
conveniently presumed to be “lawful” and “constitutional”, barely a few months 
into its operation, never mind the criminal record of its president in successfully 
inciting religious violence. What follows will further shed light on the vacuity of 
the claim that CDU was a “lawful” trade union and explicate how in search of 
such “constitutional unions”, the imperial authorities were aiding in the commu-
nalisation of politics in the labour world, at a time of rapid religious polarisation 
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To start with the CDU was able to, in effect, disorganise an important strike as 
well as the red-flag union that emerged with the strike. The former union declared 
its loyalties to the colonial state as it made it clear that it would operate on “con-
stitutional lines” at several moments. In effect, this version of “constitutionalism” 
only went as far as avoidance of strikes until absolutely necessary. 51 
For next couple of years, CPDWU found it very difficult to survive, as the CDU 
established itself under employer patronage but also that of the newly formed 
Bengal provincial government. Given the casual nature of work at the docks the 
main and most efficient strategy was the control of recruitment in the docks. In 
the chipping department workers were asked to present chits from Suhrawardy 
himself to get work. Certain sirdars were intimidated and told that no men will 
be employed under them by Suhrawardy’s men, who were also known as  dalāls
(agents). Workers were told that if they attend meetings they will not be employed. 
They were asked to join the CDU. The stevedores themselves openly told  sirdars
“to go over the side of Suhrawardy”. Many of the sirdars lost their work because 
of the strike and were not re-employed for over two years.52 In 1937 again, 60 men 
were reported to be unemployed because the dalāls had decided so.53 From then 
on, the two trade unions among the dockers would play a crucial role in securing 
work for coming decades. In 1949, an informant of Brocklebank Shipping line, 
reported, as a matter of fact, that the MSA mostly employed dockers of white 
union, while the dockers of red unions were employed mainly for government 
contracts.54 
The second plank of mobilisation of labour adopted by the CDU was the instru-
mentalisation of religion among dockers who predominantly were of Muslim ori-
gin. The leadership of CDU, and Suhrawady in particular, became known for 
Islamic propaganda. Even though Suhrawardy himself was probably not reli-
gious, he was described by a contemporary as “totally unscrupulous, but not com-
munal or religious. He ate ham and drank scotch and married a Russian actress”.55 
Many workers perceived his politics to be deeply divisive and dangerous. For 
instance, Jafar Bhai remembered how Suhrawardy had suggested the Hindus and 
Muslims to march separately “at the foot of the monument at Dhurrumtolla” on 
the eve of the strike.56 Rahim Bhai argued that the policy of Suhrawardy would 
lead to communal riots and all the union funds he is collecting will be used to 
“bury the workers who would be killed in communal strife”.57 He also noted how 
Suhrawardy, on behalf of the workers, had attempted to create divisions through 
the platform of the legislature as the labour minister. He had said: “Dear Muslims, 
separate yourselves. A Hindu is after all a Hindu. Why do you go and mix with 
them?”58 Rahim Bhai concluded: “Thus they create divisions. All these leaders 
are the betrayers of the community”.59 Calcutta’s red-flag activists identified the 
white unions as a real obstacle in the dock areas.60 In fact, a major communal riot 
broke out in Titagarh jute mill town in 1938 in the aftermath of a general strike 
in the jute mills in 1937, as a direct result of communal propaganda.61 The instru-
ment of religion could also serve the purpose of mobilising to defend the empire. 
In May 1940, the union held a “prayer meeting” attended by 1,500 dockers for the 
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The depth of impact on dockers can only be appreciated with a sense of the 
growing communalisation of politics around them. CDU’s politics of sowing 
religious division was part of a wider strategy adopted by the all-India Muslim 
League from the mid-1930s onward under Jinnah.63 Muslim League, a hitherto 
“aristocratic” party, 64 which now formed an important part of a coalition of Mus-
lim parties in Bengal Ministry, was hyperactively building a popular base in East-
ern India, including among the poor peasants and workers. The  Star of India, 
the leading Muslim English daily (patronised by the British),65 provides enough 
evidence to argue that the League was bidding for a mass base among the poor 
Muslims in the late 1930s for separatist politics. Labour issues were strikingly 
prominent in the The Star.66 The popular discontents with Congress Ministry67 in 
provinces such as Bihar and United Provinces were decried as ills of “Hindu rule” 
in headlines such as “Hindus blow up Muslim graveyard with dynamite”.68 The 
Bengal Ministry’s tenancy reforms, in fact spearheaded by Krishak Praja Party 
(KPP),69 were used excellently for mobilising support for the Muslim League 
among the peasants of Bengal and against the “Hindu” Congress.70 As part of the 
same exercise, seamen, who also came from the East Bengali Muslim peasanty, 
formed a special focus. The  Star published calls for help through financial dona-
tions and doctors when floods struck East Bengal71 and a Seamen Bangia Sahajyo 
Samity (Seamen Flood Relief Association) was initiated. 72 Splits were engineered 
in the rival Indian Seamen’s Union, and 45 seamen and dockers (including some 
members of CPDWU), along with one of the most important leaders of the Indian 
Seamen’s Union, Aftab Ali, were implicated in a criminal case; charges included 
“conspiring to kill” the acting shipping master. 73 The jute mill workers, with a sig-
nificant proportion of Muslims from Bihar and United Provinces, formed another 
important constituency for the League.74 By the end of the decade, League propa-
ganda was bearing fruit; it could boast of Muslim politicians, such as Suhrawardy 
and Fazlul Huq, being received in demonstrations of tens of thousands of work-
ers on several occasions, in Calcutta and even in the outlying jute towns.75 One 
such demonstration organised by a number of maritime unions associated with 
the Muslim parties was attended by 7,000, and “an address of welcome” was 
presented in a “silver casket” to Suhrawardy. 76 
The CDU was thus born and shaped as an employers’ union under the twin 
patronage of shipping employers, and the Bengal Ministry, through the offices 
of the labour minister and Muslim League politician Suhrawardy. The colonial 
government aided one of the most reactionary politicians of the time to realise his 
vision of trade unionism; after all it was counterposed to “communist” unions. 
The union was one of the early ones of its kind and was to form part of a network 
of city-wide white unions, collectively part of the Bengal National Chamber of 
Labour, under the patronage of Suhrawardy. 
As the subcontinent was drawn into the Second World War, and the colonial 
government’s panic about labour reached new heights, the director of Intelligence 
Branch went as far as clearly stating that “white unions” are “officially spon-
sored”.77 The official discussions within the provincial government concluded 
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information to local police officers, and employers must assist in the smooth 
functioning of what was now known as the “White-Union system”, to allow for 
“concerted action” between “H.M. (C.&L.)78 – Police – Labour Commissioner – 
Employers – White Union”.79 The network for state repression of the labour 
movement could not have been more clearly laid out. 
Of violence and volunteers 
Even so, the CPDWU was never entirely silenced, it re-emerged as Dock Majdoor 
Union (DMU) to avoid illegality. As the rising prices and the uncertainties of the 
war added to the pressing material issues of the dockers, they contested the CDU’s 
leadership and attempted to give the union a more militant shape. By 1941, the 
fragile coalition of Muslim parties in Bengal Ministry was witnessing another 
split and had ramifications for the balance of forces between the various Maritime 
trade unions, proving fortunate for the DMU to some extent.80 Popular collective 
action continued to face enormous obstacles, but labour militancy was not so eas-
ily suppressed; it only found narrower and more dangerous channels. 
The rivalries between the two unions intensified and, most significantly, were
being imposed through armed as well as externally funded (to whatever extent)
“Volunteers”. Historians have noted the proliferation of Volunteer groups in
interwar period in the Indian context.81 Paramilitary groups, often armed and
uniformed, were organised by political parties across the spectrum on national
and regional scales to fulfil the urgent needs of defence against both the per-
ceived internal and external enemies.82 The term “paramilitary” has been used
here to underline that such groups “sought state power or, proposed ethnic
nationalism” and attempted to take on state functions in a period that became
crucial in claim-making by conflicting nationalist forces.83 Many such groups84 
became infamous for their dictatorial post-colonial visions, overt militarism and
their espousal of fascist ideologies, methods and symbolisms. Nandini Gooptu
has been one of the few historians to focus on the role of Volunteers among
the urban poor; the interactions of Volunteers and labour politics have hardly
received any attention.85 
As early as 1934, the intelligence noted the practice of a march led by A.M.A. 
Zaman in the docklands, under the banners of “workers of the world unite”. In fact, 
since the inception of the DMU, formation of a Volunteer corps was considered 
necessary, as Zaman argued in a speech “not for any breach of the peace but to 
keep order in their meetings and processions”.86 A resolution to form Jamiruddin 
Fauj was passed in July 1938 in the union’s meeting. 87 It was named after a textile 
worker Jamiruddin, who had been murdered for not joining a company union.88 In 
the late 1930s, Volunteer groups emerged in several industries; intelligence reports 
for the year 1938–39 mentioned a number of such groups mainly associated with 
Congress-linked Bengal Labour Association (BLA), Indian Seamen’s Union and 
the two unions of dockers.89 The labour Volunteers associated with the BLA dis-
appeared from the radar by 1940.90 In fact, Jamiruddin Fauj and the labour mili-
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working class in the docklands as well as the higher prevalence of violence in 
labour relations. 
Initially, such groups were set up to settle inter-union rivalries, but their field 
and scope of operation quickly expanded. Volunteers associated with both the 
dockers’ unions enjoyed the patronage and functioned as part of a wider network 
of such groups in the city, which were in turn connected to national political par-
ties. Jamiruddin Fauj at the docks was part of a citywide body organised by the 
Bengal Labour Party, whose members were often seen in public meetings “clad in 
red-shirts, khaki shorts and Gandhi cap”.91 They practised lāthi-play, held regular 
drills and had access to free uniforms at times. The organisers and office-bearers 
sometimes received pocket money. Most interesting are the links formed with 
two militaristic political organisations, which had found affinities with the Nazis. 
Bengal Labour Party actively sought alliances with Subhas Chandra Bose’s 92 For-
ward Bloc and campaigned in favour of it among workers, and in return, Bose 
promised money for the party’s Volunteers. 93 
Even more striking are the Bengal Labour Party leaders’ ambitions of forming 
alliances with the Khaksar Tehreek (movement of the humble), the most militant 
of anti-colonial Muslim paramilitary groups in the interwar period. Khaksar lead-
ership idealised dictatorship as a way forward for society, and its leader Allama 
Mashriqi (sage of the east) even claimed to have inspired the Nazis. The Khaksars 
carried spade on their shoulder, in a remarkable similarity to the symbols of Nazi 
Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich Labour Service). Mashriqi advocated the domination 
of Islam through an organisation based on the values of militarism, obedience 
to the leader and unity. 94 In 1939, the intelligence mentioned that Khaksar had a 
strength of 3,000 in Calcutta alone, and it was the only Muslim Volunteer group 
that was labelled as “specially dangerous”.95 It was especially active in Kidder-
pore. The Khaksar uniform included khaki coats, breeches, belts, boots, putties, 
spades and Reza Shah Pahlavi caps.96 
The Volunteers of the CDU, whose uniform included blue shirts, caps and 
lāthis,97 formed part of closely associated Volunteer groups organised on religious-
nationalist basis like the Muslim National Guard and the Khilafat Guards.98 Even 
Khaksar men participated in some such joint activities.99 Even though Khaksar and 
Khilafat volunteers had existed previously, the basis of an all-India Muslim League 
National Guard was laid by Jinnah in 1937. In Calcutta, the numbers of League 
and Khilafat Guards remained in few hundreds between 1938 and 1942.100 They 
paraded during demonstrations of Bengal Ministry, or during Muslim League ses-
sions, they attempted to police such mobilisations.101 They protected the mosques, 
arranged relief measures even for events in Turkey, agitated for the Palestine ques-
tion, demanded “boycott” of Congress and above all, the fight for protection of 
Islam was their battle cry. 102 These Volunteers had comparatively elaborate uni-
forms: League volunteers’ uniform included green shirts, white shorts/pyjamas, 
green fatigue caps and half lāthis.103 The Khilafat volunteers wore khaki coats and 
shirts, khaki round caps with a crescent and carried half lāthis and white badges. 
In fact, Kidderpore emerged as one of centres of the activity of the Muslim 
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Muslim League had fostered among the local habitants, a significant proportion 
of whom were maritime workers. For instance, one Muslim League volunteers 
meeting in the neighbourhood was attended by as many as 800, a number of “par-
ties” from all over Calcutta arrived, including members of Khaksar and Khilafat. 
Most strikingly, some of the local ones were named as such: Kidderpore Muslim 
League (Boys group) under the leadership of Noor Mohammed, Hakim Liaqot 
Hossain’s Party of Watgunge street, Abdul Latif Ostad’s Party of Orphangunge 
Market, Kidderpore, Abdul Hakim and Bulaki’s Party of Mominpore, Kidderpore, 
testifying to organisations constituted on a local level in the dock neighbourhood 
under a one-man leadership. The highlight of the meeting was “physical display”, 
which included a stick, sword and bayonet play, and Jiu Jitsu. 104 The colonial 
government was strikingly tolerant of such displays of arms on the streets; these 
Volunteers were repeatedly labelled as “not dangerous”, as opposed to the “poten-
tially dangerous” Jamruddin Fauj and Khaksar Tehreek. 105 
Such popularity of a range of Volunteer groups in the docklands demands 
closer attention towards their function in the social and political life of maritime 
workers. An incident outside the office of a stevedore, on a payday in November 
1941, exemplifies the role such groups came to play, revealing the ongoing crimi-
nalisation of labour politics, as well as the militant assertions of working-class 
anti-colonialism. Ziauddin Ahmed, nephew of Suhrawardy, and the secretary of 
the CDU, provided the following description of the incident. As the workers were 
being paid, a sirdar was pushing them to contribute towards the war fund. When 
a worker agreed to pay, the information was passed on to “organisers of Red-flag 
dressed in red shirt and cap” who were waiting outside the office. “At this the 
agitators became furious and assaulted Jaffar Khan as soon as he came out of 
the office”. Ziauddin further claimed that the incident had “created a great panic 
in the minds of the loyal labourers”, who in his view did not feel safe enough 
to contribute to the war fund anymore. The incident was narrativised differently 
in an official police inquiry. It revealed that there were clashes on the day after 
Badiur Rahman, a well-known worker-militant belonging to DMU, raised objec-
tions against deductions for the war fund stating that this union had a separate 
fund for aid to the Soviet Union. Several workers from both the unions were 
injured and arrested. Importantly, the intelligence didn’t mention the presence of 
uniformed workers in contradiction with the report of Ziauddin.106 Yet, the latter’s 
version cannot be easily dismissed. Given that Jamruddin Fauj had been built for 
precisely the functions of armed defence of the red union, it is probable that the 
Volunteers were involved in the incident. 
The main point of significance is that DMU worker-militants, whether uni-
formed or not, had taken up the risky and internationalist cause of opposing the 
war through not paying for the Allies war fund. This was not a one-off incident; 
small groups of workers had been agitating for the cause in the dock neighbour-
hoods. In one instance, eight workers of the union made a procession and one 
of them made a ten-minute anti-war speech. We do not have access to the full 
speech; the police only recorded that he had argued that workers shouldn’t sub-
scribe the war fund, since they were already paid so little, in front of a hundred 
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workers. Dockers proclaimed, in a number of speeches, that they were collecting 
for the Soviet Union, making it clear that they were also contributing towards a 
larger issue if the rival union was collecting money to fight fascism under the 
slogans of “Hitler  Barbād (destroy Hitler)”.107 They not only voiced anti-war
opinions against supporting the British but felt (physically) strong enough to
use violence against their opponents on an issue as ideologically charged as tak-
ing sides in the war. All this at a time when the government had an extremely
repressive policy against any expressed scepticism let alone criticism of the war
effort. 108 As far as we can see, this was not as a result of worker militants rely-
ing on the anti-war feelings of the wider layers of workers. It is more plausible
to say that small groups of armed men, probably belonging to the Volunteers
discussed earlier were imposing their power on rest of the workers. Moreover,
there are indications that DMU was receiving protection from the Chief Minis-
ter Fazlul Huq109 who was rallying the dockers against Suhrawardy at a time of
a ministerial crisis. Historians like Gooptu have seen Volunteers as a crystallisa-
tion of subaltern radicalism in the face of perceived passivity of the mainstream
nationalist parties.110 This incident adds a crucial dimension by showing that
such resistance was an expression of the few, such acts of resistance involved
a handful of individuals, organised in disciplined and even armed groups, who
relied on intimidation and violence to make their point of view publicly visible
to the rest as opposed to popular actions. This was not the only incident. In the
same year, the intelligence noted the high frequency with which the two rival
unions clashed violently. 111 
In the same year as dockers associated with the Bengal Labour Party were show-
ing their muscle power to publicly defend their lack of support for the British in 
the Second World War, an intelligence report noted that regular parades of Khaksar 
were being held close to seamen’s lodging houses in the docklands, where they 
were seen wearing uniforms and belćas (spades). Notably, several of them even 
belonged to the Indian Seamen’s Union, 112 which was close to DMU and Bengal 
Labour Party. 113 The same reports are suggestive of motivations for undertaking 
the risks of participating in such militant and militaristic anti-British spectacles. To
start with, the reports all refer to a brief period during the war – May-June 1941, 
when Arab Nationalist Rashid Ali al-Gailani had just led an anti-British military 
coup in Iraq. Rashid Ali was seen as a comrade by the local Khaksars. The event 
had raised hopes that Khaksars too could play such a role in the Indian indepen-
dence; an ex-sailor had even set up a shop in Kidderpore bazaar, from where he 
spread such ideas.114 He was not alone, the intelligence worryingly noted that the 
cause of Rashid Ali, who “had been acting more in the interests of Islam than for 
any other power”, had found favour among the local seamen, many of whom had 
just returned from the Middle East with a “defeatist mentality”.115 
In other words, notwithstanding the state’s claims of assisting constitutional 
trade unionism, working-class anxieties, aspirations and militancy were finding 
outlet into a bewildering mix of political causes including varied visions of anti-
colonialism. Moreover, even the radical labour leadership, Bengal Labour Party 
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the protection of Bengal Ministry, it was already collaborating with Subhash 
Chandra Bose and was also hoping for alliances with Khaksar Tehreek. The latter 
was probably due to the pressures of party’s seamen base. Thus, even as labour 
militancy was outpouring in widening visions of anti-colonialism and crystal-
lising in red-flag trade unionism, the latter was already leaning on the forces of 
emergent nation(s) 116 as manifest in the Volunteer groups, to assume, impose and 
sustain the balance of power on its side. 
The deep anxieties of colonial state vis-à-vis a rising radical labour movement 
made for strange bedfellows, forcing collaborations with the rising star of Bengal 
Muslim League – Suhrawardy, a popular, elite and conservative politician who 
had proven adept at instrumentalising and fanning religious fanaticism for high 
politics. The efforts at quelling a red-flag trade union born out of popular collective 
mobilisation opened the way for politics of patronage of the powerful communitar-
ian parties, and of communalisation, abetting the building of a popular base for the 
Muslim League in the docklands. Notwithstanding the highly militant record and 
revolutionary claims throughout the period, red-flag trade unionism proved vulner-
able to pressures of its political climate. Access to channels of emergent nation(s) 
was becoming important in running the show even for the most radical of unions. 
The modus operandi of Volunteer groups in the docklands exemplify such trends, 
pointing to the violence of the few becoming a determining factor in labour poli-
tics, even if for the time being. The post-war period saw another moment of collec-
tive mobilisation. Even so, the violent rivalries between CDU and DMU had been 
deeply entrenched. In the late 1940s, the former smoothly shifted its allegiances 
to the ruling Congress Party after independence and became an instrument in the 
hands of the new rulers for countering labour radicalism. Ironically enough, the 
CDU, which had been nurtured by the torchbearers of Muslim separatism, now 
found it opportune to cast DMU as belonging to “Pakistani communists”.117
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 9  Cairo, Athens, Salonica: 
strikebreaking and the anti-labour
practices of employers and the 
state in the early twentieth-century 
cigarette industry 
Thanasis Betas 
Strikebreaking often plays a central role in accounts of the violence that has been 
perpetrated in the struggles between labour and capital in history. It has been 
argued that violence was a popular and often successful strategy for employ-
ers in the United States prior to the federal labour legislation of the 1930s. As 
Joshua Rosenbloom notes, one of the most visible and contentious expressions 
of the increasing pressures of competition in late nineteenth-century American 
labour markets was the widespread use of strikebreakers. The factories seem to 
have had no trouble in finding “scabs” to do the work. The ability of employers 
to replace striking workers was one of the most potent weapons they had in their 
efforts to defeat the demands of organised labour for improvements to employ-
ment conditions.1 Replacement workers were used in more than 40 per cent of 
late nineteenth-century strikes, and if strikebreaking was also used, then there 
was a great likelihood that the employer would defeat the strike. A variety of 
factors appear to have influenced the relative supply and hence cost of recruiting 
replacement workers, in particular the fact that the pool of potential replacement 
workers was larger in industries and occupations that did not require specialised 
skills.2 
Strikers were very often exasperated by the thuggery and coercion used by 
entrepreneurs during the strikes that broke out in American factories in the late 
nineteenth century. A wide array of private and government forces were brought 
in to suppress the strikes. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, private detec-
tive agencies supplied guards who protected company property against strikers 
and would sometimes even assault them. During the early twentieth century, 
several firms appeared that supplied strikebreakers and guards at the request of 
companies, drawing on what amounted to private armies of thousands of men. 
The largest of these operated nationally. On many occasions the state itself inter-
vened to break strikes. As with some of the strikebreaking firms, state militiamen 
deployed advanced weaponry against strikers and their sympathisers, including 
machine guns. Firms initiated “back to work” movements to destroy the strikers’
morale and used their considerable influence with the media to propagandise in 
the press and on the radio.3 Whatever the case may be, employers did not simply 
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Instead, they staged a fightback against the unions, sometimes through lawsuits 
and legislation, sometimes with the use of violent thugs. As Matteo Milan has 
argued, “the American case is certainly a clear archetype in terms of the violent 
counter positions between ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ . . . [with] images of brutal police 
forces employed in the services of private interests”. Yet, as he notes, the violence 
used against strikers was not only applied in the USA in the nineteenth century 
but in Europe as well.4 Recent studies have shown that in certain sectors of British 
industry – shipping, for example – there was a clear tendency “to employ violent, 
illegal and inherently subversive means to protect the management from both 
the opposition of trade unions and the increasing encroachment of the state into 
industrial matters”.5 In analysing the practices of violence during the strikes in 
Habsburg Austria from the 1890s until the outbreak of the First World War, Claire 
Morelon argues that violent confrontations between strikers, strikebreakers and 
the state forces that were protecting them frequently occurred. This is further evi-
dence that industrial vigilantism and patterns of anti-labour violence occurred not 
only in the USA but in Europe as well at the turn of the twentieth century. 6 These 
penetrating studies have undoubtedly broadened the research in the field of strikes 
and strikebreaking, illuminating the methods used by the state and employers in 
European countries to deal with them. Nevertheless, the structure of violence in 
the Pre-First World War period remains less explored, especially with regard to 
the public-private interplay in the policing of labour protests in other geographi-
cal contexts. 
In this chapter I thus focus on the strikes that broke out at the beginning of 
the twentieth century in cigarette-making factories in three different urban and 
industrial environments in the South-East Mediterranean – Cairo, Athens and 
Salonica – which are located at the periphery of capitalist growth. What were the 
demands of the workers? What attitudes, practices and discourses did employ-
ers and the state adopt and express against the strikers? What were the factors 
involved in the strikes and how did they shape anti-labour ideologies, discourses 
and practices of employers and the state? What similarities and differences can be 
observed among the cases examined and how can they be interpreted? By utiliz-
ing a comparative approach, this chapter seeks to offer answers to those questions. 
Drawing on newspapers and archival records, the chapter will highlight the poli-
cies and strategies of the state and employers vis-à-vis the strikes that broke out in 
the cigarette-making industry in the early twentieth century. 
The central question is how and for which reasons were the anti-labour ideolo-
gies, discourses and practices of employers and the state shaped. I argue that the 
mechanisms adopted to control the labour protests were not monolithic or inflex-
ible and one-dimensional. Instead, they covered a wide range of possibilities, 
from violent suppression, to the adoption of consensual methods and paternalistic 
mechanisms which aimed to manipulate labour protests and weaken trade union-
ism. This chapter will first present a broad overview of the branch of cigarette 
making in three different countries of the South-East Mediterranean – the Otto-
man Empire, Greece and Egypt – in the late nineteenth century, with an emphasis 
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cigarette makers. This will be followed by an analysis of the case of Cairo and the 
protests by cigarette makers that broke out in that city at the dawn of the twentieth 
century. Our attention will then turn to Athens, finally to move north to Salonica, 
a city that was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1913. 
 Labour market 
In the early 1880s, the Ottoman Empire established the Tobacco Régie ( Régie 
co-intéressée des Tabacs de l’Empire Ottoman) with the participation of Otto-
man and foreign banks. The Tobacco Régie had a monopoly over the tobacco 
market, exports and sales, and its purpose was to enable the Ottoman Empire to 
control tobacco revenues so as to service its external debt.7 Apart from Istanbul, 
in other urban areas of the empire too tobacco and cigarette production employed 
a great number of male and female workers in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. In Izmir, Samsun and Salonica, the monopoly tobacco factories 
employed around 1,400 women and men in total. In Salonica, industrial tobacco 
processing had previously been the main “industry” of the city, both in the final 
era of the Ottoman Empire and in the interwar period. The headquarters of Greek, 
Jewish, Armenian and American companies were located in Salonica, whose 
work involved preparing and exporting leaves and, in a very few cases, making 
cigarettes.8 
The monopoly over the market meant that the tobacco sector came to be aban-
doned by several Greek capitalists, who sought a friendlier investment environ-
ment in the cigarette-making sector. This they found in the neighbouring country 
of Egypt. Cigarette makers, specialised male technicians who made cigarettes by 
hand, would also go to Egypt for work opportunities, since their craft was highly 
sought after. In Egypt, where the tax system did not impose a monopoly, cigarette 
production in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was performed 
mainly by small and medium-sized businesses – some of which later grew into 
large tobacco industries – in which the specialised cigarette makers were men, 
who were highly sought after because of their craft. This enabled them to develop 
a strong trade union activity and in many cases disputes with their employers 
evolved into open conflicts.9 
In Greece, there was no significant pre-industrial craft industry for the manufac-
ture of tobacco products, whether cigar or cigarette making, as was the case else-
where. The history of the handmade cigarette-making sector in the country, even 
though rather brief – dating from the end of the nineteenth century to the mid-
1930s – is linked to the social, cultural, political and economic conditions of the 
period. Handmade cigarettes were the most popular tobacco product in the early 
twentieth century as they were smoked by the younger population and women, 
resulting in the constant expansion of the market. In Greece, tobacco processing – 
cutting and cigarette making for sale on the domestic market, in contrast to the 
processing sector, where selection and packaging were carried out – had become 
a state monopoly by the end of the nineteenth century. An 1883 law, passed after 
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established 80 public tobacco factories in various towns throughout the country. 
As stipulated by law, tobacco-cutting could only take place in public tobacco fac-
tories and the tax paid on cut tobacco was to be paid within the factories.10 At the 
same time, cut tobacco processing would also take place in these facilities and be 
used to make tobacco products, such as cigarettes, cigars and pipe tobacco. As a 
result, small family businesses, those which channelled cut tobacco and cigarettes 
onto the domestic market, were forced to “acquire” their own space within public 
tobacco-cutting facilities. 
After 1892, tobacco processing – cutting and cigarette making – stopped being 
an exclusive privilege of the state and the operation of private tobacco factories 
was permitted, albeit under the supervision of directors and officials from the 
public tobacco factories.11 Handmade cigarettes had to be made in public tobacco 
factories but by male technicians – cigarette makers – chosen exclusively by the 
interested manufacturers. Thus, the state personnel would work in public tobacco 
factories that were subject to the state, but they were paid by the businessmen to 
whom they were attached.12 The introduction of cigarette-making machines and 
the attempt to mechanise the sector in the early twentieth century provoked severe 
reactions on the part of the cigarette makers and led to open conflict between them 
and their employers. 
 Cairo 
To understand the position taken by the Greek tobacco industrialists and the Egyp-
tian government against the cigarette makers, we must also consider the inter-
national economic context in which the previously mentioned events took place 
just as much as the characteristics of those enterprises. The upturn in economic 
activity and the growth in international trade in the second half of the nineteenth 
century – after the great depression of the years 1873 to 1895 – brought interna-
tional capital to the expanding Egyptian cigarette market: first, the British Ameri-
can Tobacco Company (ΤΒΑ) and later the Eastern Tobacco Co, which took over 
Maspero Freres Limited, the sole British tobacco firm in Egypt, and gradually 
acquired Greek tobacco firms such as S.A. des Tabacs et Cigarettes Papatheolo-
gos and S. Mavridis Ltd. 
As has already been mentioned, in May 1883 the Ottoman Monopoly over the 
tobacco trade was taken over by the newly founded company of the Regie Co-
interesse des Tabacs de l’ Empire Ottoman, which was to constitute the largest 
foreign investment in the empire. The monopolistic privileges of the Regies and 
its dominant presence put serious pressure on the existing tobacco firms, result-
ing in some of the companies being priced out of the market and they instead 
transferred to other parts of the world, such as the USA and Germany. The main 
place to which they relocated, however, was Egypt, specifically Cairo and Alex-
andria, where the invasion of the British army in 1882 changed the economic 
and business landscape of this Ottoman region. Many Greek tobacco dealers and 
craftsmen settled in Egypt, where they became involved in the tobacco trade and 
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Koutarellis Brothers cigarette company was established in Alexandria, Egypt, by 
Konstantinos, Dimitrios, and Alkiviadis Koutarellis in 1890. 14 At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the company modernised its machines and buildings. In 
1920, it built its own privately owned factory, installing a large number of state-
of-the-art cigarette-making machines and special tobacco-cutting machines and 
increased the technical staff. The factory underwent a series of improvements 
from the 1920s onwards and by the eve of the Second World War, it covered an 
area of 5,000 square metres.15 
When analysing the causes behind the choice of Egypt historian Christos Chat-
ziiosif points to the shaping of an important and dynamic tobacco market, thanks 
to the presence of the British army of occupation, the European communities 
and the large number of travellers passing through on their way to and from the 
East. The addiction of these consumers, who would at some point return to their 
homelands, created the conditions for significant exports of cigarettes to Euro-
pean countries.16 The formation of a free market without any restrictions, promis-
ing significant profits thanks to exports, attracted Greek tobacco industrialists as 
well as cigarette makers.17 
By the end of the nineteenth century, many Greeks would go to Egypt to learn 
the art of cigarette making and then return to their home regions to practice the 
art there. Manolis Karathanasis, one of the founders of the tobacco company of 
Samos mentioned earlier, went to Egypt – it is not known for how long – to “spe-
cialize” in handmade cigarette making.18 If we go by the advertisements placed in 
the Greek press by Greek tobacco companies, then Egyptian cigarettes, as well as 
the specialised cigarette makers who came from that country, were highly valued 
in the Greek market. For example, an advertisement of the I Proodos company, 
which belonged to the Karakitis Brothers and was established in Volos at the 
end of the nineteenth century, boasts that its handmade cigarettes are of the same 
quality as those from Cairo and Alexandria, having been prepared with the same 
method used by cigarette makers in Egypt.19 
Greek-owned cigarette factories in Egypt were of various sizes and with
unequal degrees of production mechanisation. Machines were used only in some 
early production phases, such as tobacco-cutting, while cigarette packing and roll-
ing were done by hand until the end of the nineteenth century. 20 It was in this 
phase of production that Greek tobacco company owners had the greatest com-
parative advantage because, aside from importing Eastern tobacco, they were also 
able import a cheap and specialised workforce composed of Greek cigarette mak-
ers.21 However, this advantage was not due solely to the use of specialised male 
cigarette makers but also to the use or, more correctly, exploitation of the broader 
workforce, including both women and children. 
Cairo in around 1900, then, was home to an advanced handmade cigarette sec-
tor and numerous tobacco factories, strengthening the position of the cigarette 
makers. The Greek cigarette makers organised to vociferously demanded higher 
wages and better working conditions through a series of strikes that took place 
from 1899 to 1902. More pertinently, their primary concern was to maintain the 
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were more concerned to ensure this did not happen and sought to undermine the 
position of the skilled Greek cigarette makers by having them be accompanied or 
even gradually replaced by two other types of less-skilled local workers, the so-
called “macaronists” and “sorters”.22 
The Greek cigarette makers of Egypt, along with their Italian and German col-
leagues, actively participated in these strike actions. The strikes were, however, 
violently suppressed by the tobacco company employers with the aid of the Egyp-
tian police. Many Greek cigarette makers were arrested as “troublemakers” and 
the “more dangerous” ones were expelled from the country, as happened in Cairo 
in December 1901. A strike had broken out in the Greek tobacco factory owned 
by the Susas Bros company, with demands for wage rises and better working 
conditions. The Egyptian government did not remain neutral in this civil conflict 
that arose between the Greek entrepreneurs and the Greek cigarette makers. The 
cigarette makers accused the Egyptian government not only of using naked vio-
lence, arrests and expulsions, but also of protecting the Greek tobacco industrial-
ists by providing them with native workers who would enter the factory escorted 
by the army. 23 The strike was characterised as a “revolt” by the factory owners. 
The Egyptian police violently pursued the strikers, injuring many of them and 
arresting 25 people. There are reports that many women and children were among 
the injured, a fact that demonstrates the presence of women and children in the 
workplace as well as their dynamic participation in the conflicts that arose in the 
tobacco factories.24 
The president of the Greek cigarette makers’ committee in Cairo criticised the 
position taken by the Greek consulate of Cairo and wrote a letter to the Greek 
prime minister accusing the consulate of collaborating with the Egyptian authori-
ties over the expulsions and of not caring about the community of the Greek 
cigarette makers and their families. Some of those family members – women and 
children – were also employed in the tobacco factories, alongside a male member 
of their family, be it their husband, father or brother. The workforce in the tobacco 
factories, which was composed of Greeks, Armenians and Egyptians, is of par-
ticular interest as the employers of the Greek workers also came from their home-
land of Greece. The foreign citizens of Egypt, the Greeks and the Armenians, 
were well-paid skilled cigarette makers, while the native population worked in 
subordinate posts in the factory, along with the women and the children discussed 
previously. 
These foreign citizens of Egypt – the skilled cigarette makers – played a lead-
ing role in the growth of collective action in the tobacco industry. To confront the 
constantly expanding labour protests of the cigarette makers, the tobacco indus-
trialists hired native workers as strikebreakers. During the riots, the Egyptian gov-
ernment strongly intervened, violently suppressing the protests and incriminating 
the Greek cigarette makers. By ensuring that the native workers could enter the 
factory, they aimed to protect the interests of the Greek tobacco industrialists. 
This meant that the skilled foreign workers who were employed alongside their 
family members were confronted with the native unskilled workforce. The con-
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throughout the labour force, thus bringing into the open other controversial issues 
within the labour force itself, in particular ethnicity and gender. 
Athens 
This “incident” was part of a series of labour mobilisations and struggles that 
took place in Egypt at the beginning of the twentieth century. A leading role
was played by Greek cigarette makers and those of other nationalities, as well 
as specialised male craftsmen and female workers. Maintaining the production 
process – alongside demands for higher wages and better working conditions – 
was the main issue of concern for the cigarette makers in Greece too. Although 
Greece lacked a significant craft industry in hand-rolled cigarettes, which would 
have enabled the cigarette makers to strengthen their negotiating power in the 
labour market, as had happened in Egypt, the presence of cigarette workers in 
Greece was not negligible. Nor were they deprived of militancy, as the protests 
and strikes that broke out in the cigarette industry in Greece in the early twentieth 
century attest. 
It appears that the Greek cigarette makers who arrived in Greece from Egypt 
transferred not only their undeniable abilities in the craft of cigarette making, but 
also the “prowess” of protest and assertion. Having returned to Greece, they had 
no difficulty in being hired by the tobacco firms. On the contrary, they were in 
high demand, as they were guaranteed to produce the best cigarettes. This peace-
ful cooperation between employers and employees was, however, to be short-
lived, since the contradictions between the demands of both sides soon came to 
the fore, even if the prime tobacco of the exquisite handmade cigarettes papered 
over their differences. 
From as early as 1902, cigarette makers in Piraeus had been requesting a wage 
increase of 55 drachmas for every thousand cigarettes that they produced. Some 
tobacco sellers, mostly the smaller ones, accepted this compromise, as the ciga-
rette makers presented it, but the largest adamantly refused to satisfy the cigarette 
makers’ request. 25 For them, the need to “get rid of” this specialised profes-
sional group of cigarette makers became an increasing “obsession”. They were 
to achieve their goal a few years later with the introduction of cigarette-making 
machines, of which it was said that “they will get rid of any new demand from the 
cigarette makers”.26 
The first attempt to mechanise cigarette making in Greece is attributed to a pri-
vate entrepreneur, the tobacco factory owner K. Angelidis. The cigarette-making 
machine was used first in the State Tobacco Factory of Athens in 1885 and then in 
Piraeus, and it had a production capacity of about 50 kilos of cigarettes per day, 27 
that is about 100,000 cigarettes for a ten-hour working day. The production capac-
ity of a cigarette maker was 3,000 cigarettes per day. By the end of the follow-
ing decade, the cigarette-making machines had become much more widespread. 
In 1909, new cigarette-making machine models were installed and operated in 
the public tobacco-cutting facilities of Athens, Piraeus and Pyrgos. By 1914, pri-







160 Thanasis Betas 
Α. Karelias in Kalamata, V. Karavasilis in Pyrgos and N. Matsaggos in Volos 
had installed the first tobacco-cutting and cigarette-making machines.28 Each 
cigarette-making machine appears to have “replaced” about 100 cigarette mak-
ers,29 which led to a fierce reaction on the part of the cigarette makers themselves. 
As specialised craftsmen employed in public and private tobacco-cutting facili-
ties, the cigarette makers immediately understood that the beginning of the mech-
anisation of the production process would lead to their end. A professional end 
that threatened not only their identity as male specialised craftsmen but, first and 
foremost their survival, as it would push them to the margins of their industry. 
If for the tobacco traders the automation of cigarette making meant a shift from 
small craftsmanship – as it had been since the pre-industrial era – to the industrial 
and mass production of cigarettes, for the craftsmen cigarette makers it signified 
the end of their craft and their “proletarianization”, pushing them out of the “tran-
sitional zone”, where they could still be seen as “skilled, respectable craftsmen” 
positioned somewhere between the workers and the bourgeoisie. 30 Their concern 
as to what automation meant forced them into an open conflict with the tobacco 
merchants. 
In May 1910, cigarette makers who worked for the tobacco merchant K. Varkas, 
whose factory was located in Athens, went on strike in protest at his decision to 
procure cigarette-making machines. The cigarette makers occupied the area out-
side the factory and remained there until late at night and their strike was to last 
for several days. The cigarette-making machines had to be transported into the 
tobacco factory with the help of the police, as there was a risk of reprisals from 
the strikers. Throughout the night, the factory was also guarded by policemen. 
At the peak of the strike, in late May, the cigarette makers occupied the factory 
and for two to three days it seemed as though the authorities had lost control of 
public order in Athens. The cigarette makers were described in the press as “more 
demanding”. 
This description was indeed accurate as the demands of the strikers were now 
not only about the machinery but had extended to cover other issues related to the 
workplace and labour market control. In other words, in addition to attempting to 
prohibit the use of the machines, they also demanded the dismissal of the supervi-
sor entrusted by the tobacco merchant Varkas, an end to replacement hiring (or the 
use of non-unionised workers) and the dismissal of those who had already been 
hired by Varkas. In addition to their demands for higher wages, fewer working 
hours and to maintain control of the labour process, there were also demands for 
control of the labour market. The collective control of the market was needed not 
only because the shortage of labour would lead to wage increases, but also because 
it was largely a prerequisite for the achievement of every collective demand. By 
protesting in this way, the cigarette makers were at risk of being replaced by their 
employers not only temporarily during a strike but also permanently. As regards 
their demand for collective control of the labour market, this should not be seen 
exclusively as the fruition of their collective struggles but in combination with 
their goal of maintaining their privileges as skilled craftsmen – both material and 
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In late May, about 500 of the cigarette makers headed for the Customs Office of 
Piraeus, where the cigarette-making machines were being guarded, with the aim 
of destroying them. As a result, the first regiment and all the police force were put 
on guard. The strike continued until May 31 when, through the presence of over-
whelming forces that aimed to put down the strike with either the threat or the use 
of violence, the state restored order. The machinery, which was stored in Varkas’s 
property, had been protected. 31 Almost a month later, most of the cigarette makers 
appear to have returned to work. The strike ringleaders, of whom there were 28 
altogether, were indicted by the district attorney for damage to property: five were 
sent to the High Court and four to the Criminal Court. 
The demands of the cigarette makers and their conflicts with the capitalist 
tobacco merchants were widely discussed in the Greek parliament in the 1910s. 
In 1911, in response to the events of May 1910, parliament debated the immi-
nent submission of a bill on the use of cigarette-making machines. The opinions 
expressed during the debate on this bill reflect the ideas, mentalities, moral issues 
and social prejudices of the political world of the time as regards technological 
innovation, the analysis of which would require a separate study. Here we shall 
focus on two typical opposing opinions in order to trace the attitudes and the role 
of the state on this matter. The first opinion displays a modernising tendency and 
supports the need for and the inevitability of mechanisation, despite its social 
costs. This came in a speech by Nikolaos Vathris, a Member of Parliament for 
Corfu, who was also the proponent of the bill: 
Regarding the requests of the opposing parties . . . of course, progress can-
not be hindered even if means going to march on a road covered by dead 
bodies. . . . Steam destroyed sailing and deprived thousands of workers of 
work. So did railways, electricity and every progress that happens. Finally, 
the Commission deemed it necessary to tax the cigarette-making machines 
because they bring great profits to their owners, while, on the other hand, 
they deprived thousands of workers of work. 
The second opinion, given by Dionysios Gklavas, the Member of Parliament from 
Achaia, shows how the introduction of technology was perceived by some poli-
ticians as a threat for both the health of the workers and also for public health: 
“I fully support the rightful demands of the cigarette makers. Due to the intro-
duction of cigarette-making machines, a decline is being felt in this country and 
parliament must prevent the spread of this evil”.32 
Even though it was not a central demand the cigarette makers’ request for 
financial aid so that they could purchase the cigarette-making machine them-
selves reveals another dimension to these events. At the very least, it forces us to 
reflect upon and revisit the ways in which the workforce looked upon technologi-
cal innovation. Machines were seen by the cigarette makers not merely as a threat, 
as the tool that would replace them, but as a means of production that had been 
appropriated by their employer. Recognizing the value of this means, they did not 
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put forth by the cigarette makers’ union a few years later, in May 1918, for the 
concession of an area within the public tobacco factory in which they could work 
independently, 33 then a more nuanced picture emerges, which shows the protec-
tive nature of the cigarette makers’ demands towards their work during this period 
while also demonstrating their belief that the state – and its institutions – is the 
distributor of the social product. 
Their behaviour and their actions – including the destruction of or threat to 
destroy the cigarette-making machines – should therefore be seen as something 
more than simply the behaviour of workers who are thinking “traditionally” within 
the context of a moral economy, as a result of their fear of new technology. 34 On 
the contrary, these specific practices are part of their negotiation strategies to gain 
work within the new economic and social order ushered in by the arrival of this 
new technology. 
We can also view the proposal for the use of machines exclusively for pipe pro-
duction for cigarettes within this context. As already mentioned, this specific task 
was carried out by male and female workers who were considered unspecialised. 
Specialised cigarette makers, aware that technological development would trans-
form the production process and render old skills such as theirs, around which 
power relations in the place of production were structured, useless, demanded 
that they be able to determine the tasks in this area themselves. They therefore 
approached their employers in a pliant and conciliatory manner and claimed to 
be willing to accept the machines on the condition that they be used in an ancil-
lary way during the production stage. This ancillary task was to be performed by 
“other” unspecialised “assistant” employees, thus highlighting the now common 
heterogeneity, contrasts, exclusions and hierarchies that could be found among 
employees at production sites. 
To sum up, the active mobilisations of cigarette makers in the 1910s showed 
their fighting spirit, which was perhaps the result of two interconnected factors. 
First, the strong – initially – negotiating position that they had both against their 
employers and against the state, as they represented the few specialised craftsmen 
able to produce what was a very popular product. Second, the changes in work 
structure and organisation brought about by technological developments presup-
posed their own “end” – their professional “end” – and whatever this might entail 
on both a practical, material level and a symbolic one. Conflicts similar to the 
ones discussed earlier could also be observed in other cigarette factories in Greece 
during this period. 
Salonica 
Disputes between workers and employers in the cigarette-making industry over 
the organisation of labour, working conditions and control of the labour market 
broke out in the multinational post-Ottoman city of Salonica in the early twentieth 
century. In 1918, male and female workers in the cigarette factories went on strike, 
demanding a rise in wages and for workers to be hired only through the trade 
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city’s cigarette factories notified the authorities of the goals and intentions of the 
cigarette makers’ union. This letter “challenges” us to contemplate this incident, 
if only briefly, and underlines how often the “discourses” that surround an event 
are more interesting than the event itself. 
In this letter, the managers of the tobacco factories notified the general com-
mander of Salonica of the goals and practices of the cigarette makers’ trade 
union, in their view. They presented the union leaders as the instigators of the 
strike, claiming that they aspired to moral profit and that they had enthralled 
the majority of the workers, particularly the more “naive” and the youngest, 
who lack proper judgment.35 In demanding that workers be recruited through the 
union, their aim – according to the managers of the cigarette factories – was to 
gain management power over the workers as well as over the ways and the meth-
ods in which the work was performed. This had resulted in a situation the aim of 
which was to “create workers who are undisciplined, disruptive, insolent, work-
ers who deny all respect for their superiors and employers and every obligation 
to the assumed work”. For this reason, the managers of the factories concluded 
that they would not only oppose the union demand to remove the strikebreakers, 
but they would fight to expel from all the tobacco factories of Salonica the few 
“troublemaker” workers who “were and will always be at the root of all argu-
ments, the lack of discipline and, therefore, of unreasonable and inopportune 
strikes” and that “honest, hard-working and diligent workers” must instead be 
hired in their place.36 
The cigarette factory directors responded to the demand for wage increases by 
expressing an interest in male and female workers who are “naïve”, as the direc-
tors called them, and who are tricked “by capitalistic, so to say, workers, i.e. those 
who receive high wages”. For this reason they suggest that 
increases should be applied not on a sliding scale but a progressive one 
based on wages . . . [it should] be progressively distributed in favour of those 
who receive low wages, who, in this case, are blatantly wronged by their 
colleagues.37 
It seems that while the strikers demanded that all wages be increased by the same 
rate, the employers’ suggestion was that wages be increased progressively and in 
reverse proportion, i.e. a greater increase for low wages and a lower increase for 
high wages. 
As can be observed, then, the target of the attacks made by the cigarette fac-
tory managers in Salonica was not all the workers in their facilities. The object of 
their ire was specifically the most unionised workers, particularly the union lead-
ers who also happened to be the skilled male craftsmen, meaning that they were 
among the best paid but at the same time the least easy to control, in other words 
the “troublemakers”. Not only, in the eyes of factory owners and managers, did 
they provoke “unreasonable” and “inopportune strikes” and cause material dam-
age to their factories, these workers also constituted a threat to the maintenance of 







Maintaining total control of the labour process, higher wages and improvement of 
working conditions were the main demands of cigarette makers in those regions 
around the south-eastern Mediterranean Sea where handmade cigarettes were pro-
duced. Control over the organisation of labour – which is linked to technological 
and organisational changes – in the cigarette industry in those areas that were on 
the fringes of capitalist growth in Europe at the dawn of the twentieth century was 
the common factor – notwithstanding the fixed demand for wage rises – upon 
which labour protests were based. 
In Egypt, the competition between the small Greek tobacco firms – which could 
even be considered family businesses – and the large multinational tobacco indus-
try was particularly unequal. Unable to deal with the new circumstances created 
by technological and organisational developments in the tobacco industry in that 
period or to compete with the huge international tobacco firms, the Greek tobacco 
industrialists of Egypt sought to maintain control over the organisation of labour 
in their factories and to secure their profit rates through “traditional” means con-
nected to the intensity of the labour performed, as well as through repressive and 
disciplinary measures against “disobedient” workers. Lastly, it could be said that 
the reason the Egyptian authorities imposed law and order was to secure the pub-
lic peace and ensure the smooth running of the free market. 
Protests and conflicts between cigarette makers and employers became wide-
spread in Athens at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, when 
certain tobacco industry owners decided to procure cigarette-making machines. 
The strikes became open conflicts and hand-to-hand fighting broke out between 
the strikers and the strikebreakers and state forces that were brought in to crush the 
strikes. The state, through the army and navy, acted as strong forces of suppres-
sion in an attempt to “restore” law and order. With the aim of maintaining the 
social order and public peace, the state initially approached the cigarette makers 
with an attempt to understand their position. So long as the social peace was not 
disturbed, either through their words or – more often – through their actions, the 
cigarette makers were accepted and treated sympathetically by the authorities. 
In this period, then, the state appears to have played an arbitrational, consensual 
and “paternal” role between the two opposing parties: the world of labour and the 
world of capital. Acknowledging this role, both parties turned to the state, asking 
it to help secure agreement for their demands. However, once the struggle of the 
cigarette makers escalated and became radicalised, the state started to behave 
towards them in a very different way. 
The cigarette makers of Salonica were described – and identified – as “capi-
talistic classes of workers” by their employers, not only because they received 
higher wages, but also because they engaged in a fierce battle for control over 
labour organisation and to define responsibilities in the production area as well 
as for control over the labour market. Fully aware of this situation and the risks 
it posed for them the employers made an overt attempt to break up the workforce 
and consequently to weaken its capacity for collective action, as well as to “stimu-
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It could be argued that the attitudes, practices and mechanisms that were
adopted to control the labour protests were not uniform but very diverse. Such 
practices and policies were often common to and similar in the cases discussed 
here, but they were adopted in specific periods and contexts, under particular 
economic, social and cultural conditions, the further study and research of which 
will allow us to grasp more clearly their commonalities and differences. In any 
case, it could be argued that for a deeper understanding of the “vehicles”, ways and 
mechanisms of the labour protests as well as of anti-labour practices and methods 
of suppression, the questions posed must go beyond the labour/capital binary and 
be enriched with other analytical tools, such as race, gender, the family and age. 
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 10 In reaction to revolution 
Anti-strike mentalities and practices 
in the Russian radical right, 1905–141
 George Gilbert 
 Introduction 
In thinking about the nature of the Russian right’s political activism, a dramatic 
passage from the Union of Russian People’s (URP) 1905 manifesto provides the 
following insight: 
The enemies of the Tsar and of the country, by means of deception, threats, 
and violence, cause strikes in factories and mills, stop trains, disrupt trade, 
inflict tremendous loss to the entire state, and deprive hundreds of thousands 
of poor people of work in order to force them into violence through hunger. 2 
In a few short lines, the manifesto demonstrates the populism of the URP, placing 
this group on the side of the Russian people against subversive enemies, and, at 
the same time, stating their desire to defend Russian autocracy. It presents the 
URP as a force for law and order in a time of chaos and unrest, and focuses on the 
negative energies unleashed by the strike wave in late Imperial Russia. 
This chapter will investigate the ideas, mentalities and activities of Russian 
rightists concerning the strike movement in late Imperial Russia. It will look 
mainly at parties and unions that styled themselves as social movements. These 
have sometimes been known (and referred to themselves as) “Black Hundreds”, 
though here the term rightists (or “right”) will be used to denote clear reference
to the operations of specific actors – those of the right-wing parties (pravye
partii). The argument is that the right was a novel force that posed dilemmas 
not only for their opponents on the left, but also for tsarism. Rightists had an 
opportunity to share power with authorities, including the army and police, that 
was never fully grasped. Though partially because of the right’s lack of organisa-
tional wherewithal and tendencies towards infighting, the more intractable reason 
why counter-revolutionary activism did not make further inroads is the challenge 
to autocracy that rightists themselves posed. To illustrate this claim, the essay 
explores several cases from the 1905 revolution up until the First World War, 
particularly focusing on examples drawn from Odessa, St. Petersburg and Ekat-
erinoslav, though it will contextualise such findings more broadly. 
The historiography on the strike movement in the late Russian Empire is deeply 
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with increasing patterns of urbanisation, industrialisation and the development of 
the workers’ question. 3 The revolutionary epoch of 1904–7 saw a great upsurge 
in the strike movement, embodied in developments such as the General Strike 
of October 1905, which provided a defined problem for Russia’s conservatives 
to contend with. The year forms the point of departure in Peter Holquist’s sum-
mary of the “epoch of violence” (1905–21) which spanned late Imperial Russia 
and the early Soviet Union. Violent hostility to strike movements was one part of 
a much wider pattern of state, non-state and anti-state conflict.4 As has been well 
demonstrated, strikes in late Imperial Russia were often brutally suppressed by the 
defenders of the old regime, with anti-strike violence deployed by police, Cossacks 
and the army. 5 Right-wing forces opposed to strikes were just another example of 
the old regime’s defenders, prepared to use violence if necessary; intriguingly, they 
were not created by the old regime, but nevertheless rose to protect it. 
Historians have rarely lingered long on where the Russian radical right stood 
in relation to these wider patterns of anti-strike violence and activism, which is 
surprising given the literature on the Russian right has expanded greatly since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The intellectual elements of right-wing activism – 
their “ideology” – has taken precedence in most studies, alongside study of party 
and group formation.6 Though the “organized right” appeared earlier, the revolu-
tion of 1905 and in particular the promulgation of the 17 October Manifesto of 
that year provided the impetus for a wider process of right-wing group formation. 
The appearance of politics, parliament and civil rights compelled the appearance 
of new forces on the right that wished to restore Russia to an earlier time, before 
developments they negatively associated with both Russian and non-Russian lib-
eralism. The final few months of 1905 saw the formation of many significant 
forces on the right, such as the URP, whose manifesto has been already cited, 
though they were joined by many smaller and less notorious organisations. 
The Russian right, it must be said, was a diverse and differentiated series of 
organisations, and the boundaries between different groups and parties were often 
remarkably porous. Activists and leaders often crossed the boundaries from one 
group to another before, during and after the revolution of 1905, helped by the 
close ideological connections between the main parties and groups, and the ten-
dency for key individuals to be closely networked to one another. Many figures 
appear on the membership lists of several different groups, and it was not uncom-
mon for those previously active in groups like the Russian Assembly to later on 
play a role in groups including the URP or the Union of the Archangel Mikhail, 
which was formed at the start of 1908. However, the names of these groups – for 
instance, the Party of Legal Order – illustrate a commonality: a desire to defend 
the existing state structure. Rightists were deeply troubled by what they saw as the 
disorder and chaos of the new “time of troubles” that started around 1904–5, and 
shared a pessimistic, even fatalistic vision of the Russian future.7 A theme unit-
ing disparate groups on the right was their opposition to revolutionary activity, 
including strikes and striking workers. 
Exploring the right’s anti-strike activism provides vital clues to uncover their 
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that the Russian right was largely created autonomously from the government and 
supported by influential backers, some of whom could not be dismissed as lack-
eys of the tsarist establishment, as Soviet-era scholarship on the right tended to 
do.8 They tended to emerge at their own behest and their actions were not organ-
ised by employers’ associations. Furthermore, rightist desires to oppose strikers 
and tendencies towards violence complicate their self-image as loyal defenders of 
law and order, and can shed light on an important question: to what extent were 
such groups – particularly armed groups – accepted by the Russian state when 
they themselves created disorder? In summarising the pan-European impact of 
armed associations at a colloquium on the theme, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt noted the 
importance of specific “conflict structures” in accounting for the emergence of 
violence, and, influenced by Max Weber’s reading, the problem of legitimate vio-
lence in particular. These structures included the relationship between insurgent 
forces and existing authorities such as the army and police, and the latter’s moni-
toring, and, if necessary, suppression, of the potential for violence. 9 
Right-wing efforts to organise parties and groups at the local level were often 
piecemeal and haphazard, but their appearance posed intriguing dilemmas for the 
Russian state.10 Haupt’s concluding questions are appropriate: how does a state, 
in this case an autocratic one, deal with violence deployed outside of its pub-
lic monopoly on it? To what extent were such groups integrated into the state’s 
monopoly on violence? Counter-revolutionary violence was not new: it was seen 
in the pogrom wave from 1903–5. Focusing on anti-strike activism as extra-
authority practice illustrates a changing, often vexed relationship between the 
Russian state and autonomous forces. This chapter will contribute to our knowl-
edge of both the Russian right and political violence in the Belle Époque era by 
exploring the nature of this relationship, examining the shop floor culture of the 
right as well as their ideas, visions and practices towards strikes, revealing diverse 
sides of the new activist mentality, one often developing outside of the auspices 
of the autocracy. 
The workers’ question and right-wing mobilisation 
The Russian right’s hostility to strikes was partly a question of identity, linked 
to the wider development of such groups, as well as the desire to articulate and 
clarify a response to the “workers’ question” in the late Russian Empire. This 
was underscored by structural transformations in the Russian Empire, most of all 
urbanisation and industrialisation, especially from the 1880s onwards. Thinkers 
on the conservative right, including the ultra-monarchist Lev Tikhomirov (for-
merly, a member of the revolutionary group the People’s Will in the early 1880s), 
began to explore such issues in their writings. The Russian Assembly, a cultural 
organisation formed in St. Petersburg and Khar’kov, first appeared in 1901. 11 The 
Assembly and its leaders – who originated exclusively from the gentry estate – 
initially had little to say about working-class activism, and their supporters came 
almost wholly from the elites, mainly the Russian nobility. In contrast, a few
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including from workers. The names of new groups are suggestive of this trend: the 
Union of Russian Workers (Kiev) and the Circles of Russian Workers (Khar’kov) 
were two that appeared during 1904.12 This marked a transition whereby new 
parties and groups were clearly aiming to cultivate the support of workers by 
addressing them directly. At this stage such organisations had little to say about 
strikebreaking as a practice, and their calls to support the Russian autocracy did 
little to distinguish them from older conservative groups. Over time though the 
nature of their appeal began to change; publications and pamphlets began to 
address workers specifically, as in the case of a pamphlet addressed “to Russian 
workers” issued in Kiev in April 1905. 13 The “workers’ question” began to preoc-
cupy intellectuals on the right as well: early in 1905, Klavdii Paskhalov, a noted 
Slavophile thinker who was also active in right-wing circles after 1905, spoke of 
a possible “revolution from the right” as one response to challenges of mass activ-
ism and political radicalism.14 
During the revolutionary events of that year a larger strike movement appeared, 
culminating in the General Strike of October 1905, a major event that urged many 
of the newly formed parties and groups on the right to clarify a response. The 
response of many was to organise, and, around the same time, many parties and 
groups on the right desired to attract workers to their cause. From late 1905 the 
right expanded massively across the empire, and the formation of their own work-
ers’ groups followed patterns of national party formation. Groups like the URP
exemplified a more intransigent, radical presence developing on the right in this 
era, some of which styled themselves as social movements (or “unions”) rather 
than political parties, telling of the diverse constituency they wished to attract. 
Even so, the URP, by far the largest and most socially variegated of right-wing 
groups, still drew 50 per cent of its ruling council from the gentry even after the 
revolution of 1905.15 
And yet evidence shows the URP sought to recruit factory workers from the 
final months of 1905, some of whom were attracted by their specifically anti-
revolutionary message. A group in the Putilov factory in St. Petersburg, one of 
the largest manufacturing plants in the Russian Empire, which boasted a total 
workforce of around 30,000, was led by Aleksandr Polovnev; another group in the 
city was in the Nevskii factory, headed by Vasili Snessarev. The URP’s presence 
in the Putilov factory towards the end of 1905 was estimated to number around 
1,500 workers.16 The formation of a so-called “fighting brotherhood” (druzhina) 
amongst URP activists in nearby St. Petersburg demonstrated a potential for con-
flict. Developing a base of supporters amongst factory workers was linked to 
opposition to striking workers, depicted as ruinous social and political forces in 
an atmosphere of febrile crisis.17 The names of some of these new groups provide 
clues to their intention: one was called the “Society for an Active Fight with Rev-
olution”. Police records during 1907–8 estimate that together there were 3,500– 
4,000 “Black Hundred workers” (chernosotenets-rabochii) in the St. Petersburg 
area when taking into account the participation of all sympathetic organisations. 18 
Some of the most concentrated areas of right-wing activity were in newly indus-
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large manufacturing plants, an active revolutionary movement and a variety of 
social, political and ethnic tensions that gave ample forces for right-wing move-
ments to react against. The presence of many of these groups is recorded by the 
reports of the interior ministry (police), which includes lists of membership figures 
of rightist workers’ organisations such as the Union of Russian Workers (URW). 
For example, the Ekaterinoslav branch in the Briansk factory, along with activ-
ists from the Trubnoi and Shoduar factories, were together estimated to comprise 
possibly more than 1,500 people. The URW branch at the Zaporozh’e Kamenskii 
factory in Ekaterinoslav district had an even larger membership, potentially con-
sisting of 3,000. The section at the Auerbakh factory in Bakhmutskii district, also 
in the Ekaterinoslav region, perhaps included around 300 people. These reports, 
all dated from 13 September 1907, suggest a total presence in the Ekaterinoslav 
area of around 4,800 activists. These reports do not present the total number of 
workers employed at the factories, so gauging their overall success in recruitment 
is impossible, but these do represent sizeable figures, especially when placed in 
comparative context with rightist groups elsewhere.19 Kiev also contained active 
branches of the URW, estimated to be around 3,000 strong in 1905, and, according 
to the vice-governor of Kiev, closer to 6,500 towards the end of December 1907. 20 
One could expand on this image with reference to a far greater number of towns 
and cities, but the general trend is clear: recruitment gathered pace from the end 
of 1905, continuing into 1906–7. 
In addition to increasing numbers, rightists also sought to recruit different types 
of workers. As well as targeting skilled plant workers in large factories like the 
ones at Putilov and Nevskii in St. Petersburg, appeals were aimed at low-skilled 
and seasonal workers, including in areas of pronounced mobility and transition. 
The latter can be seen in the port city of Odessa, another prominent area of right-
wing mobilisation. Efforts to mobilise focused on the recruitment of loader work-
ers in the port area, which had been a hotbed of revolutionary radicalism during 
the preceding years, but several hundred workers were recruited to the right in 
Odessa during 1906–7.21 Generally speaking, right-wing support came more from 
temporary and seasonal workers, as well as low-skilled labourers (chernorabo-
chii), especially in Odessa and other regions to the South West where industry 
relied on seasonal workers for much of the work, such as in Odessa’s docks. 
Indeed according to one police report from the region in July 1907, the term cher-
norabochii had become synonymous with members of the URP. 22 The result can 
be seen in the formation of artels (workers’ cooperatives) amongst workers from 
the end of 1905 in the region, which included many of these lower-skilled sea-
sonal labourers. 
A corpus of printed texts, including manifestos, books and pamphlets, make the 
right’s sustained effort to tailor materials to a working-class demographic abun-
dantly clear. Many pamphlets were directed “to workers”, “to working people” 
or alternatively to “the masses”: nine of the 20 texts published by the Khar’kov 
branch of the URP listed in the March 1907 issue of the journal  Mirnyi trud
(Peaceful Work) had variations of these words in their titles.23 The messages of 
such pamphlets typified the central ideological tenets of right-wing groups that 
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had cohered into the recognisable tsarist formula of “faith, tsar and fatherland” 
over the past several years: indicative of the continuing commitment to a strong, 
centralised state, Russian Orthodox religion and Russian national identity. 24 The 
core ideas of the right, then, did not represent an obvious challenge to the exist-
ing order, so much so that they received some government funding, especially 
for their newspapers and journals. Petr Stolypin’s assistant at the Ministry of the 
Interior S. E. Kryzhanovskii reported in his memoirs that rightists received sub-
stantial disbursements from his office for their press; the newspapers  Russkoe 
znamia (Russian Banner) was allocated 30,000 roubles and Zemshchina (Realm) 
was allocated more than 10,000 roubles a month.25 
Even so, there was a clear challenge presented by the management of a larger, 
voluble and – at times – more vehement right-wing presence. The state’s task of 
managing these new parties and groups in an under-governed empire with often 
low densities of police and army was not an easy one.26 Some of the right’s new 
clusters focused on martial action, such as the “fighting brotherhoods” (druzhiny) 
of the URP. This connected to older traditions of nationalist violence such as 
the pogroms, and the ethnic violence practised by groups known collectively as 
the “Black Hundreds”, labels which the URP and others borrowed to describe 
themselves on occasion. Much of the right’s activity contained within it a more 
political focus in this period. Such hostility could be directed against national 
and ethnic enemies – most of all Russia’s Jews – but also the revolutionary left, 
bound up in the new mindset with the current strike wave. Such identities often 
intersected in the minds of the activists joining the groups, as well as their lead-
ers. What follows is an investigation into the political culture surrounding rightist 
hostility to the strike wave. 
Anti-strike mentalities and activism 
A marked feature of the right as it appeared during and after 1905, including many 
of the groups listed earlier, was the desire to oppose and resist strikes. This was in 
part a reaction to the revolutionary events of 1905 itself and a wider strike move-
ment. We can see from the declarations of the central councils a recurrent depic-
tion of strikes themselves as ruinous and destructive formations that needed to be 
opposed.27 The newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti (Moscow News) was edited by 
Vladimir Gringmut, a noble of Slavophile conviction who had set up the Russian 
Monarchist Party (RMP) in April 1905. The paper carried an editorial opposing 
strikes for economic motives: as a party, their policies sought to develop and 
preserve Russian industry, and they made the obvious point that the strike wave 
would cause major economic harm.28 In the regions too, such ideas can be clearly 
seen. The Tsarist Society of the Russian People appeared in the city of Kazan at 
the end of 1905 and included in its literature a desire to oppose strikes for “eco-
nomic” reasons, as detailed in a circular passed around the Alafuzovskii factory. 29 
Similar ideas circulated in the congresses of the major right-wing associations, 
like in the Fourth All-Russian Union of the United Russian People, which met in 
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An intriguing feature of rightist activity was its shop floor activism, with a
number of rightists justifying their actions in economic terms, a natural corol-
lary to their protectionist and autarkic policies.31 Following the 1905 revolution,
a range of powerful employers’ associations formed, such the St. Petersburg and
Moscow Societies of Factory Owners (1907). Evidence suggests rightists con-
tinued to mobilise independently, away from large employers’ associations, who
probably viewed their activities with suspicion. On occasion, right-wing organ-
isations showed a clear desire to work with Russia’s major ministries. In May
1907 a liberal journal reported on the murder of two railway road foreman, Iva-
nov and Mylov, who were responsible for overseeing operations in the Aleksan-
drovskii factory in Ekaterinoslav. In response, workers had been on strike in the
factory, leading to its closure. In response to the closure, the main council of the
URP claimed that it wished to enter into an agreement with both the Ministries
of Internal Affairs and of Work and Industry to keep the factory going, show-
ing a desire to work closely with the Russian authorities. They claimed many
workers would go without food as a result of the strike, so it was vital for people
to continue to work. The URP branch stated that the vast majority of workers
had been led astray by a small but well-organised clique of revolutionaries and
that the economic consequences of the shutdown would make ordinary Rus-
sian workers suffer. 32 Elsewhere, a petition addressed to the minister of internal
affairs from the aforementioned Tsarist Society of the Russian People claimed
that the closure of the Alafuzovskii plant as a result of the strikes in late 1905
would mean the loss of bread for “several thousand people, including women
and children”. Another feature of the same report makes the populist intentions
of the right clear by attacking the factory owners who “had received enormous
profits” in the preceding years.33 Though these groups wanted to open connec-
tions with the authorities in resisting strikes, the formation as well as populist
instincts of these new parties and groups represented a potential threat to order
on the factory floor.
Some branches went beyond articulating a justification for resistance to strikes 
and disorders into a much wider tranche of activities. A branch of the Union of 
Russian Workers active in the Briansk factory, Ekaterinoslav, which saw itself as 
a working-class organisation for “truly Russian” people, claimed that its main aim 
was to stop the unrest seen during the revolutionary year. The reasons to resist 
strikes mirror those previously outlined, and the union also declared its desire to 
work with factory owners and foremen to stop the harmful spread of strikes and 
oppose revolutionary forces. No armed resistance to strikes during this period is 
described: violence was considered the preserve of both the Social Democrats and 
Socialist Revolutionaries who had been active in the factories over the preceding 
years. In contrast, the union was described as a peaceful group which had provided 
food and support to the families of poor and unemployed workers at Easter time. 
Its activities were described as charitable, cultural and educational, with activists 
involved in establishing libraries and reading rooms to educate the families of 
workers. This was part of a desire to show the right as on the side of the Russian 
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strikes, painted in wholly negative terms and associated with the political left, is 
also clearly expressed. This political culture was developing independently of any 
promotion by the state, led and guided by the leaders and activists of right-wing 
groups themselves.34 
This populist vision was infused with a streak of anti-capitalism, hence the 
derogatory reference to factory owners in Kazan: economic growth in itself was 
not held to be a good thing. Though the right frequently described themselves as 
“apolitical” or alternatively “above politics” – two frequent tropes on the Russian 
right (and, indeed, the right elsewhere) in this period – what we instead see as 
a major motivation is pronounced hostility to the political left. In almost every 
instance scrutinised, an active left was necessary for a right-wing group to form: 
putting it in other terms, the “revolution” necessarily preceded the “counter-
revolution”. In the Briansk factory, the Union of Workers had appeared first out 
of a desire to stop the revolutionary left by a group of “patriotic” local workers.35 
In the Semiannovskii factory in St. Petersburg, a group called  Tver’ promoted an 
idea of resisting the left including the Social Democratic movement, if necessary 
by a “fight”. The group was set up by leaders I. Lavrov and V. Snesarev to combat 
“red terror” in the factories and leant on both factory bosses and foremen for sup-
port.36 Elsewhere in St. Petersburg, workers at Putilov mobilised out of a desire to 
oppose revolutionary left activity in the factory; they were in receipt of a batch of 
revolvers from a local organiser of the URP, Iuskevich-Kraskovskii, which were 
likely passed on to him from the civil authorities.37 
A view that the 1905 revolution was not Russian often appeared in the dec-
larations of workers’ groups on the right, including those that sought to oppose 
strikes. Most of all this hostility was directed against Russia’s Jewish citizens, 
highlighting the prevalence of antisemitism, but also towards a range of national 
and religious minorities. The April 1905 edition of the right-wing journal  Mirnyi 
trud reported on the formation of “Workers’ Patriotic Circles” in Odessa under 
the leadership of N.N. Rodzevich (who would later become active in the Odessa 
branch of the URP), and their desire to oppose their stated enemies in the region, 
namely radicals, socialists and Jews.38 For Konovnitsyn, later leader of the URP
in Odessa, a major stimulus to the group’s formation was to oppose revolution-
ary and, in particular, Jewish workers, with the revolution itself conceived of in 
national and religious terms.39 An article by an unknown author in Moskovskie 
vedomosti from February 1906 on “Workers and Revolution” listed a number of 
new organisations on the right that appeared in Tula, Iaroslavl and Ekaterinburg, 
expounding on how workers had been influenced by European and/or Jewish 
ideas which had encouraged them to strike.40 Similarly, a 1906 pamphlet written 
by Ivan Sobolev titled Zabastovki (Strikes) provided a historical overview of the 
strike movement in Russia and the West, claiming Russian workers were opposed 
to strikes but had been manipulated by Poles and Jews.41 Union leaders them-
selves were presented as exploitative: “You will get officials of a certain ‘union’
on the lookout for a simple man, waiting for a convenient time, and then taking 
his ‘union’ money”. 42 Such appeals created a conspiratorial worldview, mixing 
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influence of non-Russian groups, suggesting manifold threats to the core ethnos 
of Russian people in the empire. 
Conflict and violence 
The end result of this hostility could be conflict in different regions of the Russian 
Empire, including in its largest cities. 43 Laura Engelstein’s work on conflict in 
Moscow explored the appearance of violent “patriotic” demonstrators appearing 
in response to socialist and liberal forces that had mobilised in November and 
December 1905. The governor-general of Moscow V. Dubasov sought to quash 
the large-scale insurgency of Social Democrats and other radicals by drawing on 
these emergent forces, organising volunteer militias with the support of a new 
range of groups, including the then recently established URP. These counter-
revolutionary movements were active under the direction of the police.44 Follow-
ing the violent crushing of the Presnia uprising in the city centre in December 
1905 by the police and army, the URP branch in Moscow declared itself to be 
an anti-strike force; in the rightist newspaper Veche (Evening) it was described 
as a society for an “active fight against revolution”, which aimed towards the 
“destruction of rioters” (istrebliat’ kramol’nikov).45 
A particularly vehement URP presence was recorded in Odessa, where rightists 
portrayed themselves as strong resisters of leftist anti-state disorders. The interim 
governor-general of Odessa at the outset of 1907 P.F. Glagolev looked on them 
sympathetically, considering them a useful counterweight to revolutionary forces: 
“they have already realized the harm that comes from unrest, robberies, theft and 
strikes, and therefore fight against them”.46 In addition to the presence of right-
ists amongst dockworkers, we should note the registration of a workers’ artel with 
links to the right in Odessa.47 Count A.I. Konovnitsyn, who had previously been 
involved in the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade before becoming the head 
of the Odessa URP in the city, was responsible for organising an artel amongst 
port workers in the city. The groups under his direction were raised at a time when 
the radical left was mobilising and aimed to physically confront radicals and get 
Russia’s docks working again after the disruption from strike activity seen follow-
ing the October 1905 General Strike.48 
Police surveillance reports describe the actions of the URP in the area, led by 
Konovnitsyn, V.I. Pelikan and A. Kakhov during 1906 and 1907. Though intrigu-
ing, the sources can be suggestive and at times lack texture. Sometimes, it is not 
clear from the reports what is exactly going on, as they note clashes and colli-
sions without going into much depth about the nature of these. However, in other 
instances we can more clearly discern what is occurring: looking closely at police 
records and newspaper reports of the era together can give us an effective outline, 
including of instances of violence in the midst of strikes occurring in Odessa 
through 1906 and 1907. Groups of right-wing activists confronted striking Social 
Democrats and others from the revolutionary wing of Russian politics, which 
could result in violent confrontation. Much of this occurred in the dock areas 
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scenes of skirmishes between the Odessan right and its enemies, an open area 
in the city with much footfall that naturally attracted the attention of a vari-
ety of actors, including the local police, Social Democrats in the region, and, 
indeed, Jewish radicals who wished to strike back against the right.49 This con-
flict between revolutionary workers, Jewish self-defence forces and right-workers 
from artels formed in the region served to increase tensions and disrupt the town’s 
shipping, trade and industry – an ironic twist given how URP leaders couched 
the actions of the group as defending the Russian economy and state in a time 
of strikes and disorders.50 Elsewhere, URP activists appeared on the campus of 
Odessa’s major university in December 1906 in response to strikes and disorders, 
apparently provoked by the presence of student strikes.51 This is representative of 
the wider culture of revolutionary violence and counter-violence visible across 
the city in the era. 
The exact scale of the right-wing success in suppressing strikes is open to 
debate; evidently, the right’s own, reflective sources in recording this activity 
are subjective. Recalling his organisation of the group, Konovnitsyn described 
the violent breaking of the strike movement and clashes between URP activists 
and revolutionary workers in 1906, when the URP “thwarted and finally stopped 
the disastrous strikes amongst steamship workers who loaded and unloaded the 
ships” in the Odessa docks; he continued that these clashes “brought many ben-
efits to Russian shipping, saving it many millions from strikers”.52 If he exagger-
ated the scale of this, other sources corroborate his claim of success: a telegram 
sympathetic to the URP published in the national newspaper  Novoe vremia (New 
Time) on 28 November 1906 commented upon their activity in Odessa as follows: 
not a word has been said about the strike that was broken by the Union of the 
Russian people . . . as far as we know, this is the first time in Russia, that the 
energy of members of the Union of the Russian People has had a destructive 
edge over the revolutionary workers [movement].53 
It is worth considering why the URP could gain a foothold on Odessa and 
employ such action effectively. At first, the Odessa branch of the URP benefitted 
from a largely hands-off approach on the part of the authorities, previously seen 
in the testimony of Glagolev, which aided their attempts to generate violence 
and discord against the left. The reasons for this were structural as well as cul-
tural: as a recent formation in an under-governed empire with low-density regular 
policing, they profited from a degree of organisational laxity amongst the Odessa 
authorities. As self-stated defenders of law, order and Russian industry, they had 
the advantage of appearing as a counterweight to revolutionary forces that had 
caused a lot of unrest in the city over the preceding several years. It is also worth 
considering what type of weapons URP activists had at their disposal to strike fear 
into their enemies. Reports suggestive of violent “clashes” but with relatively few 
casualties might lead one to suspect cudgels or even fists as primary weapons, 
but other types of arms could be distributed amongst supporters to threaten and 
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were distributed amongst the Odessa URP by the Russian Society of Shipping 
and Trade – the organisation previously headed by Konovnitsyn – for the protec-
tion of this society by members of the URP against revolutionary forces. In a 
letter to the mayor of Odessa, the head of the society noted the need to do this 
given violent attacks by revolutionaries on officials from the society in recent 
times, citing a “night attack on the port by revolutionaries, who bombed, shot and 
wounded people” and were then expelled from the port area by guards.54 Noting 
the destruction wrought by revolutionaries was a straightforward and emotive 
way in which radical rightists could justify their actions, both to themselves and 
the Russian authorities. 
However, this form of activism posed challenges to the authorities as well as 
the right’s erstwhile enemies. We can clearly discern a change in the authorities’
attitudes towards the URP through 1906 and 1907; in part, this was a question of 
changing personnel within the military and civil authorities, some who regarded 
the URP with suspicion, but in other areas, it was a question of the activity and 
temper of the groups themselves. Whilst the URP and others searched both for 
authority support and a wider presence, their desire to provide an armed presence 
against revolutionary agitators made some in authority nervous. In one instance, 
the acting State Controller D.A. Filosofov declined a request from Konovnitsyn to 
organise a series of meetings on merchant ships in the Odessa dock region; it was 
added in the report that Prime Minister Peter Stolypin and all cabinet members 
present agreed with Filosofov’s actions. An article from August 1907, published 
in the newspaper Tovarishch (Comrade), noted that a number of revolvers and 
“illegal” literature from the URP activists were confiscated following a recent 
skirmish between these activists and their revolutionary enemies, no doubt a ref-
erence to the recent distribution of weapons to Konovnitsyn under the auspices of 
the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade. The report did not include a specific 
reason as to why Konovnitsyn was not allowed to mobilise his forces on Odessa’s 
merchant ships, only insisting such denials came from on high.55 Bands of right-
wing activists, sometimes described as “unionists” (soiuzniki) in such reports, 
were occasionally arrested by police: one reason could be that they were in pos-
session of weapons, including revolvers and other types of arms.56 
Eventually, the tide began to turn against the right in Odessa. Judging from the 
source record, clashes between the right and the revolutionary left and strikers 
tailed off after 1906. Partly, this is a result of the dissipation of the 1905 revo-
lution’s major energies and the gradual restoration of authority across the Rus-
sian Empire. Another, more local reason was the changing stance of the Odessan 
authorities. We have seen how police began to monitor rightists more closely and, 
if necessary, suppress them, but Konovnitsyn also lamented a lack of financial 
support from the authorities that he had sought to co-opt since 1906. In his efforts 
to stop what he saw as his Jewish enemies, he noted the presence of “unfriendly 
clerks” within the state bureaucracy, and he sought the “removal” of such people. 57 
This criticism of the bureaucracy was a trademark of the right, which saw them as 
full of enemies of different types; such a conspiratorial mindset was emblematic 
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the right in Odessa. This has been identified in Jacob Langer’s research, which 
has shown how the right in Odessa was riven by factionalism, driven in part by 
financial corruption. Such scandals within the URP drained the groups of much-
needed resources and affected many of their activities in the region, including 
strikebreaking and armed resistance to the left.58 
Union activism dropped significantly after Petr Stolypin dissolved the Second 
State Duma in 1907, a period which signalled the ascendancy of the government’s 
“repression and reform” response to the 1905 revolution. Even so, unlike in some 
other areas of the empire, the right in Odessa was active up until the eve of the First 
World War. The resurgence of the strike wave in 1911 provided new opportunities 
for anti-strike activism. One instance was the press strike of that year: the news-
paper Odesskii pechatnik (Odessa Press) cites the use of members of the Odessa 
URP as strikebreakers by a newspaper owner, one Abraham Finkel, though given 
his Jewish identity, his desire to call on them as his strikebreakers (and have them 
obey him) in order to halt the press strike seems implausible.59 What is more cer-
tain is how limited toleration from the civil authorities affected the development 
of the right in Odessa. Konovnitsyn appeared to have an uneasy relationship with 
the governor-general of Odessa I.N. Tol’machev, who, unlike some of his prede-
cessors in that office, perceived a large and voluble right-wing force as a threat. 
Initially Tol’machev appeared supportive towards the URP, but in later years 
Konovnitsyn wrote in his personal communications about Tol’machev’s “frequent 
clashes” with both himself and the URP. In one letter, Konovnitsyn reflected on 
Tol’machev’s role in suppressing the strike movement on 1911 in Odessa, claim-
ing that Tol’machev deliberately allowed the strike movement to gain purchase 
before suppressing it himself, so that he could proclaim himself as a “saviour and 
suppressor of riots and unrest” in Odessa rather than credit Konovnitsyn and his 
followers, in order to convince those in higher office of his own moral probity. 60 
Suspicion of the URP increased the further the 1905 revolution receded into the 
distance, exacerbated by the low density of regular police across much of the Rus-
sian Empire. It is important to note rightist activism continued for longer after this 
point, as demonstrated by occasional resistance to the strike wave. 
The regional perspective to much of this activity could be considered, as many 
right-wing groups proved most enduring in the South and West of the empire. This 
was especially the case near or within the Pale of Settlement, which contained a 
large Jewish population and had a history of revolutionary activism with many of 
these forces proudly self-identifying as Jewish. The most famous of these was the 
General Jewish Workers’ Union (Bund), a Social Democratic mass movement that 
championed universalism. This gave rightists presences to mobilise against. Kiev 
had been a prominent site of right-wing mobilisation from late 1905, and in a tele-
gram from February 1912 (a year before the notorious Mendel Beilis trial of 1913 
when accusations of Jewish ritual murder swept the region and beyond), the gover-
nor of the region A. F. Girs noted the presence of groups that positioned themselves 
“for law and order” against strikers. Whilst the source record is not always clear 
exactly on who these people were, most telling is the claim that these “patriotic” 
manifestations could count on authority support if they felt it was desired.61 
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Sources from other parts of the Russian Empire show a fragmented and dis-
united right, or one that was in the minority in the political and social struggles 
taking place in Russia’s factories. In Iaroslavl’ during October 1906, strikebreak-
ers appeared after rightists led by the monk Aleksei had distributed sympathetic 
newspapers such as Pochaevskii izvestiia (The Pochaev News) and Russkii narod
(Russian People) in the factories.62 Other reports from the time suggest that pro-
paganda was distributed on the part of the URP and others, but sympathisers were 
in the minority, with most workers in one of Iaroslavl’s major factories demand-
ing the removal of agitators who were in favour to the right.63 Rightists were 
involved in physical fights on the factory floor with members of revolutionary 
organisations but were often on the losing end of such collisions. The main reason 
for this is that their revolutionary enemies often outnumbered them in clashes, 
even in areas with a pronounced right-wing presence like Iaroslavl. Workers sym-
pathetic to the right could be the target of hostility from others who sought to 
drive them out of the factories.64 One worker, Volodin, employed at the Wolf 
metallurgical plant in November 1906, was said to have outraged fellow workers 
with declarations sympathetic to the extreme right (described as “black hundreds” 
in the newspaper report), and workers demanded his dismissal by the administra-
tion, or else they would kill him themselves.65 Though vocal, the likes of Volodin 
were in a clear minority in this factory, and under threat from workers who did 
not share their views. 
Though they sought to court the authorities with promises to resist strikes and 
disorder, even in areas where the right had a more effective presence evidence 
shows that right-wing strikebreakers could attract the suspicion, if not outright 
hostility, of the forces of law and order. Whilst their message to free Russia from 
the shackles of strikers was consistent, the mixed response they received from 
local populations and the authorities placed rightists in a contradictory position. 
On the one hand, they claimed to be shoring up Russian autocracy in a time of 
chaos, but on the other they demonstrated a contribution to instances of localised 
and sporadic conflict that required extra policing. Intriguingly, what these sources 
together do not show is factory owners and major industrialists themselves sup-
porting right-wing strikebreakers – at most, we have rumours of isolated instances 
that have dubious accuracy, such as that of Finkel. This supports the claim that 
rightists in this era were acting mostly at their own behest, separate from the 
machinations of big business as well as from the authorities. 
Conclusion 
To return to the dilemma outlined at the start of this essay, 1904–7 was a period 
of turmoil in the Russian Empire, with strikes and disorders stretching authorities 
to their limits and beyond. Rightist strikebreakers saw themselves as defenders of 
law and order, but, even so, the realities of their activism posed problems for the 
authorities. They claimed to be defending both Russian autocracy and a strong 
state power, as well as to be resisting revolutionaries. These were instincts shared 
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led to a continuing ambivalence about how to perceive and respond to them from 
the Russian authorities. Most of all, violence practised outside of the tsarist state’s 
public monopoly on it raised a question of whether such groups could be inte-
grated within the boundaries of legitimate conflict.66 Rightists’ radical tempera-
ment, desires to resist other armed forces and tendencies for violence all posed 
challenges at a time when restoring law and order was most crucial. Sources 
provide intriguing glimpses into an emerging shop floor culture surrounding 
rightists operating in factory environments, and their wider activism in areas of 
conflict. That all of this was developing away from the state – increasingly so 
from around 1906 after the State Duma’s appearance – was what led to suspicion, 
with armed supporters of autocracy representing both a tribute and a threat to the 
Russian state. 
To break down this larger historical question one can consider wider points
about social structure as well as the role of key individuals. In Odessa, rightists 
gained traction because of the presence of specific actors active in shaping and 
guiding the right (such as Konovnitsyn), and a passive if not outright supportive 
establishment, exemplified by governor-general Glagolev late in 1905 and early 
in 1906. Additionally, the demographic structure of the city, with its history of 
worker-activism, organisation and, more recently, violent resistance to authority 
provided forces to react against. The interplay between these personal and struc-
tural factors allowed the right in Odessa to gain a foothold. To draw a parallel 
with the pogrom wave that appeared in Odessa a little before the wider formation 
of the political right there, commonalities existed in terms of structural factors. 
Gerald Surh’s research on Odessa and Ekaterinoslav during the 1905 pogroms 
demonstrates how the police and army dealt with localised patterns of anti-Jewish 
violence, and the structural conditioning that allowed the pogrom wave to gain 
purchase in the first place. In both cases, urbanisation, hostilities between Jews 
and non-Jews and tolerance of so-called patriotic demonstrators by civil and mili-
tary authorities can help to explain the appearance of the pogrom phenomena in 
these two cities in Ukraine.67 It also highlights that there was a legacy in terms 
of counter-revolutionary violence being practised outside of the state’s ability to 
control and manage it, seen here in the wide prevalence of pogroms in 1905. In 
cases in which rightists provided a possible counterweight to revolutionary forces 
they received greater latitude from the authorities, but such a stance had the capac-
ity to shift, as seen from the gradual hardening of approaches towards the right in 
Odessa from 1906 to 1907. On the other hand, rightists also had the problem of 
attempting to implement a message directed at “truly Russian” people in areas of 
the empire with high densities of non-Russians, counting on high levels of animus 
in the Russian sections of the population towards national and ethnic minorities to 
successfully spread their ideas. This was not always the case in an empire that was 
remarkably diverse in its social, national, ethnic and religious make-up. 
Still considering structural impediments, the right’s influence amongst workers 
and strikers brings to mind the formation of “patriotic” unions under the guid-
ance of police chief Sergei Zubatov from 1902 to 1903. This period, known as 
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to infiltrate and collaborate with the trade union movement to try and encourage 
working-class loyalty to the state and stop strike action. Though wary of copy-
ing his techniques too closely – and often lacking the organisational wherewithal 
to enforce complex strategies of infiltration and collaboration – some rightists 
considered that there were lessons to be learnt from this movement and sought to 
apply them following the 1905 revolution.68 However, the Zubatov experiment 
eventually failed to achieve the authorities’ aims: not only did it fail to split the 
Trade Union movement, it provided many workers with (often formative) experi-
ences of a distinctively unionised identity, as well as practical experience of how 
to oppose government practices.69 Therefore, the recent heritage of patriotic forces 
operating in close proximity to union culture was not a positive one for Russia’s 
authorities, and this institutional memory clearly affected their practices in the 
following years. 
An important wider point raised by this case concerns development in Russia’s 
legal culture and, connected to this, civic rights and conceptions of political plu-
ralism. The right’s antipathy towards strikes was an integral part of its dislike of 
civil rights. One of the state’s responses to striking and revolt had been to grant a 
series of concessions, culminating in the 17 October Manifesto in 1905. In fact, 
many rightists saw the constitutional settlement associated with the civil rights 
enshrined by this manifesto as illegitimate in itself. This was part of a wider view 
that liberal political reform was a mendacious tool of Russia’s enemies located 
within the subversive structures of politics, parliament and bureaucracy, which 
had emanated from harmful “Western” (i.e., non-Russian) trends. This illustrates 
that the right was developing independently of the state and even – to some extent –
in collision with it. A key point was the appearance of, properly speaking, politics 
and parliament; some on the right did engage with Russia’s Duma – especially the 
Union of the Archangel Mikhail from 1908 – but this was less the case for groups 
that considered themselves to be primarily social movements, which have been 
the focus of this chapter. 
The presence of rightists in socially mixed zones of conflict, their hostility to 
the new legal order and also authorities’ lingering suspicions of worker activ-
ism all contributed to an ambivalence between sources of state authority and 
the autonomous right. This presented an important conceptual dilemma in terms 
of power sharing as outlined by Haupt, but we should also consider local and 
regional factors that together provide us with a complicated and mixed picture, 
reflected by the source record analysed herein. Rightists continued to venerate the 
semi-autocratic monarchy but appeared in an era of politics and parliament that 
they on the whole deeply opposed: an intractable issue, and one that they never 
managed to fully resolve. 
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  11 “We can kill striking workers 
without being prosecuted”: armed 
bands of strikebreakers in late 
Imperial Germany*
 Amerigo Caruso 
During a debate in the Reichstag in 1927, the communist member of parliament 
Paul Bertz looked back at the rise of professional strikebreaking before the 
First World War. He explicitly mentioned the “bands of strikebreakers” ( Streik-
brecherbanden) led by Karl Katzmarek and Friedrich Hintze, two notorious 
strikebreaking agents who organised the replacement of striking workers as well 
as violent intimidation and repression of the labour movement.1 Bertz argued 
polemically that irregular bands of strikebreakers in Wilhelmine Germany and the 
paramilitary Technical Emergency Corps ( Technische Nothilfe) in the early Wei-
mar years served similar purposes. Indeed, the corps emerged after the November 
Revolution with the aim of replacing striking workers in industrial sectors con-
sidered to be of national importance. 2 Left-wing politicians accused it of being 
“Gustav Noske’s strikebreakers’ guard”, alluding to the Weimar defence minister, 
a resolutely anti-Bolshevik member of the Social Democratic Party who deployed 
paramilitary Freikorps along with government soldiers against the revolutionary 
uprisings in early 1919.3 
The unlikely analogy between the Technical Emergency Corps and armed
bands of strikebreakers highlights the fact that different political systems, such 
as Wilhelmine Germany and the Weimar Republic, were confronted with similar 
challenges stemming from the process of democratisation and the rise of social 
movements. One of the crucial challenges facing states during the early decades 
of the twentieth century was how to deal with militarised citizens and privately 
organised coercion. In an effort to tackle “strike terrorism”, both the Wilhelmine 
and Weimar authorities supported the creation of formally regulated organisations 
of civilian volunteers, such as the Colliery Auxiliary Police Corps ( Zechenweh-
ren) in the pre-war years and the Technical Emergency Corps after the November 
Revolution.4 In addition, violent gangs of strikebreakers led by charismatic figures 
such as Hintze and Katzmarek were already a familiar presence in labour dis-
putes before 1914. Paul Bertz was therefore not completely wrong in claiming 
that mercenary bands of strikebreakers had emerged with aims similar to those of 
the auxiliary corps. In the case of armed strikebreakers, counter-strike strategies 
consisted in extra-legal, non-regulated action. 
The aim of this chapter is to shed new light on the structure of internal violence 
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that repressive functions carried out by militarised citizens were more widespread 
and more readily tolerated when social conflicts and political antagonism were 
perceived as a major threat to the established order and when state-led repression 
triggered divisive discussions concerning the legitimate use of violence. Although 
the erosion of trust in the state and political violence reached unprecedented levels 
after 1918, violent confrontations between strikers and strikebreakers had already 
been an integral part of the social reality and public discourses before the outbreak 
of the war. However, while debates about legitimate repression and “class justice” 
were led by the Social Democratic milieu in the pre-war period, it was the radical 
left that redirected them against the moderate SPD after the brutal repression of 
the Spartacist uprising. 
This chapter focuses on the violence perpetrated by armed bands of profes-
sional strikebreakers before 1914, i.e. in a period in German history of massive 
but largely non-violent protest and relatively few episodes of brutal repression. 5 
The first section examines the structure of violence in late Imperial Germany, 
with particular focus on the fact that it was not only ideological antagonism but 
also the glamorisation and sensationalisation of violence in the modern media that 
played a crucial role in intensifying political polarisation, hence setting the pre-
conditions for political violence. Section two presents the context in which violent 
strikebreaking tactics emerged and became part of the social reality and the media 
reconstruction of it. Sections three to five analyse several episodes of violence, 
namely eight murders carried out by armed strikebreakers in the decade before the 
outbreak of the First World War. The sixth section explores the repertoire of action 
by professional bands of armed strikebreakers, including those led by Katzmarek 
and Hintze. This is followed by some concluding remarks. 
Violence in late Wilhelmine Germany 
According to Alf Lüdtke in his studies of the history of everyday life, low-level 
violence against outsiders and potential revolutionaries is a widespread and rou-
tine practice in modern societies. 6 Throughout the nineteenth century European 
states were increasingly successful in establishing a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of physical force, although violence perpetrated by private citizens was 
far from marginalised. Private violence survived as a form of counter-violence 
against the state, or, in contrast, as a form of private law enforcement and support 
for the established order. After the emergence of a modern private security indus-
try around 1900 ,7 privately organised coercion was more frequently driven by 
economic than political reasons. The rise of armed strikebreaking was politically 
motivated in that it was a counter-strike strategy supported by the so-called loyal 
classes, but it was also, and probably more importantly, economically motivated 
by the steady growth in demand for replacement workers and for the “protection” 
of non-strikers in the decades before 1914. 
As mentioned in the introduction, collective violence and brutal repression were 
relatively infrequent in Wilhelmine Germany, and it is common knowledge that 
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The picture changes, at least in part, if we take a micro-historical approach and 
examine the low-level aggression and violent confrontations that became a wide-
spread phenomenon during mass demonstrations and strikes, especially where 
strikebreakers and pickets were involved. 8 The armed strikebreakers’ repertoire of 
strategies included repressive practices and mafia-like activities, such as provo-
cation, harassment, intimidation and even murder. What makes the episodes of 
“strike terrorism” and the activities of armed strikebreakers remarkable is that 
violent confrontations during labour disputes were some of the most frequently 
discussed and polarising topics in German newspapers. Widespread “threat com-
munication” made conflicts and violence more visible. 9 As noted by Ian Kershaw, 
the processes of enlargement of the public sphere and massification of society 
often led to the “glamorisation of violence”. 10 Sensational media reports of “strike 
terrorism” had an impact not only on the political debate, but also on the popular 
culture and everyday life. In 1910, for example, the semi-official Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung reported that instead of playing “cops & robbers” or “cow-
boys & indians”, children in Berlin were playing “strikebreakers & unionised 
workers”.11 
The heightened media attention on violent strikebreaking reflected a social 
reality that emerged during the decade before the First World War, when transna-
tionally active bands of strikebreakers spread throughout the highly industrialised 
regions of Central Europe. The innovative aspect of their activity was that they 
not only replaced striking workers, they also organised multiple services, such as 
transportation and supplying and housing “blacklegs”. Strikebreaker agents also 
organised “self-defence” against “strike terrorism”, and intimidation of unionised 
workers was an integral part of their business. They were almost always armed, 
mostly with revolvers, sticks and daggers. Cheap handguns could be obtained 
with no legal restrictions, and the wide circulation of firearms became a destabi-
lising factor in an age of class conflict, fear of social disintegration and radical 
nationalism.12 Bands of strikebreakers were therefore involved not only in the 
broader class struggles and political antagonism of late Imperial Germany, but 
also in the dynamics of violent masculinity and firearm obsession that character-
ised the “Browning generation”, i.e. those born in the late nineteenth century with 
no greater desire than to buy (and use) a revolver. 13 
Strikebreaking in context 
In North America, the business of providing strikebreakers and armed guards dur-
ing labour conflicts had already become widespread in the late nineteenth century. 
Several detective agencies and private police forces were widely employed to 
protect “blacklegs” and intimidate striking workers. 14 At the same time, famous 
strikebreaking agents, such as Jack Whitehead and James Farley, the latter por-
trayed in Jack London’s novel Iron Heel (1907), assembled permanent groups of 
replacement workers to be deployed throughout the country. 15 In Great Britain, 
“free labour” organisations such as the National Free Labour Association (1893) 
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around 1900. 16 Only a few years later, however, strikebreaking became increas-
ingly professionalised, more widespread and violent in Imperial Germany as 
well. The intensification of strikes and social conflicts created a new sense of 
urgency among employers, who were interested not only in the rapid recruitment 
of replacement workers, but also in private security services. 
In the years leading up to World War I, the Social Democratic press in Germany 
complained on an almost daily basis about legal discrimination against unionised 
workers and the intensification of violence and intimidation perpetrated by armed 
bands of strikebreakers, which went largely unpunished. The SPD party newspa-
per, Vorwärts, was openly critical of the fact that violent repression against the 
labour movement was de facto considered a legitimate course of action, while 
the impunity of strikebreakers represented a major threat to the rule of law in 
Wilhelmine society. 17 The Social Democratic propaganda pointed out that class-
based justice was the result of the general incompatibility of interests and values 
of the working class and the capitalist elites. 18 This emotionally charged narra-
tive of left-wing newspapers tended to exaggerate – or even invent – episodes of 
anti-labour repression, while, by contrast, conservative newspapers placed greater 
emphasis on the violence against and intimidation of strikebreakers. With the 
discourse radicalised on both sides, unionised workers and strikebreakers alike 
were accused of “terrorism”. 19 However, aside from these politically motivated 
overstatements, violent clashes between strikebreakers and unionised workers 
undoubtedly intensified around 1910. What is also remarkable is that the SPD 
party press and its agitationary journalism were able to use sensationalised and 
tendentious reports as an effective political and moral weapon in the context of 
emerging mass communication. 20 In doing so, Social Democratic opinion making 
managed to create a political culture of opposition in an era in which the SPD and 
the “free” trade unions were unassimilated forces in Wilhelmine society. 21 
At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the threat to national interests by
“strike terrorism” and growing fears of revolution were enough in the eyes of 
the “parties of order” to justify violent intimidation and repression of the labour 
movement. The right wing saw counter-strike actions by “yellow” unions and 
professional strikebreakers as necessary and urgent. Rudolf Lebius, a former 
Social Democratic journalist who founded the Federation of Yellow Unions ( Gel-
ber Arbeiterbund) in 1907, described the emerging yellow movement as a “fight-
ing force” ( Kampforganisation) against “strike terrorism”. 22 This narrative was 
rooted in anti-socialist discourses that spread more rapidly after the Social Demo-
cratic victories in 1903 and were supported by nationalist pressure groups such as 
the Imperial League against Social Democracy. 23 
As a result of partly spontaneous but partly orchestrated fears of revolution 
and “strike terrorism”, the formation of professional groups of armed strikebreak-
ers was seen as both economically and politically necessary. The idea of rally-
ing anti-socialist forces together, which was typical of the so-called Bülow Bloc, 
resulted in strikebreakers being considered part of the loyal classes and deserving 
of special protection, or a sort of extended right of self-defence against supposed 
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in north-eastern Bavaria in 1907, Vorwärts polemically argued that since state 
authorities protected strikebreakers as “useful members of the community”, the 
murder was therefore a state crime ( Staatsverbrechen).24 Karl Otto Uhlig, a Social 
Democratic member of the Saxon Landtag, accused bands of strikebreakers of 
persistent immorality and criminal acts that threatened not only the unionised 
workers but also the entire community, and he considered it unacceptable that 
the police protected them. 25 What is remarkable is that non-state armed groups, 
such as pirates, mercenaries and bandits, were primarily characterised by their 
recourse to violence without state authority or in opposition to it. 26 However, these 
armed groups – and professional strikebreakers clearly were – could also serve as 
a source of extra-legal repression and law enforcement. 
“We can kill striking workers without being prosecuted” 
According to Vorwärts and other left-wing newspapers, strikebreakers had good 
reason to claim that they could “kill striking workers without being prosecuted”. 27 
This catchphrase was attributed to a strikebreaker flaunting his impunity, and it 
became a widespread slogan against counter-strike action and “class justice”. 
After being mentioned for the first time in 1906, the phrase was used and reused 
by many left-wing newspapers in Germany, Austria and the Swiss Confederation 
before 1914. 28 In the summer of 1906 when there had already been widespread 
debates about the impunity of violent strikebreakers, a brutal fight between union-
ised workers and strikebreakers took place outside the “Union” motor vehicle 
factory near Nuremberg in Bavaria. On the morning of 17 August, during the ongo-
ing labour dispute, the management of the company incited the strikebreakers to 
intimidate the leaders of the local trade unions standing outside the factory. On the 
evening of the same day, a group of strikebreakers assaulted striking workers with 
revolvers, sticks and knives. Maurer, the director of the factory, led the attack; he 
drove his car into the fighting crowd and used an air pump as a weapon. Vorwärts
and the Austrian Arbeiter-Zeitung reported that the police were present but did not 
intervene to stop the attacks.29 
During the fight, 22-year-old strikebreaker Ernst Thiel fired three times at 
Melchior Fleischmann, one of the local trade union leaders, who died two days 
later. Claiming self-defence, Thiel went unpunished. In court, the company and 
the strikebreakers successfully accused the striking workers of being responsi-
ble for the escalation of violence outside the factory. 30 Thiel was not the only 
strikebreaker armed with a revolver; another, by the name of Fackelmeier, carried 
weapons and threatened unionised workers with his revolver. 31 The fact that the 
police ignored calls to take the weapons away from the strikebreakers provoked 
quite frequent violent outbursts by the crowd against strikebreakers and police 
forces.32 
The court case on the 1906 riot in Nuremberg resulted in five striking work-
ers being sentenced to prison for upwards of three months. By contrast, the armed 
strikebreakers Fackelmeier and Thiel (who had murdered Fleischmann) went 
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the provocations and attacks of unionised workers. 33 Liberal newspapers such as 
the Allgemeine Zeitung defended the plea of self-defence and blamed the union-
ised workers who had attacked the strikebreakers. 34 The paper confirmed that 
Fleischmann had been killed by Thiel, although it presented the murder in a com-
pletely different way to Vorwärts. The Allgemeine Zeitung denounced the striking 
workers outside the “Union” factory as violent alcoholics and published detailed 
reports on the trial endorsing the claim of legitimised self-defence against “strike 
terrorism”.35 
Murders carried out by armed strikebreakers before 1914 
Although the Nuremberg riot of 1906 and the murder of Fleischmann had a huge
echo in the Social Democratic press, it was only after popular protests erupted in
1910 in Moabit, an industrial suburb of Berlin, that the debate about “strike ter-
rorism”, “excessive strikes” and claims for better protection of “willing workers”
spread more rapidly. 36 It reached its peak in the last years before the First World War 
when, after the first murder case in Nuremberg, several more workers were killed 
by strikebreakers, strikebreaking agents and armed employers (see Table 11.1 ).
It is not surprising that liberal and conservative newspapers tended to overlook 
episodes of anti-labour violence while left-wing newspapers overstated them. 
Even though the narrative of “class justice” emphasised by Social Democrats 
needs critical reassessment, it seems clear that the Kaiserreich’s judicial system 
took a very permissive attitude towards strikebreakers’ armed self-defence. 37 The 
quasi-impunity of armed strikebreakers was clearly demonstrated by the Nurem-
berg case and many similar episodes in the following years. The most sensational 
of these episodes involved Paul Keiling, a well-known strikebreaking agent who 
had 17 prior convictions for theft, violence, robbery and other crimes. 38 In Febru-
ary 1914, despite being well known to the police, he was able to leave German 
territory and offer his strikebreaking services in Austria-Hungary, where he killed 
the bookbinder Johann Solinger during a strike in Silesia. Keiling was sentenced to 
only eight months in prison in what was one of most extensively discussed murder 
cases in German, Swiss and Austrian newspapers until the outbreak of war. 39 
Prior to the Keiling case, the most prominent and most important transnation-
ally, another murder had been carried out by an armed strikebreaker in Duisburg 
in September 1911 during the Rhineland transport company strike. Strikebreaker 
and former police officer Brackhage fired his revolver and killed the dock-
worker Meierling. 40 Brackhage’s crime was also deemed to be self-defence and 
this unpunished murder had a huge impact on the working class. Postcards were 
printed to commemorate the victim and to denounce the Kaiserreich’s class-based 
justice system. 41 A few months before Meierling’s murder, another episode of vio-
lence in Lübeck outraged the left-wing newspapers. In the old city port, a group of 
40 strikebreakers armed with revolvers and sticks were responsible for a night of 
terror as pubs and stores were plundered and many citizens injured. 42 
In September 1912, a striking worker was killed by Joseph Ruppert, a promi-
nent strikebreaking agent, near Magdeburg. Here, too, the murderer was acquitted 
  
    
    
   
 
 
    
    
    
    
    








 Table 11.1 Workers killed by German strikebreakers, strikebreaking agents and armed 
employers between 1906 and 1914 
Date Place Incident  Court decision 




27 September Duisburg 
1911 
14 September Burg 
1912 (Magdeburg) 
21 April 1912 Zurich 
6 May 1912 Aachen 
4 June 1913 Frauendorf/ 
Golęcino 
(Stettin) 
4 October Magdeburg 
1913 
8 February Tetschen/Děčín 
1914 (Bohemia) 
Strikebreaker Ernst Thiel fired 
at one of the local trade 
union leaders, Melchior 
Fleischmann, who died two 
days later 
Two strikebreakers employed 
by the local porcelain 
factory, fatally stabbed the 
worker Schödel 
Strikebreaker and former 
police officer Brackhage 
killed dockworker Meierling
Joseph Ruppert, a professional 
strikebreaker, killed striking 
worker Karl Fritsche 
German strikebreaker Otto 
Kaiser killed Swiss worker 
Karl Wydler 
Employer Von der Hecken, 
armed with a revolver, killed 
Dutch worker Hieronymus 
Stroet 
Strikebreaker Brandenburg 
stabbed striking worker 
Kühl with a bread knife 
Strikebreaking agent Karl 
Katzmarek caused a traffic 
collision killing a pedestrian, 
retired tailor Kühne 
Strikebreaking agent Paul 
Keiling killed foreman 

















Sentenced to one 
month in prison 
Sentenced to eight 
months in prison 
(in Austria-
Hungary) 
by a German court because he was deemed to have been exercising his right of 
legitimate self-defence. 43 A few months before Magdeburg, there was another case 
of a strikebreaker shooting and killing a striking worker in Zurich. The perpetrator 
was the German strikebreaker Otto Kaiser and the victim the unionised worker 
Karl Wydler, who was shot with a revolver and died a few days later. 44 Kaiser was 
acquitted, this time by a Swiss tribunal, because he was deemed to be acting in 
self-defence. This new case of “class justice” and “terrorism” once again sparked 
off emotionally charged discussions in the German, Swiss and Austrian press. 45 
One year after Wydler’s murder, on the evening of 4 June 1913 in the port city 
of Stettin, a strikebreaker named Brandenburg stabbed a striking worker with a 
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Alongside these cases of striking workers killed by strikebreakers, there is a very 
long list of workers seriously injured by armed strikebreakers. In 1913, for exam-
ple, three blacklegs who were working in Kassel fired their revolvers at the strik-
ing worker Ostertag, who miraculously escaped death. 47 Although the multiple 
episodes of violence mentioned here involved German-speaking strikebreakers 
and striking workers, the conflicts between unionised workers and strikebreakers, 
and hence the ideological antagonism between left-wing and bourgeois newspa-
pers, became radicalised when foreign “blacklegs” were employed. In June 1906, 
Vorwärts reported from Cologne that armed strikebreakers from “semi-civilised 
regions”, such as the Balkans and Italy, not only threatened striking workers but 
terrorised the entire city with their violence and criminal activities. 48 If bands of 
strikebreakers used a broad repertoire of violence against labour, it is also true that 
exploited and vulnerable migrant workers were frequently discriminated against, 
insulted and attacked by striking workers. Socialist and trade union newspapers 
used an extremely harsh tone in speaking of strikebreakers, who were not only 
morally stigmatised but also physically threatened. The home addresses of noto-
rious strikebreakers were often published in left-wing newspapers, and posters 
with explicit death threats were frequently printed during strikes. 49 In Basel, for 
example, posters with explicit death threats against strikebreakers were frequently 
translated into Italian. 50 Xenophobic discourses against strikebreakers also clearly 
emerged during transport workers’ strikes in Berlin, when for instance Russian 
replacement workers were stigmatised as “Pollacken” (a disrespectful term for 
“Polish”) or “Müllkosaken” (rubbish Cossacks).51 
More than isolated cases of violence? 
As early as 1904, two years before the first murder case in Nuremberg, Vorwärts
had extensively reported on the violent clashes between armed strikebreakers and
unionised workers in Berlin. The SPD party newspaper argued that at least two com-
panies in the industrial area of Berlin (Krey and Zürn & Glienicke) systematically
distributed weapons to strikebreakers. Armed with sticks, they formed an “assault
column” ( Sturmkolonne) against strike pickets. 52 The newspaper of the Federation
of Yellow Unions echoed these rumours and boastfully reported on the increasing
number of armed strikebreakers in, for example, Wittenau near Berlin, where they
were all armed with revolvers. 53 Sometimes employers did not limit themselves to
arming strikebreakers but were themselves armed and actively participated in “self-
defence”. This was the case with the iron industry employer, Von der Hecken, from
Aachen, who not only distributed revolvers to his strikebreakers, but also armed
himself and killed the Dutch worker Hieronymus Stroet during a strike in 1912. 54 
What is remarkable is that it was not only the professional and hierarchically 
organised groups of strikebreakers, such as those led by Hintze and Katzmarek, 
that were armed: the more ad hoc groups also obtained weapons. However, while 
armed intimidation was a fundamental aspect of the business of professional 
strikebreakers, who were already equipped with revolvers, unorganised strike-
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problem of armed strikebreakers was discussed in the Reichstag. During a debate 
in 1907, the Social Democratic member of parliament Paul Singer showed the 
assembly a photograph of armed strikebreakers in Cologne symbolically carrying 
their weapons to “defend” the company of the industrial magnate Kohl. 55 Another 
SPD parliamentarian, Theodor Bömelburg, created a huge sensation when he 
showed the Reichstag assembly one of the steel-reinforced sticks that had been 
distributed to strikebreakers in the Ruhr area.56 
The first reports of “blackleg gunfighters” ( arbeitswillige Revolverhelden) and 
employers’ attempts to militarise strikebreakers had appeared already around 
1900 but intensified in the decade before the war. 57 Liberal newspapers also fre-
quently reported on armed strikebreakers. Between September 1906 and March 
1907, for example, the Allgemeine Zeitung published three articles about strike-
breakers armed with revolvers in Munich, Nuremberg and Cologne.58 These 
armed strikebreakers were labelled “gunfighters” by the left-wing newspapers, 
a term that was broadly used to demonise gun violence and criminal gangs and 
hence created a semantic connection between the criminal underworld and pro-
fessional strikebreakers. 59 Highly evocative notions, such as “gunfighters”, or 
“worker’s murder” ( Arbeitermord), suggested that bands of strikebreakers serv-
ing to secure capitalist interests were similar to street gangs and that violence 
was an integral part of their service. Although left-wing newspapers dramati-
cally emphasised the strikebreakers’ (illegal) use of violence, the polemic against 
“blackleg gunfighters” did partly reflect the social reality after the turn of the 
century when strikebreakers began systematically to use weapons, partly in self-
defence and partly with the aim of intimidating workers and offering private 
security services to employers. It is therefore not surprising that Vorwärts also 
explicitly compared strikebreaking agents like Friedrich Hintze with Pinkerton’s 
National Detective Agency. 60 
Bands of strikebreakers: “Yellow Katzmarek” 
and “Hintze’s soldiers” 
In the decade up to 1914, the groups led by Friedrich Hintze in Hamburg and 
Karl Katzmarek in Berlin emerged as the most important strikebreaking agencies 
in Imperial Germany. Both bands of strikebreakers were highly professionalised 
and active in almost the whole of German-speaking Central Europe. They were 
well known for their brutality and for their use of weapons as a major part of their 
everyday business. Katzmarek’s and Hintze’s activities resulted in these leaders 
becoming synonymous with violent, professional strikebreaking activities. In 
describing the broader phenomenon of strikebreaking, left-wing newspapers used 
their names as negative terms for violent strikebreaking ( Katzmareks, Hintzegard-
isten and Hintzebrüder).61 Katzmarek, in particular, had a great interest in his self-
representation. Nicknamed “Yellow Katzmarek”, he was a member of the board 
of the Federation of Yellow Unions and had a personal link with Rudolf Lebius, 
leader of the Federation. 62 “Yellow Katzmarek” was always armed with revolvers 
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night of 4 October 1913, on his way back to Magdeburg in his car, he caused a 
traffic collision killing a pedestrian. Socialist newspapers reported that during the 
trial Katzmarek tried to defend himself with the argument that he was a prominent 
strikebreaking agent and therefore a useful member of the community deserving 
of special protection. Although he had previous convictions for violence, insults 
and robbery, he was sentenced to only one month in prison. 63 
In 1912, during a strike in Berlin, Katzmarek joined forces with Hintze to mobil-
ise an armed band of strikebreakers that terrorised unionised workers. 64 Accord-
ing to sensationalised reports in the SPD party press, violent intimidation of both 
striking workers and the Social Democratic milieu was the trademark activity 
of Katzmarek’s and Hintze’s bands. In 1911, during a strike in the small city of 
Güstrow in Mecklenburg, Katzmarek’s band arrived from Berlin and took de facto 
control of the town and established a “rule of violence” ( Gewaltherrschaft).65 The 
same strategy had been adopted by Hintze a year earlier during a mineworkers’
strike in Finkenheerd, another small town in northern Germany. When the 15 
members of “Hintze’s guard” arrived in Finkenheerd, they immediately set about 
organising a shooting range for weapons training, sending a clear message to the 
striking workers.66 
After the Moabit riot in 1910, Hintze became the most notorious German strike-
breaker, ironically nicknamed “the hero of Moabit” by Vorwärts because of his 
having led the so-called patriotic forces that helped to restore order after two 
weeks of rioting. 67 The Moabit riot was actually a labour dispute that escalated 
into widespread popular protests, especially after violent clashes between strik-
ing workers and strikebreakers. 68 According to the semi-official Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung, fighting escalated on the evening of 28 September with more 
than 90 injured. 69 “Hintze’s soldiers” undertook two tasks during the riot: they
supplied substitutes for striking workers, helping to deliver coal during the day, 
and at night they cooperated with the police to combat “strike terrorism”. Hin-
tze and his strikebreakers had access to a temporary prison camp for arrested 
striking workers, where, in collusion with the police authorities, they savagely 
beat the prisoners. It was not only Vorwärts but also the liberal Vossische Zeitung
that reported on the quasi-paramilitary organisation of Hintze’s band during the 
Moabit uprising.70 
In October 1910, Hintze gave a long interview to the popular newspaper Ber-
liner Morgenpost, in which he described his career as a professional strikebreaker 
and provided insights on how he organised his business. 71 Initially, Hintze worked 
for the well-known strikebreaker agent August Müller in Hamburg, but shortly 
after Müller’s death, the 21-year-old Hintze established his own organisation. 
He claimed to have more than 6,000 strikebreakers whom he could mobilise in 
only eight days. Despite this obviously exaggerated statement, Hintze was able to 
organise quite large groups of armed strikebreakers with long-range mobility. In 
1911 Vorwärts reported that hundreds of “Hintze’s soldiers” had travelled from 
Hamburg to the East Prussian city of Königsberg, which was almost 1,000 kilo-
metres away. 72 Berlin and Hamburg were the most important logistic centres for 
the distribution of strikebreakers to distant cities such as Königsberg or Basel, but 
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they more frequently operated in the regional areas of cities such as Bremen and 
Kassel as well as many small towns in Mecklenburg and Brandenburg. 73 
Hintze’s name became a synonym for professional strikebreaking with brutal 
methods. According to the SPD parliamentarian Cohn, Hintze recruited violent 
teenagers from the poorest districts of Berlin. 74 In his interview to the Morgenpost,
Hintze mentioned that his agency was doing very well and that he was paid ten 
marks for each strikebreaker he delivered. He explicitly stated that he offered not 
only labour replacement but also supply services, logistics (he had three cars) 
and, of course, organisation of the strikebreakers’ “self-defence”. He was aware 
that the interview with the Morgenpost was a great opportunity for free publicity 
and mentioned that his strikebreakers would do any kind of job that the company 
would pay for, but, more importantly, they could effectively intimidate unionised 
workers. The agent proudly proclaimed that “with thirty men I can terrify five 
hundred strikers”. 75 Hintze’s agency was not only active during strikes, it also 
offered its services to private companies in the aftermath of unrest to prevent the 
expansion of labour unions. 76 Hintze also mentioned that he was already involved 
in 15 different strikes and that the most important aspect of his business was 
to create a military-like organisation and establish military discipline among the 
strikebreakers. 
Bands of strikebreakers combined violence, a quasi-paramilitary organisation 
and street gang behaviour with a highly professionalised business. It was not only 
Hintze who made an effort to publicise his semi-legal strikebreaking agency: 
Katzmarek distributed marketing brochures informing potential employers that 
they were to pay his strikebreakers five marks per day and that they should also 
pay for transportation, food supplies and housing. Katzmarek’s brochure also 
stated that he was able to recruit service staff and cooks and to provide cooking 
utensils for the strikebreakers as well as “resolute foremen” and armed guards. 77 
His band of strikebreakers was hierarchically organised and well known not only 
in Germany but also in Austria and the Swiss Confederation. Katzmarek had a 
right-hand man, Gründke, and a group of foremen who oversaw the other strike-
breakers.78 After his election to the central committee of Lebius’s Federation of 
Yellow Workers in January 1908, Katzmarek was described by Lebius as some-
one with a charismatic but dangerously self-overestimated personality and “gipsy 
blood” (Zigeunerblut).79 Although Katzmarek cooperated with other notorious 
strikebreakers, such as Hintze, he also tried to protect his lucrative business using 
illegal methods against his competitors. In 1913, for example, he sent falsified 
letters purporting to be from private companies to other strikebreaking agents 
resulting in these delivering “blacklegs” to the wrong place and therefore receiv-
ing no pay. 80 
Joseph Ruppert was another professional strikebreaker who killed a worker 
near Magdeburg in 1912 and who, during his trial, tried to justify always carrying 
his revolver with the argument that “weapons are the tools of our trade”. 81 He was 
accused by Vorwärts of being one of the most dangerous members of Katzmarek’s 
band.82 More often, Ruppert worked independently with his partner Anton Mei-
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They were involved in several episodes of violence and intimidation not only 
in Magdeburg but also in Berlin, Thuringia (Zeulenroda) and Nesseldorf in the 
Moravian-Silesian region. The Social Democratic Arbeiter-Zeitung reported that 
Meinel threatened unionised workers during a strike in Berlin claiming: “I can 
do what I want, I am allowed in certain circumstances to shoot, I can even kill a 
man”.84 Like the other “blackleg gunfighters” mentioned in this chapter, the focus 
of Ruppert’s and Meinel’s activities was less on replacing striking workers and 
more on intimidating them.85
 Conclusion 
Greater protection for strikebreakers had already begun to be sought by conser-
vative politicians and employers at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1897, 
the Kaiser announced a programme of “protection for the national labour of the 
productive classes, . . . ruthless repression of all revolutionary subversion and 
the heaviest penalty for anyone who dares to hinder his neighbour, who wants to 
work, in his freedom to work”. 86 This political manifesto against organised labour 
formed part of the so-called Zuchthausvorlage, the penitentiary bill designed 
to penalise picketing that was presented to the Reichstag in 1899 but defeated 
by the parliamentary opposition. 87 However, the spirit of the Zuchthausvorlage
remained embedded in the Prussian courts, at least from a Social Democratic 
standpoint, even after its defeat in the Reichstag. 
The de facto impunity of armed groups of strikebreakers can be explained as 
an extra-legal response aimed at protecting the “productive classes” after lead-
ing conservatives recognised that the intensification of repressive authoritarian 
practices against the labour movement was rather unpopular and could not be 
legally imposed. The advent of mass politics, especially the introduction of uni-
versal male suffrage and the rise of mass-produced newspapers, set new limits 
on state repression and authoritarian control. At the same time, “threat commu-
nication” and the radicalisation of the debates on “strike terrorism” gave greater 
visibility and urgency to social conflicts. As a result, strikebreaking became more 
professionalised and militarised after the turn of the century. This shows that the 
transition to democracy and mass politics opened up new horizons for privately 
organised coercion and motivated the redistribution of coercive tasks to non-
state actors. 
The debate about “strike terrorism” reached a new peak in 1907 when some 
of the most influential members of the conservative party stressed the urgency 
for greater protection for those “patriotic and loyal workers” who opposed the 
“red terror”. 88 During a debate in the Reichstag in 1907, Arthur von Posadowsky-
Wehner, the Prussian secretary of state of the interior and vice chancellor, openly 
encouraged presumed victims of the “red terror” to organise themselves against the 
intimidation and violence inflicted on them by the labour movement. Posadowsky 
openly supported the formation of yellow unions and armed groups of strikebreak-
ers and assured them that Prussian courts and police authorities would tolerate 
counter-strike actions. 89 This proposition was well received and was taken up by 
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the leader of the Federation of Yellow Workers, Rudolf Lebius, as stated in his 
pamphlet Gelbe Gedanken (Yellow Thoughts), published in 1908. 90 In his articles 
for the federation’s newspaper and for several other publications, Lebius stressed 
the fact that the yellow unions were born out of the right to self-defence of patriotic 
workers who organised themselves against terrorism: “Red terrorism is the initia-
tor of the yellow movement”. 91 The Federation of Patriotic Workers ( Bund Vater-
ländischer Arbeitervereine), another anti-labour organisation, created in 1907, 
used the same argumentative strategy as Lebius. Deutsche Treue, the newspaper of 
the “patriotic workers”, claimed that “true German men” should not wait for state 
protection, but had to mobilise against labour militancy and socialist propaganda. 92 
In 1910, German industrialists launched a fresh campaign for better protection 
of “willing workers”, calling for the army’s intervention and the demonstrative 
use of machine guns against striking mineworkers in the Ruhr area. 93 State-led 
repression and repressive practices on the part of extra-legal groups, such as the 
armed bands of strikebreakers, had something in common: they all involved “col-
lective violence”. In Charles Tilly’s definition, collective violence includes a vast 
range of social interactions and excludes “purely individual action”. 94 It is there-
fore grounded in complex interactions and is also closely related to the perceived 
urgency to defend the established order against emerging social movements and 
their claims. Therefore, violence carried out by armed strikebreakers was, again 
following Tilly’s definition, not simply “individual aggression writ large” but was 
significantly affected by “social ties, structures and process” as well as by the 
political discourses and media representations in Wilhelmine Germany. 95 
Defining repressive practices carried out by armed strikebreakers as collec-
tive violence raises further, more general questions: why did strikes and mass 
demonstrations in the first decades of the twentieth century increasingly shift into 
collective violence (both in late Imperial Germany and much more dramatically 
in the early Weimar years)? What impact did different political regimes (semi-
authoritarian before 1918, democratic after 1918) have on the levels and forms 
of collective violence? What impact did the glamorisation and sensationalisation 
of collective violence in the modern media have in different political contexts? 
Although further studies are needed to provide exhaustive answers, the rise of 
armed groups of professional strikebreakers examined in this chapter is an impor-
tant yet less well-studied issue within the broader framework of authoritarian 
responses to social conflicts. The impunity of Katzmarek, Hintze and other noto-
rious strikebreakers gives new insights into the privatisation of repressive strate-
gies and the mobilisation of non-state actors in defence of the bourgeois order. 
In the decade up to 1914, strikebreaking agents were almost always armed and 
frequently used mafia-like methods to intimidate unionised workers. Along with 
providing labour replacement, the main aim of these “gunfighters” was to effect 
non-bureaucratic repression of the labour movement. The violence carried out 
by bands of strikebreakers demonstrates that the Kaiserreich’s authorities were 
inclined to tolerate, to a certain extent, privately organised coercion, especially 
where social movements, democratic institutions and the modern media were 
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 12 The wild west of employer
anti-unionism 
The glorification of vigilantism 
and individualism in the early 
twentieth-century United States1
 Vilja Hulden and Chad Pearson 
When employers organised to address the “labour question” in the opening years 
of the twentieth century, they did so as the self-proclaimed champions of “inde-
pendent” (that is, non-union) workers supposedly harassed by labour unions. At 
a moment when unions were growing, strike activity was intensifying, and the 
corporate-industrial order was under severe scrutiny, organised employers coun-
tered critiques of how economic power undermined democracy by wrapping 
themselves in a language of fairness and equal rights, characterising virtually all 
standard labour union practices as coercive while portraying themselves as the 
true defenders of American liberty. 2 
Manufacturers took the lead, as organisations like the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM), the National Founders’Association (NFA) and the National 
Metal Trades Association (NMTA) rallied against what they termed the “closed 
shop” – the common union requirement that all workers at a unionised workplace 
be union members – with a movement for the “open shop”, a workplace that pur-
portedly welcomed workers without regard to union membership. Although the 
bulk of research on the employer counterattack has focused on the manufacturers,
from the beginning the movement strove for a pan-industrial reach, which crys-
tallised in the Citizens’ Industrial Association of America (CIAA). The CIAA, 
established in late 1903 to serve as the umbrella organisation of local associations 
usually known as Citizens’Alliances, included members from manufacturing, con-
struction, lumber, banking, retail and more. It purported to work “for the protection 
of the common people” against the “tyranny of labor unions” and to safeguard 
individual pluck and initiative against the levelling influence of union contracts.3 
In this chapter, we show how the employer anti-union movement both boosted 
and intersected with the American creed of up-by-one’s-bootstraps social mobil-
ity. To do so, we turn our gaze away from the manufacturing sector and towards 
western cattle ranches, on the one hand, and urban small-time entrepreneurship, 
on the other. The former helps us examine how the employer counterattack linked 
itself with deep national mythologies of (frontier) individualism. The latter allows 
us to explore a context in which social mobility – on a modest but meaningful 
scale – was more reachable to workers than in manufacturing, somewhat chang-
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manipulated the cultural tenets and grassroots appeal of social mobility and indi-
vidualism enables us to better understand what made the employer message palat-
able to many in the middle class as well as to some workers. At the same time, 
it illuminates how employers deployed a double standard that cast elite-serving 
collective action as civic engagement while vilifying worker self-organisation as 
dangerous and always at risk of tipping over into mob violence. 
The first portion of our chapter examines the role of the famous author and pio-
neer of the Western genre of fiction writing, Owen Wister, in promoting the employer 
cause. In his writings, Wister – appointed in 1907 as member of the CIAA’s 
seven-person committee on Education and Publicity – justified and even glori-
fied vigilante violence and strikebreakers by enveloping both in a great patriotic 
tradition of individualism.4 The second portion focuses on employer promotion of 
“non-union unions”, astroturf organisations that supposedly represented the inter-
ests of workers who did not wish to join labour unions. It investigates both the 
publicity value that such unions had for the employer anti-union movement and 
the circumstances that might have prompted some workers to associate with them. 
Owen Wister and the virtuous scab 
Best remembered as the author of the 1902 book The Virginian: A Horseman of 
the Plains, Wister educated and entertained hundreds of thousands about indi-
vidual heroism and vigilante campaigns for justice. His best-selling book, based 
roughly on the 1892 Johnson County War – a violent conflict that pitted the elite 
members of Wyoming Stock Growers Association against numerous small home-
steaders – promoted the goodness of individualism, the importance of defending 
private property, the necessity of showing respect to one’s superiors and the virtue 
of standing up to the so-called dangerous classes. These values were consistent 
with the CIAA’s core mission, which included efforts to de-legitimise expres-
sions of working-class collectivism while calling on citizens to respect the men 
responsible for upholding “law and order”.5 By focusing on Wister’s writings, we 
can better comprehend the ways anti-union employers championed the activities, 
including vigilante actions of individual anti-unionists. 
Class conflict and the question of violence in 1892 
Wister started writing about labour-management conflicts a decade before pub-
lishing The Virginian; for instance, he wrote an article on the Pennsylvania
National Guard’s role in confronting the Homestead strikers in 1892, which came 
out in Harper’s two years later. One of the nation’s iconic labour conflicts, the 
protest, organised by the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers and 
Tin Workers, demonstrated the workers’ commitment to solidarity. Plant operator 
Henry Clay Frick, who had locked the men out because they refused to accept a 
wage cut, was quite frustrated by such solidarity. Writing to owner Andrew Carn-
egie on 4 July, Frick complained that “The workmen seem to be well organised, 
and have things, so far, very much their own way, that is to say, are guarding every 
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During the conflict, Frick employed the services of the Pinkertons, which 
engaged in a notorious battle with protestors that resulted in the deaths of ten: 
seven workers and three Pinkertons. In response, Frick asked Democratic gover-
nor Robert Pattison to send in National Guardsmen. 
Wister was impressed by the 8,500 scab-protecting National Guardsmen. 7 
He emphasised the visual differences between the conflicting sides, saluting the 
guardsmen for appearing “splendid on paper and picturesque to see”, while label-
ling their opponents “rats”.8 Wister showed little desire to understand the reasons 
for the workers’ grievances or their desire for a union. Instead he emphasised the 
dangers labourers posed to property rights. Among the accusations he levelled at 
the “rats” were that they distributed “incendiary pamphlets”, drove “owners from 
their property”, “established an advisory committee superior to the civil law” and 
violated “personal liberty”.9 Examples of striker militancy, in Wister’s mind, pro-
vided justification for state repression. The workers ultimately lost this struggle, 
and the membership of the Amalgamated Association Iron and Steel Workers and 
Tin Workers fell to less than 10,000 members shortly after it. 10 
Vigilante violence from above, however, was apparently quite acceptable to Wis-
ter. He condemned the Homestead strikers but showed approval for the violence 
employed by the Wyoming Stock Growers Association (WSGA), an organisation 
consisting of the state’s large landowners. These men are best known for their 
involvement in the 1892 Johnson County War, an infamous case of vigilantism that 
resulted in several killings followed by a failure of justice. Here, a combined group
of roughly 50 WSGA members and their hired gunmen, seeking greater control 
over land and cattle, invaded northern Wyoming in April 1892. They fought under 
the banner of combating rustling, annoyed that the courts frequently failed to pun-
ish men for this alleged offence. Indeed, juries, seeing little evidence of wrongdo-
ing, typically declared defendants not guilty, sparking signs of disappointment in 
elite circles. The WSGA vigilantes, joined by Pinkertons and hired gunmen, mobil-
ised in early April. They murdered two men, including a labour activist. After these 
murders, many Johnson County residents retaliated. The invaders were forced to 
seek protection, which they received from the governor and President Benjamin 
Harrison. Community defenders were shocked to discover many deadly weapons 
and a 70-person kill-list after the shooting ceased. This was a rural, rather than an 
industrial struggle. But the class divisions were just as clear in Johnson County, 
Wyoming as they were in Western Pennsylvania. In both cases, the ruling class 
believed violence was an acceptable way to resolve their problems. 
The defendants in this case – one that generated nationwide attention – got off 
after the court dismissed all charges against the cattlemen. Yet they lost the public 
relations war. 11 
The Virginian and the public relations of violence 
The invaders, though wealthy, wanted society to see them as upstanding ordinary 
people; they did not want the public to view them as suffering from what we 
might today call affluenza. They faced an increasingly unfriendly political and 
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left-wing political activism, which hurt the image of the nation’s most privileged 
residents. In addition to the Homestead Strike and the Johnson County invasion, 
miners in northern Idaho staged an extraordinary struggle against the ruthless 
exploitation unleashed by several mine owners, and later in the year, workers 
mounted a general strike in New Orleans.12 
The backlash against what seemed like a coordinated campaign against organ-
ised labour also found expression in political formations, including the rise of the 
Populist Party, which held its first meeting in Omaha on 4 July. The Populist Par-
ty’s platform included goals that reflected the widespread anger felt by many of 
the nation’s farmers and workers. The platform complained about workers’ inabil-
ity to organise and pointed to the unequal distribution of resources, including the 
large amount of “land concentrating in the hands of capitalists”. The organisa-
tion’s sixth resolution called for the elimination of the Pinkertons, the private 
security force that elites employed in Homestead, Johnson County and in Idaho’s 
Coeur d’Alene mining districts: “we regard the maintenance of a large standing 
army of mercenaries, known as the Pinkerton system, as a menace to our liberties, 
and we demand its abolition”.13 
It was impossible not to recognise that the workplace-based conflicts that 
erupted in late 1880s and early 1890s were class-based. Outside observers, includ-
ing journalists, lawyers and government officials acknowledged this stark reality 
on numerous occasions. That powerful capitalists employed private and public 
forces added to the drama. George W. Walts, California’s Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics commissioner, wrote in 1892, “We cannot overlook the fact that at the present 
time the relations subsisting between capitalists and labourers are those of war”.14 
How to win these class wars and reshape public opinion in ways favourable to 
the nation’s elites were central concerns that occupied the emotional and intellec-
tual energy of large sections of the business community. Anti-union forces sought 
to win these struggles by developing a multilayered approach, which involved 
fighting the so-called labour problem in the legal arena, at the point of production 
and in the realm of popular culture. 
A decade after the extraordinary class and political eruptions of 1892, WSGA
members, an assortment of businessmen’s associations and the ruling class gener-
ally, received help from Wister, who shared their fundamental class interests. 15 
Wister had developed relationships with elite clubmen while he was a Harvard 
student. Some of his classmates had moved West, where they entered the cattle 
business, bought land, invested in livestock and employed cowboys. Wister was 
not in Wyoming during the 1892 invasion, but he had acquired a general apprecia-
tion of it through his ties. During his various trips, Wister made time to visit the 
WSGA’s clubhouse, the Cheyenne Club, which he once called “[c]omfortable, and
full of departed glory”.16 Whether in eastern or midwestern cities or in western 
ones like Cheyenne, clubhouses were fancy settings, where an exclusive frater-
nity of men discussed the day’s politics and their personal and business interests, 
including their labour-related problems. They sometimes reminisced about the 
past. During one visit, an invasion participant, W. C. Irvine, offered personal rec-
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his experiences during the ‘invasion’ of Johnson County. The story was thrilling 
and picturesque”. Wister was captivated, telling Irvine – an influential figure who 
had served as a delegate to the convention that led to the formation of Wyoming 
statehood in 1890 – that he wanted “a written account of all these things”.17 These 
tales, told by one of the state’s most powerful people, provided Wister much to 
consider. Wister wanted to captivate audiences in the same way that the story fas-
cinated him. Such a story, in his view, needed to be told in an unambiguous moral 
way, one that clearly distinguished virtuous forces from evil ones. This he did in 
The Virginian. 
The Virginian helped to rehabilitate the reputations of Wyoming’s agricultural 
elites and sold extremely well, giving tens of thousands of readers a portrayal of 
western society as a morality tale. Rather than depict the deeply inequal power 
relations that generated conflicts like the Johnson County War,  The Virginian tells 
us about the triumph of good against evil. In the process, the book helped to turn 
killers into heroes. At the same time, Wister offered a robust defence of class divi-
sions, which he emphasised were the inevitable outcome of a society that valued 
hard work and merit: “every man should thenceforth have equal liberty to find his 
own level”. The first page of chapter 13 makes the case for a society that lets “the 
best man win! That is America’s word. That is true democracy”. 18 
The novel’s central character, the thoughtful, soft-spoken and ambitious horse-
riding southerner, demonstrates unwavering deference to the landholding elite, 
a group based on the region’s wealthy cattlemen. Wister created the image of 
wholesome and virtuous cowboys, the personification of frontier individualism.19 
And we discover that Judge Henry, the Virginian’s employer, deserves deference 
for his “courage and common sense”. Prudent men like him had experienced many 
humiliations, including the bane of rustling and an unfair court system that fre-
quently freed the criminals. The Virginian complained, “For the thieves have got 
hold of the juries in Johnson County”.20 As literary scholar Sara Humphreys puts 
it, “the ranch owner, the Judge, is the only man the Virginian wishes to please”. 21 
The Virginian was the quintessential company man, someone who sought 
to uphold the status quo. And sometimes this meant resorting to violence. In a 
revealing passage, Wister emphasises that the victims needed to keep their options 
open. Good guys, irrespective of class position, could employ “the law or popu-
lar justice”.22 If the courts were hostile or indifferent to their interests – or if the 
legal system simply functioned too slowly – the righteous men could engage in 
gunfire, kidnappings, lynchings or any other method of punishment they believed 
was warranted. 
What did Wister mean by “the law or popular justice?” In many cases, plain old
state law seemed like a reasonable option. After all, by the late nineteenth century, 
the legal authorities were mostly consistent in their willingness to protect both 
property and managerial rights in the face of challenges from rustlers, populists 
and labour activists. However, the American legal system was also designed to 
advance the principle of due process. Those accused of crimes were supposed to 
enjoy the presumption of innocence and the right to a trial by a jury of peers. Some-
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point of view. In these cases, “popular justice” remained the best course of action. 
The dilemma of whether to select “the law or popular justice” was not a choice 
simply for the western settler elite. In The Virginian, the always-insightful Judge 
Henry announces that the “ordinary citizen” had a duty to act when confronted 
with cases of rustling – or when faced with any other form of lawbreaking. Such 
vigilantism, “so far from being a defiance of the law . . . is an assertion of it”.23 
Judge Henry drew sharp distinctions between “popular justice” in the West 
and white supremacist vigilantism in the South. Aware of the racist cruelties of 
southern lynch mobs, he explains to the Virginian’s fiancé, Molly Wood, that he 
opposed the burning of “Southern negroes in public”. But he was fully supportive 
of the hanging of “Wyoming cattle thieves in private”. 24 The South, in the judge’s 
view, was “semi-barbarous”, while “Wyoming is determined to become civi-
lized”. The off-stage popular justice of the West was merely a means of upholding 
law and order, not a spectacle: “We do not invite spectators to enjoy their death 
agony. We put no such hideous disgrace upon the United States. We execute our 
criminals by the swiftest means, and in the quietest way”, he explained to Wood. 25 
Besides being more civilised, Judge Henry explained, this was also much wiser 
from a business perspective, since open displays of violence had the potential of 
discouraging investment. 
At the book’s triumphant conclusion, the hero, armed with his Winchester rifle, 
kills the story’s chief villain, Trampas – a threatening rustler, someone “coura-
geous with whisky” and a stand-in for the cowboys killed during the 1892 inva-
sion.26 Trampas was not only a threat to the property interests of the region’s most 
powerful men; he also suffered from moral lapses. The action-packed story has 
been read by millions and thus has shaped our understanding of 1890s-era western 
conflicts. The takeaway: readers gained an appreciation of the landholding elite, a 
group that was determined to, in the words of Christine Bold, protect “its privilege 
in the name of democracy”.27 
Scabs and Heroes 
The project of defending “privilege in the name of democracy” also neatly describes
the employer open-shop movement, launched in earnest the very year when Wis-
ter’s novel appeared. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Wister attracted the 
attention of the leaders of that movement, who requested his assistance in spread-
ing anti-union propaganda. Like the western cattle ranchers, the employers who 
organised to oppose unions perceived themselves as – and wished to be perceived 
by the public as – upholders of law and order and protectors of underdogs from 
the onslaught of union “tyranny”. The slogan of the CIAA, “For the Protection of 
the Common People”, emphasised this role, as well as underlined what the move-
ment stood for rather than what it opposed. Organised employers, far from being 
vicious union-busters, presented themselves as upholders of deep-seated Ameri-
can values, such as the right of a worker to work when and where he pleased, a 
position captured by Harvard president Charles Eliot in calling scabs “heroes”, a 
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Wister, too, viewed strikebreakers as heroes, as he made clear in an essay in 
1904, a couple of years before he joined the CIAA’s propaganda committee. The 
“scab”, Wister explained in a  Saturday Evening Post article, 
stands for liberty, the right to live, the right to work, every right that we have 
all inherited in the land of the free. As the patriots stood against George and 
his Stamp Act in 1776, so in 1904 does the scab stand against Unionism and 
dynamite. He is the human symbol of protest against tyranny. 29 
For Wister, “the scab”, stigmatised and repeatedly confronted with threats and 
violence, deserved as much admiration as the nation’s earliest and most iconic 
history-makers. If scabs could sometimes be violent, no matter: the morally just 
visionaries who led the American Revolution, including well-known military men 
and nameless yeomen farmers, also achieved political freedom by mobilising 
troops and using violence. In that founding spirit, Wister called for renewed out-
bursts of patriotism and self-defence in workplaces throughout the nation against 
the forces that sought to take away the constitutional freedoms gained from the 
revolution. Violent opposition to closed or union shops was, he implied, not only 
justifiable, but necessary and deeply patriotic. 
Thus, honest “ordinary citizens” in whatever context, had a right, even a duty, 
to challenge what Wister and other anti-union activists considered injustice, even 
if they were required to take to violent means to do so. Deferential cowboys like 
the Virginian, who understood the moral uprightness of the elites and the threat 
posed by rustlers, and strikebreakers who understood how union “rats” squeezed 
both the employer and the non-union worker were Owen Wister’s heroes. They 
had, and should have, the backing of both lawmen and the industrious and patri-
otic men behind the open-shop movement, those fully committed to helping “the 
common people” resist union pressure. 
Wister was a big hit with those in the leadership of anti-union organisations. 
National and regional employers’ associations praised his books in their publica-
tions, and they invited him to speak at their conferences.30 They realised that this 
literary giant had the unparalleled power to shape the views of the masses, which 
is something ordinary employers could not achieve. 
Astroturfing support: non-union unions and open-shop 
employers 
Around the time of the founding of the Citizens’ Industrial Association of Amer-
ica, there appeared a spate of stories about “independent workmen” opposed to 
unions coming together in a spirit of mutual support and labour-capital harmony. 
Some such stories portrayed supposed workers’ organisations expressing their 
appreciation of leaders of the open-shop movement, such as in a Los Angeles 
Times story about James W. Van Cleave, the president of the National Association 
of Manufacturers, being awarded a “handsome walking stick” in recognition of 
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fair-minded employer”. 31 Other stories reported on parades by such organisations, 
such as in a September 1904 Associated Press story about a Labor Day parade in 
Cripple Creek, Colorado. The non-union parade purportedly comprised “3,000 
independent workmen” carrying signs that apparently rejected union organisers 
with such slogans as “We Don’t Hire Salaried Agitators Here”. 32 
These stories were, in general, either purely fake or at least comprehensively 
engineered by employers and/or their agents. The Cripple Creek non-union parade 
probably did take place: it was reported in multiple local and national papers 
(although the claimed participant numbers fluctuated). It was hardly a spontane-
ous worker rejection of unionism, however. Cripple Creek had in 1903 and 1904 
been the site of a miners’ strike suppressed with extraordinary and widely publi-
cised state and vigilante violence, culminating only the month before the Labor 
Day parade in deportations at gunpoint of Western Federation of Miners members 
and sympathisers. It must have been amply clear to remaining townsfolk that 
suppleness in dancing to the mine owners’ tune was a key qualification for contin-
ued residence in the area. The intimidating meanings of the parade were thus well 
understood both locally and by unionists in general, even if the parade may also 
have been intended to generate positive publicity among a national middle-class 
audience.33 The incident where a workers’ organisation honoured Van Cleave with 
a special present is rather less likely to have even occurred; the only paper to 
report the story seems to have been the then notoriously anti-union Los Angeles 
Times, and moreover, the story reported the prize being presented by one M. M. 
Mulhall – better known to posterity as an undercover political operative on the 
NAM payroll. 
Though it is impossible to trace specific stories conclusively to CIAA or NAM 
sources, we do know that both maintained close relationships with newspaper and 
magazine editors (and sometimes were editors themselves) and hired publicity 
bureaus to conduct campaigns, including ones involving planted news stories.34 
The main function of such news was to lend plausibility to the employers’ self-
appointed project of “protecting the common people” and to their claims that 
ordinary workers were oppressed by “tyrannical” labour unions. 
But parades and prize ceremonies were one-time events, easily forgotten. What 
if there existed sustained worker organisations that explicitly rejected unionism 
and allied with employers? That would provide a much stronger boost to employ-
ers’ claims of being the true allies of workers. If such organisations could get 
off the ground, their activities could be promoted and publicised as examples 
of genuine grassroots discontent with labour organisations, which of course 
would lend significant legitimacy to employers’ claims of union tyranny as well 
as would demonstrate the enterprising and individualistic spirit of the American 
workingman. 
Stories about such “non-union unions” appeared with some frequency in the 
early years of the twentieth century, roughly coinciding with the launch of the 
open-shop campaign. In early 1903, news stories reported on a new organisation,
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the former Unitarian minister turned expert in moral instruction, Edwin Milton 
Fairchild of Albany, New York. The stated goals of this organisation were to 
“protect independent workmen in their independence”, “sustain higher wages by 
skilful, energetic cooperation with our employers” and “compel labor unions to 
observe the laws”.35 The ILLA workers would reject strikes and instead strive 
to advance themselves by “earnest co-operation with employers and legitimate 
business methods”.36 Fairchild, who was a strong believer in instilling values and 
character through education, did not deny that the organisation was instigated by 
employers. Rather, he made that a virtue, arguing that it showed real goodwill on 
the part of the employers to understand that “some kind of labor organisation is 
proper and within the rights of employees” and thus encourage “the more intel-
ligent and American portion of the laboring people of Elmira” to create a union 
that would be “an embodiment of our national spirit” and with which employers 
could discuss.37 
At almost exactly the same time an “Independent American Mechanics’ Union” 
or “Independent Order of American Mechanics” was incorporated in Anderson, 
Indiana to defend against any attacks on “the inalienable right of all mankind to 
work for such wages as shall be mutually satisfactory to the individual workman 
and his employer”, while by the fall, an “American League of Independent Work-
men” was operating in Spokane, Washington and a “Citizens’ League” affiliated 
with the Indiana organisation had been established in Fort Bragg. 38 The ILLA also 
added chapters in several cities besides the original Albany and Elmira ones, and 
the Indiana organisation claimed to be making “rapid strides” in cities across the 
Midwest.39 Labour papers noted that such non-union unions seemed to be newly 
proliferating, though they were not a novelty, having existed in specific industries 
particularly for the purposes of “making a show of non-union labor” to intimidate 
workers. Labour editors predicted that whatever the present purpose of such asso-
ciations was, they would quickly “degenerate . . . into strikebreaking machines”.40 
There is little doubt that these “non-union unions” were closely affiliated with 
and initiated by the employers involved in the open-shop movement. The timing 
of their rise matches precisely the open-shop movement’s launch; they often arose
in areas with strong employer organisations; their titles and planks are worded 
alike and parrot the open-shop movement’s language; and they usually praised 
open-shop employers for their “valiant work” in assisting them and occasionally 
invited open-shop employers to speak at their events. Indeed, non-union organisa-
tions sometimes explicitly stated that they would not establish branches in cities 
that already had a Citizens’ Alliance, “on account of the similarity of principles” 
between the two.41 Employer support, certainly, was explicit: the NAM passed a 
resolution at its 1903 convention to support such organisations, and its president 
openly offered them financial support. 42 Moreover, there is evidence that these 
organisations were indeed used for strikebreaking: the National Metal Trades
Association (one of the key open-shop employer organisations), for example, used 
the Elmira ILLA’s membership to recruit strikebreakers, and it seems that these 
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Quite possibly, since they generally followed British developments quite 
closely, American open-shop employers got the idea of “non-union unions” from 
Great Britain.44 There, the National Free Labour Association (NFLA) had been 
active since the early 1890s. The association was founded and headed by Wil-
liam Collison, who explained that he, though a workingman himself and a former 
union member, had become disgusted with trade unions. Unionism, in his telling, 
had veered away from “sober discrimination and . . . the path of public sympathy” 
that posited no “essential antagonism between master and man”; it had given way 
to “faction and self-interest” and been taken over by “mob managers”.45 Hav-
ing left the unions, he instead created the NFLA, which preached against “union 
tyranny” – and found much favour with employers both for its rhetoric and for its 
provision of strikebreakers, earning Collison the sobriquets “King of Blacklegs” 
and “Prince of Scabs”. In 1906, Collison visited the CIAA’s annual convention 
in Chicago, where he was eagerly interviewed by the leaders of the open-shop 
movement; upon returning home, he founded a British version of the Citizens’
Industrial Association, though that association was apparently not particularly 
active.46 
Like the American non-union unions, the NFLA was to a great extent the 
creature of employers, especially those active in the powerful Liberty and Prop-
erty Defence League.47 It depended heavily on employer support and catered to 
employers’ demand for workers who did not mind working during a strike. It also
appears that its “conventions”, though well publicised, were largely faked, with 
“delegates” collected from among down-at-heel hang abouts and paid for their 
attendance. And despite Collison’s version of how he was motivated by a wish 
to combat union “dictation” and the socialist drift of British unions, the associa-
tion’s origins were closely tied to employers and their strikebreaking needs: before 
founding his own organisation, Collison was a chairman of another Free Labour 
Association, this one created by the Shipping Federation keen to disguise its strike-
breaking activities.48 
At the same time, Collison did in fact come from a working-class background, 
and he was genuinely piqued at the New Unionism and its language of class. 
His NFLA was in his control and in accordance with his ideology, even if his 
finances came largely from employers, and even if strikebreaking was his major 
service.49 The individuals associated with non-union unions might, then, have 
had real grievances or aspirations beyond making a quick buck; the remainder of 
the paper explores what we might uncover, or at least speculate, regarding those 
aspirations based on the available sources.50 
The problem, of course, is that information about the individuals associated 
with the elusive “independent labor leagues” is scarce in the extreme. By their 
very nature as astroturf creations, these organisations held few meetings, left 
behind no documents and rarely produced publications independent of those 
edited and written by the employers who promoted them. Most of them were 
short-lived; some apparently existed only to enact the occasional publicity stunt. 
The non-union unions’ existence was much more ephemeral than that of the com-
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United States and that had been growing for some time before the war, e.g. in 
Germany. 51 Unlike company or yellow unions, the non-union unions did not enrol 
large numbers of workers in a sustained way and only appear to have activated 
substantial numbers in the context of employer-generated strikebreaking cam-
paigns. The non-union unions also portrayed themselves more as organisations 
of concerned citizens than as employee representatives, so while company unions 
usually provided at least some employer-controlled form of representation or ben-
efits, the non-union unions offered at best the promise of a job and possibly an 
informal connection to the organisation’s employer sponsors, with its potential to 
facilitate upward mobility. 
Thus, there is little formal material to draw on. Collison’s American coun-
terparts left far fewer traces of themselves than he did, either biographically or 
ideologically. 52 Those few whose words we do have, though, seem to reflect Col-
lison’s sentiments quite closely. For example, in 1904, a machinist named John 
Galloway testified against union-sponsored legislation at a congressional hear-
ing as the representative of a Dayton, Ohio non-union union called the Modern 
Order of the Bees. Though probably there at the instigation of Dayton’s open-
shop employers, Galloway waxed quite eloquent in recounting how the union’s 
efforts to coerce him to join “put me on my American dignity right away” and 
prompted him to denounce the union’s socialistic ideas. 53 Galloway illustrates that 
in the opposite scale from unions’ proposals of solidarity and contracts were the 
appeal of the ideology of liberty and individualism as well as the allure of social 
mobility and pride in modest prosperity; Galloway, for instance, spontaneously 
made reference to how his hard work had gotten him “a little house in Dayton 
that I would not exchange for Mr. Roosevelt’s place” and how his “family [was] 
getting along as well as anyone’s family”. In short, there was the promise of the 
“American dream”, if only one adhered to the right values. To the extent that non-
union unions played on these emotional strings, they may have held some appeal. 
Most of the non-union unions were too ephemeral to have left even many 
names of members or officers behind, and the claims of “hundreds” of members 
are probably about as reliable as Collison’s convention delegate numbers. 54 How-
ever, to the extent that it is possible to trace the men whose names appeared as 
spokesmen or directors, they seem often to have been involved in the building 
industry or in urban trades. For the one organisation that was slightly longer-lived, 
the American League of Independent Workmen of Spokane, Washington, this was 
particularly true; indeed, the league, reportedly founded by an engineer called 
George B. Weaver, soon boasted that it was doing “more building with non-union 
than union men in this city”.55 The men listed in connection with the league in 
news stories or city directories nearly all came from the building industry. Luther 
Holcomb, the man most often cited as a spokesman of the league, was listed in a 
1902 Spokane city directory as a carpenter, and William H. Schleppy, sometimes 
listed as a president for the league, is listed in a 1901 directory as a carpenter and 
contractor. Similarly with others linked to the organisation: T. W. Ettershank was 
a painter and J. P. Earl a carpenter. Most of these men also seem to have risen in 
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a carpenter to being a building contractor, as did Earl; Schleppy went from being 
a contractor to being an architect; Ettershank bought a paint and varnish store with 
his brother. 56 
Construction was not only a major battleground between unions and employ-
ers, but local building and contracting was squarely within what Andrew Wender 
Cohen has called the “craft economy” – the everyday business of baking bread, 
transporting goods, barbering, building and otherwise keeping a city’s daily life 
running along. This craft economy was characterised by a mix of individualism 
and collective governance, agreements enforced by violence and ostracism and 
low barriers to setting up as an entrepreneur. 57 While Cohen discusses the fluidity 
of the craft economy mainly from the point of view of how it retained an emphasis 
on “well-governed agreements” and craft rulemaking rather than efficient corpo-
rate structures and free markets or freedom of contract, seen from another angle 
the urban economy also lent itself to individualistic upward mobility. 58 
The distance between workers and entrepreneurs in the urban economy 
remained relatively short, and both had a precarious position vis-á-vis those above 
them in the hierarchy. The smaller among the entrepreneurs might aspire to rise 
in the world through association with larger businessmen, and joining the anti-
union associations could provide a handy networking opportunity. As one union 
president snidely but astutely observed, when a Citizens’ Alliance was set up in a 
town, the town’s small businessmen flocked to curry favour with the big shots: 
[A]ll the small fry of manufacturers, as well as storekeepers, druggists, even 
peanut vendors, joined the alliance. Just think of the prestige they would have 
when the big manufacturer, driving along in his carriage and four, would 
clasp the hand of the peanut vendor and say, “Brother of the Labor Bursting 
Brigade”.59 
In the urban economy, there were many workers who were more like “peanut 
vendors” than full-blown proletarians with factory jobs. In the urban crafts, an 
aspiration for economic security and self-respect could be expressed in striving 
for small entrepreneur status just as rationally as it could be manifested in staunch 
unionism.60 
For a worker in the early twentieth-century urban economy, to graduate from 
being in another man’s employ to holding a place among the “small fry” of the 
retail, commercial and city services entrepreneurs was a realistic aspiration, and 
the Spokane case seems to indicate that some of those associated with non-union 
unions did just that. The capital required to set up as a building contractor, a baker 
or a team owner was minimal; the majority of such businesses were proprietorships 
operating on narrow margins and led by men with limited formal education. 61 And 
despite academics’ penchant for envisioning social mobility as rising in the world 
through moving from manual to white-collar occupations, most working-class 
folk with upward aspirations in the early twentieth century dreamed not of office 
jobs but of small businesses that would allow them to control their work time, 
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received.62 When such aspirations combined with the realistic opportunities of 
the craft economy and its often quite rancorous rivalries and were bolstered by a 
broader culture praising individualism and entrepreneurial striving, it is perhaps 
not surprising that some workers opted for sidling up to anti-union employers who 
could easily offer the capital and the business opportunities to enable a worker 
amenable to the anti-union message to prosper as an entrepreneur. 
*** 
Owen Wister’s career and non-union unions illustrate both the cachet of indi-
vidualism in American culture and the diligence with which anti-union employers 
deployed it to benefit themselves and undermine working people. An individual-
istic frontier mythology reverberated in the willingness of Wister’s heroes to take 
(manly) action, at the same time as this action was softened to middle-class palat-
ability by the deference and upwardly mobile aspirations of the novel’s epony-
mous Virginian and the figure of the virtuous scab. Similarly, a spirit of can-do 
attitude and hard work infused the stories about non-union unions, where upstand-
ing workmen willing to do a fair day’s work came together to defend their Ameri-
can liberty against union tyranny. Lost strikes and failed boycott campaigns, the 
frustrations of union rules and the attractions of possible upward mobility surely 
sometimes got workers to wonder if individualism might not offer a better deal 
than union solidarity. Yet – as is perhaps best illustrated by the contrast of glorify-
ing elite-perpetrated vigilante violence while condemning even worker efforts at 
rulemaking as violent “tyranny” – in the wild west of employer anti-unionism, 
some people were more equal than others. 
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 13  Vigilant citizens 
The case of the Volunteer Police Force, 
1911–14* 
 Alessandro Saluppo 
In the years preceding the First World War, the threat of organised labour fuelled 
fears of social disintegration and high levels of insecurity among conservative 
ranks.1 At the same time, increasing jingoistic nationalism along with a grow-
ing deterioration in the international situation transmuted labour unrest into an 
expression of domestic disloyalty. Arguments about the future survival and pros-
perity of Britain gradually coalesced with a quest for public discipline.2 These 
visions of orderliness provided the ideological framework for the emergence of a 
number of patriotic leagues, citizens’ patrols and parapolice corps with the inten-
tion, or at least the ostensible intention, of assisting the police in the maintenance 
of law and order and in performing essential public services during major indus-
trial disputes.3 Aside from newspaper reports, little is known about these private 
anti-labour associations. Questions regarding their formation and structuration, 
their organisational functioning and operational modes have remained for the 
most part unanswered or outrightly ignored. In an attempt to fill this void, this 
chapter retraces the case of the Volunteer Police Force (VPF). Founded on Tra-
falgar Day (21 October) in 1911 by picture frame dealer William Mailes Power 
and presided over by James Hamilton, 2nd Duke of Abercorn, the VPF may be 
interpreted as a paradigmatic manifestation of the propagation of vigilante behav-
iour in the Edwardian years. During the parliamentary debate on the 1923 Spe-
cial Constables Act, the Liberal MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme, Josiah Clement 
Wedgwood, declared: 
I remember that it was before the War that the Citizen Defence Force ( sic) 
first came into being, with his Grace the Duke of Abercorn as president and 
a son of Mrs. Humphrey (sic) Ward as one of the whippersin. They had their 
meeting in the Crystal Palace, and decided to break the strikes. They enrolled 
everyone who would come along . . . in order that when next the wicked 
working man rose up in his might and attempted to destroy civilization . . . 
they might be armed at every point to resist red revolution.4 
His harking back to the short-lived and shadowy existence of the VPF was offered
as an argument against the appointment of permanent special constabularies in 
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Wedgwood’s reference to the Duke of Abercorn’s organisation is not as surprising 
as it might seem. The foundation and conduct of the VPF had caused great alarm 
and clamour in the press on the eve of the First World War, and it is therefore 
highly plausible that its name still resonated in the memories of more than a few 
Labour MPs. Despite the great stir it made at the time, the story of the VPF, which
took upon itself the role of protector of the social order and industrial discipline, 
has fallen into oblivion. The main purpose of this study, therefore, is to shed light 
again on this forgotten case of anti-labour mobilisation and, at the same time, to 
use its paradigmatic story to probe the social and political tensions that character-
ised Britain’s pre-war years. Drawing on a vast array of archival and documentary 
sources, this chapter reconstructs the VPF’s organisation, endowments, clientage, 
recruitment, governance and modes of action. It also analyses the intellectual jus-
tifications and motivations which underpinned it. In doing so, the intention is to 
reveal the disposition of certain social groups – from aristocratic castes to the upper
middle classes – to both counter the rise of political and socio-economic deviance
and lay to rest the spectre of socialism with violence. Enquiry into these pressures 
on the state’s monopoly of the use of legitimate force serves to show the consider-
able support for organised self-defence lent by “respectable society” during the 
Great Labour Unrest (1911–14). The story of the VPF also serves to complexify 
the conventional assumption that the potential for organised political violence in 
mainland Britain was marginal or even non-existent before World War I. 
Crisis of cohesion and the rise of vigilante behaviours 
In 1912, journalist and science fiction writer John Twells Brex published  The Civil
War of 1915. The book, which had appeared in serial form in The Sporting Times
prophesied the near-future uprising of working masses and Britain’s descent into 
class war. For Twells and many of his contemporaries, the spectre of a general 
strike of wage-earners paralysing the whole machinery of production, culminating 
in social anarchy, revolution and the collectivisation of property, had been gradu-
ally transfigured into a psychological reality. 6 
Between 1910 and 1914, Britain was faced with a mass upsurge in labour mili-
tancy and strike waves. Something over 4,000 strikes involving about four mil-
lion workers were recorded, while working days lost peaked to an annual total 
of over ten million. Over the same time span, trade union membership rose from 
about two million to 4.1 million.7 Among the most striking novelties of the “Great 
Unrest” was its “violent, unofficial and insurgent character”. 8 In the Cambrian 
stoppage of 1910 in South Wales, a fertile terrain for revolutionary syndicalist 
doctrines, violence was pervasive, as evidenced by frequent acts of sabotage on 
installations and equipment as well as attacks on non-union workers, the houses 
of mine managers and the property of magistrates. Violent clashes with the police 
at the Glamorgan Colliery in Llwyn-y-pia led to rioting in Tonypandy. 9 
While the Cambrian dispute was dragging on, “the great outburst of 1911” 
commenced with a general strike of seamen and firemen in Southampton, which 
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peacetime and transport workers came out in solidarity with the seamen, virtually
arresting the movement of cargo through the docks. The bitterness with which the 
strike was fought and the extent of the disruption it caused, lent plausibility to Elie 
Halevy’s portrayal of the conflict as “nothing short of a revolutionary outbreak”. 10 
Fierce battles between strikers and the police, arson, destruction of property, man-
hunts against foreign strikebreakers and episodes akin to popular insurrection 
occurred in Hull, Glasgow, Manchester and Cardiff. 11 The high level of violence, 
which tainted the irenic image of Britain as an orderly and law-abiding society, 
terrified the affluent and middle classes. 12 
At the beginning of August, while the uproar associated with the dockworkers’
and seamen’s strike appeared to be subsiding, transport workers in other parts of 
the country went on strike. About 80,000 workers brought the Port of London to 
a standstill. From the beginning of August onwards, labour disruptions spread to 
the railways leading to the first national strike in that sector. At the end of a huge 
demonstration in Liverpool, troops opened fire on rioters killing two, an episode 
which became known as Bloody Sunday. 13 A few days later, a crowd attacked a 
train driven by “blacklegs” in Llanelli; soldiers fired shots killing two men, and a 
violent explosion due to an arsonist setting fire to some trucks containing cylin-
ders of detonators resulted in more deaths.14 Meanwhile, anti-Jew riots erupted in 
some Welsh mining towns. 15 
The disturbances in the summer of 1911, and later, shook the confidence of 
British society.  The Times gloomily reported that: 
we are assisting at the absolute decomposition of society into its elements, in 
the absence of settled principles, of sane direction, and of discipline of any 
shape or form. . . . There is no King in Israel and every man is a law unto 
himself.16 
The contemporaneous Agadir crisis, the controversy over the powers of the Lords, 
the suffragettes’ campaign, the mounting battle over Home Rule and the subse-
quent arming of Ulster made industrial disorders appear more ominous than they 
were.17 
Predictably enough, fears of riots, strikes and bloodshed combined with per-
ceived deficiencies in law enforcement resulted in the rise of vigilante attitudes 
and behaviours. During the 1911 London Dock Strike, the manager of Raphael’s 
Refinery informed the Home Office that he had made 
complete preparations against any attack on this place, that our men are fully 
armed and we shall not sit still and watch our property being looted as did the 
owners of property at Newport, Tonypandy, Hull, Manchester, Cardiff and 
other towns.18 
London printing firms hired private guards, mostly former constables, to protect 
their premises.19 In Liverpool, in response to the transport strike in the summer of 
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“to assist the authorities in preserving the health, safety and well-being of the City 
in time of need”.20 By May 1913, about 2,500 volunteers had been trained to carry 
out electrical and steam engineering work, stoking, motor driving and medical 
services in case of an industrial emergency. 21 Although the Civic Service League 
vowed to protect the general public from the effects of prolonged labour stop-
pages as its principal goal, it was essentially a “white collar” anti-labour organisa-
tion. In the meantime, “Provision Protection Committees” were formed in many 
parts of the country in anticipation of disorderly outbreaks and hooliganism aris-
ing from new strikes. “In every community”, controversial newspaper editor W. T.
Stead wrote, 
there may have to be organized a volunteer force of men willing and ready to 
take the places of strikers whose abstention from work threatens the whole 
community with the loss of the indispensable services of public utility rep-
resented by those who supply food, drink, light, sanitation, and the transmis-
sion of raw materials.22 
At the end of August 1911,  The Times proposed the formation of “standing 
volunteer force corps” in each locality to carry on operating necessary public 
services in case of severe disturbances as a result of industrial disputes. Modelled 
on the Frivilliga Skyddskåren, a public security brigade which had helped break 
the Swedish General Strike of 1909, this national strikebreaking organisation was 
to assist in food supply and distribution, transport and shipping at times of seri-
ous unrest.23 In the same period, the president of the Automobile Association and 
future ultra-conservative Home Office Secretary, William Joynson-Hicks, pro-
posed the creation of a National Transport Service of “private motors” to mitigate 
the impact of transport strikes.24 Similarly, Lord Montagu of Beaulieu suggested 
that motorists could be properly organised and deployed to limit the consequences 
of a general railway strike.25 Such schemes for recruiting and mobilising volun-
teer labour were evidently attractive to the patriotic middle classes. Dismayed by 
the gravity of industrial unrest and its potential revolutionary escalation, many of 
them had already served as special constables during the summer strike crisis. 
In Liverpool, during the August riots, justices swore in 4,142 citizens, of which 
“over 1,200 did actual street duty in the disturbed areas”.26 In London, many hun-
dreds of volunteers proved “ready to take a baton” for the preservation of public 
peace and the protection of property. 27 The petit-bourgeois composition of the 
special constabulary helped exacerbate tensions.28 “In 1911 we had Bluebottles 
on top of the meat vans”, Labour MP John Johns recalled, “they were special con-
stables, and very special constables. They were not used to break the strike, but to 
break people’s heads”. 29 
The government attempted to forestall such securitarian pressures by institu-
tionalising them.30 In mid-September 1911, the chairman of the Sheffield Watch 
Committee, Alfred Cattell, announced before the City Council that the Home 
Secretary, Winston Churchill, was working hard to arrange the formation of a 
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with emergencies similar to those that had arisen during the transport strikes and 
to preclude the use of the military to repress civil disorders. The chairman praised 
the Home Office’s scheme, pointing out that “the ordinary police forces were 
totally inadequate for the recent troubles”, and to have a volunteer force ready 
for times of great stress could be a necessary arrangement to contain industrial 
unrest.31 
While labour representatives expressed their legitimate concern over the
strikebreaking nature of a civilian police force dedicated to the defence of prop-
erty, the Home Office issued the seminal Circular 214312, a document that 
pressed police authorities to persist in the enrolment of special constables and to 
keep a classified register of trusted persons who could be mobilised to deal with 
future emergencies. The Home Secretary also suggested the creation of a two-tier 
police reserve: the First Police Reserve was to consist of men accustomed to mil-
itary discipline and trained in the police or in the army, while the Second Police
Reserve was to be made up of regular special constables. The proposed scheme for 
a new reserve police force, which came under severe criticism from municipal 
authorities as it would entail further cost to the taxpayer, was only systematised 
at the onset of the war and remained fundamentally unmodified until the end of 
World War II. 32 
In London, a movement in support of a volunteer police force had earlier gained 
traction after the Chief Commissioner of Police, Edward Henry, recommended 
setting up a permanent register of citizens who would be available for Special 
Constable service in every borough.33 In relation to this proposal, the future 
founder of the VPF, W. M. Power, who had offered to raise a company of spe-
cial constable cyclists during the London Dock Strike, began making preparatory 
arrangements for the formation of a civilian police.34 Power, who had joined the 
Queen’s Westminster Volunteers as far back as 1874 and was the first attested 
member of the 16th (County of London) Battalion, The London Regiment, envis-
aged a national organisation of “volunteer police clubs” whose main purpose was 
to assist the regular police during emergencies arising from industrial disputes 
and to make local authorities independent of military aid in maintaining order 
and protecting life and property. These corps, organised in a decentralised struc-
ture, much on the lines of volunteer clubs and, at least initially, funded by private 
contributions, were to be subordinate to the Chief Commissioner and to Chief 
Constables. Volunteers had to take the special constable’s oath and were provided 
with a badge or a warrant. Former Army and Navy servicemen, Territorials, pro-
fessionals and youths in the quest for an “adrenaline rush” were expected to con-
stitute the primary recruiting pool for the new organisation. Labour training and 
periods of drilling, including boxing, wrestling, gymnastics and athletics, were to 
be arranged for the members.35 
The proposal to form a civilian force, with no formal connection to the Special 
Constable scheme, attracted the suspicion of the Home Office. On 16 September, 
Churchill received a letter from Power, accompanied by a memorandum, in which 
the mission and objectives of the proposed Volunteer Police Force were out-
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to the desire of citizens not only to support the police in maintaining law and 
order during outbreaks of “industrial warfare”, but also to prevent a repetition of 
such occurrences. Power hoped to secure the cooperation, or at least the acquies-
cence, of the Home Office in establishing such a force. The Home Office declined 
to express any support whatsoever for a private body that unreservedly miscon-
ceived the Home Secretary’s recommendations apropos the organisation of police 
reserves under the control of public authorities. Furthermore, Churchill, who was 
preparing to switch offices with Reginald McKenna and move to the Admiralty, 
refused to meet Power and distanced himself from any possible association of his 
name with the movement.37 
Despite the government’s hostility, the VPF was set up. The Duke of Abercorn 
accepted to become its president, while a loose assemblage of right-wing conser-
vatives, businessmen, financiers, clerics and other contemptuous opponents of the 
Liberal government, expressed public support for the new civilian body. 38 Power 
wrote on the eve of the inauguration of the VPF: 
The government must do something. . . . The first instinct of man is “self-
defence”. On to this civilization has grafted the great motto of “Peace”, while 
experience has shown us that the only method . . . that works smoothly is “be 
prepared”.39 
“England expects every man to do his duty”: the Volunteer
Police Force 40 
The Volunteer Police Force was established in London on Trafalgar Day, 1911. 
For the inaugural meeting, which was held in the central transept of the Crys-
tal Palace, the Victorian opera diva Emma Albani had consented to sing “Home 
Sweet Home” and “God Save the King”. Other noted artists of the time, including 
Violet Oppenshaw, Walter Hedgcock, Dalton Baker and Herbert Godfrey, were 
also engaged for the musical entertainment of the public. Throughout the previous 
days, the major railway companies had been advertising the event and “running 
excursions” in London.41 
In the midst of a noisy crowd, for the most part drawn to the Palace by the 
prospect of hearing Albani sing, Viscount Templeton opened the meeting by stat-
ing that there was no political bias in the movement and that the new civilian 
police was not intended to replace, but rather to supplement the regular police 
during national emergencies. 42 After this preamble, the body’s organising chair-
man, Arnold Statham, a well-known barrister, delivered an aggressive speech in 
which trade union solidarity action was labelled as “a mere cloak for class warfare 
to extort surrender to unjustifiable demands”, and the peaceful picket “a kind of 
State-protected highway robber with violence”. He argued that Labour leaders 
and their threat to call a national strike of railway and transport workers were 
“holding England by the throat”. In consequence, he stressed the right of citizens 
to come together in self-defence and “to take a firm stand against anarchy”. “What 
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Bismarck with a will of iron”.43 After this extravagant praise of authoritarian rule, 
Statham moved the first resolution: 
that this Mass Meeting of citizens from all parts of the United Kingdom, 
impressed with the urgent necessity of quelling lawlessness and disorder 
from time to time in case of need, resolves to form, without casting any addi-
tional burden upon the taxpayer, a Volunteer Police Force of private citizens 
to cooperate with the Regular Forces in the protection of life, property and 
liberty, where the same are assailed, and for the maintenance of general trans-
port, whensoever the public carriers of the people’s food are threatened with 
violent interference.44 
After unanimous approval of the first resolution by an impromptu Grand Coun-
cil,45 F. C. Morgan, president of the Central Association of Accountant, moved 
the second resolution. This set out in detail the constitution and organisational 
principles of the force. In 14 points, it declared that the VPF was a force of private 
citizens, which, in cooperation with the regular forces of the United Kingdom, 
was committed to the protection of “life and property” and to the maintenance of 
essential services of public utility during disputes. The force was to submit to the 
orders of the heads of the Police Departments, although it was stated that 
it shall be free to act . . . where attempts are threatened to wreck trains or sig-
nal boxes, set fire to warehouses, loot shops, or do other malicious injury to 
public methods of locomotion, transport, or private property without await-
ing the initiative of absentee officials. 
The national character of the Volunteer Police Force was to be firmly established 
and its units made available during “any sudden crisis . . . like a force of light 
infantry for rapid transit to areas where rioting, arson, or scenes of violence are 
being enacted”. The organisation, whose recruitment processes included physical 
fitness screening, was to be maintained by private contributions with no demands 
made upon the state.46 
Once the forms of the organisation were fixed, it was announced to the public 
that branches of the VPF were to be formed in Wales, Scotland and Ireland. 47 
The force, one of its secretaries, Wilfrid E. Myers, declared to a correspondent 
of the London Daily News, was not a strikebreaking organisation, but “when as 
happened in Swansea, rioters start setting fire to houses and damaging property, 
then we think it is time for the ordinary citizen to step in”. “Our scheme”, Myers 
bizarrely added, “is really a form of Socialism – citizens themselves looking after 
the common welfare”.48 
As early as 13 November, the press reported that the London Brighton and South 
Coast, the London and New Western, the Great Eastern, the London and South-
Western, and the Central London railway companies had engaged the services 
of the VPF in anticipation of a renewal of labour disturbances on the railways. 49 
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engineering work, were to be mobilised to protect labour replacements and rail-
way materials. Each man dispatched to the strike areas was expected to wear a 
uniform and to be equipped with a blackjack (or life preserver).50 To meet all con-
tingencies, the administrators of the VPF proposed that manufacturers of commer-
cial vehicles provide assistance in transporting supplies from the railway termini 
to distribution centres. Car makers Dodson Motors Ltd responded to the appeal 
by placing a car at the disposal of the movement.51 “This organization”, the Home 
Office laconically commented on the VPF’s strikebreaking plans, “is likely to 
give trouble”.52 
At the end of November, the VPF had received over 30,000 applications at its 
headquarter on Victoria Street. 53 Membership was “largely composed of wealthy 
young men, who might, intentionally or unintentionally, fail to distinguish 
between hooliganism and legitimate forms of working-class protest”, historian 
Veronica Cicely Wedgwood wrote many years later. 54 While the peer’s sons vol-
unteered, as they did against the Boers, “to stamp on the restless workers”, the 
Duke of Abercorn repeatedly appealed for funds to help meet the organisation’s 
growing expenses.55 “In order for the force to be effective in rendering substantial 
assistance to the public services”, he wrote, “a highly efficient organization of the 
force must be built”, and this evidently required money. 56 
If the conservative press lauded the VPF for its avowal to protect general 
transportation, working-class organisations had grown increasingly alarmed by 
the decision of local commercial and industrial personalities to set up volunteer 
police corps. In Yorkshire, it was reported that members of the VPF had held 
meetings with local businessmen and plans for the formation of a civilian police 
force had been positively received.57 In Derby, the presidents of the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Chamber of Trade informed the VPF’s organising secretary, 
W. M. Myers, of their decision to form a similar private organisation on the banks 
of the river Derwent.58 
“Efforts are being made in many directions”, the pseudonymous  Labourite
complained in the Derbyshire Courier, “to undermine the power of the workers, 
intimidatory forces are being organized under one disguise or another”. 59 Leftist 
papers bluntly defined the VPF as a strikebreaking group organised along the 
lines of the Pinkertons in America. The  Justice wrote significantly: 
There are two movements now going on by which the master class are now 
endeavouring to ensure themselves against any dislocation of business in the 
event of a strike. . . . One is the Home Office movement for the enrolment of 
special constables . . . and the other is the organization of a “volunteer police 
force” by the capitalist themselves.60 
Under the pen name “Trade Unionist”, a commentator for the Bournemouth-
based Christchurch Times wrote: 
A number of busybodies, almost entirely prominent Tories, are going about 
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private venture. . . . This new body is to have a uniform, and it is quite certain 
that it will be composed of men who are strongly anti-trade unionist. Thus, 
if such a force were to become numerous, there is all the material for class 
antagonism of the worst kind. It is to be hoped that Mr. McKenna will keep 
his eye on these amateur policemen, who are likely to cause more trouble to 
the regular police than to assist them to maintain order. These Tory strike-
breakers may easily become a greater danger than any strikers.61 
The propagation of the VPF across the country kindled talk of self-defence among 
workers. The Bradford branch of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants 
passed a resolution stating that the formation of such a force, “organized and con-
trolled by the capitalist classes outside and above the law of the land and openly 
supported by railway companies”, was a serious menace to the liberties of work-
ing men. They therefore agreed to form a “physical protection league”, whose 
objective would be to train and equip selected trade unionists “to meet on equal 
terms the bullies of organized capital”. 62 
Meanwhile, at the House of Commons, Labour MPs raised questions about the 
legality of a private uniformed volunteer force, “purposely armed with bludgeons 
to break people’s heads” and to be used as a strikebreaking force in the event of 
industrial disputes. Home Secretary Reginald McKenna replied that the Volun-
teer Police Force was a private and self-governing organisation which had not 
received any government approval. He cautioned that the formation of an inde-
pendent organisation, whose purpose usurped the functions of the police, aroused 
reasonable “suspicion”, and therefore was inimical to the safety of the state. Fur-
thermore, the use of uniforms and badges that resembled those of ordinary police 
forces was illegal and per se objectionable. McKenna concluded by deploring 
what he termed a “perilous venture”.63 The Irish News observed: 
The Home Secretary’s hint is to be hoped of hav[ing] the effect of calming 
the martial ardour of the zealous patriots who are anxious to be invested
with the nimble truncheon and teach the mere hack policeman how much
better they could bring about peace by cracking skulls.64 
In answer to the observations made in the House of Commons, Statham – in his 
capacity as chairman of the Grand Council – denied that the intention of the force 
was to imitate the functions of the regular police, but rather it was intended to 
render “practical assistance to the public in times of necessity”: 
The services to the public, such as the assistance of electric light, power and 
other public undertakings by mechanical engineers, electrical engineers, and 
other trained members of the force were functions entirely different from
the ordinary police, and it was considered absolutely necessary in the inter-
ests of the public services that an organization should exist for their succour 
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The hostile stance of the Home Office prompted the VPF to publish a booklet in 
order to publicly clarify the “aims and objects” of the organisation. It stated that 
the underlying principle of the force was that all law-abiding and loyal citizens 
owed a duty to assist the state – the guardian of the “common good” – in pro-
tecting the rights and liberties of citizens threatened with tumult, intimidation 
and violence. Among members’ duties were the preservation of peace, either in 
cooperation or in partnership with the regular police, the protection of non-union 
workers and public vigilance.66 
In spite of all the controversies, organisation of the VPF continued to push 
forward. A Southend and County branch of the force was inaugurated and “a 
company of 120 men was enrolled among scenes of great enthusiasm”.67 Invest-
ment broker and estate agent, Aitken Tweedale, began making preparations for 
the formation of the VPF in Bristol. Large employers and prominent citizens 
were invited to help the new force by funding equipment and materials. In return 
they might have had a company named after them.68 In mid-December, an “at 
home” was given by Mrs. Holcombe Ingleby to raise funds for the force and was 
attended by influential figures, including Major General Sterling, Admiral de 
Courcy Hamilton, Lieutenant Colonel Driscoll and the pioneer of aircraft design, 
Lieutenant Edward Busk. At the event, Statham stated that a “great number of 
men”, some trained in electrical and mechanical engineering, retired civil ser-
vants, men of the Royal Artillery and the Field Artillery and others who served 
on the railways during the time of the Boer war had been recruited. Major-
General Sterling also addressed the gathering, deprecating the use of the military 
during the strikes and lauding the movement as a great patriotic one. “A body of 
guardsmen”, he said, “in their shirtsleeves with big sticks might be useful in a 
street riot”.69 
Two days later, at a meeting of the Grand Council, a proposal was made by Lord 
Lonsdale, and approved unanimously, to rename the Volunteer Police Force the 
Civilian Force. It was understood that the change was aimed at preventing any 
possibility of confusion between the Volunteer Police Reserve, which was being 
established by the Home Office with police functions, and the Volunteer Police 
Force whose purpose was “the maintenance of public services and other purely 
civic duties”.70 This resolution did not dispel the suspicion that the force was noth-
ing more than a strikebreaking outfit and the concurrent news that its members 
were being hired en bloc by companies added to this presentiment.71 Speaking 
before the executives of the National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union, syndicalist 
Madame Sorgue, the “most dangerous woman in Europe”, commenting on the 
labour unrest of summer 1911 and the new challenges facing the British labour 
movement, stated: 
I see there is a volunteer police force being organized [in England]. That is 
the most serious blunder. I knew those volunteer police. I have seen them at 
work at Parma. There they pursued deliberately a policy of exasperation. It 
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At the end of the year, the Civilian Force released a new, detailed booklet. The 
objectives and aims of the force were restated, and the right and duty of citizens to 
protect their liberty and the inviolability of property, without statutory approval, 
was repeated. In pursuing these objectives, volunteers would assist “Railways, 
Ships, Docks, Tramways, Electric Power, Light Sanitary, or other Public Ser-
vices” and would ensure the movement of essential supplies. The force was also 
directed to recruit Special Constables and to supplement them and the fire and 
ambulance services and provide safeguards for the protection of animals from 
acts of cruelty. Finally, the Civilian Force was “to provide a system of physical 
and moral training for young men, to render them proficient in some branch of 
public spirit and patriotism, and equip them for the full discharge of the responsi-
bilities of citizenship”.73 
The organisational structure of the Civilian Force was streamlined and func-
tionally differentiated. Beneath the Grand Council, members were divided into 
“special service members”, who would act as flying columns throughout the 
Kingdom; “trade service members”, who were assigned to prescribed industries 
“for the protection of their business or employment, or with the consent of their 
employers for the protection of other concerns of a similar kind”; and, finally, 
“service members”, who operated in a specific district and were organised into 
companies of 120 men commanded by a captain, who was in turn appointed by 
the district headquarters. In addition to the regular companies, mounted cyclists 
and motor cyclists were in the process of being organised. The Civilian Force’s 
equipment consisted of a helmet, armlet, whistle, collar numbers and unspeci-
fied “weapons of defence”. The men received training in boxing, walking-stick 
defence and a method of attack known as the Vigny system, which had been 
devised to combat “Les Apaches” of Paris. The uniform was grey with fawn fac-
ings and a distinctive aluminium badge. The members of the Civilian Force did 
not receive any monetary reward for their services. However, when engaged in 
duty, members were covered by a special insurance that paid out a sum of £200 in 
the event of death or permanent disability. For temporary or partial disability, up 
to £2 per week was paid.74 
District staffs, which consisted of a chief of staff, a medical officer, an enrol-
ment officer, a principal mobilisation officer, a director of supplies and transport, 
a signalling instructor and a veterinary officer, had the authority to conduct all 
of the Civilian Force’s affairs, including fundraising, recruitment, and training, 
equipping and mobilising the service’s operating forces. To ensure compliance 
with the applicable laws, members of the Civilian Force were sworn in as special 
constables “before going on duty in any public place”. They were exonerated 
from taking the special constable’s oath when they acted on “behalf of the Pro-
prietor as his friends or servants for the purpose of protecting his property from 
forcible trespass”.75 
The Civilian Force’s undertaking “to assist the community at large” under the 
cover of the law did not soften the Home Office’s opposition. The Permanent 
Under-Secretary, Sir Edward Troup, considered it intolerable for any “govern-
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of strikers, to have anything to do it”.76 In spite of Abercorn’s reassurances to the 
Home Office that there was no intention of the Civilian Force “being a privately 
controlled or directed organization”, 77 at the beginning of the year its associates 
continued looking for financial backers and businesses willing to either hire them 
or set up their own companies. In London, a delegation of the force approached 
the representatives of the Shipping Federation to offer them their protection ser-
vices. The shipowners, who staunchly opposed trade unionism, agreed to make a 
donation of £500 to Abercorn’s force, which would be increased to £1,000 if the 
organisation developed along promised lines. 78 Harrods Limited pledged to form 
a full company from among their employees and to open a recruiting depot at their 
stores in London.79 In Oxford, a Strike Emergency Committee was formed with 
the intention of joining the Civilian Force. “It is hoped”, The Times wrote, “the 
example of the undergraduates there will lead to similar action in other University 
towns and elsewhere”.80 
In the meantime, at the Civilian Force’s headquarters, retired cavalrymen, 
colonials and members the Legion of Frontiersmen were enrolled “as a flying 
squadron”, while retired army offices were assigned to the coordination of ser-
vice members. Arrangements were made to train volunteers in operating electrical 
power stations and railways.81 A correspondent from the  London Evening News
described one of the first public appearances of the force thus: 
If you were in Victoria-street . . . on Monday evening, you must have noticed 
a number of men, dressed in an odd mixture of police and military-looking 
uniform, patrolling the pavement or standing on guard. They were London’s 
new policemen. In their grey military helmets, long, dark coloured police 
overcoats, shiny black waterproof capes, blue and white armlets and ordinary 
workday trousers, forty men and officers of this new civilian force were out 
on duty for the first time.82 
While new companies of the Civilian Force were formed around the country, 83 the 
press reported that Abercorn’s “amateur police” had been engaged to guard the 
Victoria Street branch of the London and South Western Bank to prevent suffrag-
ettes carrying out window-smashing protest.84 Also at this time the new secretary, 
Pirie Gordon, unsuccessfully approached Sir Robert Baden Powell to propose 
enlisting 18-year-old boy scouts in the Civilian Force. 85 
At the beginning of March, perhaps after consultation with Sir Theodore Mori-
son, a member of the Council of India, the Duke of Abercorn announced that 
in view of the serious possibilities which may be in store for the country, the 
Civilian Force has decided to try to enlist the assistance of those officers of 
the Indian Army, Indian Police, and other Indian services who are home on 
furlough in the Civilian Force.86 
In response to Abercorn’s proposal to raise a company for special service to
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India, Edwin Samuel Montagu, sought legal advice from the Home Office as he
entertained “grave doubts” over the legality of the matter. 87 The Home Office
replied that while the government could not support the policies and methods
of the Civilian Force, it recognised that it could not interfere with the citizen’s
right to offer his services to police authorities. These officers in the service of
the government of India could, therefore, have been employed on public duty,
but only after being sworn in as Special Constables.88 After fresh questions
on the activities of the Civilian Force were raised in the House of Commons,
Abercorn cautiously ordered that the “Indian Services Company” should not
be involved in the maintenance of any branch of public services during labour
disputes.89 
With the miners’ strike spreading nationwide, the Civilian Force was alerted for 
possible mobilisation. If deployed, the force was expected to guard the pitheads 
and pumping installations and to feed the pit ponies. The strike was described in 
a pamphlet circulated by the Civilian Force as “the first stage of the revolutionary 
scheme” and a step towards the “syndicalist ideal” which would bring employers 
to their knees, coerce the government and by “one grand coup d’état” collectivise 
property. To deal with such a revolutionary threat, “patriotic citizens” should be 
mobilised for the protection of society: 
The hour appears to be approaching when the long intended blow will be 
struck by organized Labour against an unorganized community, and it is of 
urgent importance that every patriotic citizen should hasten the assistance of 
the only body [the Civilian Force] that has been organized to assist the forces 
of the Crown to cope with such an INSURRECTION IN THE LABOUR 
WORLD.90 
Although the Civilian Force’s strikebreaking services were not requested by 
the coal mine owners, and would in any case have been of little or no value to 
them considering the scale of the dispute, the fear of a revolutionary strike was 
drawing an unnegotiable line between good and bad citizenship in the minds of 
Abercorn and his associates. The “socialist trade unionist” could not have been a 
good citizen nor could he have been acknowledged as a member of the national 
community. 
At the beginning of the London Dock Strike of 1912, the Shipping Federation, 
which had complained of the Home Office’s decision to refuse police protection 
for imported labour, hired the services of the Civilian Force. On 28 May,  The 
Times reported that 
an urgency call was received for a detachment of the Civilian Force to escort 
labourers to the docks where already many members of the force had been 
engaged in discharging cargoes of food. By midnight, an officered and fully-
equipped company supplied with rations were at work. By 4.30 yesterday 
morning the whole body were stationed at places indicated by the Shipping 
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At Greenhithe, where the Shipping Federation’s notorious frigate, Lady Jocelyn, 
was lying along the pier with 600 blacklegs housed on board ready to be dis-
patched by several tugs to the various London docks, members of the Civilian 
police clashed with pickets. The confrontations resulted in many injuries on both 
sides. The shipowners recognised that the presence of the Civilian Police “largely 
contributed towards a feeling of security on the part of the imported men”.92 
According to an unnamed trade unionist, Abercorn’s volunteers were “unprepos-
sessing and mostly unshaven men, in grey helmets, long coats with belts, corduroy 
trousers and dirty boots. They were all armed with heavy sticks and revolvers”. 93 
In several instances, there was actual or threatened use of these firearms, conceiv-
ably supplied by the shipping companies, against the strikers. At the beginning 
of June, the Civilian Force released a statement declaring that it had assisted the 
Shipping Federation in the 
transportation of food supplies for London, protected free labourers from 
molestation, escorted large bodies of willing workers to the docks and 
guarded vessels from damage by strikers, and some detachments have, in 
addition to protection duty, worked hard in discharging cargoes of food. 94 
The practice of substituting a private for the public police authority spawned 
a lively debate in parliament and in the press.95 For MP Wedgwood, the Civilian 
Force appeared to be not only an unnecessary reflection upon the regular police, 
but also an imitation of those private police organisations in America “which were 
largely responsible for the bloodshed which marks labour trouble in that coun-
try”.96 The Daily Herald criticised the Civilian Force as “the new slave guards”,97 
while The Syndicalist and Amalgamation News would later speak of a “Capital-
ists’ Private Army of Armed Strike Breakers”. 98 Trade union leader Ben Tillett 
vigorously protested the use of the Civilian Police and told Lord Haldane that “if 
he permitted the capitalists to arm their blacklegs with revolvers and truncheons, 
they would arm their men with similar weapons”.99 
During the summer, amidst ongoing polemics on the purposes and functions of 
Abercorn’s organisation, the Home Office pressed those stipendiary magistrates 
who had been associated with the Grand Council of the Civilian Force to sever 
their connections with that organisation. 100 At the end of the year, vice-president 
and chief of staff, William M. Power, had his membership revoked by unani-
mous resolution of the Grand Council following accusations by other executive 
members of administrative and financial malfeasance.101 A short time later, Power 
would establish a new organisation, the Volunteer Civil Force (VCF), on much the 
same lines as the Civilian Force. After the sudden death of the Duke of Abercorn 
on 3 January 1913, proceedings were brought against Power in the Chancery Divi-
sion to restrain him from presenting the VCF as the direct successor or replace-
ment of the Civilian Force or from persuading the public that the Civilian Force 
had ceased to exist. A series of legal squabbles virtually paralysed the new organ-
isation up to the summer of 1914, when Power began publication of the monthly 
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Although, as the Board of Trade reported in its annual report on Strikes and 
Lock-outs, the year 1913 “was remarkable for the number of disputes which 
occurred during its course, far exceeding the number recorded in any previous 
year”,103 the activities of the Civilian Force appear to have been sporadic. A scar-
city of funds and, perhaps, a decline in membership because of internal disagree-
ments were very likely the causes of this lack of activity. However, at the end of 
the free speech demonstration in Trafalgar Square on 29 June, which was attended 
by trade unionists, suffrage societies and the Free Speech Defence League, mem-
bers of the Civilian Force violently clashed with “dockers and socialists” who 
were marching to Downing Street.104 In defending Britain from “subversion”, 
the extreme anti-socialist ideology of the Civilian Force easily amalgamated with 
anti-feminism and anti-suffragism. 105 
At the end of October, James A. E. Hamilton, 3rd Duke of Abercorn, who had 
succeeded his father as president of the Civilian Force and commanded the Tyrone 
Regiment of the newly formed Ulster Volunteer Force, appealed for money. “It is 
abundantly evident”, he argued, “that our organisation may be badly needed in the 
near future, and committee is anxious to raise an assured income to enable them 
to maintain the Force on substantial scale, and ready to meet any emergency”. 106 
About a week later, a detachment of the Civilian Force was dispatched to Dublin 
for “protection duty” in the midst of the lockout and was quartered on the Ship-
ping Federation’s depot ships. By mid-November, hundreds of strikebreakers were 
regularly working in the guarded docks under the protective eye of volunteers.107 
On the outbreak of war, the Civilian Force, like the other patriotic organisations 
that had sprung up with perplexing rapidity in the turbulent summer of 1911 to 
safeguard Britain from the evils that the self-appointed saviours of society dreaded, 
began to volunteer for the various forms of war service. This led to the establish-
ment of a hospital for the wounded, assistance with recruitment and fundraising for 
Belgian refugees. The Civilian Force was not reconstituted at the end of the war. 108
 Conclusions 
In the post-war years, the Volunteer Police Force (then the Civilian Police) had 
only survived in the tenacious memory of some Labour MPs, to then fall into 
oblivion. In his memoirs, much influenced by the years of fascism and war, Josiah 
Wedgwood went so far as to define the VPF as an “abortive forerunner of the 
Nazis”.109 Aside from hyperbolic comparisons, the meteoric rise of Abercorn’s 
amateur police reveals the apprehension and disquiet afflicting British elites and 
upper middle classes in the face of extended political, social and industrial citizen-
ship. At the same time, the formation of a private body organised on quasi-military 
lines for the maintenance of civil order and for the preservation of individual 
liberty, freedom of contract and “national efficiency” suggests a certain deterio-
ration of trust on the part of vested interests and conservative elements in the 
ability of state authorities to suppress deviance. In addition, the wearing of uni-
forms, the organisation and training of members and the carrying of offensive 
weapons drew attention to the distorting effects of the militarisation of society 
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and the risk of legitimising violence perpetrated by civil actors, where this was 
deemed to be in the national interest. In this context, the principles and practices 
of the VPF embodied an exclusionary concept of citizenship, which tended to 
relegate demands for collective bargaining and industrial democracy to the status 
of “social treason”. The government’s firm opposition to the VPF inhibited its 
development and prevented potential imitative spirals, and at the same time might 
have cautioned certain sectors of British capital against unlawful, if not seditious, 
conduct against trade unionism and calmed their push towards the privatisation 
of security. The mobilisation for total war absorbed those “patriotic excesses”, 
traces of which were to resurface as fears of revolt spread following the Russian 
Revolutions of 1917 and in the turbulent post-war years.110
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 14 From “state protection” 
to “private defence” 
Strikebreaking, civilian armed 
mobilisation and the rise 
of Italian fascism *
 Matteo Millan 
On 14 July 1919, the Italian Parliament was discussing a vote of confidence in 
Francesco Saverio Nitti’s cabinet. Often accused of being an opportunistic politi-
cian and a cold-hearted economist, unable to grasp the passions and the new situ-
ation created by the end of the war, Nitti’s legacy has often been surrounded by a 
general antipathy. 1 However, at the time, the government that Nitti was going to 
lead was seen with great hope. It was born with the ambitious purpose of moving 
the country away from the legacies of the First World War towards a new future 
of prosperity. 2 Nitti’s internal policy reflected his economics-oriented background 
and was well exemplified in the motto “consume less, produce more”, that he 
repeated again and again during his parliamentary speeches. Usually tolerant and 
neutral in economic disputes, Nitti’s government was nonetheless harsh and repres-
sive against any real or perceived political demonstrations, often interpreted as 
the prelude to social revolution and a waste of energies and productive resources. 3 
While parliament was discussing the vote of confidence, Nitti, in his capacity 
as minister of the interior, issued a circular letter to all the prefects of the King-
dom of Italy. The circular was part of a broad set of measures that the government 
was taking in response to the impending “super strike” (scioperissimo) called by 
left-wing organisations, parties and unions in solidarity with the Bolsheviks and 
against the intervention of western powers in Russia.4 Nitti invited the prefects 
to “keep in touch” with reliable members of liberal “groups [fasci] and veterans’
associations” in order to obtain their “collaboration at times when public authori-
ties cannot remain isolated and only rely on public officials and the public force”. 
Nitti also invited the prefects to prevent any autonomous initiative: 
if such groups want to cooperate to enforce law and order and to repress 
violence and attempts at revolution, they will act patriotically by voluntarily 
observing the orders of the authorities and by accepting their leadership in 
accordance with the regulations, which cannot be but unique.5 
Interestingly, Mussolini’s newly established  Fasci di combattimento were among 
those patriotic organisations that the authorities considered potentially useful for 
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Nitti’s instructions came at a time of panic over the potential revolutionary 
consequences of the general strike. In March, the leadership of the Italian Social-
ist Party asserted that the general strike was the main instrument for establishing a 
socialist republic.7 Despite these proclamations, however, the strike was a general 
fiasco for reasons both international and domestic in nature. Not only did other 
international organisations, and in particular the French General Confederation of 
Labour, refuse to join the international mobilisation, but, more importantly, lead-
ing Italian unions, such as the railway workers’ unions, kept working. 
Many historians have considered Nitti’s 14 July dispatch as part of a political 
strategy to obtain the approval of ultra-nationalist movements and associations 
both within and outside parliament.8 Others saw in it tangible proof that the politi-
cal authorities of the liberal state had given up the Weberian state monopoly of 
physical violence.9 According to Emilio Gentile, such “patriotic” groups reflected 
a process of “secondary mobilisation” in reaction to the primary mobilisation of 
left-wing parties and unions. Although they could not be put down to any actual 
attempt at revolution, nonetheless mass mobilisation during strikes and other dem-
onstrations, requests for wage increases and better working conditions, the con-
tractual power of left-wing organisations and their significant success at general 
and local elections “were perceived as a real danger by the bourgeoisie and the 
middle-classes, prompting them to mobilise”.10 
There is no doubt that these forms of secondary mobilisation were fertile 
ground for the development of fascism, in terms of both political cultures and 
membership. At the same time, the huge impact and massive scale of later fascist 
violence helped cast a shadow on the concrete organisational and violent practices 
of these former associations, and their cultural and political background has been 
generally described in the light of a vague anti-socialism.11 
This chapter argues that strikebreaking – in terms of both work replacement and 
auxiliary police functions – was a veritable obsession for significant sectors of the 
middle classes and was at the heart of their armed political mobilisation. Within 
a broader framework the focus is on the two paradigmatic cases of Bologna and 
Milan in the immediate post-war years (1919–20).12 The first two sections show 
how the founding of strikebreaking groups reflected the crucial role played by 
work replacement and anti-strike activities in shaping outlooks and mentalities 
in broad sectors of Italian society. In this regard, the concluding section claims 
that post-war forms of bourgeois mobilisation can be fully appreciated only by 
situating them within a longer tradition of armed civilian cooperation between the 
state authorities and discrete social sectors, especially in the case of major strikes 
involving public services. This long-term interpretative perspective offers new 
insights into the origins of the crisis in the Italian liberal state and ultimately can 
help explain the consensus enjoyed by the armed fascist reaction.13 
Looking for the support of honest citizens 
The circular letter of 14 July was a response to the genuine panic that had spread 
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dramatic series of popular protests against the high cost of living, the so-called 
moti per il caroviveri. In such a state of affairs, Nitti’s entire policing policy was 
ambitious but also extremely difficult to implement. In his directives, he always 
stressed the need to rigorously repress social disorder, but at the same time to also 
“avoid making people think that we want reaction”. “I approve whatever has to 
be done against reckless strikes”, he told the prefects, “as long as this does not 
give the impression that we are carrying out a reactionary policy”. His policy 
may be summarised not so much as “anti-popular and anti-socialist” but rather as 
“anti-revolutionary”14 and resulted in the issuing of uncertain and contradictory 
directives which did nothing but upset everyone. It was with these directives in 
mind that police authorities dealt with a number of incidents, upheavals, small 
revolts, riots and lootings. The response usually fell under the banner of bloody 
repression. In the first two weeks of July 1919 alone – that is, in the period imme-
diately before the circular was sent – about 30 people were killed by police forces; 
many were wounded and hundreds arrested.15 This was largely the result of the 
panic and fear which invested police forces, who were largely undertrained and 
deficient in number. 16 
Nitti’s 14 July circular aimed to be a response to the serious lack of available 
forces by resorting to the complementary assistance and support of trustworthy 
social sectors of civil society. This was conceived as an emergency response prior 
to full implementation of a civilian police force, the Royal Guard of Public Secu-
rity, that Nitti and the chief of police, Vincenzo Quaranta, worked to establish and 
that became fully operational in January 1920.17 
Although determined to obtain the support of reliable citizens, Nitti was also 
fully aware of the risk that he was taking and was worried – with good reason – 
that things might get irretrievably out of control. In an “urgent telegram” sent just 
five days after the original circular letter, he insisted that “cooperation must be 
regulated and follow obediently the orders of local political authorities”; autono-
mous initiatives would be “illegal and reckless” as these “would do nothing but 
fuel dangerous reactions”. The prefect, he concluded, “is the only one who has 
the duty and responsibility to defend public order in the exclusive interests of the 
country”.18 The effectiveness of such measures is, of course, debatable. Nitti’s 
insistence on local police and political authorities having exclusive control and 
leadership over forms of civilian collaboration indicates a full awareness of the 
state’s prerogatives. However, he was also convinced that state forces alone would
be insufficient to deal with the massive disorders and demonstrations that the 
country would probably experience. That being so, the support of patriotic citizens 
and associations in law enforcement and strikebreaking operations was deemed 
necessary, though extremely dangerous, given the extreme counter-positions and 
panic over an impending revolution. Nevertheless, Nitti and other government 
officers decided to play that card, maybe in the hope that this would strengthen the 
loyal classes’ support for the government. At the same time, Nitti’s frequent letters 
and telegrams are telling of his worries over the actual capacity of the authorities 
to control delegation of the power to enforce law and order to private citizens that 
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Although the scioperissimo of July 1919 was a flash in the pan, Nitti and other 
government officials did not abandon the idea of seeking the support of good 
citizens. On 19 January 1920, the minister of justice and acting prime minister 
(Nitti was at that time in London), Ludovico Mortara, issued a circular letter to all 
the prefects in preparation for an upcoming massive railway and postal workers 
strike. Mortara invited prefects to act with the “most absolute rigour” in order to 
protect rail infrastructures and passengers. “Using weapons in cases like these”, 
he added, “is a form of self-defence on the part of the homeland [Patria ] and 
civilisation against any wild aggression”. Faced with the “too scarce presence 
of deployable military units”, Mortara requested prefects to establish “volunteer 
vigilance squads to effectively enforce public order”. “Such squads”, he stated, 
should be formed of “honest citizens” and “could be armed, if necessary”.20 
Mortara’s initiative was soon taken up by other ministers and state officials. 
Minister of Transport Roberto De Vito invited former railway workers to join 
the anti-strike squads comprising Navy sailors and engineers, though with little 
success.21 Government directives were immediately implemented in many Italian 
cities. On 20 January, the prefect of Milan, Angelo Pesce, invited industrialists, 
employers and local politicians to “foster citizens’ reactions against the strike 
and collaboration with government authorities to overcome deficiencies in public 
services, and establish squads of volunteers to support the public force”. When the 
strike broke out the following day, Pesce and the local chief of police ( questore) 
organised a corps of about 40 volunteers to take on public order functions. 22 Over 
50 volunteer engineers were recruited in southern Italy and dispatched to the north 
to replace the striking workers.23 There were also attempts to recruit retired engi-
neers as strikebreakers.24 Secondary school and university students were particu-
larly keen to offer their time and energies as strikebreakers. In Venice, students, 
boy scouts and women of the Red Cross worked on trains to secure passenger 
services.25 In Florence, 160 volunteers from the Alliance of City Defence took 
up service in post offices to substitute for strikers. 26 The young black-shirt Mario 
Piazzesi was proud – though a little bit fatigued – to act as a crumiro, a deroga-
tive Italian term to indicate a blackleg.27 He also mentioned, with a touch of envy, 
that volunteers armed with regular Army rifles had been sent to Bologna to act as 
strikebreakers.28 
In Bologna, Mortara’s directive was indeed followed to the letter. From 24 to 
29 January, “volunteer vigilance squads” were set up to perform “public order 
duties”, enjoying the full support of the local military command, the prefect and 
police authorities. The 123 volunteers, led by “9 officials”, were deployed to pro-
tect a train depot and coal yard, substituting for regular troops, which could then 
be deployed for patrol and public order services. The volunteers were all armed 
with carbines provided by the military authorities and wore civilian clothes with 
a “white and red armband”. Improvisation and lack of proper training led to a 
couple of accidental injuries resulting from the misuse of firearms. Despite such 
incidents, official reports all agreed that the volunteers were quite effective in pre-
venting thefts of coal and other materials.29 According to the prefect of Bologna, 
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Students from the “pre-military training battalion” also cooperated to substitute 
for striking postal workers.30 Military authorities committed to responding to the 
strike in a similar fashion. General Ugo Sani, the local military commander, issued 
a wall poster calling for volunteer motorists to transport food and other supplies 
during the strike. Sani invited “veterans” and “citizens” to enlist in special corps 
“for the exclusive interest of the country”, in the name of the same “patriotism” 
that they had shown during the war. 31 Sani’s words are particularly interesting, as 
they indicate a substantial overlap between external and internal enemies. 
The establishment of civilian-government cooperation initiatives stemmed
from joint bottom-up and top-down efforts. Patriotic associations dedicated to 
strikebreaking and work replacement were autonomously mushrooming through-
out the country. These included the Permanent Committee for National Defence 
in Vicenza, 32 the National Alliance in Venice, the Alliance of City Defence in 
Florence, the Association of Volunteers for Public Services in Rome, the Associa-
tion for Social Renewal and Defence led by future Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi 
in Mantua and, as we will see, the Association of Social Defence in Bologna and 
the Committee of Civil Organisation in Milan. 33 These largely spontaneous forms 
of mobilisation had several points in common with the government’s outlook and 
actions. While the postal and railway workers strike was still going on, Nitti sent 
the umpteenth circular letter explaining how to manage the protesters and enforce 
law and order. The prime minister exhorted prefects to “try to encourage a spirit 
of resistance in all kinds of forms”. He added that 
Citizens in the first place must resist abuses. If people understand the dangers 
of the present situation, then they have the duty to organise themselves and 
react. Repression can be avoided only if resistance increases. I approve any-
thing people do in response to excessive strikes, as far as people do not want 
to merely react.34 
As Nitti explained, one of the main reasons for preventing and, if necessary, 
repressing strikes lay in the weakness of the Italian economic system, still largely 
subject to foreign imports and credits. 
It is no surprise then, that what were, for certain sectors of the middle classes
and for the authorities, manifestations of patriotism in a collaborative and col-
lective effort to preserve peace and order, for socialist organisations were mere
acts of strikebreaking and reaction. According to the Socialist Party’s newspa-
per L’Avanti!, the capitalist bourgeoisie, the government, the conservative press
and the bourgeois parties were all working together to call for “the support of
self-styled citizens of order to restore public services”. These “so-called citi-
zens” were invited to act as crumiri. Some of them, the “daddy’s boys”, “stu-
dents” and other “loafers by definition”, were deployed for work replacement,
substituting for rubbish collectors, stokers and tramway drivers, often ineffi-
ciently or unsafely. Others, the newspaper claimed, the more “violent men”,
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The January 1920 strike in many ways paved the way for new forms of bour-
geois mobilisation. From then onwards, civilian volunteering in the case of a strike 
had two forms. On the one side, there was the defence of public order through the 
organisation of units of armed volunteer auxiliary police with the aim of support-
ing and assisting ordinary state police and military forces. On the other side, the 
mobilisation of citizens responded to the imperative of securing public services, 
from train and tram services to sanitation, food supplies and street lighting. Strike-
breaking practices and volunteer work replacement were, therefore, considered 
vital to the defence of the social fabric and public order, along with more direct 
and confrontational forms of repressive intervention. These attitudes mirrored 
deep-seated and long-standing outlooks and political cultures in large sectors of 
the Italian middle classes. 
Loss of support 
Faced with the perceived threat of complete disruption to the foundations of 
the social order, various sectors of Milan civil society established a Committee 
of Civil Organisation ( Comitato di organizzazione civile) in January 1920. The 
committee was an “association based on the principles of order and aimed to 
fight any kind of social movement acting against the principle of state author-
ity and social peace and preventing public services from operating”. It fostered 
inter-class cooperation to prevent social struggle and, at the same time, claimed 
to help “the poorest people”. It gathered together veteran groups, monarchical 
and liberal clubs, professional associations of shopkeepers and tenants, industrial 
associations and Benito Mussolini’s  Fasci di combattimento.36 Following the 
great postal and railway workers’ strike in January 1920, the committee “organ-
ised and provided personnel to replace workers on strike”37 and became the main 
“reservoir” of patriotic citizens from which volunteers could be recruited. On 19 
February 1920, the prefect of Milan, Angelo Pesce, put out a call to raise a corps 
of “Volunteers of Order”. Their aim would be to cooperate with police forces 
to prevent and repress crimes against “persons and properties” and so quash 
the wave of criminality that was plaguing the city, also as a consequence of the 
continuous social disorder. Both private citizens and patriotic associations could 
apply to become volunteers. All members would be armed with “revolvers or 
rifles”, and those without “gun licences” were provided with “special authori-
sations”. The volunteers were to be organised under the command and respon-
sibility of police officers. Although open to “upright and courageous citizens 
belonging to any social class and political party”, the volunteers received no 
remuneration and were to patrol the streets in their spare time, so that despite 
claims of inter-class cooperation, it is somewhat doubtful that the working class 
played any part in the initiative.38 The prefect’s proposal was warmly received 
by employers, patriotic associations and politicians.39 The newspaper Corriere 
della Sera enthusiastically welcomed his commitment to fighting crime and saw 
in it a prelude to the establishment of a real “city militia [milizia comunale]” 
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ordinary police forces.40 Others agreed: a private citizen asked the prefect to 
create a “corps of Citizens’ Patrols, like those operating in other cities”. 41 As we 
will see in the last section, these references to militias and Citizens’ Patrols are 
not accidental. 
Although the Volunteers had the approval of the local bourgeoisie, the prefect’s 
initiative immediately provoked the opposition of Milan’s socialist mayor, Emilio 
Caldara. In Caldara’s view the Volunteers were a serious threat: “in an atmosphere 
of passion and high tension [elettricità]”, in which people continuously “fire 
revolver or rifle shots”, arming volunteer citizens and giving them “the authority 
to use weapons” was an extreme danger in itself, not to mention a serious embar-
rassment to “the authority of the state”. The creation of the Volunteers, Caldara 
prophesied, would mean “the reactionary elements, who had carried out the most 
provocative strikebreaking actions during working-class agitations, will be able 
to get a foot in the door of the state police”. This, Caldara concluded, might result 
in “civil war”. In linking the activities of the Volunteers with those of strikebreak-
ers, Caldara was not simply resorting to the usual socialist argumentation but was 
stressing the crucial role that the newly established militia would play in social 
conflicts and, therefore, their implicit partiality. 42 Just a few days after the calls for 
volunteers to enlist had been put out, Minister of Justice Mortara aligned himself 
with Caldara’s positions. In fact, given the strong presence of an “anti-socialist 
party” in Milan, Mortara feared that direct, institutional support for the recruit-
ment of volunteers would have severe political repercussions for the government. 
At the same time, loyal to his long-lasting commitment to recruiting auxiliary 
volunteers, Mortara invited Pesce to leave these sorts of initiatives to private citi-
zens and associations, so that the government would not be deemed accountable 
for their actions.43 This is a crucial turning point in the attitude of the government. 
Without formally delegating a portion of the state monopoly to recognised private 
organisations, but by simply turning a blind eye to forms of vigilantism, Mortara 
only unleashed forms of organised private violence against the so-called subver-
sives. The consequences would be felt for a long time. 
The need to maintain good relations with Milan’s moderate and reformist social-
ist city administration eventually obliged the government to appoint a new prefect 
to replace Angelo Pesce. 44 His successor, Enrico Flores, nevertheless pursued the 
same policy of collaboration with the city’s patriotic forces as his predecessor had 
done. In June 1920, it was again an impending railway-workers’ strike that pushed 
the government to look for the collaboration and support of “experienced citizens 
willing to operate in the public interest”.45 Nitti asked prefects to collaborate with 
industrialists and employers, who “are among those most affected by the strike”, 
in order to create “squads of volunteers” to replace the striking railway workers. 
Moreover, the support of “citizens willing to cooperate with the authorities to 
enforce law and order” was extremely welcome as long as they remained under 
the orders of police officials, Nitti concluded. 46 
In Milan, prefect Flores soon started organising “squads of volunteers” to serve 
both as replacement workers and as “armed squads” to protect infrastructures, 
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local patriotic associations under the auspices of government directives was frus-
trated by political qualms and perplexity. On 17 June, just three days after issuing 
his first order, the national chief of police, Vincenzo Quaranta, urged the prefect to 
avoid establishing a “special corps of volunteers to support the police forces” as it 
was deemed politically compromising for political authorities to take full respon-
sibility for the action. Again, Quaranta suggested not giving “official character to 
the institution” of the volunteers and “letting private citizens take the initiative”.48 
Despite advice to the contrary, prefect Flores made further agreements with 
the local military authorities to establish “a civil organisation against popular 
upheavals”. Again, the “civil organisation” would be formed of two branches. A
first group, composed of “elements with technical functions” to be recruited with 
the support of the Regional Federation of Industrialists, would serve as a work-
replacement unit to be deployed in case of “interruption to public services”. A
second group, the “military auxiliaries”, would be in charge of enforcing public 
order under the command of military personnel; all members of this group would 
be armed with regular military rifles. When popular upheavals broke out on 24 
June, a first unit of 200 auxiliaries was recruited.49 As Flores stated, the “use 
of every single piece of civilian energy” and the “spirit of initiative”, shown by 
the city’s “social organisations”, “in support of state powers against any form of 
public disturbance” had been “my first concern since taking office”. The “patrio-
tism”, proof of which the good citizens of Milan had demonstrated during the war, 
had now, according to the prefect, to be redirected in support of “state authority” 
against internal enemies.50 The case of Milan clearly shows how the government’s 
contradictory policies and attitudes towards bourgeois mobilisation contributed to 
create subversive attitudes among the middle classes. 
Milan was not the only city were such dynamics occurred. The Association of 
Social Defence in Bologna is also a somewhat paradigmatic case. It is usually 
analysed by scholars as a forerunner of local fascism,51 although its strikebreaking 
activities have been generally overlooked. Again, this is not to underestimate its 
connections with the first fascist squads in the city, but rather to stress that those 
connections were made possible first and foremost by the common ground of 
anti-strike mobilisation. 
The association’s early origins lay in the spontaneous reaction to a massive 
strike. In April 1920 local trade unions and the Chamber of Labour called a gen-
eral strike in protest at the massacre of Decima di Persiceto (5 April 1920), in 
which eight day labourers were killed and 45 wounded by the Army. The strike 
immediately progressed into an almost complete stoppage of public services and 
factory work, which was on a much wider scale than the railway strike of January. 
Tired of “those who wanted to suppress the most elementary liberties”, a group 
of citizens established a Civic Committee and prepared an exonerating report to 
be presented to the government.52 In the document delivered to Nitti and Quar-
anta, the citizens stated that the recent strike was “the last event in which we are 
prepared to take part without the vigorous engagement of volunteer defence and 
protection”. What made them furious, in particular, was the tolerant attitude of the
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to suffer the “outrageous event of the suspension of public lighting at night”. The 
complete interruption of public services and production was considered danger-
ous not only for economic reasons, but also because “it created a situation of 
anxiety and distress, made worse by the spread of false news (voci fantastiche)”. 
Panic also spread as soon as the workers at the city bake-house went on strike, as 
they were immediately accused of starving children. “What else should we wait 
for”, clamoured one of the leaders of the committee, “no bread can be bought”, 
“the city has been in darkness for three nights”, “trains have stopped”, there is “no 
mail”, “no sanitation”.53 
In the face of such a state of affairs, the report condemned the change in gov-
ernment policy: “not having been invited to give a show of civilian resistance”,
as in the past, the “citizens” had no other option than to organise themselves. 54 
Faced with the government’s impotence, many citizens started to think they would
exercise their natural right of “self-defence”. If the good citizens had so far been
“trustful in the very concept of liberty” and “had yielded to the government their
means of defence”, now these means had to be “created by ourselves”, the commit-
tee declared.55 According to the supporters of the Civic Committee, the rise of “civil
conscience” was first and foremost because of their “loss of confidence” in govern-
ment action.56 As soon as the report spread across the city, conservative and social-
ist newspapers alike spoke of the return of the so-called pattuglioni (big patrols),57 
although the committee deemed this a “fantasy”.58 As we will see, the pattuglioni
referred to were vigilante formations which had been organised in the pre-war
period and had clear connections with the Citizens’ Patrols, a long-established mili-
tia that had been cooperating with police forces in patrolling the streets of the city
since the early nineteenth century. The issue reached parliament, where the socialist
member Lionello Grossi asked the government to explain why a “Committee of
citizens in Bologna” wanted to create “organisations with the same duties as those
of the State, including those of armed police”. The answer from the under-secretary
for home affairs was telling: while he excluded any informal or formal authorisation
by the government, “civilian volunteering . . . responded to a free and fully legal
individual activity” that the government had to protect from interference.59 
Established in June 1920, the Association of Social Defence represented the 
institutionalisation of these first forms of civilian mobilisation. Its statute clearly 
stated the aims and objectives of the association: “to cooperate . . . in continuing 
absolutely necessary public services in case of major general or partial strikes, 
thus making the authorities’ tasks easier”. Strikes were not to be banned, but the 
freedom to work had to be secured along with the “freedom to strike”, the only 
“exception” being public service strikes, which had to be absolutely outlawed 
and repressed.60 In the following months, the association was involved in mul-
tiple propagandistic activities as well as concrete strikebreaking mobilisation. In 
November 1920, for example, the association created a substitute urban public 
transport service using lorries supplied by local employers and agricultural entre-
preneurs to be deployed in case of strike.61 
Feelings of betrayal and disdain towards the government did not change when 
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June 1920. In July 1920, the association warned that if the prefect did not prevent 
a socialist rally from taking place, the “healthiest segments of the citizens would 
rise up and act in self-defence” against the enemies of “social coexistence”.62 In 
October, an implicit threat was made by several members of the association and 
local politicians: they repeatedly stated that in the name of “self-defence” they 
were ready to react against the “State within the State” represented by socialist 
local administrations. That these were not just words soon became clear. In a 
memorandum to the authorities, the leaders of the association publicly stated that 
their aim was to gather, “always in arms, and always together”, all those men who 
were ready to “defend with any means our principles and our sacred right”.63 On 
at least one occasion, in November 1920, members of the nationalist paramilitary 
formation, Sempre pronti (Always Ready), guarded the premises of the associa-
tion.64 To bolster their propaganda efforts and even their strikebreaking activities, 
in September the association decided to hire a group of “300 young men, to be 
armed”.65 The association also made contact with the local fascists led by former 
anarchist Leandro Arpinati, although it, is unlikely they recruited any of them. The 
local black-shirts soon assumed a role as the armed wing of fearful citizens. As 
many historians have reconstructed it, the Association of Social Defence in some 
way paved the way for the full development of local fascism, which found spaces 
of initiative and a broad consensus for its violent and brutal methods among 
wide sectors of the respectable bourgeoisie. The so-called massacre of Palazzo 
D’Accursio, in which fascist action squads from Bologna, Ferrara and other cit-
ies of the Po Valley provoked a series of incidents and violent confrontations on 
the day Bologna’s new socialist administration was inaugurated (21 November 
1920), left 11 people dead: ten socialist militants and one nationalist councillor, 
Giulio Giordani, who quickly rose to become a “fascist martyr”. According to 
the national chief of police, the event was the starting point of a process of legal 
and illegal dismantling of socialist presence in the economic, political and social 
life of the province and, more generally, the beginning of a mass campaign of 
destruction carried out by fascist squads throughout northern and central Italy in 
the months to come.66 
Long-lasting self-defence of the bourgeoisie 
As the examples cited have shown, strikes were not merely economic manifesta-
tions but a genuine obsession and a real nightmare for large segments of the
Italian middle classes. The Association of Civil Defence’s report clearly out-
lined the true panic that strikes aroused. References to dark cities without public 
lighting, dark hospitals where patients were left without care, fathers unable to 
feed hungry children, the spread of false news that “nobody can confirm”, con-
jured powerful images of a social order shaken to its foundations.67 The very 
same Volunteers of Order in Milan were (allegedly) established to counter the 
spread of crime that was making the city unsafe. Right-wing newspapers, civilian 
associations and state authorities alike used highly politicised and almost apoca-
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preservation” in order to “eradicate once and for all the evil tree” of criminality, 
claimed prefect Pesce.68 Mortara, in urging prefects to organise corps of volun-
teers, contrasted the efforts of “honest citizens” with the “wild aggression” of 
subversives.69 
While Italian authorities did not underestimate the potential threat represented 
by the strike wave that hit the country in the immediate post-war months, they 
probably failed to fully grasp what the strikes, disorder and protests represented 
for “honest citizens” and certainly failed to appreciate the lack of trust held by 
these good bourgeois citizens in how the state was dealing with the increasing 
social conflicts. This contributed to a significant underestimation of the inherent 
psychological and emotional power of the strikes. Those involving public ser-
vices, in particular, were seen as a threat to the entire foundation of society, not 
only because their supposed aim was to ignite revolution, but also because they 
prevented the orderly functioning of society and caused a waste of public money. 
Behind the interruption of the electricity supply, many saw the spread of crimi-
nality in dark cities; behind the stoppage of local trains and tramways, a blow to 
individual freedom of movement; behind the strike of municipal bakeries, a threat 
to children and the sanctity of the family; behind the strike of agricultural day 
labourers, the first step towards collectivisation and a threat to national wealth. 
Such fears could not simply be considered propagandistic claims; they in fact mir-
rored deep-seated political cultures and outlooks that made it almost impossible to 
see strikes anything other than clashes of “civilisation”. 
Faced with what they believed was an impending revolution, local associations 
and committees and state authorities spoke of the necessity for “self-defence”. 
Self-defence soon became a social imperative, totally unrelated to the very rigor-
ous and limited specimens of criminal law. 70 Referring to popularised versions of 
the social contract and natural law doctrines, honourable citizens always insisted 
on their right to defend themselves where the state failed to provide protection and 
defence. In a letter to the local prefect, the Association for Social Defence spoke 
of the need to act in “self-defence against the wounded dignity” of “citizens”.71 
An article in the conservative newspaper Il Progresso was even more explicit: 
in the same way the Law forbids individuals to use weapons, but allows it for 
legitimate self-defence, so, too, should the community be allowed legitimate 
self-defence. The bourgeoisie, stifled by insane and criminal people, see their 
own existence as being in great danger. . . . They have not only the right but 
the duty to resist and fight.72 
Mortara himself – despite his legal education and his position as a senior
magistrate – stated that “using weapons” in cases of major strike was a “form of 
self-defence to protect the homeland (Patria) and civilisation against any wild 
aggression”.73 
Undoubtedly, the deep political crisis that affected Italy in the aftermath of the 
Great War was largely the result of huge problems inherited from the war period. 
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continuities with the pre-war period emerge. The introduction of the 1889 Penal 
Code recognised workers as having both the right to strike and the right to work. 
After some years in which the code was not substantially implemented in terms 
of concrete protection of workers’ rights, Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti intro-
duced a new policing policy based on state neutrality in social conflicts. There 
were, however, significant exceptions. Pasquale Arena, a professor of law, claimed 
in 1908 that the state should act according to the “holy right of self-defence” and 
use both repression and replacement workers in response to public service strikes. 
“No one can deny the state the opportunity to ban public service strikes in order to 
defend its own existence”, stated his colleague Guglielmo Sabatini.74 
Continuities also emerged in terms of actual practices of civilian mobilisa-
tion. Throughout the chapter we have seen that in Bologna, in particular, but 
also in Milan, patriotic citizens or organisations referred several times to patrols 
or pattuglioni (i.e. big patrols). The terms come from a very specific institution 
particular to Bologna, the so-called Citizens’ Patrols ( Pattuglie cittadine ). Estab-
lished in 1827, under papal rule, the Patrols were intended to support local police 
forces in patrolling the streets at night, a task they retained after Italian unifica-
tion. Although largely ineffective and disorganised, they nevertheless represented 
an institutional opportunity for the grouping of bourgeois reaction during the 
major strikes of 1906 and 1908 and again during the so-called Red Week of 1914. 
The pattuglioni were in fact groups of “good citizens” which took to the streets 
shoulder to shoulder with members of the Citizens’ Patrols, forming indeed “big 
patrols”. They performed strikebreaking tasks, which soon degenerated into vigi-
lante activities. They made arrests and carried out searches autonomously and on 
one occasion tried to destroy the local Chamber of Labour. 75 
In the new and highly conflictual context of the immediate post-war years, it is
interesting that references were made to Patrols and pattuglioni to justify legitimised
forms of strikebreaking and vigilantism. According to the conservative, but pro-
government, newspaper,  Il resto del Carlino, the Association of Social Defence had
tried to resurrect the pattuglioni of 15 years earlier. True “liberal consciousness”,
the newspaper claimed, “rejects this: it rejects this because it is against the very
conception of state authority and the modern state”.76 Others, in contrast, whole-
heartedly praised the re-establishment of pattuglioni as the sole and unique reaction
against impotent authorities.77 The “myth” of the Patrols helped place the new phe-
nomenon of fascist  squadrismo within a longer tradition of civilian mobilisation 
and violence. Writing a few weeks after the March on Rome, a semi-unknown law
scholar, Ettore Vulterini, resorted to the example of the Citizens’ Patrols (“a private
armed corps”) in Bologna to justify the violent actions perpetrated by fascist squads.
According to Vulterini, to save the state and social order, citizens had the right to
organise themselves and, weapons in hands, to react against “delinquency and
thugs”. This was what citizens in Bologna had done as members of the Patrols 
and the pattuglioni before the war and immediately after the end of the conflict, and
what fascists had done in more recent times, Vulterini sustained. Such forms of 
self-organisation were considered a fully legitimate reaction to mortal threats to 
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By looking at the interplay and mutual relationships between state authorities 
and patriotic associations through the lens of armed voluntarism, this chapter has 
highlighted the crucial role played by strikebreaking in radicalising the social 
struggle and making private intervention a fully legitimised course of action. 
The persistence of patterns, experiences and models, for example in terms of the 
debate on state intervention in public service strikes or anti-strike activities, made 
post-war strikebreaking a plausible, thinkable and ultimately legitimate course 
of action. 
Mortara’s and Nitti’s attempts to involve “honest citizens” in the defence of 
order and “civilisation” was a huge political gamble. However, this did not nec-
essarily represent a dismissal on the part of the Italian authorities of the state 
monopoly on physical violence. As many scholars have shown, forms of coopera-
tion between legal authorities and good citizens precisely in the case of major 
strikes were common throughout Europe, both before and after the Great War. 79 
However, civilian mobilisation in Italy took on quite strong vigilante implica-
tions, as the recurrent references to self-defence testimony. 80 Members of the 
Association of Social Defence or the Committee of Civil Organisation were not 
hotheads or ultra-reactionary mobs; they were men wholly concerned with the 
need to restore order and the correct functioning of society and the economy 
disrupted by strikes and popular upheavals. While they wanted to restore law and 
order and strengthen state authority, their very existence was the consequence of 
a derogation from the principle of state monopoly on physical violence. We have 
seen that Nitti’s and Mortara’s instructions, as well as those given by prefects at 
the local level, clearly testify to an acknowledgement of the state’s prerogative 
to have exclusive and full control over the civilian volunteers. However, this pre-
rogative could in many cases be ignored in the light of contradictory instructions 
and political opportunism, as happened in Milan after Mayor Caldara’s protests. 
This had the effect of paving the way for forms of autonomous mobilisation by 
“honourable citizens”, completely outside state control and legitimisation. After 
all, calling for the support of patriotic citizens was a risky political gamble: if the 
state was strong, credible and legitimised, then both state authorities and private 
citizens would feel themselves part of the same community of destiny; if the state 
was de-legitimised and there was a wide discrepancy between rulers and civil 
society, then a call for help and support would be perceived as a sign of weakness 
and would encourage vigilante (i.e. anti-state) initiatives. What is paradoxical 
is that Nitti and other government officers justified their contradictory attitude 
towards supporting civilian mobilisation in the name of political impartiality, 
electoral opportunism and, ultimately, respect for the state’s role as a neutral and 
impartial mediator in social conflicts. It was this perceived betrayal in the name 
of democratic and liberal principles (no matter how opportunistic they might 
be) that pushed the now mobilised “honest citizens” to go it alone, precisely in 
the name of self-defence. In the face of a weak state and an impending socialist 
threat, breaking the law was the only way, they believed, to restore law and order. 
It was in the grey zone between the defence of public order and fears of subver-
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This does not mean, however, that the ultimate convergence of these “good
citizens” into fascism was inevitable. The contradictory attitudes of the political
elites towards the involvement of private citizens in public order and strikebreaking
tasks helped shed light on the difficulties the liberal elites encountered in finding
a credible balance between order and freedom in times of rapid social and politi-
cal change. The political system was “incapable of answering citizens’ requests
for change but nevertheless capable of preserving and reproducing itself”.81 Nitti’s
attempt to involve private citizens in the defence of the state was just the last stage in
a long and conflictual relationship between the Italian state and its “loyal classes”.
In the context of the liberal state’s enduring crisis of legitimisation, solutions were
extremely hard to find, if they might be found at all. In a speech in 1914, Alfredo
Rocco, a law scholar and future minister of justice during the fascist dictatorship,
spoke of the necessity to substitute “state protection” with “private defence”. “The
private intervenes”, Rocco argued, “when the State has broken down. . . . Therefore,
what should be condemned is not private defence in itself but the return of the State
to past eras of juridical evolution”.82 In the light of these words, we may won-
der whether the involvement of private citizens in public functions might have had
some chance of success in strengthening the shaken legitimacy of the liberal state.
Nitti’s gamble was an attempt to bring the country out of political stalemate. In 
the end, all it did was open a Pandora’s box. Paradoxically, the fragile legitimacy of
the liberal state was ultimately destroyed by neither popular upheaval nor the con-
sequences of full democratisation but by those forces mobilised to oppose them. 
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 15 Conclusion 
Strikebreaking and the fault lines 
of mass society, 1880–1930 
Martin Conway 
History is often best viewed from the margins. That would certainly seem to be 
true of the forms of strikebreaking that occurred in the half-century from the 1880s 
to the 1930s. As the fascinating studies contained in this collection demonstrate, 
strikebreaking – and the myriad activities associated with it – were a pervasive 
feature of the many societies which experienced disruptive economic transforma-
tions, along with consequent social upheavals and crises of state authority, across 
the globe in this period. And yet as the novelty of this collection equally indicates, 
it is not a phenomenon which until recently has attracted sustained attention from 
historians.1 
Part of the explanation of this neglect lies in the simple difficulty of recover-
ing its history from the archival record. As a number of the contributors to this 
volume remark, the activities of strikebreakers, of company trade unions, of vol-
unteer vigilante groups and of groups committed to the defence of the freedom 
of honest workers (and, more especially, of employers) are an elusive histori-
cal subject. This was partly by design. Those operating on the edges of legality 
and illegality preferred to keep a low profile, often changing their location and 
identity with rather bewildering frequency. But it also reflects the discontinuous 
history of instances of strikebreaking. They were, in every sense, circumstantial 
phenomena, the transient character of which reflected the episodic nature of the 
strike or other incident that had caused them to come into existence. The his-
tory of labour relations is a notoriously challenging subject of research, which 
demands a close familiarity with the complexities of workplace structures, that 
is rendered all the more challenging by frequent gaps in the archival documenta-
tion.2 But that difficulty is all the greater when one is dealing with the actions of 
those whose effectiveness often relied on their evasion of responsibility. Those 
who instigated confrontations with strikers or pickets, intimidated smallholders 
with threats of violence or recruited replacement labour to break an industrial 
dispute, left little by way of paper records and have to be glimpsed through the 
allegations of their opponents, or the often one-sided accounts provided by news-
papers or state authorities. 
This is all the more so when the actions of the strikebreakers and their allies 
occurred in distant, often marginal, locations. Disputes in mines and on rural 
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and still more on the ships of the Messageries sailing from Marseille to the Far 
East occurred out of sight of a mass public, or the visibility provided by press cov-
erage. Moreover, even when the actions of strikebreakers occurred in more acces-
sible locations, as in the case of the strikes in the ports of colonial-era Bengal, or 
the tobacco factories of Cairo or Athens, they remained opaque events, in which 
much about their genesis and true dynamics was hidden from view. The actions of 
strikebreakers and their allies consequently flit across the historical record, lack-
ing the legibility and continuity of their socialist or communist opponents, or of 
the police or state authorities. 
To these archival difficulties are added the relative anonymity of the actors 
themselves. There were few outstanding figures in the ranks of the strikebreakers, 
the volunteer civilian guards and the short-lived employers’ associations, which 
proliferated in the early years of the twentieth century. The media celebrity tran-
siently enjoyed by strikebreaking gang leaders in late Wilhelmine Germany was 
in this respect the exception to the rule; but even they were less significant in 
themselves than for the way in which the press attention given to their activities 
served as a means of giving voice to wider fears about criminality and the fragil-
ity of the legal order. Much more commonplace was the way that many of these 
anti-socialist activists and self-declared defenders of freedom proved to be oppor-
tunists, publicists and in a good number of cases simple rogues and criminals, 
whose grand rhetorical posturing belied the emphatically self-interested nature 
of their actions. Of course, in some contexts, the struggle against organised trade 
unionism and revolutionary socialism drew in more significant political forces, 
such as the nascent right-wing nationalist groups in Russia in the first decade 
of the twentieth century, or the communal politicians of interwar Bengal. But, 
as the studies in this collection demonstrate, these were essentially marriages of 
convenience that disintegrated as political circumstances changed. The history of 
strikebreaking in its manifold local forms was much more generally populated 
by a repertoire of figures of secondary importance, whose efforts at economic 
or political entrepreneurism, and unoriginal manipulation of rather empty slo-
gans, served to display the opportunism of men – and they were overwhelmingly 
men – seeking to gain advantage from the rapidly changing winds of social and 
economic circumstance.3 
And what was true of the leaders was of course even more true of the rank and 
file. The replacement workforces recruited during industrial disputes to work in 
Egyptian cigarette factories, to unload ships in the port of Calcutta, or to staff the 
boiler rooms and kitchens of the ships of the Messageries, remain for the most 
part obstinately anonymous in the archival records. At most, we can occasionally 
detect their confessional or ethnic character: foreign workers brought in to replace 
those on strike, but whose value and reliability for their employers rarely proved 
to be especially durable. These “scabs” – to use the offensive term of abuse invari-
ably thrown at them in a multitude of linguistic variants – were the mute foot 
soldiers of these social disputes, imprisoned within the negative social resonances 
of community betrayal and the most basic motives of economic opportunism 
imputed to them by those on the other side of the picket lines.4 Those who broke 











movements, the scab worker was always the opposite against which they defined 
their ethics of commitment, and more especially of kinship with their fellow strik-
ers and union militants.5 
The most profound cause of the marginalisation of strikebreaking in the history 
of the era is however perhaps not so much archival as historiographical. For all 
of the mediocrity of its actors and the litany of failed ventures and broken lives 
which it left behind it, strikebreaking had a global ubiquity and a scale which 
demands attention. And yet it sits uneasily within the established paradigms of 
the history of the era as one of globalisation, projects of political revolution, and 
mass warfare on an unprecedented scale. Amidst the tall trees of the emergence of 
a global economy, world war and the powerful surges in revolutionary socialism, 
it is tempting to regard strikebreaking as of no more than anecdotal significance, 
part of the undergrowth generated by other more powerful forces. This is perhaps 
especially so, given the dominant political template that is often applied to the 
era from the emergence of mass politics in the 1880s, through the revolutionary 
transitions of the early decades of the twentieth century to the bitter conflicts 
generated by the Great Depression of the 1930s. This template implicitly accords 
priority to the forces of the left in the social and political conflicts of the final 
years of the nineteenth century, and the first two decades of the twentieth century. 6 
Consequently, historians of the early twentieth century have, on the whole, been 
more preoccupied by the actions and motivations of those who went on strike, 
demonstrated or even marched on the citadels of state power, than those who 
remained loyal to the established structures of economic and political authority. 7 
But the same is also true of the subsequent development during the 1920s and 
1930s of movements of the extreme right. The historiography of the right has long 
neglected the continuity of cultures of conservatism to focus on the specifically 
political and ideological dynamics of fascism, which within a few years propelled 
this new form of politics to the centre of state power. 8 
And yet as much recent work on left revolution and extreme-right counter-
revolution in this era has served to elucidate, these instances of political success 
and failure were above all products of contexts that were much more than political 
in nature. Movements of left and right gained their definition and momentum less 
through their own actions than through the way that they were moulded by the 
complex interaction of economic, social and institutional forces that were specific 
to the contexts of place and time.9 This localising of historical perspectives chal-
lenges the generalisations inherent to phraseology such as “the Russian Revolu-
tion of 1917”, or “the rise of Italian Fascism” or of German Nazism and brings to 
the fore instead the irreducible diversity of the local contexts out of which they 
arose. Rather than a zero-sum game of the victory of one political force at the 
expense of the other, political outcomes were defined by the economic ruptures, 
social conflicts and challenges to state authority, out of which they arose. 10
 *** 
It is within this context-specific perception of European and global history of the 
era from the 1880s to the 1930s that strikebreaking and related activities acquire 
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particularities of place and time; and yet all demonstrate, too, the prevalence of 
a broader pattern of social, economic and institutional conflict. This is revealed 
above all by their remarkable synchronicity. The specific nature of the events 
was highly varied and not in any meaningful sense interconnected. And yet it is 
striking that the same chronologies return again and again within the individual 
chapters: the new forces of mass socialist organisation and trade unionism took 
shape in the 1880s, prompting a new era of labour militancy over the subsequent 
years, notably in key industries and public services, which reached an initial peak 
in the general strikes that occurred in many locations during the first decade of the 
twentieth century. 11 The fears (and hopes) that these generated of a wider social 
and political explosion were initially deferred by the outbreak of war in 1914. 
But they returned all the more intensely during the crescendo of state collapse, 
economic and ethnic conflicts and political polarisation that occurred in the era of 
military demobilisation (and political remobilisations) that accompanied the end 
of the formal military conflict in 1917–18 and continued to reverberate power-
fully into the post-war years.12 
The various forms of strikebreaking, volunteer vigilantism and semi-formal 
and informal acts of violence that multiplied across this period were direct, often 
jagged, manifestations of the conflicts that characterised this most chaotic era 
of global modernisation. They owed little to central direction, as the failure of 
the various attempts at federating vigilante groups within a national framework 
demonstrated, at least until Mussolini’s partial unification of the  squadristi groups 
within his Fascist movement in Italy in 1920–21.13 But they were all closely tied 
to the highly disruptive – and on occasions traumatic – impact of capitalist eco-
nomic transformations. The emergence of long-distance global marketplaces, sen-
sitive to all of the vagaries inherent to the circumstances of production as well as 
to shifts in demand, led to booms and crashes in the prices of basic commodi-
ties (including land) as well as of manufactured or semi-manufactured goods. 
Their impact was reinforced by the rapid pace of technological changes, which 
abruptly rendered craft-based processes of production obsolete, while creating 
new commercial opportunities for machine-based mass production. But they were 
exacerbated too by the volatility of stock-market prices and more especially of a 
banking sector, to which many individuals and companies were heavily indebted. 
The consequence was an economic context in which nothing could be regarded as 
certain, and where the exploitation of advantage, or at least the averting of disas-
ter, depended on moving swiftly, and often ruthlessly. 
These processes of change were directly visible in the patterns of strikebreak-
ing which occurred. It was in sectors such as railways, ports or shipping, where 
time was everything, and the ability of workers to exploit their power to block 
trade was often most tangible, that the incentive was greatest for employers to 
resort to direct action. Strikers had to removed, by force if necessary, and replaced 
by those who as a consequence of their dependence would be more reliably qui-
escent.14 But in other sectors too, notably mining and iron and steel production, 
as well as the commercial exploitation of agriculture, many of the same forms 







the possibilities to exploit whatever transient leverage they possessed to demand 
higher rates of pay, less oppressive working conditions or the dismissal of unpop-
ular foremen or managers. In response employers resorted to a wide repertoire 
of techniques to reinforce labour discipline, including the intimidation of union 
organisers or political militants, the recruitment of factory guards and the procur-
ing of the services of groups of vigilantes or local members of the bourgeoisie. 
Direct physical conflict was never far away and was reinforced by the relatively 
easy availability in many locations of the guns and pistols being produced in 
unprecedented volumes by the small-arms industry. The consequence was a new 
militancy among employers. Convincing themselves they were confronted by 
the danger of a socialist revolution, they acted with more individual force within 
and without the law, but also with more collective resolve, creating sectoral and 
national federations to protect their interests and to make their voices heard in the 
arenas of state decision making. 
The state was the third element in this volatile relationship of forces. Far from 
acting as the neutral arbiter between the interests of workers and employers, the 
state at its various hierarchical levels generally opted to side with the employ-
ers in the interest of the maintenance of economic production, or the wider and 
less tangible goal of the defence of the social order. Thus, the state authorities 
in tsarist Russia or colonial Bengal, but also in Wilhelmine Germany, deployed 
their judicial and administrative powers to prosecute union activists or deport 
them to distant locations, as well as using the uniformed ranks of the police, the 
national guard or gendarmerie, or in extremis the army, to break picket lines, 
protect replacement workers or forcibly clear agricultural day labourers off the 
land. The state was, however, rarely a reliable guarantor of social order and eco-
nomic peace. The growth of modern police forces was too recent, their skills and 
resources too limited, and the willingness of populations to accept their authority 
too uncertain, for the state to be able to exercise its writ without challenge. More-
over, state officials were too jealous of their self-image as the impartial guardians 
of the national or public interest to rush too readily or visibly to act as the lackeys 
of the employers in an industrial dispute.15 A certain prudence, reinforced by the 
lobbying of elected Social Democratic officials, led policemen and army officers 
to hold back, notably in various areas of Austria-Hungary, from the unrestrained 
deployment of the forces of order. Consequently employers and landowners were 
obliged to appeal for the assistance of a wide range of less formal groups. This 
was the era of civil leagues, bourgeois associations, and after the First World War, 
of military reservists, Freikorps and squadristi, transferring their mentalities and 
practices of the defence of order from the military sphere to the town squares, fac-
tory gates and agricultural estates, of the post-war world. 
Strikebreaking was therefore never a specific form of action, but a shorthand 
expression for the much larger reality of an era when economic power was fiercely 
challenged, contested and defended. The phenomenon was neither universal nor 
continuous. On the contrary, it tended to come to the fore at moments of economic 
crisis and along the fault lines of economic change, at the nodes constituted by 
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distant from more long-established locations of industry and of state authority – 
the wild west and the wild east of the global economy. But the underlying reality 
was everywhere the same, as was demonstrated by the multiplication of forms 
of vigilantism and paramilitary mobilisation which occurred in Catalonia, in the 
provinces of northern Italy and across the post-imperial territories of central-
eastern Europe in the years following 1918. 
It is this pervasiveness which also explains to a large degree why it came to an 
end. The forms of action analysed in this volume never went away. They contin-
ued through the prolonged economic depression of the 1930s and returned again 
in the 1970s and 1980s, most notably during the bitter Miners’ Strike of 1984–85 
in Britain. Moreover the authority of the state to regulate social and economic 
order was directly challenged through the actions of Resistance groups and trade 
unions in liberated Europe during the mid-1940s, and amidst the social upheavals 
of the later 1960s.16 But there was something distinctly different about these later 
practices. They operated within a structure of industrial relations which, though 
it certainly did not exclude the use of force and the infiltration and subversion of 
trade unions by employers and the state, was much more institutionalised, and 
on the whole predictable. Unions and employers alike had been drawn into a 
structure of corporatist negotiation, with each other and with the state, which had 
blunted the frontal confrontations that had taken place during the early twenti-
eth century. 17 In large part, this evolution was the consequence of changes in 
the structure of capitalism, which at least in the economies of the Global North 
had replaced individual structures of ownership with joint-stock companies, in 
which financial institutions often had the predominant influence. The obstinate 
individualism and preoccupation with short-term profit maximisation, which had 
long hindered attempts at coordination among employers gave way to the more 
cautious and corporate mentality of a professionalised class of managers. Only 
when this attitude changed once again in response to the economic crisis of the 
1970s, and the dissemination of neo-liberal ideologies of the market, did employ-
ers revert to much more direct attacks on the authority of trade unions, including 
a return to the use of alternative labour forces, and the partisan deployment of the 
police in industrial disputes.18 
The role of the state too had changed. The improvised and fragile forces of law 
and order evident in the early decades of the twentieth century were replaced by 
much more professionalised and better resourced police forces, at least in Europe, 
that could confront most challenges to their authority without recourse to large-
scale violence. Nor were they challenged so directly. The stateless societies that 
developed in some areas of Spain during the early period of the Civil War in 
1936–37, and more generally across many areas of occupied and liberated Europe 
during the latter years of the Second World War, 19 were the last occasion when 
state authority was swept away within Europe. Thereafter such insurrectionary 
strategies were displaced from Europe to territories such as Palestine and Alge-
ria, where the dwindling power exercised by European powers was contested by 
those imbued with the legitimacy of national liberation.20 Within Europe, but also 












a pragmatic tendency on the part of individuals, communities and interest groups 
to seek their advantage by working within a state-defined regime of legality. 21 The 
mentality of the state, and of those who staffed it, had changed too. The nervous 
concern of state officials to assert their authority at all costs had been replaced by 
a policy – well exemplified in this volume by the case of Sweden – of encouraging 
unions and employers’ organisations to collaborate in a wider process of social 
and economic managerialism. This creation of what Zygmunt Bauman termed 
the “social engineering state”22 was the dominant reality in Western Europe in the 
decades following 1945, creating a technocratic ethos which privileged Keynes-
ian economic management and the construction of an inclusive welfarism over 
the brutal assertions of state power described in this volume.23 
These differences rest on a distinctive Western perspective. In many other 
areas of the world, and perhaps most notably in South Asia and Latin America, 
the direct confrontations described in this volume remained the norm. However, 
the more regulated and legalistic structure of industrial relations that emerged in 
Europe and in a number of other Western economies from the middle decades 
of the twentieth century onwards serves to underline the distinctiveness of the 
era from the 1880s to the 1930s. During that half-century, the volatility of the 
global economy, but also the uncertain relationships of power within it, created a 
potential for violence and conflict that often spilled beyond the formal frontiers of 
industrial disputes. Recent historical research has served to emphasise the impor-
tance of this phenomenon of unstructured violence in the military and political 
spheres. The warfare conducted on the battlefields of the First World War, and its 
many ancillary conflicts, notably in imperial territories, formed merely one part 
of a much more generalised culture of informal military violence which endured 
on a smaller scale in many areas of the world until at least the end of the 1940s. 
Similarly, in politics, the rituals of electoral contests and parliamentary politics 
coexisted with a much wider sphere of informal politics, where practices of 
streetfighting, ethnic violence and social intimidation were commonplace.24 The 
prevalence of strikebreaking and other violent actions within the global economy 
across the same period extends this perspective into the sphere of labour rela-
tions. Thus, by reorientating attention towards the confrontations, social violence, 
and simple chaos that characterised many industrial disputes in these formative 
decades of the twentieth century, this volume brings what had formerly seemed 
marginal or secondary emphatically to the centre of the picture. 
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